Alford et al v. Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 17 OPPOSED MOTION by Judith Alford, Tina Alford, Melissa Bias for Jurisdictional Discovery; directing jurisdictional discovery in this case limited to the issue of FHI and Subaru's contacts with West Virginia, which may require producing, in whole or in part, discoverable business plans, marketing strategies, sales data, and other commercial interactions between these corporations and the forum State; in conducting jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs shal l have all the traditional discovery tools available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the deadline for completing jurisdictional discovery is on or before sixty days after the entry of this order. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 2/25/2016. (cc: attys; any unrepresented parties) (mkw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION

THE ESTATE OF JUDITH ALFORD, BY
MELISSA BIAS, ADMINISTRATRIX and
TINA ALFORD, individually,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-16449

FUJI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD,
a foreign corporation;
SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.,
a New Jersey corporation; and
KEATON’S COLLISION CENTER, INC.,
a West Virginia corporation,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is a motion for jurisdictional discovery brought by Plaintiffs. ECF No. 17. In that
motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold in abeyance for sixty days a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction brought by Defendant Fuji Heavy Industry, Ltd. (“FHI”), ECF No. 10, to
grant jurisdictional discovery during the sixty-day abeyance, and to permit Plaintiffs to respond to
FHI’s motion at the end of that sixty-day abeyance.1 FHI opposes jurisdictional discovery, arguing
that district courts lack power to order jurisdictional discovery, and second, even if they possess
such power, in this case Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts necessary for granting
jurisdictional discovery. Defendant Subaru of America, Inc. (“Subaru”) (collectively

1

Previously, the Court granted Plaintiffs an extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss.
ECF No. ECF No. 19. Plaintiffs’ response is due on or before seven days after an order denying
Plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery; or on or before sixty days after an order granting
Plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery. Id.

“Defendants”) joins FHI’s opposition to jurisdictional discovery. Because the Court has power to
order jurisdictional discovery, and because such is warranted in this case, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery.
I.

Federal District Courts Have Power to Grant Jurisdictional Discovery

First, this Court has power to grant discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction raised
by Defendants’ motion to dismiss. A federal district court uncertain about its personal jurisdiction
over a defendant may, in its discretion, grant discovery for the limited purpose of determining
whether exercising personal jurisdiction is proper. See Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst
Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing district courts have broad
discretion whether to grant discovery and concluding court did not abuse discretion in denying
discovery on issue of personal jurisdiction); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 64 (4th
Cir. 1993) (same); McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming district
court conclusion that “limited depositions may be warranted to explore jurisdictional facts in some
cases”); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978) (observing
“where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the facts bearing
on such issues.”); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Although
the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts that support personal jurisdiction, courts are
to assist the plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery unless the plaintiff's claim is clearly
frivolous. If a plaintiff presents factual allegations that suggest with reasonable particularity the
possible existence of the requisite contacts between the party and the forum state, the plaintiff's
right to conduct jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“[a] plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is entitled to

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reasonable discovery”) (citation omitted).2 “When a plaintiff offers only speculation or conclusory
assertions about contacts with a forum state, a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional
discovery.” Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 402. In this case, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on
personal jurisdiction. In response, Plaintiff has asked for jurisdictional discovery. Therefore, the
Court has discretion to order jurisdictional discovery.
II.

Jurisdictional Discovery is Warranted in this Case

Second, construing all facts in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Complaint suggests with reasonably
particularity the possible existence of personal jurisdiction over FHI. When asking if personal
jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant, federal courts employ a two-step inquiry: first, is
the state long-arm statute satisfied by the defendant’s alleged conduct? Second, is the Fourteenth
Amendment due process guarantee satisfied by the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum
state? Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994); Syl. Pt. 1, Easterling
v. American Optical Corp., 529 S.E.2d 588, 207 (W. Va. 2000). Federal courts, looking to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals’ interpretation of West Virginia’s long-arm statute, have
concluded that the state long-arm statute’s reach is “co-extensive with due process.”3 Clark v.

2

In the context of special proceedings to inquire about personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
has dismissed potential concerns about violating due process by mere use of procedural tools—
like granting jurisdictional discovery. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 706-07 (1982) (“the manner in which [a district court] determines whether it has
personal jurisdiction may include a variety of legal rules and presumptions, as well as
straightforward factfinding. . . [T]he mere use of procedural rules does not in itself violate the
defendant's due process rights.”).
3
Notably, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not itself interpreted the State’s longarm statute as coextensive with federal due process. Instead, it has continued to apply a two-step
framework. See Easterling, 529 S.E.2d at 595–96. Even still, the West Virginia long-arm statute
is satisfied in this case. The long-arm statute, by its terms, authorizes suit against nonresidents who
transact business within West Virginia. W. Va. Code § 31-1-15, 56-3-33. That section does not
limit its application to nonresidents whose business relates to the cause of action. Thus, if a
defendant transacts business in the State, even business unrelated to the cause of action, and the
constitutional requirement is met—general personal jurisdiction being the only one available when
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Milam, 830 F.Supp. 316, 319 n. 3 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (citing Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid
Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522, 525 (4th Cir.1987)). Accordingly, this Court will only pursue the
second step in the personal jurisdiction analysis: whether the Fourteenth Amendment due process
guarantee is satisfied. “To satisfy constitutional due process, the defendant must have sufficient
minimum contacts with West Virginia so that requiring it to defend its interests here would not
‘offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Vass v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc.,
304 F.Supp.2d 851, 854 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)). Because the cause of action in this case is unrelated to Defendant’s contacts with the
forum—this case centers upon an injury that occurred in another state and Defendant’s alleged
contacts pertain to business it conducts in West Virginia—the Court will ask if it has general
personal jurisdiction over this corporate defendant doing business in West Virginia. When a
defendant has such “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state that the defendant
is essentially “at home” there, courts of the forum will have general personal jurisdiction over the
defendant for all claims, even those unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
Construing all facts in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Complaint pleads with particularity the
possibility that this Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants. According to the
Complaint, FHI is a foreign corporation conducting business in West Virginia. Compl. 1–2, ECF
No. 1–1. FHI designs, manufactures, markets, distributes, assembles, and tests products for use in
West Virginia, including its product at issue in this case, a 2003 Subaru Legacy. Compl. 2. In their
motion for jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs point out that FHI is a multinational corporation that

the cause of action is unrelated to the business conducted in the forum—then the long arm statute
and due process requirements are both satisfied and the court has general personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.
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has three types of businesses: automobiles for Subaru, airplanes and helicopters for Boeing and
Lockheed Martin, and other industrial products. Mot. for Jurisdictional Discov. 2, ECF No. 17.
FHI knows that many of these products are sold to West Virginians. Id. Take for instance Subaru,
a division of FHI: Subaru alone sells hundreds if not thousands of vehicles each year in West
Virginia. Id. Consider also Polaris: FHI owns stock in Polaris and has provided it millions of
engines for snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, watercraft, and other utility vehicles, many of which
are sold in West Virginia. Id. There are many Subaru and Polaris dealerships in West Virginia,
which sell FHI vehicles and products with FHI components. Id. Look also at Toyota: FHI is partly
owned by Toyota, and FHI has made thousands of Toyota Camrys at its Indiana plant, knowing
many of these would be sold in West Virginia. Id. at 2–3. Additionally, FHI tracks complaints and
feedback from consumers, distributors, and dealers, many of whom are West Virginians. Id. at 3.
For each state FHI records the number of its vehicles shipped there and revenue generated in that
state. Id. Through FHI’s automobile distributorship agreement, FHI derives substantial profit by
selling vehicles in the State of West Virginia. Id.
Taking the above facts as true, the Complaint establishes the possibility of this Court’s
general personal jurisdiction over FHI. A reasonable person could conclude from these facts that
FHI intends for this large volume of products to be sold in West Virginia because FHI knows with
certainty its products are sold there when FHI sells these products to various distributors and
retailers. Even if that conclusion on its own does not establish general personal jurisdiction over
FHI, these facts make it possible that FHI, because of its size and volume of business, conducts
other business in West Virginia so systematically and continuously that it could reasonably foresee
being hauled into court there for any matter. See Toys "R" Us, Inc., 318 F.3d at 456 (requiring for
jurisdictional discovery only that plaintiff allege facts “suggesting with reasonably particularity

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the possible existence” of personal jurisdiction). Because the plaintiff alleges facts suggesting with
reasonable particularity the possible existence of general personal jurisdiction over FHI, the Court
finds limited jurisdictional discovery is warranted in this case.4
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS jurisdictional discovery in this case limited
to the issue of FHI and Subaru’s contacts with West Virginia, which may require producing, in
whole or in part, discoverable business plans, marketing strategies, sales data, and other
commercial interactions between these corporations and the forum State. In conducting
jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs shall have all the traditional discovery tools available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The deadline for completing jurisdictional discovery is on or
before sixty days after the entry of this order.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Memorandum Opinion and
Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:

February 25, 2016

The Court has considered the declaration attached to FHI’s motion to dismiss, but the declaration
does not affect the Court’s jurisdictional discovery analysis. Decl. of Yasuhiro Takemoto in
Support of FHI’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10–1. Mr. Takemoto, a manager for FHI, states in his
declaration that FHI does not conduct any business in West Virginia. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4. FHI has never
“reached into West Virginia to solicit or initiate business,” and it does not “sell or ship goods to
West Virginia customers,” id. ¶ 6, nor does it design, manufacture, advertise, or “have long-term
business activities” in the State. Lastly, FHI does not have an office or any property or agent the
State, nor is it registered to do business there. Id. ¶ 5. The Court finds these declarations are too
broad and unspecific to be helpful in its analysis. In light of the alleged volume of business that
FHI conducts, these boilerplate declarations do not persuade the Court that its general personal
jurisdiction over FHI is altogether impossible. Unlike the Complaint’s allegations coupled with
explanations in Plaintiffs’ motion for jurisdictional discovery, Mr. Takemoto’s allegations are
conclusory and wholly lacking particularity about the different types of business that FHI
conducts. Therefore, the Court finds Mr. Takemoto’s declarations unhelpful in its jurisdictional
discovery analysis.
4

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