Earle et al v. City of Huntington et al

Filing 387

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendant's 297 Motion for Summary Judgment for the claims brought against Defendant City of Huntington. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 7/27/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (jsa)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION

LUMUMBA EARLE, individually and
as the Personal Representative of the
ESTATE of ANNIE EARLE, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-29536

CITY OF HUNTINGTON, d/b/a CITY OF
HUNTINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
a municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court deferred ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 297)
regarding Defendant City of Huntington in its prior Memorandum Opinion and Order. See Mem.
Op. & Order, ECF No. 345. The Court directed the parties to file additional briefs discussing the
claims against Defendant City of Huntington for municipal liability. See Order, ECF No. 343.
The Court has received Plaintiff’s Surreply and Defendant’s Response, and the issue is now ripe
for review. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 297) for the claims brought against Defendant City of Huntington.
I.

Discussion
The Court has thoroughly discussed the relevant facts for this Motion in its previous order

and will not repeat the summary here. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 345, at 2-8. Plaintiff
brought claims against Defendant City of Huntington (Defendant) for the failure to train and
supervise, negligent hiring, deliberate indifference, and for violations of the state constitution.

See Pl.’s Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 111. Defendant originally moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity for Defendant Officer Josh Nield. See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp.,
ECF No. 298, at 16. However, in the Reply, Defendant challenged Plaintiff’s claims under
municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978). Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 320, at 12-16. Plaintiff argues that the evidence
supports claims against Defendant for failure to properly investigate uses of force and failure to
train police officers on mental illness, but the Court disagrees. See Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 348.
The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have established a test for municipal liability that
Plaintiff cannot meet at the summary judgment stage.
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality cannot be held liable for its
employees’ actions under a traditional respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693.
“Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipal policies can
be based on regulations and ordinances or the informal “decisions of municipal officials authorized
to make and implement municipal policy.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir.
1987) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484 (1986)). Municipal customs can
be based on the “persistent and widespread … practices of [municipal] officials[, which]
[a]lthough not authorized by written law, [are] … so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (internal quotation marks
omitted). These customs can be attributed to the municipality only “when the duration and
frequency of the practices warrants a finding of either actual or constructive knowledge by the
municipal governing body.” Spell, 824 F.2d at 1387. For a plaintiff to successfully prove a

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municipal liability claim, the plaintiff must also establish that the policy or custom caused the
constitutional violation.

Id.

Causation can be direct when the policy or custom is

unconstitutional on its face or can be proven independently through “an affirmative link between
policy or custom and violation.” Id. at 1388 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Municipalities rarely enact policies that read explicitly unconstitutional, so plaintiffs often
have to show unconstitutionality through independent evidence. The Fourth Circuit in Spell
identified the two most basic theories for municipal liability in these situations: first, the deficiency
in police training and supervision that led to officers committing constitutional violations; and
second, the failure by municipal officials to stop or correct the improper conduct. Id. at 1389. In
each of these scenarios, the plaintiff must: (1) identify the policy or custom at issue; (2) connect
the policy or custom back to the municipality; and (3) show the affirmative link between the policy
or custom and violation to prove causation. Id. The court in Spell further limited successful
municipal liability claims under each theory by requiring the plaintiff to meet stringent
requirements. As Plaintiff in this case alleges claims against Defendant under both of these
theories, the Court will discuss the requirements in turn.
First, Plaintiff alleges liability against Defendant for failing to investigate uses of force by
police officers, which resulted in a lack of discipline for abuses and acquiescence to continued
misconduct. Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 348, at 2-4. Plaintiff attached exhibits showing that
supervisors routinely do not report to a scene when force is used and, thus, do not interview
witnesses who may have been available. Id. at 3 (describing previous procedure required by
Huntington Police Department and Defendant’s failure to follow policy). Defendant argues that
even with this evidence, Plaintiff cannot meet the standards set forth in Spell. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Surreply, ECF No. 349, at 3.

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Under Spell, Plaintiff’s claim falls under the category of “[u]nconstitutional police
practices as municipal ‘custom or usage’ by condonation.”

Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390.

Unconstitutional practices by police officers can make a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 if the conduct becomes sufficiently widespread to establish a custom or usage that has the
force of state law. Id. “Municipal fault for allowing such a developed ‘custom or usage’ to
continue requires (1) actual or constructive knowledge of its existence by responsible
policymakers, and (2) their failure, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference,
thereafter to correct or stop the practices.” Id. at 1391. A municipality’s failure to correct must
rise to the level that a violation would be “almost bound to happen, sooner or later” – not just
provide the mere likelihood that a violation could occur eventually. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is underdeveloped at this late stage of litigation and
cannot meet the standards set forth in Spell. The policy cited to in Plaintiff’s Surreply details
reporting requirements when police officers use force in the field. Originally, the policy required
the supervisor to go to the scene where force was used. This policy, however, was updated in
2012 to replicate the policy from the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies. The new policy does not require a supervisor to report to the scene or interview
witnesses, but these “more lax” measures do not correlate with Earle’s untimely death in this case.
Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 348, at 3.

Plaintiff fails to connect how less stringent reporting

requirements made the constitutional violation of excessive force almost bound to happen.
Plaintiff attempts to connect the two by describing a culture that permits excessive force violations,
but this causal link is too attenuated and lacks corresponding evidence. The documents provided
to the Court include reports identifying any use of force by the officers, which could have been
reasonable under the circumstances, rather than reports of excessive force. These files do not

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support a custom or culture of excessive force violations. Further, the fact that supervisors no
longer have to report to the scene and interview witnesses is not a “sufficiently close causal link”
to the specific constitutional violations presented in this case.
Additionally, the evidence in this case does not compare to the amount of evidence
provided in Spell, which set the standard for these claims. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1392-93 (detailing
evidence of seven lay citizens’ testimony, eight officers’ testimony, state district attorney’s
testimony, legal adviser’s testimony, and internal police records showing that complaints of force
were not corrected or punished). The complaint in Spell detailed how the defendant officials had
“knowledge of repeated allegations of abusive and assaultive behavior” and that these officials
“fail[ed] to discipline … police officers … who had been found to have committed abusive and
assaultive behavior.” Id. at 1392. The evidence submitted at trial “substantially tracked these
essential allegations.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to the Court to
establish Defendant’s knowledge of the improper custom’s persistence or an intent or indifference
to correct improper conduct. The records produced detail investigations for use of force but do
not identify excessive force incidents. Plaintiff’s only evidence of excessive force surrounds the
instant case with Officer Nield’s actions. Evidence of one incident does not provide proper notice
to officials to correct or alter behavior. At this stage in litigation, Plaintiff must produce enough
evidence to support a claim to justify sending the issue to the jury. Plaintiff has not done so here.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot maintain a municipal liability claim against
Defendant for the failure to properly investigate the use of force by the Huntington Police
Department’s officers.
Second, Plaintiff alleges liability against Defendant for failing to properly train its police
officers on handling persons with mental illnesses. Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 348, at 4-5. Plaintiff

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points to deposition testimony of Huntington Police Department officers who do not recall
receiving training – or at least fail to remember the contents of such training – for encountering
persons with mental illness. See id. at 5. Defendant argues that the evidence fails to meet the
standards set forth in Spell for deficient training claims. See Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Surreply, ECF
No. 349, at 14-15.
Under Spell, Plaintiff’s claim is characterized as “[d]eficient training as culpable municipal
policy.” Spell, 824 F.2d at 1389. Training programs and subsequent supervision of police
officers constitutes a matter of policy that can establish municipal liability under Monell. Id.
However, “[o]nly those deficiencies in police training policies that result from policymaker fault
of at least the degree of deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the constitutional rights of
persons within police force jurisdiction can give rise to municipal liability; mere negligence on the
part of policymakers is not sufficient.” Id. at 1390. A successful claim for deficient training
must demonstrate “a sufficiently close causal link” between the deficiency and the constitutional
violation. Id. “This requires first that a specific deficiency rather than general laxness or
ineffectiveness in training be shown.” Id. The violation again must be “almost bound to happen,
sooner or later” due to the deficiency in training. Id.
Although the Court may find Defendant’s training on mental illnesses imperfect, Plaintiff
has failed to produce enough evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion on the claim.
Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to the Court to demonstrate Defendant’s deliberate
indifference or reckless disregard for the deficient training.

At most, the record shows an

ineffectiveness in the training provided. See Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 348, at 5 (detailing how
various officers could not remember the substance of mental illness training).

This

ineffectiveness clearly contributed to Officer Nield’s actions regarding Earle, but Plaintiff has not

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provided other instances in which police officers failed to react properly when interacting with
persons having a mental illness.

Plaintiff has not provided witness statements or specific

examples to support the allegation that the Huntington Police Department has a policy or custom
that violates the rights of persons with mental illness.
surrounds Officer Nield’s actions in the instant case.

The only evidence provided again
Without more examples of improper

conduct, the Court cannot state that Defendant’s ineffective training on mental illness amounts to
a policy or custom to hold it liable for an individual officer’s constitutional violations. “[P]roof
of a single violation will not support the inference that the violation resulted from a municipal
‘policy’ of deficient training.” Spell, 824 F.2d at 1391. At the summary judgment stage, the
Court requires concrete evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim to justify a jury trial on the issue. As
the record currently stands, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant City of Huntington are too
undeveloped to proceed to a jury. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 297) for claims against Defendant City of Huntington.
II.

Conclusion
The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet the stringent requirements to establish municipal

liability under Monell or Spell. Accordingly, the Court must GRANT in part Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 297) in favor of Defendant City of Huntington.1
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.

ENTER:

1

July 27, 2017

Claims against Defendant Officer Josh Nield will continue to trial as specified in the
Court’s previous Order. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 345.
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