Carley v. Colvin

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER adopting and incorporating 14 Proposed Findings and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge; denying petitioner's 9 motion for judgment on the pleadings; granting commissioner's 10 motion for judgment on the pleadings; directing that this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from the Court's docket. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 9/8/2017. (cc: Magistrate Judge Eifert; counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (hkl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION

RANDALL CARLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-cv-10034

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Randall Carley, instituted this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on October 15,
2015, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). By standing order, this action was referred to the Honorable
Cheryl A. Eifert, United States Magistrate Judge, who filed her Proposed Findings and
Recommendations (“PF&R”) on July 28, 2017. Proposed Findings & Recommendations, ECF No.
14. Judge Eifert recommends that this Court grant the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings, deny Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismiss this case with
prejudice.
Plaintiff filed objections to the PF&R on August 10, 2017, which the Court will assess
under a de novo standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
I.

Background
On June 19, 2013, Plaintiff brought his claim alleging disability due to multiple conditions.

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application both initially and upon reconsideration. Decision

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of ALJ, ECF No. 8-2, at 1; Tr. of Oral Hr’g on June 5, 2015, ECF No. 8-3, at 3. After a hearing
requested by Plaintiff, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was not disabled
as defined by the Social Security Act. Decision of ALJ, at 4-14. In a written decision dated July
20, 2015, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments including,
coronary artery disease, status post myocardial infarction and stent placement with high blood
pressure, lumbar degenerative disc disease and degenerative join disease, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, borderline intellectual functioning (“BIF”)/ learning disorder, and affective
disorder. Id. at 3-4. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of those listed in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retains “the residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary work” and that “there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” Decision of ALJ, at 6-13. Based
upon these findings, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application for DIB.
Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision, and contended that the ALJ improperly determined
that his cognitive functioning did not meet or equal the standard for an intellectual disorder in
Listing 12.05. The Appeals Council denied the request for review on September 21, 2016,
rendering the ALJ decision final.
The PF&R contains a thorough analysis of relevant information regarding Plaintiff’s
person, medical, and procedural history. Plaintiff maintains the same objections to the PF&R as
he did to the ALJ’s decision.
II.

Standard of Review
This Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the . . . [Magistrate

Judge's] proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §

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636(b)(1). The scope of this Court's review of the Commissioner's decision, however, is narrow:
this Court must uphold the Commissioner's factual findings “if they are supported by substantial
evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing “findings of the Commissioner
of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”) (other
citation omitted)). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, but only such
evidence “as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)).
In conducting this review, this Court also must address whether the ALJ analyzed all of the
relevant evidence and sufficiently explained her rationale in crediting or discrediting certain
evidence. See Milburn Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Murphy
v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1987) (remanding claim for disability benefits because ALJ
did not adequately explain why he credited one doctor's views over those of another). It is the
ALJ’s duty, however, not the courts, “to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). If there is
conflicting evidence and reasonable minds could differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, it is
the Commissioner or his designate, the ALJ, who makes the decision. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589
(citation omitted). “The issue before [this Court], therefore, is not whether [Petitioner] is disabled,
but whether the ALJ's finding that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was
reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.” Id. (citation omitted).
Applying these standards, the Court has reviewed de novo those portions of the PF & R to
which the Commissioner objected. For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADPOTS AND

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INCORPORATES HEREIN the PF & R of the Magistrate Judge, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings, GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this case from the docket.
III.

Discussion
The PF&R provides a detailed and well-articulated reasoning for concluding that the ALJ’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence. Judge Eifert explained that, viewed as a whole,
the ALJ’s findings were based upon a complete examination of the record. Proposed Findings &
Recommendations, at 15-27. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not demonstrate the necessary
deficits to satisfy Listing 12.05. Decision of ALJ, at 6. In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ did not
ignore contrary evidence. The ALJ recognized that the Plaintiff’s records reflected some cognitive
limitation. Proposed Findings & Recommendations, at 22; Decision of ALJ, at 6-7, 10-12. But, the
evidence of Plaintiff’s sufficient adaptive functioning led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff did
not satisfy Listing 12.05. Decision of ALJ, at 6-7. Specifically, the ALJ based his conclusion upon
evidence in the record that the Plaintiff “performs many activities of daily living including
performing his own personal care . . . , performed well at manual labor jobs for many years . . . ,
[and] reported in 2013 that he could follow spoken instructions, count change, and manage money
orders.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff contends that the weight of the evidentiary record supports a finding that he
demonstrated the necessary deficits to satisfy Listing 12.05. Pl.’s Obj. to Proposed Findings and
Recommendation, ECF No. 15, at 3. He argues that the ALJ relied upon “shallow [and]
insignificant evidence to support his decision.” Id. at 1. According to Plaintiff, that he “can perform
deminimus [sic] activities” should not disqualify him from satisfying the requirements under

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Listing 12.05. Id. at 2. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the ALJ found that Plaintiff exhibited
adaptive functioning sufficient to not qualify under Listing 12.05.
A claimant must satisfy three prongs to demonstrate that his or her limited cognitive
functioning meets or equals the listed impairment of intellectual disability under Listing 12.05. 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, §12.05; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir.
2012) (outlining the requirements for Listing 12.05). First, a claimant must demonstrate “deficits
in adaptive functioning initially manifesting during the developmental period . . . before age 22”
(“Prong 1”). Id. Second, claimant must meet the requirements in one of four paragraphs, known
as Paragraphs A-D. Id. In this case, Plaintiff sought to show that he met the requirements under
Paragraph C. Under Paragraph C, a claimant must have a qualifying “valid verbal, performance,
or full scale IQ of 60 through 70” (“Prong 2”). Id. Finally, a claimant must show “a physical or
other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of
function” (“Prong 3”). Id. If a claimant does not satisfy any one of these prongs, the claim fails.
See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 475.
As more thoroughly explained in the PF&R, the ALJ found that Plaintiff failed to satisfy
the requirements of Prong 1. Although somewhat opaque in its composition, the ALJ’s decision
provides an adequate discussion of the record to support the finding that Plaintiff did not have the
necessary deficits in adaptive functioning to meet Prong 1. Decision of ALJ, at 6, 10-12. Adaptive
functioning generally refers to how well individuals cope with everyday demands. See Dearry v.
Astrue, 2:11-CV-27, 2012 WL 1165332, at *5 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2012) (quoting Am. Psychiatric
Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42 (4th Ed. 1994)). The Fourth
Circuit has provided that when determining deficits in adaptive functioning, an ALJ may consider
“limitations in areas such as communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use

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of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and
safety.” Jackson v. Astrue, 467 Fed. App’x 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Atkins
v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002)). In determining that Plaintiff did not demonstrate the deficits
in adaptive functioning necessary to meet Prong 1, the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s ability to perform
many “activities of daily living,” his satisfactory job performance for many years, and Plaintiff’s
admissions that he could follow spoken instructions, count change, and manage money orders.
Decision of ALJ, at 6.
Furthermore, the ALJ discussed the totality of evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental
impairments later in the decision. The ALJ explored the litany of difficulties claimed by Plaintiff.
He detailed the social, intellectual, and practical challenges Plaintiff faces. Specifically, the ALJ
cited to the Plaintiff’s limitations in reading and writing, completing household chores, dealing
with other people, focusing, and following instructions. Id. at 6-7, 10-12. The ALJ even found that
Plaintiff had both “moderate limitations” in the areas of social functioning, concentration, and
persistence, and “mild limitations” in the area of daily living activities. Id. 11-12. Additionally,
the ALJ explained the findings and opinions of Emily Wilson, MA, LP, who examined Plaintiff.
Ms. Wilson opined that Plaintiff “had mildly deficient social functioning and his pace was mildly
slow.” Id. at 11. Finding Ms. Wilson’s opinions well supported by the record, the ALJ gave them
weight in reaching his conclusions. Id.
Despite this evidence of certain cognitive limitations, the ALJ found that Plaintiff still
maintained the ability to read at a fourth or fifth grade level and write lists for simple tasks; do
simple math; learn and apply simple and clear instructions of no more than three or four steps; and
“get along with coworkers and the retail public, but is limited to routine and perfunctory social
interactions.” Id. at 12. The ALJ based his findings upon Plaintiff’s testimony that he goes to the

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post office, goes to social functions, reads, writes, count change, pay bills, does some chores, and
generally succeeded in his employment for many years. Id. at 6, 10-12. Indeed, the record suggests
that Plaintiff “performs most activities of daily living fairly independently.” Tr. 4201, ECF No. 813. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate the necessary deficits in adaptive
functioning is based upon substantial evidence found in the record. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364
F.3d 501, 504-05 (3d. Cir. 2004) (providing in the context of administrative proceedings under the
Federal Black Lung Act, an ALJ’s decision may appropriately be “read as a whole”).
The ALJ’s consideration of not only Plaintiff’s abilities, but also his limitations constitutes
a satisfactory analysis of the record. Discussion of Plaintiff’s admitted abilities to perform
everyday tasks provides “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion.
See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (describing what is needed to satisfy the substantial evidence
requirement). Although reasonable minds could differ about whether or not Plaintiff meets the
conditions of Listing 12.05, it is not the place of this Court to reweight the evidence. Craig, 76
F.3d at 589. The ALJ is tasked with both resolving conflicts in the record and making
determinations of credibility. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Craig
v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)). Consistent with his adjudicatory duties, the ALJ
reasonably resolved the conflict in evidence regarding the extent of Plaintiff’s cognitive
functioning by finding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the necessary deficits under Listing
12.05. Accordingly, this Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not demonstrate
the necessary deficits in adaptive functioning under Listing 12.05 was based upon substantial
evidence.

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Citations to “Tr. __” refer to the administrative record and the omnibus numbering provided for that record.

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Additionally, Plaintiff rightfully points out the ALJ’s error in finding that Plaintiff lacked
the required IQ score to satisfy Listing 12.05C. Pl.’s Obj. to Proposed Findings and
Recommendation, at 1. However, because the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate
the necessary deficits in adaptive functioning is supported by substantial evidence, the IQ score
error is a harmless one. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 475 (“As previously noted, [Plaintiff] can prevail
only if she establishes that the ALJ erred in his analysis of Prong 1 and Prong 2. Therefore, even
if the ALJ’s finding concerning Prong 2 of Listing 12.05C did not rest on substantial evidence, we
would still be required to affirm the ALJ’s decision if his finding with regard to Prong 1 was based
on substantial evidence.”).
IV.

Conclusion
It is the job of this Court not to decide the case, but instead to ensure that the ALJ has based

his or her conclusion sufficiently upon the factual record. In this case, the ALJ made his
determination with sufficient analysis of, and support from, the evidentiary record.
Therefore, having received the PF&F and Plaintiff’s objections, and having reviewed the
record de novo, it is ORDERED:
1. That the PF&R be, and hereby is, ADOPTED AND INCORPORATED HEREIN;
2. That the Petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED;
3. That the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED; and
4. That this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from the Court’s docket.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to Magistrate Judge Eifert,
counsel of record, and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:

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September 8, 2017

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE