Morris v. Santander Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 47

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL granting Plaintiff's 36 MOTION to Compel Defendant Santander Bank, N.A., to provide supplemental answers to discovery; directing Santander to supply Plaintiff with the requested information within seven days of the date of this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 12/13/2017. (cc: counsel of record) (jsa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
PAULA LUCAS, Administratrix
for the Estate of LEAH
DELORES MORRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-12742

SANTANDER BANK, N.A., et. al,
Defendants
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL
Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Santander Bank, N.A., to
provide supplemental answers to discovery. (ECF No. 36). This case involves a mortgage
loan obtained by Plaintiff’s decedent in May 2000—the terms of which Plaintiff claims
were unconscionable. Defendant Santander Bank, N.A. (“Santander”) began servicing the
loan in 2015. Plaintiff served Santander with discovery requests in June 2017, and
Santander responded to the requests on October 16, 2017. Plaintiff filed her motion to
compel on November 13, 2017 asking the Court to order Santander to produce two pieces
of information: the name of the current holder of the 2000 mortgage loan and a copy of
the loan origination file. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion and
ORDERS Santander to supply this information to Plaintiff within seven days of the
date of this Order.
Santander provides five arguments in opposition to the motion to compel. Each
argument will be addressed in turn. First, Santander argues that the motion should be
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denied, because the requested information is outside the scope of discovery permitted by
the Court. In support of that contention, Santander points to the Report of Parties’
Planning Meeting and the Court’s Scheduling Order. (ECF Nos. 19, 20). Santander claims
that the Court approved the Report of the Parties’ Planning Meeting, “thereby narrowing
the parties’ discovery.” (ECF No. 44 at 2). In the Report, the parties agreed that discovery
would need to be conducted on whether Santander’s debt collection practices violated
West Virginia law. The parties did not mention any other areas of discovery in the report.
However, contrary to Santander’s representation, the Court did not explicitly limit
the subject matter of discovery in the Scheduling Order. (ECF No. 20). Although the Court
adopted the parties’ limitations on the number and use of various methods of discovery,
the Court made no mention of a “narrowed” subject matter. Considering that Plaintiff’s
complaint, in large part, arises from an alleged unconscionable mortgage loan and further
considering that the Court did not expressly place a subject matter limitation on
discovery, the undersigned finds Santander’s first argument to be without merit.
Second, Santander contends that information regarding the loan origination and
current loan holder is irrelevant, because it has nothing to do with the only remaining
issue in the case; that being, whether John Doe loan holder is a party to an unconscionable
contract. Santander alleges that the current holder of the mortgage loan “was not around
at the inception of the contract” and, thus, “cannot provide any insight” into the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the loan. (ECF No. 44 at 3). Santander argues,
as a result, the name of the loan holder cannot be relevant to the pending claim. The
undersigned finds this argument unconvincing. Since the identity of the loan holder is
unknown to Plaintiff and the Court, it is equally unknown whether the current holder was
“around” at the inception of the loan and whether the holder has “insight” into the
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origination of the loan. Until the identity of the holder is revealed, Santander’s
representations are unsubstantiated and cannot provide a basis for withholding the name.
Therefore, the identity of the current loan holder is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim. Moreover,
as Santander concedes, whether the terms of the loan are unconscionable “depends on
circumstances … beyond the face of the [loan agreement].” (Id. at 2) (quoting Powell v.
Bank of Am., No. 2:11-cv-00335, 2012 WL 1155130, at * 7 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 5, 2012).
Consequently, documents in the loan origination file may certainly be relevant to
Plaintiff’s claim that the loan was unconscionable. As such, the undersigned finds
Santander’s second argument to be unpersuasive.
Third, Santander asserts that it should not be required to provide supplemental
responses, because Plaintiff no longer has any pending claims against it. According to
Santander, it “should not be forced to endure the burden of time and expense to engage
in additional discovery” in view of the absence of such claims. (ECF No. 44 at 3). The
undersigned likewise finds this argument unpersuasive given that parties to litigation
frequently obtain information and documents from third-parties against whom no claims
are asserted. If Santander were not a party to this action, Plaintiff would have the right to
subpoena the requested information from Santander. However, since Santander is still a
named party, Plaintiff has the right to seek to compel the information as long as it is
relevant, not privileged, and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
The information sought is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim and is not privileged, and Santander
provides no factual basis upon which the undersigned should be concerned about the
proportionality of the requests. Therefore, this argument is without merit.
Next, Santander claims that Plaintiff’s motion failed to comply with the Local Rules
of this Court, which require Plaintiff to specify which discovery requests were not fully
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answered. While it is true that Plaintiff does not indicate which requests are in dispute,
Plaintiff attaches a copy of the requests and responses to the motion to compel. Plaintiff
has particularized the information that she wants Santander to supply; therefore, the
undersigned is able, without much effort, to determine which numbered requests are
implicated. Plaintiff asked for the name of the current loan holder in Interrogatory No. 3
and asked for the loan origination documents in Request for Production of Documents
No. 2. As the attachment to Plaintiff’s motion demonstrates, the information sought to be
compelled was requested and was withheld. Local Rule 37.1(c) is designed to assist the
judicial officer in efficiently resolving discovery disagreements by requiring parties to
clearly specify the issues in dispute. In this case, the undersigned finds the issues to be
clear; therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to list the disputed requests did not hinder the Court’s
assessment of the motion.
Finally, Santander states that the motion to compel should be denied, because
Plaintiff did not file the motion within 30 days after the discovery responses were due, as
required by Local Rule 37.1(c). According to the information provided to the Court,
Plaintiff served her requests on June 29, 2017, making the responses due no later than
July 31, 2017 (assuming they were sent by mail). Therefore, under the Local Rule, the
motion to compel should have been filed on or before August 30, 2017. Nevertheless,
Local Rule 37.1(c) provides the Court with authority to extend the 30-day deadline for
good cause shown. Here, Plaintiff’s motion to compel was filed beyond the deadline, but
so were Santander’s responses to the discovery requests. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s motion
was filed within thirty days of receipt of Santander’s responses.
While the undersigned does not intend to encourage parties to violate the Local
Rules, this case has had an unusual progression. In view of the limited information sought
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by Plaintiff, the fact that Plaintiff’s delay in moving to compel the requested information
was partially due to Santander’s untimely responses, and given the fact that producing
same will not change the status of the claims against Santander, the undersigned finds
good cause to extend the 30-day deadline set forth in Local Rule 37.1(c).
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion
to compel and ORDERS Santander to supply Plaintiff with the requested information
within seven days of the date of this Order.
The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record.
ENTERED: December 13, 2017

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