Ball et al v. CSX Transportation, Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 10 MOTION to Stay and granting 6 MOTION to Remand to Circuit Court; this Court Orders Plaintiff to submit within 14 days of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order an affidavit specifying costs and expenses incurred as a result of the removal; Defendant CSX, as the party that removed this case, will then have 7 days in which to file a response. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 5/9/2014. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (skm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
RICHARD DWAYNE BALL, as
Administrator of the Estate of
JACOB DWAYNE BALL, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-13369
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
CITY OF HURRICANE
a West Virginia political subdivision,
PUTNAM COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
a West Virginia political subdivision,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 6), Defendant
Putnam County Board of Education’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8), and Plaintiff’s Motion to
Stay (ECF No. 10). For the reasons explained below, the Motion to Stay is GRANTED and the
Motion to Remand is GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to state court. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this Court ORDERS Plaintiff to submit within fourteen
(14) days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order an affidavit specifying costs and
expenses incurred as a result of the removal. Defendant CSX, as the party that removed this case,
will then have seven (7) days in which to file a response.
I.
Background
This case stems from the tragic death of Jacob Dwayne Ball, a sixteen year-old student at
Hurricane High School. On January 31, 2012, Mr. Ball was walking along railroad tracks shortly
after school hours, wearing headphones as he walked. He was struck from behind by a train,
resulting in his death. Plaintiff Richard Dwayne Ball, acting as administrator of the estate of Mr.
Ball, filed the instant Complaint in the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia, against
CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”)—which owns and operates the train that collided with Mr.
Ball and the tracks on which that train traveled—, the City of Hurricane, and the Putnam County
Board of Education. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 5-14. The Complaint alleges that these Defendants
breached duties owed to Mr. Ball, resulting in Mr. Ball’s death. It also alleges that Plaintiff is a
citizen of West Virginia, CSX has its principal place of business outside West Virginia, and the
City and the Board of Education are political subdivisions pursuant to West Virginia law. Id. ¶¶
1-4.
Under federal law, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).1 For federal
diversity jurisdiction to exist in this case, no Defendant may have the same state of citizenship as
Plaintiff. The parties are in agreement that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds
$75,000, that CSX is diverse from Plaintiff, and that the City and the Board of Education are
non-diverse from Plaintiff. On the face of the Complaint, therefore, it appeared that federal
diversity jurisdiction did not exist.
1
A separate basis for federal jurisdiction exists when the case involves a federal question. 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). This case, however, does not
implicate federal question jurisdiction.
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CSX filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441 on March 27,
2014, removing the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Notice Removal, ECF No.
1. CSX argued in the Notice of Removal that the City and the Board of Education had been
fraudulently joined to the case and therefore their citizenship should be disregarded in the
diversity analysis. Id. ¶¶ 9-14. The case was accordingly removed to this Court.
On April 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion to Remand, requesting this Court to
remand the case to the Circuit Court because this Court lacks jurisdiction. Mot. Remand, ECF
No. 6; Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand, ECF No. 7. Plaintiff also requests an award of costs and
expenses incurred as a result of removal. Reply Mot. Remand 2, ECF No. 16. Each Defendant
filed a Response in opposition to the Motion to Remand. City’s Resp. Mot. Remand, ECF No.
13; CSX’s Resp. Mot. Remand, ECF No. 14; Board’s Resp. Mot. Remand, ECF No. 15. Plaintiff
filed an omnibus Reply. ECF No. 16. The Motion to Remand is now ripe for resolution.
Additionally, the Board of Education has filed a Motion to Dismiss. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 8;
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed a Resp, ECF No. 12, and the Board of
Education filed a Reply, ECF No. 17. The Motion to Dismiss is also ripe for resolution. Plaintiff,
however, has filed a Motion to Stay consideration of the Motion to Dismiss pending resolution of
the Motion to Remand. Mot. Stay, ECF No. 10; Mem. Supp. Mot. Stay, ECF No. 11. The Board
of Education has filed a Response to the Motion to Stay. ECF No. 18.
Section II discusses the Motion to Stay. Section III analyzes the Motion to Remand.
II.
Motion to Stay
Plaintiff requests that resolution of the Motion to Dismiss be stayed pending resolution of
the Motion to Remand. In a given case, a court should resolve a motion to remand before turning
to resolution of a motion to dismiss. McCoy v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 858 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (S.D.
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W. Va. 2012) (“[I]t is ordinarily improper to resolve the motions to dismiss before deciding the
motion to remand. The question arising on the motion to remand as to whether there has been a
fraudulent joinder is a jurisdictional inquiry.”); see also Bilmar Ltd. P’ship v. Prima Mktg., LLC,
No. 2:13-cv-14391, 2013 WL 6195722, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 27, 2013) (citing McCoy for
that proposition). The Board of Education argues that the jurisdictional inquiry into fraudulent
joinder requires consideration of the merits of Plaintiff’s claims; that issue, however, will be
addressed in the next Section. Based on the case law noted, the Court will resolve the Motion to
Remand before turning to the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Motion to Stay is
GRANTED.
III. Motion to Remand
A. Legal Standard for Fraudulent Joinder
The case must be remanded back to the Circuit Court if this Court lacks jurisdiction over
the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). The existence of
jurisdiction here hinges on whether the City and the Board of Education were fraudulently
joined. As explained by the Fourth Circuit, fraudulent joinder exists when the removing party
“demonstrate[s] either ‘outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts’ or that
‘there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the
in-state defendant in state court.’” Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir.
1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th
Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, “the party alleging fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden—it must
show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and fact in
the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. The plaintiff’s pleadings are treated with great deference at this point,
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as “this standard is even more favorable to the plaintiff than the standard for ruling on a motion
to dismiss under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).” Id.
If the City and the Board of Education were fraudulently joined, then their citizenship is
not considered in the diversity analysis; in that situation, diversity exists between the remaining
parties and the case will remain before this Court. However, if there is a possibility of recovery
against either the City or the Board of Education, then the case must be remanded to the Circuit
Court.
B. Discussion
CSX argues that there is no possibility that Plaintiff can recover against the City and the
Board of Education—and that, therefore, the City and the Board of Education have been
fraudulently joined—because neither the City nor the Board of Education owed Plaintiff’s
decedent a duty and because the City and the Board of Education are entitled to sovereign
immunity under West Virginia law. Plaintiff, however, argues that there is a possibility of
recovery against both the City and the Board of Education.
The Court is mindful of the statutory immunity provisions for political subdivisions
found at West Virginia Code § 29-12A-4, as the parties have engaged is substantial discussion
regarding the possible application of West Virginia’s statutory immunity law. Based on the
pleadings presented, the Court declines to find that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff has no possibility
of recovery against the City and the Board of Education. Plaintiff has alleged negligence by the
City and the Board of Education in addressing and protecting Plaintiff’s decedent from the
known danger presented by trains. Although it obviously remains to be seen whether Plaintiff
actually recovers on its claims against the City and the Board of Education—and whether its
claims against those Defendants would survive a motion to dismiss—the fraudulent joinder
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standard is more favorable toward Plaintiff than the standard for dismissal. Although the Court
may consider the merits of Plaintiff’s claims to the extent necessary to resolve the jurisdictional
issues presented by the motion to remand, see Bilmar, 2013 WL 6195722, at *4-7, the Court
believes that Plaintiff has sufficiently presented a possibility of recovery against the City and the
Board of Education. The issue of dismissal will be left to the Circuit Court. Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand is GRANTED.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay is GRANTED and the
Motion to Remand is GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to state court. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this Court ORDERS Plaintiff to submit within fourteen
(14) days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order an affidavit specifying costs and
expenses incurred as a result of the removal. Defendant CSX, as the party that removed this case,
will then have seven (7) days in which to file a response.2
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Opinion and Order to
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:
2
May 9, 2014
The Court notes that although the case is remanded to state court, this Court retains jurisdiction
to award expenses and costs. Watson v. Charleston Hous. Auth., 83 F. Supp. 2d 709, 711 (S.D.
W. Va. 2000) (“Every circuit court of appeal that has considered this issue has concluded that a
district court may award fees and costs after the case has been remanded to state court. A court
maintains the jurisdiction to enter an award of fees and costs under 1447(c) after remand because
the issue of fees and costs is a collateral [sic] to the merits of the underlying action.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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