Van Matre v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust et al
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff has failed to set forth plausible claims and grants 6 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 8/23/2011. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (skm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
MICHAEL A. VAN MATRE, an
individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-1291
BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH
NATIONAL PENSION TRUST, an
Employee Welfare Benefit Plan; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael A. Van Matre filed this action on November 10, 2010, alleging a
violation of Section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). On January 12, 2011, Defendant Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension
Trust filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. [Doc. No. 6]. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
For the following reasons, the Court agrees with Defendant and GRANTS the motion to dismiss.
I.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states he received a letter dated December 29, 2006, from
Defendant entitled “Notice of Rights of Certain Eligible Participants to Apply for Retroactive Early
Retirement Pension Benefits.” The letter explained that, pursuant to the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004), retroactive early
retirement pension benefits may be available if certain conditions are met. The letter described those
conditions and provided that if an individual believes he or she qualifies for retroactive benefits, the
individual should submit an application for benefits. Believing he met the criteria in the letter,
Plaintiff applied for retroactive benefits.
By letter dated July 2, 2009, Plaintiff’s application was denied. Letter from Richard
Calcara, Executive Administator, to Michael Van Matre (July 2, 2009). The letter addressed the
Heinz decision, which held that “the anti-cutback provision flatly prohibits plans from attaching new
conditions to benefits that an employee has already earned.” 541 U.S. at 747. The Supreme Court
found this prohibition included “amendment[s] expanding the categories of postretirement
employment that trigger suspension of payment of early retirement benefits already accrued.” Id.
at 741.
In the letter, Plaintiff was informed that the Board of Trustees determined that such
a prohibited amendment occurred in 1999, when it expanded the definition of prohibited
employment. Letter from Calcara to Van Matre, at 1. Therefore, under guidance provided by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Fund found it was required to pay retroactive retirement benefits
to certain participants. However, the letter explained that, “[u]nder federal law, a participant is not
eligible to receive pension benefits until they have separated from service.” Id. at 2. The letter
specifically stated the Plan adheres to this requirement in order to preserve its tax-qualified status.
Thus, “any Pension Plan participant who did not separate from service or retire was not a member
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of the two groups to which the IRS required the Fund Office to pay retroactive benefits or to allow
to retroactively elect to commence benefits under Heinz.” Id. at 2 (italics original).
According to the letter, the employees to which retroactive benefits are payable
include those who:
(1) Retired before December 31, 2006, [and] began
receiving pension benefits and whose benefits were
suspended because of the 1999 amendment’s
expanded definition of prohibited employment, or (2)
Separated from service before December 31, 2006,
[and] applied to start receiving pension benefits and
whose applications were denied because they were
engaged in employment that was prohibited as a result
of the 1999 amendment. Participants in this group
(“Group 1”) were entitled to retroactive benefits
because they had their pension benefits either denied
or suspended by the Fund Office.
Id. at 1 (italics original). The Trustees also granted retroactive benefits to those participants,
categorized as “Group 2,” who “after the date the 1999 amendment was adopted, were eligible to
receive benefits under the Pension Plan, but did not apply for or start receiving pension benefits
because they were engaged in employment which was defined as prohibited under the 1999
amendment.” Id. at 2 (italics original).
In addition, the Trustees contemplated an amendment to the Plan which would allow
retroactive early retirement benefits to third group of participants who were ineligible for Heinz
benefits. “Group 3” included those individuals who “were engaged in the type of employment that
was prohibited by the 1999 amendment, did not retire or separate from service prior to December
31, 2006, but might have done so (because they met the age and service requirements) had they
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know that the 1999 amendment was not valid.” Id. (italics original). At the time the Trustees were
considering this amendment, a Notice was sent to participants, including participants in Group 3
because of the uncertainty of whether benefits would be payable to this Group. Ultimately,
however, the Trustees voted against amending the Plan because such retroactive pension benefits
were not expressly approved by the IRS. Id. at 3. In order to help ensure the financial stability of
the Fund, the Trustees rejected granting discretionary benefits to Group 3. Finding that Plaintiff fell
within Group 3 because he “did not retire or separate from service prior to December 31, 2006,” he
was denied retroactive early retirement benefits.
Plaintiff appealed this decision and the matter was presented at a meeting of the
Board of Trustees. By letter dated January 26, 2010, Plaintiff’s appeal was denied. The denial letter
provided that Plaintiff “did not qualify for relief under the IRS’ guidance on Heinz because he did
not separate from service any significant amount of time prior to filing a Pension Application.”
Letter from Richard Calcara, Executive Administrator, to Attorneys Stuart Caldwell and Tom Rodd,
at 1 (Jan. 26, 2010). In addition, the letter stated Plaintiff’s claim was denied because he was
seeking early retirement benefits on grounds not covered by the Plan “and the Trustees declined to
exercise their discretion to amend the Plan document to provide such benefits.” Id. The letter then
quoted several sections of the Plan covering eligibility for early retirement benefits and the
suspension of benefits, and informed Plaintiff he had the right to bring a civil action pursuant to
Section 502(a) of ERISA.
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On November 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court alleging he is
entitled to receive Heinz benefits because he met the test set forth in the “Notice of Rights of Certain
Eligible Participants to Apply for Retroactive Early Retirement Pension Benefits.” Plaintiff points
out that the test set forth in the Notice contained no requirement a participant must retire by
December 31, 2006, and he claims he was denied his rights and benefits under the Plan. Therefore,
Plaintiff requests inter alia that he be awarded such benefits. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s
allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, should be
dismissed. Upon review, the Court agrees with Defendant.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the United States Supreme
Court disavowed the “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),
which was long used to evaluate complaints subject to 12(b)(6) motions. 550 U.S. at 563. In its
place, courts must now look for “plausibility” in the complaint. This standard requires a plaintiff
to set forth the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to relief” that is more than mere “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint
as true (even when doubtful), the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). If the allegations in the complaint, assuming their
truth, do “not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the
point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. at 558 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court explained the
requirements of Rule 8 and the “plausibility standard” in more detail. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court
reiterated that Rule 8 does not demand “detailed factual allegations[.]” 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a mere “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists when a claim contains
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court continued by explaining that,
although factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted).
Whether a plausible claim is stated in a complaint requires a court to conduct a context-specific
analysis, drawing upon the court’s own judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 1950. If the
court finds from its analysis that “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting, in part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The Supreme Court
further articulated that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
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While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Id.1
III.
DISCUSSION
Initially, the Court finds that the December 29, 2006 Notice sent to Plaintiff
informing him that he may be eligible for retroactive benefits was in no way an assurance that such
benefits would be ultimately granted. The Notice very clear provides it is a merely a invitation “to
apply” for benefits, and the “Pension Fund does not know which participants might be eligible to
receive the retroactive early retirement pension benefit.” Notice of Rights of Certain Eligible
Participants to Apply for Retroactive Early Retirement Pension Benefits, at 3. The Notice provides
that, if a participant meets all the conditions contained therein, then the participant “may qualify to
receive retroactive pension benefits.” Id. (italics added). Even assuming for purposes of this motion
to dismiss that Plaintiff meets all the criteria set forth in the Notice, there is simply nothing in the
Notice which guarantees that his application for benefits will be approved. Moreover, the Notice
itself cannot confer benefits upon Plaintiff, and Plaintiff makes no allegation in his Complaint or in
his arguments that the Notice modified the Plan.2 Thus, the Court finds as a matter of law that
1
The Plan document, the letters and the Notice referred to in Plaintiff’s Complaint were
attached to the Complaint by Plaintiff and filed with this Court. As those documents are central to
Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds it is not required to convert Defendant’s motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment. Witthohn v. Federal Ins. Co., 164 Fed. Appx. 395, at *396 (4th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) (stating “a court may consider official public records, documents central to
plaintiff's claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint so long as the authenticity
of these documents is not disputed” without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment) (citations omitted).
2
The Fourth Circuit has held “that in order to be effective, any modification to a plan must
(continued...)
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Plaintiff cannot demonstrate he is entitled to Heinz benefits by virtue of the fact he may have met
the criteria contained in the Notice. See Complaint, ¶ 19 (alleging he “is due Heinz benefits under
the December 29, 2006 “Notice of Rights of Certain Eligible Participants to Apply for Retroactive
Early Retirement Benefits”).
Turning next to whether Plaintiff is entitled to benefits under the Plan irrespective
of the Notice, the Court observes he has not pointed to a single provision in the Plan which entitles
him to benefits. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes in his Response brief that his claim for benefits “is not
based upon the language in the Plan.” Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant BoilermakerBlacksmith National Trust’s Motion to Dismiss, at 2. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under
the terms of the Plan for benefits.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges no facts in his Complaint that would allow him to collect
benefits directly under the Heinz opinion itself. In paragraph 5, Plaintiff states he “has duly
complied with all of the conditions necessary to receive Heinz benefits,” but the remainder of his
Complaint focuses on him meeting the criteria contained in the Notice to qualify for benefits. The
Complaint is devoid of any facts suggesting the Heinz decision itself requires benefits be awarded.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s case is different than the facts of Heinz.
2
(...continued)
be implemented in conformity with the formal amendment procedures and must be in writing.”
HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]nformal amendments to established ERISA plans are
completely incapable of altering the specified terms of the plan’s written coverage.” Id. (citations
omitted).
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In Heinz, the participants had actually retired, were being paid early retirement
benefits, and worked other jobs which allowed them to continue receiving their benefits under the
Plan. 541 U.S. at 741. Thereafter, the Plan was amended to expand the scope of forbidden
employment, which resulted in the suspension of the participants’ retirement benefits. Id. The
Supreme Court held that this amendment violated ERISA’s anti-cutback rule. Id.
To the contrary, in this case, Plaintiff makes no allegation that he separated from
service, and he does not challenge the Trustee’s finding that he had not done so. Indeed, in his
Response brief, Plaintiff admits he continued working at his job without taking his early retirement.
However, in his Response, he further states he was forced to keep working his job, because the job
he “could have worked while receiving his pension was denied . . . [him] under a 1999 amendment
to the Plan that expanded the scope of ‘Prohibited Employment.’” Memorandum of Law in Response
to Defendant Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Trust’s Motion to Dismiss, at 8. In considering this
argument, the Court finds that, not only is Plaintiff’s situation distinguishable from that in Heinz,
but Plaintiff has not made any of these factual allegations in his Complaint. There is nothing in the
Complaint other than the bare legal conclusion that he “has duly complied with all of the conditions
necessary to receive Heinz benefits.” Complaint, at ¶ 5, in part. This conclusory statement is simply
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal.
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III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, finding Plaintiff has failed to set forth plausible claims, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.3
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Opinion and Order to
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:
August 23, 2011
ROBERT C. CHAMBERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
The Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant may not move to dismiss
his action because he is permitted to bring an action under ERISA and Defendant informed him of
this fact in his denial letter. Likewise, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s post hoc rationale
argument.
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