Jenkins v. Colvin

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING Plaintiff's 11 Brief in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings, GRANTING Defendant's 14 Brief in Support of Defendant's Decision, AFFIRMING the final decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSING this mater from the docket of this Court. Signed by Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley on 9/30/2015. (cc: attys) (mkw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON
TONYA MAE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

CASE NO. 3:14-cv-17028

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF
No. 11) and Brief in Support of Defendant’s Decision (ECF No. 14).
Background
Tonya Mae Jenkins, Plaintiff (hereinafter Claimant), applied for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on January 3, 2011, alleging disability
beginning on April 1, 2002 (Tr. at 144-149). The claim was denied initially on April 12, 2011
(Tr.at 77-81), and upon reconsideration on September 21, 2011(Tr. at 88-94). Claimant filed a
request for hearing by an Administrative Law Judge on September 29, 2011(Tr. at 95-97). In her
request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Claimant stated that she
disagreed with the determination made on her claim because her impairments rendered her
disabled under social security regulations (Tr. at 95). Claimant appeared in person and testified at
a hearing held in Huntington, West Virginia on October 24, 2012 (Tr. at 27-57). In the Decision
dated December 7, 2012, the ALJ determined that the Claimant was not disabled under section
1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act (Tr. at 8-26). On February 8, 2013, Claimant filed a

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Request for Review of the Hearing Decision of the ALJ because the decision was not supported
by substantial evidence (Tr. at 7). On March 24, 2014, the Appeals Council “found no reason
under our rules to review the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Therefore, we have denied
your request for review” (Tr. at 1-6). The Appeals Council stated that it considered the Claimant’s
disagreement with the decision, the additional evidence1 listed on the Order of Appeals Council
and found that this information did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision (Tr. at 16).
On May 28, 2014, Claimant bought the present action requesting that the decision of the
Commissioner should be reversed or remanded by this Court because the decision is not supported
by substantial evidence, and/or because the Commissioner committed other error.
Under 42 U.S.C. ' 423(d)(5) and ' 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i), a claimant for disability benefits has
the burden of proving a disability. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 774 (4th Cir. 1972).
A disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. ' 423(d)(1)(A).
The Social Security Regulations establish a "sequential evaluation" for the adjudication of
disability claims. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520, 416.920 (2014). If an individual is found "not disabled"
at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. '' 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The first inquiry under
the sequence is whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. Id. ''
404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not, the second inquiry is whether claimant suffers
from a severe impairment. Id. '' 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If a severe impairment is present, the
third inquiry is whether such impairment meets or equals any of the impairments listed in

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Claimant’s attorney’s contentions dated February 9, 2013, were admitted into evidence by the Appeals Council and
labeled as Exhibit B14E (Tr. at 4).
2

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Administrative Regulations No. 4. Id. '' 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
If it does, the claimant is found disabled and awarded benefits. Id. If it does not, the fourth inquiry
is whether the claimant's impairments prevent the performance of past relevant work. Id. ''
404.1520(e), 416.920(e). By satisfying inquiry four, the claimant establishes a prima facie case
of disability. Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). The burden then shifts to the
Commissioner, McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983), and leads to the fifth
and final inquiry: whether the claimant is able to perform other forms of substantial gainful
activity, considering claimant's remaining physical and mental capacities and claimant's age,
education and prior work experience.

20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(f), 416.920(f) (2014).

The

Commissioner must show two things: (1) that the claimant, considering claimant=s age, education,
work experience, skills and physical shortcomings, has the capacity to perform an alternative job
and (2) that this specific job exists in the national economy. McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d
572, 574 (4th Cir. 1976).
In this particular case, the ALJ determined that Claimant satisfied the first inquiry because
she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date, December 2, 2010
(Tr. at 13). Under the second inquiry, the ALJ found that Claimant suffers from the severe
impairments of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder and
borderline intellectual functioning (BIF) (Tr. at 14). At the third inquiry, the ALJ concluded that
Claimant=s impairments do not meet or equal the level of severity of any listing in 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. at 16). The ALJ then found that Claimant has a residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following
nonexertional limitations: sufficient residual exists for repetitive routine tasks of a simple nature
in setting where social demand is low (no crowds and limited contact with public), as well as no

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intensive team projects (Tr. at 17). As a result, Claimant can return to her past relevant work as a
convenience store cashier, cook, cleaner, dishwasher, stock clerk, telemarketer and hotel/motel
housekeeper (Tr. at 21). On this basis, benefits were denied. (Id.)
Scope of Review
The sole issue before this Court is whether the final decision of the Commissioner denying
the claim is supported by substantial evidence. In Blalock v. Richardson, substantial evidence was
defined as:
Aevidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to
support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a
verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial
evidence.=@
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1972) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d
640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). Additionally, the Commissioner, not the Court, is charged with resolving
conflicts in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless,
the Courts Amust not abdicate their traditional functions; they cannot escape their duty to scrutinize
the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.@ Oppenheim v.
Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).
A careful review of the record, which includes medical records, reveals the decision of the
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant=s Background
Claimant was 38 years old at the time of the hearing (Tr. at 34). She graduated from high
school and went to the Huntington Junior College for approximately a year. (Id.) Claimant was
married but separated on the hearing date. She has two children.

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The Medical Record
On December 6, 2010, Claimant’s former treating psychiatrist, Nika Razavipour, M.D.,
reported that Claimant ran out of her medication. She diagnosed Claimant with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder (Tr. at 538).
On February 3, 2011, Dr. Razavipour indicated in a prescription pad that Claimant was
unable to work and was on psychotropic medication (Tr. at 187). On February 22, 2011, Claimant
completed a Function Report – Adult when she reported that her daily activities consisted of
watching television, doing daily chores and taking care of her pets (Tr. at 188). She indicated
going shopping in stores and by mail, and shopping for groceries (Tr. at 190). She spends time
with her sister and goes to sporting events with her husband and children (Tr. at 191).
On March 14, 2011, state agency medical consultant, Rogelio Lim, M.D., reviewed
Claimant’s medical record and completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.
Dr. Lim reported that Claimant had no established exertional, postural, manipulative or
environmental limitations (Tr. at 729-732).

He reported that objective findings were

unremarkable, non-severe or slight (Tr. at 735).
On March 22, 2011, state agency medical consultant, H. Hoback Clark, M.D., reviewed
Claimant’s medical record and reported that she worked as a cook, cashier, stock person,
dishwasher, food service maid, and telemarketer, and stopped working in April 2002 because of
pregnancy (Tr. at 750).
On May 13, 2011, Dr. Razavipour completed an Adult Psychiatric Review and noted that
Claimant’s speech was clear and coherent, her thought process was goal-directed, her insight and
judgment were fair, and her intelligence was average (Tr. at 761). She diagnosed Claimant with
PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, and a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score of

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52, which corresponds to moderate health symptoms, or moderate difficulty in social, occupational
or school functioning (Tr. at 762).
On August 22, 2011, state agency psychologist Lisa Tate, M.A., saw Claimant for a
psychological evaluation (Tr. at 775). Ms. Tate noted that Claimant started having PTSD from
finding her sister’s baby who had died from SIDS, and that the identified symptom of PTSD was
reported as excessive startle response.

Claimant also reported depression, anxiety, bipolar

disorder, and medical problems (Tr. at 776). Ms. Tate indicated that Claimant had no recent
illnesses, injuries, or hospitalizations, and that her current medical problems were reported as
allergies, kidney stone, hypertension, and sinus problems. Claimant’s prescription medication
include Paxil, Wellbutrin, Inderal, Seroquel, Vistaril, and Zantac. No medication side effects were
reported. Ms. Tate reported that Claimant last worked in approximately 1997 and 1998 as a gas
station/convenience store employee, worked for one year before becoming pregnant, and reported
that her husband did not want her to work (Tr. at 777). Upon mental status evaluation, Ms. Tate
reported that Claimant was alert throughout the evaluation and oriented to person, place, time, and
date; had depressed mood, a mildly restricted affect, logical and coherent thought processes, and
no indication of delusions, obsessive thoughts or compulsive behaviors; and reported no unusual
perceptual experiences. Claimant had fair insight, her judgment was within normal limits, she
denied suicidal or homicidal ideation, she had moderate immediate memory and mildly deficient
recent memory, and her remote memory was within normal limits. Claimant’s concentration was
mildly deficient and her psychomotor behavior was normal (Tr. at 778). The psychologist
diagnosed Claimant with major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate, chronic with
anxious features and borderline intellectual functioning. She also reported that Claimant’s social
functioning, persistence, and pace were within normal limits.

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On August 25, 2011, state agency medical consultant Stephen Nutter, M.D., saw Claimant
for an internal medicine examination. Claimant complained of back and neck pain. Upon
examination, Dr. Nutter found that Claimant ambulated with a normal gait, did not require use of
a handheld assistive device, and appeared stable at station and comfortable in the supine and sitting
positions. He noted Claimant was able to walk on her heels and toes, and was able to perform
tandem gait and squat, but had complaints of back pain with squatting. He noted that Claimant’s
intellectual functioning appeared normal and that her recent and remote memory for medical
events was good. He found no evidence of thyromegaly, palpable masses, lymphadenopathy,
jugulovenous distention or hepatojugular reflux upon examination of her neck. He noted cervical
spine pain and tenderness to the paraspinal muscles and the spinous processes, no evidence of
paravertebral muscle spasm, 45 degrees of flexion and extension, 30 degrees of lateral bending
bilaterally and 80 degrees of rotation bilaterally. He also found dorsolumbar spine normal
curvature, no evidence of paravertebral muscle spasm, no tenderness to percussion of the spinous
processes, and normal straight leg raising in the sitting and supine positions. He found that
Claimant was able to stand on one leg at a time, had minimal difficulty balancing, was able to
bend forward at the waist to 70 degrees, exhibited lateral bending of the spine to 25 degrees on
the right and 20 degrees on the left, and complained of pain with range of motion testing of the
lumbar spine. He found no hip tenderness, redness, warmth, swelling, or crepitus, and range of
motion of the hips with the knees flexed was to 100 degrees bilaterally (Tr. at 770-774). He
diagnosed Claimant with chronic cervical and lumbar spine strain without evidence of
radiculopathy. Dr. Nutter summarized that Claimant had some neck pain and tenderness, and back
pain with mildly reduced range of motion of the back and neck. He stated Claimant’s straight leg

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raising test was negative for radiculopathy, deep tendon reflexes were brisk and the sensory and
motor modalities were well preserved, and there was no evidence of weakness (Tr. at 774).
On September 17, 2011, state agency medical consultant Thomas Lauderman, D.O.,
reviewed Plaintiff's medical evidence record and completed a Physical Residual Functional
Capacity Assessment. Dr. Lauderman reported that Claimant did not have any exertional,
postural, manipulative, communicative, or environmental limitations (Tr. at 782-785, 788). On
this date, state agency psychological consultant G. David Allen, Ph.D., also reviewed Claimant’s
medical evidence record and completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. Dr.
Allen reported that Claimant was moderately limited in her ability to: understand, remember, and
carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; and
interact appropriately with the general public (Tr. at 789-790). Dr. Lauderman reported that the
course of Claimant’s illness seemed to wax and wane, with good days and not, and that sufficient
residual exists for repetitive routine tasks of a simple nature in settings where social demand is
low and no intensive team projects (Tr. at 791). Dr. Lauderman also reported that Claimant’s
activities of daily living were mildly restricted, and that she had moderate difficulties in
maintaining social functioning, and in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace (Tr. 803).
Records from Prestera Center, Inc., show that Claimant underwent an Adult Psychiatric Review
in December 2011 (Tr. at 851-853). Pursuant to a mental status evaluation, Claimant was
diagnosed with clear and coherent speech, no noted thought content deficits, goal-directed thought
process, and fair concentration, insight, and judgment (Tr. at 851). A July 26, 2012 mental status
evaluation shows that Claimant’s appearance, sociability, speech, and thought content were within
normal limits, she was oriented to person, place, situation, and time, her recall memory and coping

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ability were normal, and her affect was appropriate (Tr. at 863-864). The record also show that
Claimant cancelled or was a “no show” for scheduled appointments (Tr. at 869-887).
Claimant saw a therapist for mental health counseling for her anxiety and depression from
August 7, 2012,2 through October 2012. David J. Humphreys, M.D., co-signed the reports (Tr. at
821-834). By September 4, 2012, the therapist reported that Claimant’s depression and anxiety
were normal and moderate in severity, her mood was normal, and her thought process, insight,
memory, and cognitive function were intact. She was oriented as to time, place, and people. Upon
mental status examination, Claimant did not have hallucinations or delusions (Tr. at 827).
Claimant reported that she was beginning to feel better (Tr. at 826).
On October 19, 2012, Claimant’s attorney referred her to psychologist Richard Reeser,
M.A., for a Psychological Evaluation to help in disability determination (Tr. at 888). Upon mental
status evaluation, Mr. Reeser reported that Claimant’s affect was flat, her mood depressed and
anxious, her thought processes logically formed with normal flow, her judgment, insight, remote
and recent memory were fair and she was oriented to person, place, month, and year. He reported
that test results were indicative of major depression and anxiety disorder. He diagnosed Claimant
with depressive and anxiety disorder, moderate and recurrent major depressive disorder and
generalized anxiety disorder by history, schizoaffective disorder rule out PTSD, borderline
intellectual functioning by history rule out dependent and schizoid personality disorder, and a
GAF of 50 (Tr. at 889). He concluded that Claimant’s mental health problems significantly
blocked her ability to secure and maintain gainful employment, but appeared to have the capacity
to manage any funds that may be awarded to her (Tr. at 890). In a Medical Source Statement of

2

On August 7, 2012, David J. Humpreys, M.D., reported Claimant’s chief complaints to be depression, anxiety and
grief (Tr. at 821). He reported that Claimant’s grooming was neat but her facial features were anxious, tearful and
depressed. Her affect was hopeless, flat, depressed, anxious and guilty. Claimant’s insight was impaired and her
mood was depressed and anxious. (Id.) Her cognitive functioning and judgment were impaired.
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Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental), Mr. Reeser indicated that Claimant ability to
understand and remember simple instructions was mildly limited, her ability to carry out simple
instructions and make judgments on simple work-related decisions was moderately limited, and
her ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions, and to make judgments
on complex work-related decisions were extremely limited (Tr. at 891). He also indicated that
Claimant’s ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, and to
respond to changes in a routine work setting were markedly limited (Tr. at 892).
Claimant=s Challenges to the Commissioner=s Decision
Claimant asserts that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence due to the
ALJ’s failure to give proper weight to the opinions of her treating psychiatrists and other medical
sources (ECF No. 11). Claimant argues that the evidence of record demonstrates that her
impairments prevent her from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Defendant asserts that the
ALJ appropriately weighed the opinion of Claimant’s treating and consulting medical sources
(ECF No. 14).
Discussion
“Under the Social Security Act, [a reviewing court] must uphold the factual findings of the
Secretary if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of
the correct legal standard.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (alteration in
original) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(“The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .”); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (“A factual finding by
the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the
law.”). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
“[I]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance.” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (alteration in original) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368
F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should] not
undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its]
judgment for that of the Secretary.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,
1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). If “conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a
claimant is disabled,” the Court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Id. (citing Walker v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Claimant “bears the burden of proving that he is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act.” English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)
and Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981)). “The term ‘disability’ means . . . inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Treating Physician
Claimant argues the following:
The Administrative Law Judge failed to give proper weight to the
opinion of Nika Razavipour, M.D., the Plaintiff’s former treating
psychiatrist, who stated that the Plaintiff is disabled (TR. 187). Dr.
Razavipour’s opinion is reasonable in light of the Plaintiff’s
continuing struggle with posttraumatic stress disorder, major
depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. As support for Dr.
Razavipour’s opinion, attention is called to the opinion of David J.
Humphreys, M.D., the Plaintiff’s current treating psychiatrist,
whose progress notes reveal that the Plaintiff suffers from chronic
unstable moderate recurrent major depression along with chronic
uncontrolled generalized anxiety disorder (TR. 821-828, 829-834).

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…
[T]he Administrative Law Judge did not give proper consideration
to the opinions of several consulting sources as follows:
a.
Stephen Nutter, M.D., a consulting examining
physician, stated that the Plaintiff suffers from chronic
cervical and lumbar strain (TR. 770-774).
b.
Lisa C. Tate, M.A., a consulting examining
psychologist, stated that the Plaintiff suffers from chronic
major depressive disorder with anxious features along with
borderline intellectual functioning (775-780).
c.
Richard Reeser, M.A., a consulting examining
psychologist, stated that the Plaintiff has a depressive
disorder, anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder
(recurrent, moderate), and a generalized anxiety disorder
with a GAF of 50 (TR. 888-890). Going further, Reeser
opined that the Plaintiff would have “Marked” limitations in
her ability to interact appropriately with supervisors,
coworkers, and the public as well as “Marked” limitations in
her ability to respond to changes in a routine work setting
(TR. 891-893). Reeser’s opinion is critical in as much as the
Vocational Expert testified that the Plaintiff would be unable
to engage in substantial gainful activity if Reeser’s findings
are accurate (TR. 56). (ECF No. 11).
In evaluating the opinions of treating sources, the Commissioner generally must give more
weight to the opinion of a treating physician because the physician is often most able to provide
Aa detailed, longitudinal picture@ of a claimant=s alleged disability.

See 20 C.F.R. ''

404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(d)(2) (2014). Nevertheless, a treating physician=s opinion is afforded
Acontrolling weight only if two conditions are met: (1) that it is supported by clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and (2) that it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.@ Ward v.
Chater, 924 F. Supp. 53, 55 (W.D. Va. 1996); see also, 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1527(d)(2) and
416.927(d)(2) (2014). The opinion of a treating physician must be weighed against the record as
a whole when determining eligibility for benefits. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(d)(2)

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(2014). Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Commissioner, not the court to review the case,
make findings of fact, and resolve conflicts of evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990). As noted above, however, the court must not abdicate its duty to scrutinize the
record as a whole to determine whether the Commissioner=s conclusions are rational. Oppenheim
v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1994).
If the ALJ determines that a treating physician=s opinion should not be afforded controlling
weight, the ALJ must then analyze and weigh all the evidence of record, taking into account the
factors listed in 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1527 and 416.927(d)(2)-(6). These factors include: (1) Length
of the treatment relationship and frequency of evaluation, (2) Nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, (3) Supportability, (4) Consistency, (5) Specialization, and (6) various other factors.
Additionally, the regulations state that the Commissioner Awill always give good reasons in our
notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source=s opinion.@ Id. ''
404.152.
The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of treating psychiatrist, Dr. Razavipour. The
ALJ stated that although Dr. Razavipour noted that Claimant was unable to work, she never
mentioned a functional rational. Dr. Razavipour’s opinion that Claimant is unable to work is
inconsistent with her subsequent opinion. Dr. Razavipour’s note opining that Claimant is unable
to work was written in February 2011. In May 2011, Dr. Razavipour completed an Adult
Psychiatric Review and noted that Claimant’s speech was clear, her insight and judgment were fair
and that her intelligence was average. Furthermore, finding someone “disabled” is a decision of
the Commissioner and should be supported by comparable treatment notes” (Tr. at 20).
Claimant also argues that the ALJ did not give proper consideration to the opinions of state
agency medical consultant Stephen Nutter, M.D., and psychologists Lisa Tate, M.A., and Richard

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Reeser, M.A. (ECF No. 11). However, the ALJ demonstrated why he did not rely upon Dr.
Nutter’s opinion (Tr. at 15). The ALJ reported that Dr. Nutter’s physical examination of Claimant
revealed that her gait was normal, her hearing was adequate, her chest was symmetrical, her lungs
were clear, her neurological evaluation was intact, and her muscle strength was unremarkable.
(Id.) The ALJ also found that although Dr. Nutter offered a diagnosis of chronic cervical and
lumbar strain, there was no evidence of radiculopathy.
Likewise, Claimant’s argument that the ALJ did not give proper consideration to the
opinion of Ms. Tate is inaccurate. The Psychological Evaluation of Claimant performed by Ms.
Tate on August 22, 2011, reflects that Claimant was alert throughout the evaluation, observed as
feeling depressed, demonstrating mildly restricted affect, reported that her insight was fair and
judgment was within normal limits (Tr. at 777-778). Claimant’s social functioning was reported
as within normal limits (Tr. at 778). Her concentration was mildly deficient and her persistence
was within normal limits. Ms. Tate’s opinion was properly considered and addressed in the ALJ’s
decision.
Lastly, Claimant argues that consulting examining psychologist, Richard Reeser, M.A.,
stated that Claimant has a depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder
(recurrent, moderate), and a generalized anxiety disorder with GAF of 50. Claimant asserts that
the ALJ failed to give Mr. Reeser’s opinion appropriate weight (Tr. at 888-890). In regards to Mr.
Reeser’s opinion evidence, the ALJ gave Mr. Reeser’s opinion no weight (Tr. at 20). The ALJ
found that Mr. Reeser’s assessment dated October 22, 2012, is inconsistent and unsupported by
the overall evidence of record.

Mr. Reeser’s treatment notes reported that Claimant was

noncompliant with her oral treatment regimen and mental health treatment. The ALJ stated “Most
notably, when taking her medication, she sees improved and feels normal” (Tr. at 21).

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The ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to any treating physician’s opinion when
the opinion is not supported by clinical evidence, is internally inconsistent or is not consistent with
other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Upon review of the
ALJ’s decision, it is clear that the ALJ considered, analyzed and weighed the opinions of
Claimant’s treating physicians and psychiatrists based upon all the evidence of record.

After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, this Court finds that the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ properly weighed the
medical opinions on the record. Accordingly, by Judgment Order entered this day, Plaintiff’s Brief
in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 11) is DENIED, Defendant’s Brief in Support
of Defendant’s Decision (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED, the final decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED and this matter is DISMISSED from the docket of this Court.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide copies of this Order to all counsel of record.

Date: September 30, 2015.

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