Earle et al v. City of Huntington et al

Filing 157

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part 122 MOTION by Bobbi Adams, Melissa Blagg, Andrea Heath, Tammy Peyton, Tara Ramsey, St. Mary's Medical Center, Inc. to Dismiss Federal Claims and Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, as to the federal claims alleged against these Defendants, and denying in part as to the state claims against them; denying Defendants' 116 and 119 MOTIONS to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims for failure to comply with the MPLA, Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim, and Plaintiff's wrongful death claim. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 6/8/2016. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (mkw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION

LUMUMBA EARLE, individually and
as the Personal Representative of the
ESTATE of ANNIE EARLE, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-29536

CITY OF HUNTINGTON, d/b/a CITY OF
HUNTINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
a municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are multiple Motions to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment
filed by Defendants St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc. (“St. Mary’s”), Tammy Peyton, Tara Ramsey,
Bobbi Adams, Melissa Blagg, and Andrea Heath (collectively “Nurses”) on all claims against
them. ECF Nos. 122 (Federal Claims), 119 (Medical Professional Liability Act or “MPLA”), 116
(False Imprisonment Claim), 113 (Wrongful Death Claim). First, St. Mary’s and Nurses
(collectively “Defendants”) move for dismissal of, or summary judgment on, the federal claims
alleged against them under U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (“Federal Claims”), and Defendants further request
that the Court decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ECF No. 122. Second, Defendants move for dismissal of, or summary
judgment on, all claims for failure to comply with West Virginia’s MPLA. ECF No. 119. Third,
Defendants move for dismissal of, or summary judgment on, the state law false imprisonment

claim under Count VII of the Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 116. Lastly, Defendants move
for dismissal of, or summary judgment on, the state law wrongful death claim under Count IX of
the Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 113. For the reasons explained below, the Court
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Federal Claims and
Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions for
Dismissal and Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s state claims.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts
According to the Third Amended Complaint, Decedent Annie Earle (“Ms. Earle”) arrived
at St. Mary’s Emergency Room on January 10, 2014 for treatment of a facial laceration sustained
at the home of her daughter, Angela Earle. 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 111. While treating her
injury, the staff at St. Mary’s began a mental hygiene assessment and filed a mental hygiene
petition1 to detain Ms. Earle. Id. ¶ 23. After Ms. Earle voluntarily left the hospital, St. Mary’s staff
contacted law enforcement to advise them of Ms. Earle’s departure against medical advice, as well
as the staff’s attempt to obtain a mental hygiene order. Id. ¶ 26; Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss
3, ECF No. 123. When officers brought Ms. Earle back to St. Mary’s, the hospital staff advised
them that the previously filed mental hygiene petition had been denied and that Ms. Earle could
A mental hygiene petition is an informal term for a notarized “Application for Involuntary
Custody for Mental Health Examination”. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rogers, 745 S.E.2d
483, 487 (W. Va. 2013). This application is made pursuant to W. Va. Code § 27-5-2, for
instances when a person “has reason to believe that the individual to be examined is . . . mentally
ill and . . . likely to cause serious harm to himself, herself or to others if allowed to remain at
liberty while awaiting an examination and certification by a physician or psychologist.” W. Va.
Code Ann. § 27-5-2(a) (West 2016). The detention of the individual named may be approved by
a circuit court, mental hygiene commissioner or designated magistrate, until a mental health
examination can be performed. W. Va. Code Ann. § 27-5-2(c) (West 2016).
1

-2-

be discharged. 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25–26. Thereafter, a physical and verbal altercation arose
between Ms. Earle and Officer Josh Nield, during which Ms. Earle sustained fractured ribs that
punctured her heart and caused her death. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
B. Procedural History
On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff Lumumba Earle (“Plaintiff”), both individually and on
behalf of Ms. Earle’s estate, filed a complaint against the City of Huntington, the City of
Huntington Police Department, and Officer Josh Nield. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff subsequently
filed two Amended Complaints, which further named St. Mary’s, Cabell County 911, Cabell
County Commission, Police Dispatcher Ted Grant, and Police Dispatcher Patrick Watkins as
Defendants. Am. Compl., ECF No. 4; 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 66. On September 23, 2015, the
Court granted St. Mary’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with the West Virginia MPLA’s
pre-suit requirements. ECF No. 17. The Court also dismissed claims against Cabell County 911
and the Cabell County Commission that were based on the reckless and intentional conduct of Mr.
Grant or Mr. Watkins, as well as all claims against Mr. Grant and Mr. Watkins individually. Earle
v. City of Huntington, No. 3:14-29536, 2015 WL 5611650 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 23, 2015), available
at ECF No. 103. Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on January 8, 2016, including Nurses
as Defendants. 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 133.
Now, Defendants move under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims against them, and
alternatively, they seek summary judgment on these claims. ECF Nos. 122 (Federal Claims), 119
(MPLA), 116 (False Imprisonment Claim), 113 (Wrongful Death Claim). Having introduced the
relevant background, the Court will explain the legal standards for 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss in Part II, and discuss Defendants’ arguments for dismissal and summary judgment in
Part III.

-3-

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a suit must be dismissed if a
federal court does not have the proper subject matter jurisdiction. “Challenges to jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1) may be raised in two distinct ways: ‘facial attacks’ and ‘factual attacks.’” Zimmeck
v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, No. 3:13-14743, 2013 WL 5700591, at *2 (quoting Thigpen
v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 401 n.15 (4th Cir. 1986), rejected on other grounds; Sheridan v.
United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988)). A facial attack questions whether the allegations in the
complaint are sufficient to sustain the court’s jurisdiction. Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 401 n.15. If a facial
attack is made, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and decide if the
complaint is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
On the other hand, a factual attack challenges the truthfulness of the factual allegations in
the complaint upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based. In this situation, a “district court is
to regard the pleadings’ allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence
outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.”
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1991)
(citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982); Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft
Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir.1987)). To prevent dismissal, “the nonmoving party must set
forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id.
(citation omitted). A dismissal should only be granted when “the material jurisdictional facts are
not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted).
When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court follows a two-step approach: (1)
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and then (2) “[w]hen there

-4-

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
For the first step, the complaint must provide the plaintiff’s “grounds of . . . entitlement to
relief” in more factual detail than mere “labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
For the second step, a court must take the remaining factual allegations in the complaint as
true, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.
The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 555, 570 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plausibility is established “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION

First, Defendants ask to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Plaintiff’s federal
claims against them; they further ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Second, Defendants ask to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) all claims for failure to comply with West Virginia’s MPLA. Third,
Defendants ask to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the state law false imprisonment claim. Lastly,
Defendants ask to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the state law wrongful death claim. Alternatively,

-5-

Defendants ask for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) on all claims against them. The Court
considers each of Defendants’ motions and arguments in turn below.
A. Motion to Dismiss Federal Claims and Decline Exercising Supplemental Jurisdiction Over
State Claims
First, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims against them. Defendants also
request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state
claims against Defendants. As explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
the federal claims, insofar as they apply to Defendants St. Mary’s and Nurses, but the Court
exercises discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.
Defendants Motion for Dismissal of the federal claims against them is granted. In the Third
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, and 1985, as well as
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These appear to be alleged
against all named defendants. See 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 35–42. However, in the response to the
Motion on Federal Claims, Plaintiff describes these federal claims as “moot” and not applying to
St. Mary’s or Nurses. Mem. Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 137. Therefore, to the extent
the Complaint can be read to assert these federal claims against them, the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s federal claims against St. Mary’s and the Nurses.2
In the latter part of their Motion, Defendants argue supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state claims is lacking and, in the alternative, Defendants ask the Court to decline
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).3 The Court disagrees. The Court finds

2

These federal claims still apply to other named Defendants.
Defendants never specifically argue that the Court is lacking in subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims. However, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is titled, in part, as one justified by a
“lack of jurisdiction” and is raised under Rule 12(b) generally. Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. To Dism.
1, ECF No. 123. Though subject matter jurisdiction is not raised specifically, the Court must assure
itself that subject matter jurisdiction exists over all claims, including Plaintiff’s state claims.
3

-6-

supplemental jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff’s state claims and declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims is not warranted.
Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that “form part of
the same case or controversy” as a federal claim presented in the same case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(2012); Hartman v. Univ. of Maryland at Baltimore, 595 Fed. App’x 179, 180 (4th Cir. 2014);
Arrington v. City of Raleigh, 369 Fed. App’x 420, 422 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). Even after all federal
claims supporting supplemental jurisdiction are dismissed, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) permits district
courts to retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining pendant state claims. Arrington, 369 F.
App’x at 422. Section 1367(c) lists circumstances when district courts should decline to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, specifically when: (1) the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over federal claims, (3) all
federal claims have been dismissed, or (4) other compelling reasons exist for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. §1367(c) (2012); Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173
(1997); Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S. Carolina, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001). The district
court’s exercise of discretion under § 1367(c) is not a jurisdictional matter, and therefore, it “may
not be raised at any time as a jurisdictional defect.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.
635, 640 (2009). When determining whether to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction,
courts should consider “convenience and fairness to both parties, as well as the interests of judicial
economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 112 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the Court has original jurisdiction over the federal claims against some named
Defendants, and it has supplemental jurisdiction over all related state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). The Parties agree that Plaintiff’s federal claims do not apply to St. Mary’s and Nurses,
and neither Party contends the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims

-7-

against St. Mary’s and Nurses. Because the federal law and state law controversies between
Plaintiff and all named Defendants center on Ms. Earle’s death and the preceding events,
supplemental jurisdiction exists over the state claims.
Additionally, the Court finds no reason to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Judicial economy is best served by retaining St. Mary’s and
Nurses as defendants in this case; separate, concurrent state and federal actions would be
duplicative. Thus, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims.
B. Motion to Dismiss all claims for failure to comply with the MPLA
Defendants next argue Plaintiff’s state claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not
adhere to the pre-suit notification requirements of West Virginia’s MPLA. The Court disagrees.
The MPLA, set forth at West Virginia Code § 55-7B-1, et seq., applies to the instant case.
Earle, 2015 WL 5611650. No person may file a medical professional liability action against any
health care provider without complying with the MPLA pre-trial notification requirements. W. Va.
Code Ann. § 55-7B-6(a) (West 2016). Under these provisions, “[a]t least thirty days prior to the
filing of a medical professional liability action against a health care provider, the claimant shall
serve by certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of claim on each health care provider the
claimant will join in litigation.” Id. § 55-7B-6(b). The notice of claim “shall include a statement
of the theory or theories of liability upon which a cause of action may be based, and a list of all
health care facilities to whom notices of claim are being sent, together with a screening certificate
of merit.” Id. A single certificate is insufficient, as “[a] separate screening certificate of merit must
be provided for each health care provider against whom a claim is asserted.” Id.4

4

A screening certificate of merit:
[S]hall be executed under oath by a health care provider qualified as
an expert under the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, and shall state
-8-

The question raised by the MPLA-based motion to dismiss is whether or not Plaintiff’s
notice of claim and screening certificate are legally sufficient under the MPLA. To determine legal
sufficiency, a reviewing court should evaluate Section 55-7B-6 in light of its statutory purpose.
Syl. Pt. 6, Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387, (W. Va. 2005). The statutory purpose of the
MPLA’s pre-suit requirements is to prevent frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits and promote
pre-suit resolution of non-frivolous medical malpractice claims, id, but not to restrict or deny
citizens’ access to the courts. Syl. Pt. 2, id. Therefore, a principal consideration in determining
sufficiency should be whether a party has demonstrated a “good faith and reasonable effort” to
further the statutory purposes. Syl. Pt. 6, id. When reviewing for a good faith effort, courts do not
equate individual deficiencies in the certificate of merit with failure to comply with the MPLA.
Rather, courts should look for an attempt by the plaintiff to comply with the MPLA. Rectifiable
deficiencies are generally insufficient to warrant dismissal unless the plaintiff has willfully ignored
them and made no effort to correct. See Westmoreland v. Vaidya, 664 S.E.2d 90, 97 (W. Va. 2008)
(holding a reasonable belief of compliance was satisfactory and plaintiff should be afforded an
opportunity to correct deficiencies where plaintiff thought he was statutorily exempt from filing a
certificate); Gray v. Mena, 625 S.E.2d 326, 333 (W. Va. 2005) (explaining dismissal is not favored
where adjustments can be readily made to permit adjudication on the merits).
In the instant case, Plaintiff provided each named Defendant a copy of the same notice of
claim and screening certificate of merit. Defendants draw attention to the MPLA’s requirement

with particularity: (1) The expert’s familiarity with the applicable
standard of care in issue; (2) the expert’s qualification; (3) the
expert’s opinion as to how the applicable standard of care was
breached; and (4) the expert’s opinion as to how the breach of the
applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death.
W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7B-6(b) (West 2016).
-9-

that separate certificates be delivered to every potential defendant, and that each certificate must
state, with particularity, any potential defendant’s breach and how it resulted in injury or death.
Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 6–7, ECF No. 120. Defendants contend that providing multiple
copies of a single certificate is insufficient to comply with the MPLA. Id. However, nowhere in
Section 55–7B–6(b) does the word “individual” appear, nor does the MPLA state that certificates
need to be tailored to each recipient. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7B-6(b) (West 2016). So long as
every potential defendant receives a certificate that details each defendant’s breach and resulting
injury, the certificate complies with the MPLA. See id; Syl. Pt. 6, Hinchman, 618 S.E.2d 387. The
certificate Plaintiff provided explicitly names each of the Defendants, with the exception of Nurse
Peyton,5 and details what action constituted a breach that lead to the injury or death of Ms. Earle.
Defendants further argue dismissal is justified because Plaintiff previously failed to comply
with the MPLA. In support of this argument, Defendants point to Cline v. Kresa-Reahl, 728 S.E.2d
87 (W. Va. 2012), where the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals expressly warned against
non-compliance with the MPLA. However, Cline is inapplicable to this case. The plaintiff in Cline
altogether failed to file a certificate before trial. Cline, 728 S.E.2d at 91. In this case, Plaintiff
corrected the complete lack of notice or certificate, but Defendants argue this correction is still
insufficient. The court in Cline also disallowed amending pre-suit notice, reasoning “there would
seem to be no sense or utility in allowing amendment of a pre-suit notice and certificate after suit
is filed since its purpose is to avert frivolous claims and promote pre-suit resolution.” Id. at 98
(internal quotation and citation omitted). In the instant case, Plaintiff made a good faith effort to

5

While the certificate neglects to name Nurse Peyton specifically, a certificate was delivered to
each of the Nurses, including Nurse Peyton, and the certificate does specify how the actions of the
Nurses, generally and specifically, breached the standard of care and caused the death of Ms. Earle.
While the certificate could have benefitted from more clarity, the Court finds these deficiencies do
not warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.
-10-

comply with the statutory requirements of the MPLA and the alleged deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
certificate are inconsequential. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s notice and certificate
sufficient to satisfy the MPLA’s requirements.6
Lastly, Defendants move for summary judgment but fail to offer any justification why such
an order would be appropriate; all requests are couched in terms of dismissal. Furthermore, any
motion for summary judgment would be premature, as discovery is not complete on this issue. For
these reasons, the Court denies without prejudice Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
based on failure to comply with the MPLA.
C. Motion to Dismiss False Imprisonment Claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to articulate a viable false imprisonment claim.
The Court disagrees.
To bring a false imprisonment claim in West Virginia, a plaintiff must show “(1) the
detention of the person, and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention and restraint.” Riffe v. Armstrong,
477 S.E.2d 535, 552 (W. Va. 1996), modified of other grounds by Moats v. Preston Cty. Comm'n,
521 S.E.2d 180 (W. Va. 1999). Regarding mental hygiene orders, “[t]he circuit court, mental
hygiene commissioner or designated magistrate may enter an order for the individual named in the
application to be detained and taken into custody for the purpose of holding a probable cause
hearing.” W. Va. Code Ann. § 27-5-2 (West 2016). This application process for a mental hygiene
order does not provide for involuntary custody while an application is still pending. Id. (allowing
for detention only after petition has been granted).
Taking the Third Amended Complaint’s plausible allegations as true, a reasonable fact-

6

As suit is currently pending, Plaintiff is not required to submit any additions or amendments to
the certificate.
-11-

finder could find Ms. Earle was unlawfully held at St. Mary’s—either prior to her initial departure,
upon her return to St. Mary’s, or at both times. The Parties agree that Ms. Earle was at the hospital
for eighteen hours and was cleared for discharge well before her release at 4:40 PM on the day
after her initial admittance to St. Mary’s. Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 117; Mem.
Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 2–4, ECF No. 139. Furthermore, Ms. Earle was detained when she was
picked up by law enforcement and returned to St. Mary’s. While the lawfulness of such detention
is still at issue, Plaintiff clearly alleges an unlawful detainment by Defendants, both prior to Ms.
Earle’s initial release from St. Mary’s, 3d Am. Compl. ¶18, and upon her detainment by law
enforcement at Defendants’ direction, 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶18, 26, 74, 77, both of which could
amount to false imprisonment under West Virginia law. Riffe, 477 S.E.2d 535. Finally, it is a
question of fact whether Nurses acted negligently or intentionally in their call to Cabell County
911, during which they notified law enforcement of Ms. Earle’s departure from St. Mary’s. For
these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the False Imprisonment Claim is denied.
Defendants also move for summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim. Defendants
point to Ms. Earle’s medical records as evidence refuting any claim that she was unlawfully
detained prior to her initial release. However, this self-maintained record does not contradict
evidence that Ms. Earle was unlawfully detained. See McKelvey v. W. Reg'l Jail, No. CV 3:1322206, 2016 WL 1090619, at *12 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 21, 2016) (holding initials on defendants selfmaintained log did not blatantly contradict plaintiff’s deposition evidence of abuse). Additionally,
further discovery is needed to clarify how Ms. Earle’s detention came about, as well as the role of
Defendants in her detention. A defendant who summons the police, resulting in unlawful detention
of the plaintiff, is only absolved from false imprisonment liability when there is no evidence the
defendant directed the police to detain the plaintiff. See Lusk v. Ira Watson Co., 408 S.E.2d 630

-12-

(W. Va. 1991) (explaining liability for false imprisonment based on actions of law enforcement is
only avoided when there is no evidence that officers acted at the direction of defendant-merchant).
Here, several issues of fact remain. For instance, there is an issue of fact as to which of the Nurses
knew about the denial of the mental hygiene order before law enforcement was notified of Ms.
Earle’s departure from the hospital. Another fact-issue is whether or not Defendants were acting
negligently or with intent to detain Ms. Earle when they notified law enforcement. Because fact
issues remain at this time, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the false imprisonment
claim is denied without prejudice.
D. Motion to Dismiss Wrongful Death Claim
Finally, Defendants contend dismissal of Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim is proper under
Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff did not allege Defendants were the proximate cause of Ms. Earle’s
death. Defendants further maintain that even if such allegation was made, Officer Nield’s actions
were an intervening cause of Ms. Earle’s death. In the alternative, Defendants again seek summary
judgment. The Court finds these arguments unavailing.
Wrongful death claims in West Virginia arise under W. Va. Code § 55-7-5, which states,
in relevant part, “[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the
party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof.” W. Va. Code Ann. §
55-7-5 (West 2016). Additionally, “[q]uestions of negligence, due care, proximate cause and
concurrent negligence present issues of fact for jury determination when the evidence pertaining
to such issues is conflicting or where the facts, even though undisputed, are such that reasonable
men may draw different conclusions from them.” Syl. Pt. 6, McAllister v. Weirton Hosp., 312
S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 1983). However, a person may be absolved of liability when there is an

-13-

intervening cause, which “must be a negligent act, or omission, which constitutes a new effective
cause and operates independently of any other act, making it and it only, the proximate cause of
the injury.” Estate of Postlewait ex rel. Postlewait v. Ohio Valley Med. Ctr., 591 S.E.2d 226, 232
(W. Va. 2003) (quoting Syl. pt. 16, Lester v. Rose, 130 S.E.2d 80 (W. Va. 1963)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has alleged negligence leading to wrongful death. 3d Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 87–90. The Third Amended Complaint alleges negligence both preceding Ms. Earle’s
return to the hospital, as well as during the altercation that caused her death. See id. Furthermore,
a determination of intervening cause at this juncture would assume the negligence and independent
action of Officer Nield, a question of fact yet to be determined. Granting a motion for dismissal or
summary judgment on these grounds would require, at this time, a circuitous logic the Court will
not engage in. Given the complexity of the events surrounding Ms. Earle’s death and the competing
issues of fact, a reasonable fact-finder, construing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,
could find in favor of Plaintiff. Thus, the Court finds a claim of wrongful death has been
sufficiently alleged and denies Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Wrongful Death
Claim.
Because discovery on the issue of wrongful death is not yet complete, Defendants’
alternative Motion for Summary Judgment is premature. As such, the Court denies without
prejudice Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Mary’s Medical Center, Tammy Peyton, Tara Ramsey,
Bobbi Adams, Melissa Blagg, and Andrea Heath’s Motion to Dismiss Federal Claims and Decline
Supplemental Jurisdiction, ECF No. 122, is GRANTED in part, as to the federal claims alleged
against these Defendants, and DENIED in part as to the state claims against them. Lastly,

-14-

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims for failure
to comply with the MPLA, ECF No. 119, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, ECF No. 116, and
Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, ECF No. 116, are DENIED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Opinion and Order to counsel of
record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:

-15-

June 8, 2016