Fredeking et al v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER granting the 54 Motion of Fredeking and Fredeking Law Offices to Quash Subpoena; granting Plaintiffs' 57 Motion to Quash Subpoena; and granting 59 Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Compelling Discovery, for the reasons more fully stated herein and at the motion hearing held 5/11/2018; directing Defendant to produce the two policies requested by Plaintiffs on or before 5/25/2018; further directing Plaintiffs to provide support for their request for reasonab le fees, costs, and sanctions related to pursuing their discovery motions on or before 5/25/2018; Defendant shall have two weeks after receipt of Plaintiffs' filing to respond in opposition of the request. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 5/14/2018. (cc: counsel of record) (jsa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
R.R. FREDEKING, II and
DEBBIE FREDEKING,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-12415

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
On Friday, May 11, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the Motion of Fredeking and
Fredeking Law Offices to Quash Subpoena, (ECF No. 54); Plaintiffs’ Motion to Quash
Subpoena, (ECF No. 57); and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order Compelling Discovery, (ECF
No. 59). After reviewing the materials and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court
GRANTS the three motions for the reasons more fully stated at the hearing. In summary,
the Motions to Quash are granted, because Defendant has not established that the records
sought from Fredeking and Fredeking are relevant to the issues in dispute. Defendant
argues that the requested documents are relevant, because Plaintiffs seek damages under
the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”), W. Va. Code § 46A1-101, et seq.; specifically, Plaintiffs allege violations under W. Va. Code § 46A-2-127 and
W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128. Defendant contends that in order for Plaintiffs to succeed on
their WVCCPA claims, they “must prove that the account at issue is used ‘primarily for
personal, household, or agricultural purpose.’” (ECF No. 69 at 4). Defendant asserts that
the pertinent Chase revolving charge account was opened by Plaintiff, R.R. Fredeking, II,
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who used the account to purchase both business and personal items and services.
Therefore, Defendant contends that it is entitled to discover what percentage of the
purchases made on the revolving charge account were for business purposes and what
percentage were personal charges.
However, after reviewing the WVCCPA and the cases cited by Defendant, the
undersigned finds no support for Defendant’s position. Nothing in the cases or statutory
provisions referenced by Defendant indicates that the revolving charge account must be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes in order to prosecute a matter
relating to a charge made on that account. Instead, in the undersigned’s view, the
WVCCPA is concerned with the purpose of the individual transaction at issue, not with
the account as a whole.
Indeed, the introductory sections of the WVCCPA make clear that it applies, in
relevant part, to a “consumer,” who is induced to enter into a “revolving charge account.”
W. Va. Code § 46A-1-104. The statute does not state that the revolving charge account
must be used primarily for personal, family, or household charges. In the definitions
section that applies to the claims asserted by Plaintiffs, the term “consumer” is defined as
“a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” W. Va. Code § 46A-2122(a). The definition of “consumer” makes no comment regarding the nature of
purchases covered by the WVCCPA; it only concerns who qualifies as a consumer under
the Act. Furthermore, § 46A-2-122(b) indicates that when used in W. Va. Code §§ 46A-2127, 46A-2-128 (the sections under which Plaintiffs sue), the term “claim” means “any
obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction
in which the money, property, insurance, or service which is the subject of the
transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes, whether or not
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such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” W. Va. Code § 46A-2-122(b) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the relevant definitions require only that Plaintiffs be natural
persons allegedly obligated to pay a debt, and that the debt arise from a transaction that
is primarily personal. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the relevant issue
to be discovered is the nature of the disputed transaction. Consequently, Defendant is not
entitled to all law firm documents related to Plaintiffs’ revolving credit account.
With respect to the Motion to Compel, the parties largely resolved the issues with
the exception of two Chase policies requested by Plaintiffs. Defendant argues that the
policies are not applicable. However, as the policies involve the management by Chase
employees of disputed credit card charges, and this case arises from a disputed credit card
charge, the undersigned finds that the policies are discoverable and should be produced.
For the reasons stated, Defendant is ORDERED to produce the two policies
requested by Plaintiffs on or before May 25, 2018. Plaintiffs request reasonable fees,
costs, and sanctions related to pursuing their discovery motions. Therefore, Plaintiffs are
ORDERED to provide support for that request on or before May 25, 2018,and
Defendant shall have two weeks after receipt of Plaintiffs’ filing to respond in opposition
of the request.
The Clerk is ORDERED to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record.
ENTERED: May 14, 2018

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