S.M.B. v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendants Michael York's and P. Owen's 9 MOTION to Dismiss; directing that Plaintiff's claims for money damages based on violations of the West Virginia Constitution are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 9/1/2017. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (jsa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
S.M.B.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-1300
WEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL AND
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AUTHORITY,
MICHAEL YORK,
P. OWENS, and
JOHN DOE #1,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants Michael York’s and P. Owen’s Motion to Dismiss.
ECF No. 9. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants alleging violations of the state and federal
constitutions and common law negligence for failing to protect him from physical and sexual
assault by his fellow inmates at the Western Regional Jail. Defendants, employees of the West
Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority (“WVJCFA”), believe they are entitled
to qualified immunity and should be dismissed from the suit. Defendants also contend that the
West Virginia Constitution does not permit money damages. For the following reasons the Court
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss.
I.
Background
Plaintiff was initially detained at Western Regional Jail (“WRJ”) in October 2014 as a
pretrial detainee. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 12, ECF No. 1. He was housed in POD C-1. Id. ¶ 13 During his
time in C-1 a number of inmates harassed and threatened to kill Plaintiff and one inmate even
constructed a noose out of bed sheets. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff notified WRJ staff about the threats and
harassment, and he was placed in protective custody. Id. ¶ 15. At some point after he was placed
in protective custody, Plaintiff was released on bond. Id.
On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff was again detained at the WRJ after his bond was revoked.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 16. Upon admission, Plaintiff informed Defendant John Doe #1 that he should not be
housed in POD C-1 due to the presence of the same inmates that had threatened him during his
previous stay in C-1. Id. ¶ 17. Defendants York and Owens were on duty as booking officers or
supervisors on February 20 and 21. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. Plaintiff alleges that one or more of the Defendants
responded to his protestations that he “shouldn’t have come back to jail” and his safety “was a
personal problem.” Id. ¶ 19. Defendants did not conduct a review of records related to Plaintiff’s
previous stay, and Plaintiff was assigned to C-1. Id. ¶ 20.
Within hours of his arrival inmates that had threatened his life during his previous stay
physically and sexually assaulted Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 21. During their assault the inmates rendered
Plaintiff unconscious and inflicted such injury that Plaintiff required emergency surgery to repair
his spleen. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff also suffered a number of broken bones and other injuries consistent
with sexual assault. Id.
Plaintiff filed this suit claiming Defendants violated his federal and state constitutional
rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and Defendants negligently performed their
duties when they reassigned Plaintiff to POD C-1. Id. ¶¶ 24–42.
Defendants York and Owens now move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Def.’s Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 9. Defendants believe they are entitled to qualified immunity
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for their conduct as WVJCFA employees and that West Virginia does not permit recovery of
money damages for violations of the state constitution. Id. 3, 6.
II.
Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court follows a twostep approach: (1) “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and then
(2) “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
For the first step, the complaint must provide the plaintiff’s “grounds of . . . entitlement to
relief” in more factual detail than mere “labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
For the second step, a court must take the remaining factual allegations in the complaint as
true, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.
The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 555, 570 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plausibility is established “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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III.
Discussion
a. Qualified Immunity
Defendants’ argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct in this case.
Defendants resort to state qualified immunity standards and principles to demonstrate their
immunity. Def.’s Mem in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3–5. West Virginia’s state qualified immunity
standard, although modeled on the federal standard, does not apply to Plaintiff’s federal claims,
See State v. Chase Secs., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 595 (W. Va. 1992) (finding that the state immunity
inquiry should be guided by federal immunity in Section 1983 cases); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S.
356, 375 (1990) (holding that in Section 1983 cases “[t]he elements of, and the defenses to, a
federal cause of action are defined by federal law”). As a result, the Court takes Defendants’
Motion to challenge only Plaintiff’s state law claims.
The most comprehensive formulation of West Virginia’s qualified immunity standard can
be found in W. Va. Reg’l Jail and Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B. 766 S.E.2d 751, 755, Syl. Pt. 5 (W.
Va. 2014) (quoting Chase Secs., 424 S.E.2d 591). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
declared that “[a] public executive official who is acting within the scope of his authority . . . is
entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability for official acts if the involved conduct did
not violate clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known.” The court
went on to explain that “[t]here is no immunity for an executive official whose acts are fraudulent,
malicious, or otherwise oppressive.” Id.
The Supreme Court of Appeals created a two-step analysis to establish whether a public
official may be shielded by qualified immunity. A reviewing court must first ascertain “the nature
of the governmental acts or omissions which give rise to the suit.” Id. at Syl. Pt. 10 (citing Parkulo
v. W. Va. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 483, S.E.2d 507, Syl. Pt. 7 (W. Va. 1996)). If the nature of
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the act is “judicial, executive, or administrative policy-making,” the official is absolutely immune.
Id. Where the act is a “discretionary function,” the officer is entitled to immunity unless the
following two qualifications obtain: (1) the act was in violation of a clearly established statutory
or constitutional right which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) was otherwise
“fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive.” Id. (citing Chase Secs. 424 S.E.2d 591).
As applied to York and Owens, their “general functions as correctional officer[s], like most
law enforcement officers, are broadly characterized as discretionary, requiring the use of [their]
discretionary judgments and decisions.” Id. at 767–68 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff does not
seriously dispute that York and Owens were exercising their discretion as WRJ officials to
determine the proper housing for Plaintiff at the WRJ. Consequently, the Court must determine
whether Plaintiff adequately alleged that York and Owens’ actions violated a clearly established
right or were otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive.
Taking Plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations as true, as the Court must at the pleading
stage, Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations that York and Owens violated his rights under the
West Virginia Constitution and the United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5 (West, Westlaw through 2017); U.S. Const. amend. VIII.1
The Supreme Court of Appeals has explicitly held on multiple occasions that “prison inmates in
the West Virginia correctional system, have [a] right[] . . . to reasonable protection from constant
1
The United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have held, on multiple occasions, that
prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence “at the hands of other prisoners.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To fail in the reasonable execution of that duty
violates an inmate’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Woodhous v. Virginia, 487
F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Kartman v. Markle, 582 Fed. App’x 151, 153 (4th Cir.
2014) Meadows v. Saunders, 14 F.3d 595 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Roe, 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir.
1990).
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threat of violence and sexual assault by fellow inmates.” Bishop v. McCoy, 323 S.E.2d 140, 148
(W. Va. 1984) (citing Hackl v. Dale, 299 S.E.2d 26, 28 (W. Va. 1982)); Harrah v. Leverette, 271
S.E.2d 322, 674–75 (W. Va. 1980).
As alleged, York and Owen’s actions did not reasonably protect Plaintiff from
violence at the hands of his fellow inmates. During his initial stay at the WRJ, jail employees
thought threats to Plaintiff’s safety serious enough to warrant placing him in protective custody.
Upon reentry, a mere four months later, Plaintiff informed York and Owens that the inmates who
previously threatened him were still housed in C-1 and he should not be housed there. Defendants
remarked sardonically that Plaintiff “shouldn’t have come back to jail” and his safety “was a
personal problem.” They then housed him in C-1, the very same housing unit where just months
before he was removed for his own safety. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted and
savagely beaten to such a degree that he required emergency surgery. Defendants’ remarks, if
ultimately proved, demonstrate more than just a violation Plaintiff’s clearly established rights, but
also a sadistic indifference to the monstrous cruelty inflicted on and by the very people the State
of West Virginia entrusts to the care of Defendants to protect and rehabilitate. Bishop, 323 S.E.2d
at 148 (holding inmates have rights to protection and rehabilitation).
Moreover, Defendants’ failure to review Plaintiff’s previous housing designation,
especially after he informed them that the same inmates who had threatened him were still housed
in C-1, reveals a callous disregard of the duty to exercise their discretion reasonably as dictated by
the state and federal constitutions. As such, Plaintiff has pled both a violation of a clearly and longestablished constitutional right of which any prison official is certainly aware, and conduct that is
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“malicious and oppressive.” Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for
their conduct.2
b. Damages for Violations of the West Virginia Constitution
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s state constitutional claims must be dismissed against
them because they seek money damages and West Virginia does not recognize recovery of money
damages for violations of the state constitution. Plaintiff counters by arguing that although there
is no Section 1983 analogue for state constitutional claims, the availability of money damages
should be implied. After all, Plaintiff concludes, there is no statute authorizing equitable relief for
violations of the state constitution but their availability is implied. See Harrah v. Leverette, 271
S.E.2d 322, 324 (W. Va. 1980).
Courts in this District have more or less consistently held that money damages for state
constitutional violations are not available. Sanders v. Jones, No. 3:15-cv-14196, 2016 WL
2
In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges York and Owens negligently performed their duties
and their negligence proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendants attempt to argue that
qualified immunity bars claims of negligence. For support they cite to this Court’s decision in
Lavender v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. No. 3:06-cv-1032, 2008 WL 313957, at *8
(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 4, 2008). Defendants’ reliance is misplaced. In Lavender, the Court made clear
that where a government official’s acts “give rise to a deprivation of a right clearly established by
statutory law or constitutional rights,” the official is not entitled to qualified immunity, regardless
of whether the acts were negligent. Id. The Court based its holding on the Supreme Court of
Appeals’ decision Clark v. Dunn. 465 S.E.2d 374, 380 (W. Va. 1995). “In Clark, plaintiff brought
a negligence action against [a state official], who was found to be engaged in the performance of
discretionary judgments . . . within the course of his . . . duties.” A.B., 766 S.E.2d at 763 (citing
Clark, 465 S.E.2d at 380). The Clark Court noted “that the officer did not violate a “clearly
established” right. (internal citation omitted). As such, the court held that the state official was
entitled to qualified immunity. Clark, 465 S.E.2d at 380. In the subsequent A.B. case, the Supreme
Court of Appeals credited the Clark Court for reaffirming the qualified immunity standard, which
it then restated. A.B., 766 S.E.2d at 763. It is the same standard this Court applied in this case.
Thus, as this Court has already held, where a state official acts in a discretionary manner, that
official is not entitled to qualified immunity if his actions violated a clearly established right.
Whether the illegal act was done intentionally or negligently is not determinative to the application
of qualified immunity. See Id.
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3512247, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Jun. 22, 2016) (Chambers, C.J.); Howard v. Ballard, 2:13-cv-11006,
2015 WL 1481836, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2015) (Johnston, J.); McMillion-Tolliver v.
Kowalski, No. 2:13-cv-29533, 2014 WL 1329790, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 1, 2014) (Goodwin, J.);
Smoot v. Green, No. 2:13-cv-10148, 2013 WL 5918753, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 1, 2013)
(Copenhaver, J.); but see Aliff v. W. Va. Reg’l Jail and Corr. Facility Auth., No. 2:15-cv-13513,
2016 WL 5419444, at *11 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 26, 2016) (Johnston, J.) (noting that the court had
previously considered certifying the question to the Supreme Court of Appeals). In all, except Aliff,
courts in this district have relied on the Supreme Court of Appeals case Harrah v. Leverette. 271
S.E.2d at 324. In that case the Supreme Court of Appeals held:
A person brutalized by state agents while in jail or prison may be entitled to:
(a) A reduction in the extent of his confinement or his time of confinement;
(b) Injunctive relief, and subsequent enforcement by contempt proceedings . . . ;
(c) A federal cause of action authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
(d) A civil action in tort
Id. at Syl. Pt. 4. All of the courts note the conspicuous absence of a specific remedy for money
damages. In such absence the courts in this district, applying an expressio unius argument to the
Harrah decision, have held that the West Virginia Constitution does not provide for money
damages without some additional legislative action akin to Section 1983. See, e.g., McMillionTolliver, 2014 WL 1329790, at *2 (“Without an independent statute authorizing money damages
for violations of the West Virginia Constitution, the plaintiff’s claim . . . must fail.”).
Plaintiff, not unconvincingly, argues that courts in this district have read too much into the
Harrah decision. Plaintiff highlights that the decision does not explicitly bar damages awards.
Plaintiff further argues that rather than barring recovery of damages for state constitutional
violations, Harrah implicitly sanctioned them by permitting civil tort actions, of which
constitutional torts are a species.
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In support of his gloss on Harrah, Plaintiff turns to Hutchinson v. City of Huntington, 479
S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1996), which he believes supports, again implicitly, his argument. The
Hutchinson Court explicitly recognized that a private cause of action exists where the state
government violates the state constitution. Id. at 660. The Supreme Court of Appeals remarked
that this proposition was undisputed and went no further. Id. From this Plaintiff insists that by
finding a private cause of action, the court was also sanctioning money damages for constitutional
violations. The Plaintiff reasons that there would be no meaning to state constitutional guarantees
without such a remedy.
Doubtless, money damages would serve to remedy unconstitutional behavior by state
agencies and officials. Nevertheless, recognition of a private cause of action does not imply
recognition of a specific remedy to that cause of action. In light of Harrah, which explicitly
sanctions injunctive relief, the more sound assumption is that a private cause of action may be
brought for seeking equitable relief to remedy constitutional violations but not money damages.
The Court also interprets Harrah to represent the Supreme Court of Appeals’ decision to
rely on federal law, that is Section 1983, and state common law tort suits to provide a vehicle,
otherwise unavailable, to recover money damages for state constitutional violations. Section 1983
suits brought pursuant to the United States Constitution and common law tort suits permit recovery
of money damages, and can often, if not always, be brought on the same grounds as a state
constitutional claim.
Admittedly, the issues raised by Plaintiff are not addressed particularly well by the state
courts of West Virginia. Based on the paucity of guidance, reasonable minds could certainly differ
on the interpretation of the state constitution and the Supreme Court of Appeals decisions
explicating it. Nevertheless, in light of the near unanimous view in this district and the Court’s
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reasoning above, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot recover money damages for violations of the
state constitution. See Private Mortg. Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Hotel Club and Assocs., Inc., 265 F.3d
308, 312 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that where a state supreme court has not spoken directly on an
issue, it is incumbent on the federal courts to predict how that court would rule if presented with
the issue). Plaintiff’s claims for damages based on violations of the state constitution are therefore
dismissed.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’
Motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s claims for money damages based on violations of the West Virginia
Constitution are DISMISSED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order and Notice to counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties.
ENTER:
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September 1, 2017
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