Ashland Inc. et al v. Randolph
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' 21 MOTION AND REQUEST for Attorney Fees and 23 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION AND REQUEST for Attorney Fees; directing Defendant Jeff Randolph, d/b/a Kwik Lube to reimburse Plaintiffs $1,890.00 in attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 5/14/2014. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (mkw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
ASHLAND INC., d/b/a VALVOLINE,
and ASHLAND LICENSING AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-21768
JEFF RANDOLPH d/b/a KWIK LUBE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are Plaintiffs’ Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 21, and Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 23. As explained below, these
motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Jeff Randolph, d/b/a Kwik
Lube, is hereby ORDERED to reimburse Plaintiffs for $1,890.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
I.
Background
Pursuant to the Court’s December 10, 2013, Order, ECF No. 19, which found Defendant in
civil contempt, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 21,
which requested reimbursement for $1,917.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
bringing the motion for contempt. On April 10, 2014, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion
and Order which directed Plaintiffs to file, within 14 days of that Order, evidence sufficient to
support a finding by this Court of a precise amount of such reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, or
risk the denial of their Motion and Request for Attorney Fees. See ECF No. 22. Plaintiffs filed their
sealed Supplemental Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 23, 15 days after the entry of
the April 10, 2014, Memorandum Opinion and Order. As has been the case throughout the
pendency of this action, Defendant did not respond to either of these filings. Both Motions are now
ripe for review.
II.
Standard
“[A] compensatory sanction[, including an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,]
may not exceed the actual loss to the complainant caused by the actions of respondent.” In re Gen.
Motors Corp., 61 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In awarding
attorneys’ fees [pursuant to a finding of civil contempt], the district court should first focus on the
time and labor expended and the customary fees for like work.” Colonial Williamsburg Found. v.
Kittinger Co., 38 F.3d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 1994). “[D]etermination of the hourly rate will generally
be the critical inquiry in setting the ‘reasonable fee,’ and the burden rests with the fee applicant to
establish the reasonableness of a requested rate.” Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.
1990). “In addition to the attorney’s own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory
specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for
which he seeks an award.” Id.
“After determining the initial fee, the district court should consider whether to adjust the
fee on the basis of other factors, briefly explaining any adjustment.” Colonial Williamsburg, 38
F.3d at 138. In so doing, the court should consider the twelve factors enumerated in Barber v.
Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978):
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in
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which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 1003, 1032 (4th Cir. 1997). However, “a fee based upon
reasonable rates and hours is presumed to be fully compensatory without producing a windfall”;
thus, “upward adjustments of the lodestar amount[, determined by multiplying reasonable hourly
rates by reasonable hours expended,] based on the other factors listed in Barber are not favored
and are appropriate only where exceptional circumstances are present.” Almond v. Boyles, 792
F.2d 451, 456-57 (4th Cir. 1986). Additionally, the court “may adjust the lodestar based only on
the []Barber factors that are not accounted for in the lodestar figure.” Bradford v. HSBC Mortgage
Corp., 859 F. Supp. 2d 783, 791 (E.D. Va. 2012).
III.
Analysis
In their sealed Supplemental Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, Plaintiffs detail the
tasks completed (researching and drafting the contempt motion, compiling exhibits for the motion,
and appearing in court for the contempt hearing), the dates on which they were completed, the time
spent on each task (presumably rounded to the nearest tenth of an hour), the persons completing
the work, their positions in the firm—a partner and a legal assistant—, and the rates consequently
charged. Plaintiffs also attach the invoices submitted to them by their counsel for these charges.
The dates, time expended, tasks, rates, and people completing each task as outlined in the motion
correspond with the same information as outlined in the attached invoices.
Plaintiffs also cite numerous recent cases from the Southern District and the Northern
District of West Virginia which found hourly rates comparable to and higher than that charged by
the partner working on this case to be reasonable. However, Plaintiffs provide absolutely no
evidence regarding the regional prevailing market rates for legal assistants in support of the rather
high rate charged for the time spent by the legal assistant on this case. See E. Associated Coal
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Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 724 F.3d 561, 575 (4th Cir. 2013) (overturning
an agency adjudicator’s assessment that $100 per hour was the prevailing market rate in Virginia
and West Virginia for the services rendered by legal assistants in a Black Lung Benefits Act case).
The Court is satisfied that both the time spent and the rates charged by the partner in
preparing and pursuing the contempt motion are reasonable. However, given the complete lack of
evidence in support of the rate charged for the legal assistant’s time and the Court’s explicit
instructions in its prior Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding the evidence required of
Plaintiffs, the Court excludes the legal assistant’s time from the final calculation of reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs. Thus, the Court finds the reduced total
attorneys’ fees and costs of $1,890.00 to be reasonable reimbursement for the contempt motion
work completed in this case.
IV. Conclusion
As explained above, Plaintiffs’ Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 21, and
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion and Request for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 23, are GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. Defendant Jeff Randolph, d/b/a Kwik Lube, is hereby ORDERED to
reimburse Plaintiffs for $1,890.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Opinion and Order to counsel
of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:
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May 14, 2014
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