O'Dell v. USAA Federal Savings Bank

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendant's 23 MOTION for Summary Judgment; granting the Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Counts II and III; denying the Motion with regard to Count I. Signed by Judge Robert C. Chambers on 4/5/2018. (cc: counsel of record; any unrepresented parties) (jsa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER O’DELL,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-1427

USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
aka USAA,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable
juror to find in Plaintiff’s favor. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 23, at 1. Consistent with that
contention, Defendant believes it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Plaintiff filed his
response to Defendant’s motion, in which he counters Defendant’s contentions. Having reviewed
the complete briefing on the matter, the Court agrees with Defendant with regard to two of
Plaintiff’s counts, but disagrees with regard to the remaining count. Accordingly, and for the
reasons provided below, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, and DENIES, IN PART, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23).
I.

Background

Mr. Christopher O’Dell (“Mr. O’Dell” or “Plaintiff”) got in trouble with credit card debt.
Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 24-2, at 6-71; Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF

1

Three of the exhibits filed by the parties overlap: (1) Deposition of Mr. O’Dell (Ex.

No. 24-1, at 1. Sometime late in the first decade of the 2000’s, Mr. O’Dell opened a credit card
account with USAA Savings Banks2 (the “USAA Card”). Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 5.
Mr. O’Dell did not use the card for extravagant purchases. Id. at 16. Instead, he used the USAA
Card for general purchases at the grocery store or drugstore, as well as to pay bills and cover dayto-day expenses. Id. at 5. Despite sensible use of the card, and while simultaneously holding two
jobs, Mr. O’Dell fell behind with payments on the USAA Card. Id. 5-7.
In November 2012, faced with mounting debt held by numerous entities, and with an
insufficient income to cover it all, Mr. O’Dell stopped making payments on the USAA Card. Id.
at 5-7. By this point, he owed roughly $11,000 on the USAA Card. Id. at 5. Mr. O’Dell, who
worked as a janitor when he was not working as a schoolteacher, freely admitted that he owed the
debt. Id. at 17. By his own admission, Mr. O’Dell just got “overextended.” Id. at 5. He, however,
did not expect USAA to merely forgive this accrued debt. Id. at 6.
In line with Mr. O’Dell’s expectation, USAA did not just call it even and forgive the debt.
Instead, Defendant came calling to collect on that debt. Defendant began a multi-faceted approach
to retrieving the money USAA was owed. In addition to sending letters, Defendant initiated a
regular course of calls to Mr. O’Dell’s home, cell, and work numbers in December 2012. Ex. 1 to

2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 23-2; Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 25-1); (2) Defendant’s
Call Records (Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 23-3; Ex. 3 to Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 253); and (3) Mr. O’Dell’s Call Log (Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 23-4; Ex. 2 to Pl.’s
Resp., ECF No. 25-2). When providing citations, and for ease of reference, the Court will only to
cite to one of the respective locations at which the information may be found in the exhibits. This
choice should not be construed as a comment upon either party’s evidentiary production.
2
Although Mr. O’Dell opened the credit card account with USAA Savings Bank,
that entity is not a party to this litigation. USAA Savings Bank assigned the collection activities to
one of its affiliates, USAA Federal Savings Bank (“USAA FSB”). Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot.
for Summ. J., ECF No. 24, at 2 n.2. As such, references to “Defendant” only refer to USAA FSB.
References to “USAA” refer to either USAA Savings Bank or USAA FSB, or both, depending
upon the context. However, reference to “USAA” does not imply any liability on the part of USAA
Savings Bank.
-2-

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 1; Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 7-10; see generally Ex. 3 to
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 23-3; Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 23-4.
Around the same time that Mr. O’Dell stopped making payments and Defendant started
making calls, Mr. O’Dell sought the assistance of a lawyer. Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at
7. Mr. O’Dell felt overwhelmed by the calls, as well as the pressure to pay the debt, and he needed
help. Id. at 7-8, 10, 14. His attorney provided him with a strategy for documenting the calls that
Mr. O’Dell received. Id. at 8. Additionally, Mr. O’Dell’s lawyer provided him with a script that
he was to read upon answering one of Defendant’s calls. Id. at 10. The script read as follows:
“PLEASE DON’T CONTACT ME ANYMORE IT MAKES ME NERVOUS. SCOTT
STAPLETON OF HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA IS MY LAWYER.” Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot.
for Summ. J., at 1 (capitalization original). According to Mr. O’Dell, he read this script on January
23, 2013, then hung up. Id.; Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 11-12. After reading this script,
Mr. O’Dell stopped answering Defendant’s calls. Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 11-12.
Defendant’s call records fail to reflect this attorney notification. See generally Ex. 3 to
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. However, Defendant’s records do reflect that Mr. O’Dell provided
notification that he had legal representation. Only, Defendant’s records show that Mr. O’Dell first
mentioned retaining a lawyer before, not after, January 23, 2013. Compare Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J., at 57 (showing the acknowledgment that Mr. O’Dell had told Defendant’s representative
that he was represented by an attorney) with Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 11-12 (explaining
that Mr. O’Dell does not recall notifying Defendant of his representation before January 23, 2013).
According to Defendant’s call records, on December 31, 2012, Defendant’s call center
received an incoming call.3 Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 57. During the course of this call,

3

As an aside, the Court finds Defendant’s call records to be cryptic and confusing.
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Mr. O’Dell appears to have notified Defendant that he was represented by an attorney. Id. But,
according to Defendant’s record of the conversation, Mr. O’Dell could not recall specific
information regarding his attorney at the time. Id.; Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 12. Further,
the note in Defendant’s call logs indicates that Defendant’s representative told Mr. O’Dell that he
would remain in their system until he provided more information regarding his attorney. But the
representative instructed him to call back to provide the information when he had it available. Id.

Largely written in unexplained abbreviations and code, the call records do not help the Court to
understand basic and essential information about Defendant’s calling practices. For instance,
Defendant’s call records reflect that a vast majority of the call attempts appear to have been placed
between 2:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. See generally Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Even if the Court
were to assume that this timestamp reflects an adjustment for the time-zone difference between
where the calls were placed, and where they were received by Mr. O’Dell, this timestamp does not
make sense. The Court could only identify one call that appears to have been made post meridiem
(p.m.). Id. at 60. Mr. O’Dell, however, reports that he regularly received calls from around 9:00
a.m. to 8:30 p.m. See Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Defendant’s call records do not appear to
reflect a similar 12-hour time-range for calls. Moreover, even if the timestamp did indicate an
adjustment for time-zone difference, given the nearly 12-hour period that Plaintiff received calls,
the Court would expect more than one call with a “p.m.” indication. This is just one of the
peculiarities contained within Defendant’s call records.
Generally, if a party is going to submit its own records to support its position regarding
summary judgment, the Court expects the parties to explain the documents where their meaning is
not readily decipherable on their face. Without some sort of legend, key, or cypher, Defendant’s
call records make little sense. Furthermore, the Court cannot rely upon any generally acceptable
point of reference to discern the inputs and codes found on Defendant’s call records. Faced with a
largely incomprehensible set of documents, the Court must either guess at the meaning of aspects
of the records, or ignore all but those portions of the records that have a minimum resemblance to
common English.
Defendant has submitted its call records to support its position that the only reasonable
interpretation of the undisputed evidence falls in its favor. But due to Defendant’s shorthand or
code, the Court cannot extract a large portion of the meaning that these records supposedly contain.
The Court is certain that Defendant’s representatives could look at these records and glean all
manner of helpful nuggets of information. However, without the benefit of that expertise and
entrenched corporate training, the Court cannot do the same. In order to fulfill its duty as an
objective, fair, and reasonable adjudicating body, the Court must have, at the very least, a minimal
appreciation for the information contained within submitted documents. Where unclear to the
untrained eye, the parties and their counsel must fill in the gaps to comprehension, and provide the
Court with instruction on how to read a party’s cryptic documents.
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Mr. O’Dell, however, did not recall this conversation. Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at
12. During Mr. O’Dell’s deposition, Defendant’s counsel asked him whether he had notified
Defendant regarding his hiring of an attorney prior to January 23, 2013. Id. Mr. O’Dell responded
that he had not. Defendant’s counsel read to Mr. O’Dell the interpretation of Defendant’s notes
from that December 31, 2012 call. 4 Id. Even after this prompt, Mr. O’Dell did not recall this
conversation taking place. Id. Additionally, Mr. O’Dell clarified that this alleged conversation on
December 31, 2012 could not have been the same one that he noted on January 23, 2013.
Regardless of the date on which Mr. O’Dell first notified Defendant that he had retained
an attorney, Defendant continued to call him dozens and dozens of times. Mr. O’Dell’s call log
shows 183 calls from Defendant within a four-month period. See id. at 8, 12; See generally Ex. 4
to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Although Defendant’s representatives did not abuse Mr. O’Dell
verbally in the calls, the incessant calling made Mr. O’Dell very nervous. Id. at 10, 13-14.
In an effort to remedy what Mr. O’Dell believed was “harassment,” he filed the complaint
in this action. Id. at 4. Originally, Mr. O’Dell’s attorney filed the complaint in the Circuit Court of
Mason County, West Virginia. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. However, Defendant timely
removed the action to this Court. Id.

During the deposition, Defendant’s counsel qualified her reading of the notes: “And I
know these are in abbreviations, but I will try to read through this with you as best as I can.” Ex.
2 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 12. Her difficulty interpreting the notes is understandable. The
notes read as follows: “PHC ADV HE IS REP BY ATRNY FOR BK – MBR DID NOT HAVE
ATRNY INFO AT TIME OF CALL – EXPL TO MBR WILL KEEP IN CALL SYSTEM UNTIL
ATNRY INFO UPDATED AND IF MBR CAN PLEASE CALL BACK WHEN HE HAS THE
INFO ALSO.” Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 57 (capitalization original). As the court noted
above, supra note 3, Defendant’s call records are largely incomprehensible due to the ubiquity of
code, abbreviations, and jargon. Sadly, the notes read by Defendant’s counsel regarding the alleged
conversation taking place on December 31, 2012 are among the most readily intelligible
information contained within Defendant’s call records.
4

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In his complaint, Mr. O’Dell asserts three counts: (1) Violations of the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act (“WVCCPA”); (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (“IIED”); and (3) Common Law Invasion of Privacy. Compl., ECF No. 1-1, ⁋ 11-22. He
also requests relief in the form of appropriate statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages. Id.
at 7-8. Defendant contends that summary judgment is appropriate in its favor for each of Mr.
O’Dell’s claims.
As explained below, the Court believes summary judgment is appropriate in Defendant’s
favor with regard to Counts II and III, alleging claims of IIED and Common Law Invasion of
Privacy, respectively. However, because there remain genuine issues of material fact, the Court
must permit certain aspects of Mr. O’Dell’s Count I, stating claims under the sections 46A-2128(e) & 46A-2-125(d) of the WVCCPA, to continue.
II.

Legal Standard

To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that no genuine issue as to any
material fact remains and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “Material facts” are those that might affect the outcome of a case, and a “genuine
issue” exists when a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party upon the evidence
presented. The News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In considering
a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter[.]” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). So too, it is not the
province of the Court to make determinations of credibility. Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th
Cir. 1991). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

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475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). Any inference, however, “must fall within the range of reasonable
probability and not be so tenuous as to amount to speculation or conjecture.” JKC Holding Co. v.
Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, in order to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must offer
some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her]
favor[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party
has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and, after adequate time for
discovery, does not make a showing sufficient to establish that element. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by
offering more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. “Mere speculation by the non-movant cannot create a genuine issue of material fact”
to avoid summary judgment. JKC Holding Co., 264 F.3d at 465.
III.

Discussion

Because Defendant argues for summary judgment on each of Mr. O’Dell’s claims, the
Court will review each claims, and the parties’ respective arguments, in turn.
a. Count I: WVCCPA Claims
Count I of Mr. O’Dell’s Complaint alleges violations under multiple sections of the
WVCCPA. The WVCCPA is a comprehensive consumer protection code that provides private
causes of action for aggrieved debtors against debt collectors. See Bourne v. Mapother &
Mapother, P.S.C., 998 F.Supp.2d 495, 500-01 (S.D.W. Va. 2014) (citation omitted). As a general
matter, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“West Virginia Supreme Court”) has
instructed that courts applying the WVCCPA should construe the statute broadly and liberally. See

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id. (citing State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 516, 523 (W. Va.
1995)). To that end, when considering the WVCCPA, courts should give effect to the purposes
intended by the legislature. Id. at 501.
Mr. O’Dell puts forward three claims that rely upon sections of the WVCCPA: (1) one
under W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128(e); (2) one under W. Va. Code § 46A-2-125; and (3) one under
W. Va. Code § 46A-2-125(d). See Compl. at ⁋ 12. In its motion, Defendant contests that summary
judgment on each of these claims is appropriate.
With respect to Mr. O’Dell’s claims under section 46A-2-125 and section 46A-2-125,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under the umbrella provision of 46A-2125 that is separate from his 46A-2-125(d) claim. The Court need not reach a decision with regard
to that question. In his response, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s contention that the claim
under the umbrella section, 46A-2-125, should be dismissed. As such, Plaintiff has produced no
evidence to support a potential claim under the umbrella provision. Therefore, the Court agrees
with Defendant. However, because the Court will permit Mr. O’Dell’s claim to continue under the
subsection, 46A-2-125(d), the Court will merely construe Mr. O’Dell’s citation to the umbrella
section 46A-2-125 as superfluous. The Court will combine the second and third claims under
WVCCPA, and appropriately analyze the claim under the relevant framework applicable to
subsection 46A-2-125(d).
i. Claim under W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128(e)
Returning to Mr. O’Dell’s first claim under the WVCCPA, Mr. O’Dell claims that
Defendant violated section 46A-2-128(e). That section prohibits “[a]ny communication with a
consumer whenever it appears that the consumer is represented by an attorney and the attorney’s
name and address are known, or could be easily ascertained.” W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128(e)

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(2013)5. A debt collector does not violate the provision if the communication occurs after “the
attorney fails to answer correspondence, return phone calls or discuss the obligation in question.”
Id.
Defendant contends that Mr. O’Dell’s 46A-1-128(e) claim must fail because he has not
presented sufficient evidence that “his attorney’s name was known to [Defendant] or could [have
been] easily ascertained.” Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 6. Defendant conceded that
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he read the script with the name of his attorney, Scott
Stapleton, to Defendant’s representative. Id. However, Defendant argues “there is no evidence that
[Defendant] had knowledge of Mr. Stapleton’s name or that it could easily ascertain [it].” Id. To
support its view, Defendant advances a two-buttress argument, one legal and one factual.
On the legal front, Defendant claims that Mr. O’Dell’s evidence that he merely read the
script is inadequate to support his claim. Defendant implores that the “statutory requirement is not
that the name be provided to the debt collector – it is that the name be known to the debt collector
(or that it could be easily ascertained).” Id. (italics and parenthetical original). And, according to
Defendant, Plaintiff has only demonstrated that he said Mr. Stapleton’s name, and the city where
he could be found. However, says Defendant, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant’s
representative “actually heard and knew Mr. Stapleton’s name.” Id. Based upon this argument,
Defendant asserts that only speculation supports Plaintiff’s required showing that Defendant

5

Note that this version of the code ceased to be effective on June 11, 2015. Since then, the
section has been amended twice. The first change became effective on June 12, 2015, and ceased
its effectiveness on July 3, 2017.This version specifically required written notice to a debt collector
of attorney representation. W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128(e) (2015). On July 4, 2017, the effective
section changed again. In its current form, section 46A-2-128(e) not only requires written notice,
but the written notice must now be delivered to the debt collector via certified mail. W. Va. Code
§ 46A-2-128(e) (2018).
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“heard and knew” Mr. Stapleton’s name. Id. at 6-7. In the vacuum of evidence, Defendant argues
that the claim must fail.
With regard to its factual contentions, Defendant bolster’s its legal argument by suggesting
possible, alternative factual scenarios. These scenarios, however, are unsupported by even the most
tangentially relevant evidence. Defendant suggests that Mr. O’Dell “may have mumbled, talked
too fast, or the connection could have cut out, among other potential issues.” Id. at 6. Additionally,
in a footnote, Defendant’s counsel provides a hypothesis for how Mr. O’Dell’s words might not
have been properly understood by the call representative. Defendant’s counsel proffers this
possibility: “the representative believed he or she heard ‘Scott Staples’ rather than ‘Scott
Stapleton.’” Id. at 6 n.3. This hypothesis, of course, finds no genesis in anything found in the
factual record. To be clear, no deposition testimony, document, or record suggests any of these
issues. Indeed, this appears to be a fictitious version of a possible occurrence, created by
Defendant’s counsel. 6 The Court cannot accept baseless suppositions to support a grant of
summary judgment.
On summary judgment, the Court must draw any permissible inference in favor of the
nonmoving party, Mr. O’Dell. In this case, the Court finds it reasonable to infer from Plaintiff’s
concrete evidentiary showing, that Defendant’s representative heard Mr. O’Dell when he read his
script over the phone. To the extent that this is not the case, the parties genuinely dispute an issue
of material fact: Did Mr. O’Dell’s words audibly and intelligibly make their way to the Defendant’s

6

The hypothetical footnote continues. As with any diligent application of the scientific
method, a hypothesis must be tested to determine its validity. Indeed, Defendant’s counsel tested
the hypothesis that the representative heard “Scott Staples” instead of “Scott Stapleton.” Def.’s
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 6 n.3. Her results: a Google search returned a different law
firm than Mr. Stapleton’s, when “Scott Staples” was searched. Id. Not resting with just one test
variance, counsel also tested a search of “Scott Staples Huntington, WV attorney.” But again, the
search was fruitless. Id.
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representative on the other end of the telephone line? Whether or not Defendant’s representative
heard Mr. O’Dell’s recitation of his lawyer’s name and city would likely affect the ultimate
determination of his claim under 46A-2-128(e). Where the parties dispute an issue of material fact,
summary judgment is inappropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (providing that summary
judgment “will not lie” if there is a genuine dispute over a material fact).
Additionally, Defendant contends that even assuming that the call representative clearly
heard Mr. O’Dell, the information read from the script is insufficient to support a 46A-2-128(e)
claim. Defendant cites to the portion of that provision that requires the attorney’s name and address
be known, or easily ascertained. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 7. Because Mr.
O’Dell failed to provide an address, Defendant argues his notification was deficient under the
parameters of the section. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with the reasonable inference that Mr. O’Dell’s words were heard and
understood, the Court finds that Mr. Stapleton’s address could have been “easily ascertained.”
Plaintiff submitted with his response an exhibit depicting an internet search. The entry of “scott
stapleton of huntington, West Virginia [sic throughout]” returned a panoply of links and
information about Mr. Stapleton’s firm, including his address. Ex. 5 to Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 25-5.
Based upon this showing, and common sense, the Court finds the information contained within
Mr. O’Dell’s script would permit a debt collector to easily ascertain Mr. Stapleton’s address.
Therefore, Mr. O’Dell’s claim under section 46A-2-128(e) will continue.
ii. Claim under W. Va. Code § 46A-2-125(d)
Defendant similarly challenges Plaintiff’s claim under section 46A-2-125. That section
prohibits debt collectors from “unreasonably oppress[ing] or abus[ing] any person in connection
with the collection of or attempt to collect any claim alleged to be due and owing by that person

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or another.” W. Va. Code § 46A-2-125. At the time of the conduct at issue here, subsection (d) of
the provision, under which Plaintiff brings his claim, established a standard for determining
whether conduct was “unreasonably oppressive and abusive.” The debt collector violated section
46A-2-125(d) if it “caus[ed] a telephone to ring or engag[ed] any person in telephone conversation
repeatedly or continuously, or at unusual times or at times known to be inconvenient, with intent
to annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten any person at the called number.” W. Va. Code § 46A-2125(d) (2013).7 Defendant, however, contends that this version of the section does not apply.
Instead, Defendant argues that the amended version of section 46A-2-125(d) applies to this
case. Effective as of June 12, 2015, the current version of the subsection provides a two prong
standard to determine whether a debt collector has violated the provision. See W. Va. Code § 46A2-125(d) (2018). A debt collector violates the section if it calls
[(1)] any person more than thirty time per week or engag[es] any
person in telephone conversation more than ten times per week, or
at unusual times or at times known to be inconvenient, [(2)] with
intent to annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten any person at the called
number.
Id. Thus, a plaintiff must satisfy the first prong by establishing the threshold of the quality or nature
of violative conduct (the “threshold element”), then a plaintiff may demonstrate the intent behind
the conduct (the “intent element”). Huffman v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., No. 3:16-8637, 2017
WL 2177351, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. May 17, 2017) (Chambers, J.) (describing the amendment to the
statute, and providing that the initial threshold element must be met before a jury can consider the
intent element). Plaintiff must demonstrate the required call threshold before he would be
permitted to continue with his claim. Id. at *4-5. This threshold prong substantially differs from

7

This version of the code remained effective until June 11, 2015.
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the prior version of subsection (d), which was effective at the time Defendant allegedly called Mr.
O’Dell in violation of the WVCCPA.
Despite the fact that the amended version of 46A-2-125(d) did not take effect until over
two years after Defendant placed the calls at the heart of this suit, Defendant argues it applies.
Defendant balances its entire argument upon the wobbly support afforded by a footnote in a recent
opinion by the West Virginia Supreme Court. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 8-10.
In Valentine & Kebartas, Inc. v. Lenahan, the West Virginia Supreme Court reviewed, as a matter
of first impression, whether a volume of calls by a debt collector could, absent any other evidence,
establish the intent prong under section 46A-2-125(d). 801 S.E.2d 431, 432 (W. Va. 2017).
Ultimately, the Court said that a plaintiff must produce some other evidence, in addition to call
volume, in order to satisfy the intent prong. Id. at 436-37.
In construing the dictates of the intent requirement under the statute, the West Virginia
Supreme Court clarified that it was analyzing the old version of the subsection. Id. 434 n.8. It did
so by dropping a footnote. The footnote acknowledged both that the statute had been amended in
2015, and that the amended version was effective at the time of the Court’s decision. Id. After
providing the new language, the West Virginia Supreme Court stated as follows:
We decline to consider this amendment because it was not in effect
as of the date of the bench trial in this matter. All subsequent
references to West Virginia Code 46A-2-125 shall be to the version
in effect at the time of the bench trial in this case, which was
promulgated in 1974.
Id. The Court then proceeded with its analysis regarding the lower court’s determination that call
volume alone could substantiate the intent requirement under the old version of 46A-2-125(d).
Defendant contends that this footnote makes it “clear” that a court must apply the version
of 46-2-125(d) “in effect at the time of trial.” Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 9

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(citing Valentine, 801 S.E.2d at 434 n.8). As such, Defendant urges this Court to apply the amended
version of the statute to Plaintiff’s claim, which arose prior to the amended statute’s enactment.
Although Defendant’s argument drips of legal creativity, its augment lacks the necessary legal
footing. The Court will not effect retroactive application of a statute by relying upon the footnote
in Valentine.
As Plaintiff correctly notes in his opposition to Defendant’s inventive argument,
“retroactivity is not favored in the law.” See Pl.’s Resp., at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Landgraf v. USI Films Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994)). Although this “antiretroactivity
principle” emanates from various Constitutional provisions, it harkens back to legal thinking that
predates the Republic. See id. at 266 (explaining how the idea has roots in both prior legal doctrines
and the Ex Post Facto, Takings, and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution). That citizens should
generally receive “fair warning” regarding the law underlies the continued emphasis upon the
principle.
Echoing this idea, West Virginia solidified the “antiretoractivity principle” in its Code. “A
statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.” W. Va.
Code § 2-2-10(bb). In order for a statute to apply retroactively, it must appear “by clear, strong[,]
and imperative words or by necessary implication, that the Legislature intended to give the statute
retroactive force and effect.” Martinez v. Asplundh Tree Expert, 803 S.E.2d 582, 586 (W. Va.
2017) (internal quotation marks and citaiton omitted) (quoting Syl. pt. 2, In re Petition for Attorney
Fees and Costs: Cassella v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 766 S.E.2d 432 (2014)). And although procedural
statutory amendments may be allowed retroactive application, if a statute “diminishes substantive
rights or augments substantive liabilities[, it] should not be applied retroactively to events
completed before the effective date of the statute . . . unless the statute provides explicitly for

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retroactive application.” Id. at 586-87 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Syl. pt. 2, Pub.
Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank in Fairmont, 480 S.E.2d 538 (W. Va. 1996)).
This District has already analyzed whether the 2015 amendments to the WVCCPA apply
to events which occurred prior to their effective date. In Biser v. Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., Judge
Burger noted that the West Virginia Legislature did not expressly direct retroactive application of
the 2015 WVCCPA amendments. 211 F.Supp.3d 845, 853 (S.D.W. Va. 2016). Moreover, Judge
Burger found that retroactive enforcement of the statute’s changes would “substantively alter the
legal implications of events completed prior to the amendment’s effective date.” Id. Based upon
this finding, Judge Burger considered the Legislature’s attempt to classify the amendments as a
“clarification” to be unavailing. See id. 853-54. Although the pre-2015 version of the WVCCPA
broadly stated what constituted violative conduct, the statement was clear. Id. at 853. In light of
the “antiretroactivity principle,” the standards for determining retroactive application, and the
language of the 2015 WVCCPA amendments, as well as the original version of the statute, Judge
Burger concluded that the amendments would only apply prospectively. Id. at 854.
The Court does not believe that footnote eight of Valentine alters the correctness of Judge
Burger’s analysis, or conclusion. As emphasized in the discussion about the standards for
retroactive application, clarity of retroactivity is paramount. Despite the Defendant’s contentions,
the Valentine footnote does not clearly state a change in the WVCCPA’s retroactive application.
Defendant did not cite to any case, nor could the Court identify a case, where a court applied the
2015 WVCCPA amendments to events that occurred prior to their effectiveness. See Def.’s Mem.
in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 8-10; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 26, at 7-9. Indeed, in Valentine, the
West Virginia Supreme Court did not apply the 2015 WVCCPA amendments retroactively.
Although the footnote in Valentine may be loosely phrased, the Court believes the footnote’s main

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premise parallels Judge Burger’s conclusion in Biser, as well as the Court’s conclusion in this case.
In essence, the Valentine footnote explained that the West Virginia Supreme Court would not
consider the 2015 WVCCPA amendments because they would not be applied to a scenario that
predated their effectiveness. See Valentine, 801 S.E.2d at 434 n.8. Consistent with that, the Court
will not apply the 2015 WVCCPA amendments to the facts of this case, which occurred prior to
June 12, 2015.
Analyzing Mr. O’Dell’s claim under the version of 46A-2-125(d) effective at the time of
the calls in question, the Court finds he has met his burden to survive summary judgment. In order
to violate the old version of 46A-2-125(d), a debt collector must “caus[e] the telephone to ring or
engag[e] any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously . . . with the intent to
annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten any person at the called number.” W. Va. 46A-2-125(d) (2013).
Mr. O’Dell’s call log satisfies the required showing to establish “repeated or continuous” calling
at the summary judgment stage. Mr. O’Dell has submitted evidence of roughly 180 calls over a
four-month period. See generally Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 25-2. But Defendant’s call records
appear to reflect fewer calls. See generally Ex. 3 to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.. To the extent that the
parties’ respective call information differs, the parties have demonstrated that they dispute a
material issue of fact regarding whether the calls were “repeated or continuous.” With this dispute
over material fact, summary judgment is improper. This, however, is the first of a two-part required
showing for the 46A-2-125(d) claim to continue.
Mr. O’Dell has likewise produced sufficient evidence to meet his burden regarding the
intent prong of the 46A-2-125(d) claim. In Valentine, the West Virginia Supreme Court concluded
that a volume of 211 calls over eight months was insufficient to establish the intent prong of 46A2-125(d) as a matter of law. Valentine, 801 S.E.2d at 436 (“We similarly find that the volume of

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unanswered calls in this case does not establish intent in violation of [the section].”). Without other
evidence, said the Court, the plaintiff’s evidence of 211 calls was not enough. Fortunately for Mr.
O’Dell, he has presented additional evidence supporting the intent prong, and has met the standard
announced in Valentine.
In addition to establishing the 183 calls over a four-month period, Mr. O’Dell has produced
sufficient evidence to illustrate a disputed issue of material fact regarding the intent of the calls.
Beyond the volume, Mr. O’Dell has produced evidence about the quality and characteristics of the
calls from which a reasonable juror could find that Defendant intended to, at the very least, annoy
him. As reported by Mr. O’Dell, Defendant did not just call his home and cell phones. Ex. 1 to
Pl.’s Resp., at 10. Instead, it apparently called his place of work, leaving messages with Mr.
O’Dell’s co-workers. Id. Additionally, Mr. O’Dell, in reading his script to Defendant’s
representative, communicated three meaningful messages.
First, Mr. O’Dell requested that Defendant stop calling. Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Resp., at 1. Unlike in
the Valentine case, Mr. O’Dell had answered Defendant’s calls on multiple occasions. Ex. 1 to
Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 25-1, at 10-11. The Valentine court seized upon the plaintiff’s refusal to
answer the calls in that case. See Valentine, 801 S.E.2d at 437-38. The Court said that answering
would have been a basic step that the plaintiff could have taken to abate the calls. Id. Here, Mr.
O’Dell had a history of answering Defendant’s calls. And when the calls became oppressive, Mr.
O’Dell requested that Defendant stop calling. Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Resp., at 10. Therefore, Defendant had
notice of Mr. O’Dell’s desire to have the calls cease. But Defendant disregarded Mr. O’Dell’s
request, and did so over 180 times, in a four-month span. Mr. O’Dell’s notification, and
Defendant’s subsequent contrary actions, militates in favor of establishing an intent to annoy, at
the very least.

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Second, Mr. O’Dell conveyed to Defendant the deleterious effect its continued calls had
upon him. Mr. O’Dell told Defendant that the calls made him “nervous.” Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Resp., at 1.
In Valentine, the plaintiff had not provided the defendant with any knowledge of the effect the
calls had upon him. See Valentine, 801 S.E.2d at 437-38. Yet in this case, Mr. O’Dell notified
Defendant that its continued calls were injurious. In spite of this knowledge, Defendant continued
to call, over and over again. A reasonable juror could certainly find that repetitive and continuous
calls to an individual, after he or she has notified a debt collector that its calls were negatively
affecting him or her, would indicate an intent to annoy, abuse, or oppress.
Third, Mr. O’Dell represented to Defendant that he had retained an attorney, and provided
the name and location of his attorney. Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Resp., at 1. Defendant, however, made all of
the relevant calls after Mr. O’Dell notified Defendant that he had counsel. See generally id. This,
yet again, differentiates the facts of this case from those in Valentine. In Valentine, only one or
two calls, of the roughly 200 attempted, were made after the plaintiff had notified the defendant
that he had hired a lawyer. Valentine, 801 S.E.2d at 433 n.4. However, the 46A-2-128(e) claims
had not been addressed by the trial court, and were thus not considered by the West Virginia
Supreme Court. Id. But in this case, of the 183 calls made, all of them were made after Mr. O’Dell
had supposedly notified Defendant that he had retained Mr. Stapleton. Although conduct violative
of 46A-2-128(e) does not per se violate 46A-2-125(d), it certainly supports the reasonable
conclusion that, when combined with the other considerations, Defendant acted with the culpable
intent under 46A-2-125(d). See Biser, 211 F.Supp.3d at 856 (“The Court declines to adopt the
[plaintiffs’] position that calls placed after notice of an attorney constitute a per se violation of
§125 as well as §128(e).”).

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The record demonstrates that Mr. O’Dell has presented more than just the mere volume of
calls to establish Defendant’s intent. Mr. O’Dell has produced evidence regarding the volume, the
nature, the quality, and the characteristics of Defendant’s repeated and continuous calls. As such,
Mr. O’Dell has complied with the dictates of the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in
Valentine. As illustrated above, Defendant’s insistent and multi-faceted focus upon Valentine to
support its arguments misses the mark.
As other courts in this District have instructed, when considering whether a debt collector
has engaged in unreasonably oppressive or abusive conduct, a jury may consider the totality of
circumstances. See Biser, 211 F.Supp.3d at 856. The Court will let the jury consider the totality in
this case. Mr. O’Dell’s claim under 46A-2-125(d) survives summary judgment.
b. Count II: IIED Claim
Count II of Mr. O’Dell’s Complaint alleges that Defendant’s conduct constituted a
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Under West Virginia law, a plaintiff must
establish four elements to maintain an IIED claim. The plaintiff must show:
(1) conduct by the defendant which is atrocious, utterly intolerable
in a civilized community, and so extreme and outrageous as to
exceed all possible bounds of decency; (2) the defendant acted with
intent to inflict emotional distress or acted recklessly when it was
certain or substantially certain such distress would result from his
conduct; (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
to endure it.
Travis v. Alcon Labs. Inc., 504 S.E.2d 419, 425 (W. Va. 1998) (quoting Hines v. Hills Dept. Stores,
Inc., 454 S.E.2d 385, 392 (W. Va. 1994)).
Plaintiff may only continue with his IIED claim if he shows that Defendant’s conduct is
“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

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decency.” Id. at 426 (quoting Tanner v. Rite Aid of W. Va., Inc., 461 S.E.2d 149, 156-57 (W. Va.
1995)). This first element presents a high bar for a plaintiff to clear. Bourne, 998 F.Supp.2d at 507.
A litigant cannot succeed upon an IIED claim by merely asserting conduct that was “annoying,
harmful of one’s rights or expectations, uncivil, [or] mean-spirited.” Courtney v. Courtney, 413
S.E.2d 418, 423 (W. Va. 1991). For the claim to survive, there must be a genuine issue as to
whether the conduct can “be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Travis, 504 S.E.2d at 425. Whether Defendant’s conduct satisfies the “outrageous”
requirement is a question of law. In this case, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s
conduct met the high bar necessary to maintain the IIED claim.
In supporting his IIED claim, Plaintiff relies upon the same facts that he cited to support
his WVCCPA claims. Certainly, conduct violative of the WVCCPA could also support an IIED
claim. Baldwin v. Wells Fargo Fin. Nat’l Bank, No. 3:16-4841, 2017 WL 63026, at *2-3 (S.D.W.
Va. Jan. 5, 2017) (Chambers, J.) (providing that separate WVCCPA and IIED claims may be based
upon the same facts). However, in this case, the Court cannot find that Defendant’s repeated and
continuous calls constituted sufficiently “outrageous” conduct to permit Mr. O’Dell’s IIED claim
to continue. See Casto v. Branch Banking and Tr. Co., No. 3:16-5848, 2017 WL 265586, at *12
n.11 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 2, 2018) (Chambers, J.) (clarifying that although the Court found the
evidence insufficient to support an IIED claim, the finding should not be construed to mean that
conduct that violates the WVCCPA cannot also support an IIED claim).
West Virginia courts do not whimsically apply the legal standards for IIED. The West
Virginia Supreme Court emphasizes that when inspecting the sufficiency of an IIED claim, the
trial court must serve a “gate-keeping” role. Philyaw v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 633 S.E.2d 8,
14 (W. Va. 2016). Tortious intent of an actor alone fails to carry an IIED claim. Id. Instead, the

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conduct must be “so extreme and outrageous ‘as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (quoting Tanner
v. Rite Aid of W. Va., 461 S.E.2d 149, 156-57 (W. Va. 1995)).
Although Defendant’s actions in this case may have reached the level of being annoying
or uncivil, to describe the conduct as “utterly intolerable in a civilized community” exceeds the
bounds of reason. Mr. O’Dell does not allege any aggressive or intolerable actions that surpassed
“all possible bound of decency.” Defendant called Mr. O’Dell many, many times. Those calls took
place after Mr. O’Dell had asked Defendant to stop. Indeed, Defendant may have even made those
calls unlawfully. However, without any other evidence, the Court does not believe Mr. O’Dell has
demonstrated activity that can support an IIED claim.
For example, Mr. O’Dell has not produced any evidence that Defendant used offensive or
threatening language. With regard to the vast majority of calls, Mr. O’Dell did not answer. As
such, he cannot show that Defendant used language that would compel this Court to find that
Defendant’s conduct was sufficiently outrageous to maintain his IIED claim. So too, Mr. O’Dell
never reported that Defendant’s representatives used offensive language in the calls that he did
answer, prior to giving Defendant notification about his attorney. Where the record is devoid of
evidence supporting “atrocious” behavior, the Court finds that Defendant’s conduct cannot
reasonably be considered outrageous. Accordingly, Mr. O’Dell’s IIED claim fails.
c. Count III: Common Law Invasion of Privacy Claim
In his final count, Mr. O’Dell claims that Defendant violated his common law right to
privacy. Compl., at ⁋ 18-22. Although unclear from his complaint, in his Response to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated this right in two ways.

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Pl.’s Resp., at 12-14.8 The record, however, fails to support either of Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy
theories.
West Virginia courts recognize that an individual has a protectable right to privacy. Crump
v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 84 (W. Va. 1983). The law provides four theories
under which a plaintiff can prosecute an invasion of privacy claim:
(1) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) an
appropriation of another’s name or likeness; (3) unreasonable
publicity given to another’s private life; and (4) publicity that
unreasonably places another in a false light before the public.
Id. at 85 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1977)). Mr. O’Dell claims that
Defendant violated his common law right to privacy through both unreasonable intrusion, and
unreasonable publicity. Therefore, the Court will review the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s production
with regard to both of those contentions.
Attending to the first, Mr. O’Dell contends that Defendant unreasonably intruded upon his
seclusion by repeatedly and continuously calling him. Pl.’s Resp., at 12-13. In order to maintain
this claim, Mr. O’Dell must demonstrate that Defendant “intentionally intrude[d], physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, . . . [and
that] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Harbolt v. Steel of West
Virginia, Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 803, 817 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (Chambers, J.) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B)). Courts in this District have consistently
instructed that repeated, persistent calling can substantiate an invasion of privacy claim. See

8

In its Reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff first mentioned the common law invasion of
privacy by publicity in his Response. Def.’s Reply, at 14-15. Defendant claims Plaintiff
inappropriately raised this rationale for his invasion of common law right to privacy claim. Id.
However, since the Court finds that both of Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy theories fail, the Court
need not address Defendant’s objection.
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Imagine Medispa, LLC v. Transformations, Inc., 999 F.Supp.2d 873, 886 (S.D.W. Va. 2014)
(citing cases in this District); see also Huffman, 2017 WL 2177351, at *7-8. In order to survive
summary judgment on an invasion of privacy claim premised upon calls, a plaintiff must “offer
evidence that the phone calls were made within a short time frame or that they were placed at
inappropriate hours.” Adams v. Chrysler Fin. Co., LLC, No. 5:11-cv-914, 2013 WL 1385407, at
*9 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 3, 2013) (Berger, J.). Although Plaintiff has produced evidence of multiple
calls a day, the Court does not believe that Defendant’s actions constitute activity that is highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
Plaintiff focuses upon his call log to support his allegations of unreasonable intrusion. That
log does reflect that Defendant once called Plaintiff five times in a single day. Ex. 2 to Pl’s. Resp.
However, Defendant did not reach that number of calls on any other day. So too, the log reflects
that those five calls were not immediately following each other. Instead, the calls were spaced out
over the span of a day. Id. at 44-45. And, even though the log had a space for Mr. O’Dell to record
“[b]ad things they said,” he did not report that Defendant’s representative(s) said anything “bad”
throughout the four months of calls. Upon this record, the Court cannot find that Defendant’s
conduct could be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The Court certainly recognizes that a reasonable person could consider Defendant’s
conduct to be offensive. But to maintain his invasion of privacy claim upon an unreasonable
intrusion, Mr. O’Dell must show that the calls had become “a substantial burden to his existence.”
Imagine Medispa, LLC, 999 F.Supp.2d at 886 (parenthetically quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B cmt. d). The calls were many and often. However, the constraints of rationality do
not permit a finding that Defendant’s calls substantially burdened Mr. O’Dell’s existence.
Therefore, Mr. O’Dell’s unreasonable intrusion theory for his invasion of privacy claim cannot

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continue past summary judgment. The Court finds Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence
to permit the reasonable juror to find Defendant’s conduct “highly offensive.”
Turning to Mr. O’Dell’s second invasion of privacy argument, he claims that Defendant
unreasonably publicized his personal life to others. Pl.’s Resp., 13-14. Plaintiff contends that by
calling his work place and leaving messages with his co-workers, Defendant unreasonably
publicized his personal life. Id.
Although the record reflects that Defendant called Mr. O’Dell’s work and left a message
with his co-workers, the record lacks any indication of what Defendant’s representative conveyed
in that message. During his deposition, Mr. O’Dell testified that a school secretary reported to him
“that USAA had called.” Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Resp., 10. Mr. O’Dell’s testimony does not provide any
insight into the content of the message beyond that USAA had called for him. In order to show
that Defendant unreasonably publicized his personal life by leaving those messages, he must, at
the very least, produce evidence that Defendant communicated some information about his
personal life. Merely asking a third party to let Mr. O’Dell know that Defendant had called for him
reveals nothing personal. There is no indication in the record that Defendant’s representative told
the school secretary that Mr. O’Dell owed money, had defaulted, or any other personal information
within that realm. Without adequate evidentiary support, Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy
due to unreasonable publicity also falls short. With both theories extinguished, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to adequately support his claim for common law invasion of privacy.
IV.

Conclusion

Consistent with the analysis and explanation above, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, and
DENIES, IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23). Specifically, the
Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Counts II (IIED claim) and III

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(Common Law Invasion of Privacy claim) of Plaintiff’s Complaint. However, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Count I (WVCCPA claims).
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties.
ENTER:

April 5, 2018

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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