Barber v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.

Filing 326

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER denying Defendant's 298 MOTION to Compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents; granting Plaintiff's 307 MOTION to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum on Camden Clark Memorial Hospital. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 7/20/2017. (cc: counsel of record) (jsa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
JILL C. BARBER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-27349

JAMES W. HESLEP,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This case involves alleged fraudulent conduct by Defendant in the course of
resolving a Workers’ Compensation claim. As part of the prayer for damages, Plaintiff
seeks compensation for emotional distress, mental anguish, and mental pain and
suffering. During discovery, Defendant learned that Plaintiff had received mental health
care in the early 1980’s, when she was a teenager. Accordingly, Defendant served Plaintiff
with a request for production of documents, seeking the mental health records from
Plaintiff’s earlier treatment. Plaintiff acknowledged that she had possession of the
records, but after some consideration, she refused to supply them to Defendant. Around
the same time, Defendant served Camden Clark Memorial Hospital, the successor to the
mental health provider that treated Plaintiff in the 1980’s, with a subpoena requiring
production of her records. Currently pending are Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash the
subpoena, (ECF No. 307), and Defendant’s Motion to Compel responses to
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, (ECF No. 298). The issue in
both motions is whether Plaintiff’s thirty-year-old mental health records should be
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disclosed to Defendant. The parties appeared on July 19, 2017, by counsel, to argue the
merits of their motions. Having carefully considered the arguments, and for the reasons
that follow, the Court finds that the records should not be disclosed and, therefore,
GRANTS the motion to quash and DENIES the motion to compel.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) sets forth the protections available to a
person subject to or affected by a subpoena. In particular, Rule 45(d)(3) outlines when a
court must quash or modify a subpoena, when it may do so, and when the court may
direct compliance under specified conditions. In the context of discovery, “Rule 45 adopts
the standards codified in Rule 26.” Schaaf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 233 F.R.D. 451,
453 (E.D.N.C. 2005). Therefore, the scope and limitations of discovery set forth in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 are controlling in both motions.
Rule 26 allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). As part of the proportionality analysis, the court must consider the
significance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery to
resolving the issues, and the burden or expense of the proposed discovery. In addition to
defining the scope of discovery, Rule 26 contains limitations to discovery. For example,
when a protective order is sought, the court may forbid proposed discovery in order to
protect a party or person from suffering embarrassment or oppression. Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c).
In considering the pending motions, the first question that must be answered is
whether Plaintiff’s mental health care records are privileged; thus, removing them from
the scope of information subject to discovery under Rule 26. In an action based on
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diversity of citizenship, where state law supplies the rule of decision, the existence of a
privilege is determined in accordance with state law; in this case, the law of West Virginia.
Fed. R. Evid. 501. The parties implicitly agree that West Virginia does not recognize a
psychotherapist/patient privilege; accordingly, Plaintiff’s mental health care records are
not privileged and may be discovered. Nevertheless, the West Virginia legislature has
mandated that mental health care information be treated differently from other health
care matters, providing mental health care records with heightened protection from
disclosure. See W. Va. Code § 27-3-1. According to W. Va. Code § 27-3-1:
Communications and information obtained in the course of treatment or
evaluation of any [psychiatric] client or patient are confidential
information. Such confidential information includes the fact that a person
is or has been a client or patient, information transmitted by a patient or
client or family thereof for purposes relating to diagnosis or treatment,
information transmitted by persons participating in the accomplishment of
the objectives of diagnosis or treatment, all diagnoses or opinions formed
regarding a client's or patient's physical, mental or emotional condition, any
advice, instructions or prescriptions issued in the course of diagnosis or
treatment, and any record or characterization of the matters hereinbefore
described.
W. Va. Code § 27-3-1(a). The statute further prohibits the disclosure of confidential
information except in the following circumstances:
(1) In a proceeding under section four, article five of this chapter to disclose
the results of an involuntary examination made pursuant to section two,
three or four of said article;
(2) In a proceeding under article six-a of this chapter to disclose the results
of an involuntary examination made pursuant thereto;
(3) Pursuant to an order of any court based upon a finding that the
information is sufficiently relevant to a proceeding before the court to
outweigh the importance of maintaining the confidentiality established by
this section;
(4) To provide notice to the federal National Instant Criminal Background
Check System, established pursuant to section 103(d) of the Brady Handgun
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Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922, in accordance with article sevena, chapter sixty-one of this code;
(5) To protect against a clear and substantial danger of imminent injury by
a patient or client to himself, herself or another;
(6) For treatment or internal review purposes, to staff of the mental health
facility where the patient is being cared for or to other health professionals
involved in treatment of the patient; and
(7) Without the patient's consent as provided for under the Privacy Rule of
the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45
C.F.R. § 164.506, for thirty days from the date of admission to a mental
health facility if: (i) The provider makes a good faith effort to obtain consent
from the patient or legal representative prior to disclosure; (ii) the
minimum information necessary is released for a specifically stated
purpose; and (iii) prompt notice of the disclosure, the recipient of the
information and the purpose of the disclosure is given to the patient or legal
representative.
W. Va. Code § 27-3-1(b). Only subsection (3) applies to the instant action.
Subsection (3) requires the court to conduct a two-step analysis before ordering
the release of confidential information. First, the court must determine whether the
confidential information is relevant to the proceeding. If the information sought is not
relevant, then it may not be disclosed. Next, if the information is deemed relevant, the
court must determine if the information is “sufficiently” relevant to outweigh the
importance of maintaining its confidentiality.
Considering the first step, Plaintiff acknowledges that she has made a claim for
damages based on mental anguish and emotional distress. She argues, however, that the
information sought by Defendant is not relevant, because her mental health as a child has
no bearing on her mental state just prior to and after the alleged fraudulent conduct by
Defendant. In response, Defendant points to case law in this district finding that a
plaintiff’s medical records, including mental health care records, are relevant to
emotional distress and mental anguish claims. Having reviewed the applicable law, the
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undersigned agrees with Defendant. For the most part, a plaintiff’s mental health
treatment and history are relevant to claims of mental anguish and emotional distress.
Carpenter v. Res-Care Health Servs., No. 3:12-cv-08047, 2013 WL 1750464, at *2 (S.D.
W. Va. April 23, 2013).
Turning to the second step, the court must weigh the evidentiary significance of
the records against the statutory and public policy goals of keeping psychiatric
information confidential. At this step, Plaintiff’s argument that her thirty-year-old
records lack “sufficient” relevance is persuasive. Mental health care records reflecting
treatment received by Plaintiff three decades earlier, when she was a teenager, are simply
too remote in time to be of great evidentiary significance. Defendant’s need for the records
is further diminished by the fact that Plaintiff did not receive any additional mental health
care after her treatment in early the 1980’s until 2013, when she sought treatment in
connection with the instant action. Thus, when comparing the potential litigation benefits
associated with a release of the records against the need to protect their confidentiality,
the importance of the records is substantially outweighed by the Plaintiff’s right to keep
those records confidential. Therefore, the records may not be disclosed under West
Virginia law.
The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record.
ENTERED: July 20, 2017

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