Rackley v. Western Regional Jail Authority et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER directing Plaintiff to amend his 2 Complaint within 45 days and cure the following deficiencies in pleading as indicated, as more fully set forth herein; noticing plaintiff that a failure to amend the complaint as direc ted may result in a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and L. R. Civ. P. 41.1; reminding Plaintiff of his obligation to prom ptly notify the Clerk of Court of any change in his contact information; holding in abeyance the 1 APPLICATION by Shawn Michael Rackley to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees or Costs pending initial review of Plaintiff's amended complaint or pending other further proceedings in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert on 10/25/2017. (cc: Plaintiff) (mkw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
SHAWN MICHAEL RACKLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:17-cv-04209

WESTERN REGIONAL AUTHORITY;
LIEUTENANT MORRISON;
C. O. SPAULDING;
C. O. AKERS;
C. O. STAPLETON;
and C. O. THACKER,
Defendants .

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without
Prepayment of Fees and Costs, (ECF No. 1), and his Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (ECF No. 2). In keeping with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned has
conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint to determine if the action is
frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Although pro se complaints, such as
the one filed in this case, must be liberally construed to allow the development of
potentially meritorious claims, the court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims
that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998),
develop the plaintiff’s legal theories for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th
Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court. Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). At the same time, to achieve justice,
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the court may allow a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to
correct deficiencies in the pleading. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).
Plaintiff alleges the following in his complaint:
1.

He is an inmate at the Western Regional Jail in Barboursville, West
Virginia and has been placed on a 2-man assignment, meaning there
must be two officers present with him during any activity;

2.

He is supposed to have a shower every three days. However, he went
from September 20, 2017 to September 27, 2017 without a shower
and from October 11, 2017 until the date he prepared the complaint
(October 16, 2017) without a shower;

3.

He has spoken to the defendants about not receiving a shower every
72 hours; and

4.

The lack of showers violates his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment and violates his civil rights.

For relief, Plaintiff demands “any and all things that the court deemed right and fair.”
(ECF No. 2). As currently written, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim sufficient to
withstand dismissal on initial screening, as explained below.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy to parties who are deprived of federally
protected civil rights by persons acting under color of any state “law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage.” To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege facts showing that: (1) an official deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected civil
right, privilege or immunity and (2) that the official did so under color of State law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983; see also Perrin v. Nicholson, C/A No. 9:10-1111-HFF-BM, 2010 WL
3893792 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2010). If either of these elements is missing, the complaint fails
to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, for an official to be liable
under § 1983, it must be “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in
the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no
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application under this section.” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D.Md. 1971)).
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant correctional officers and the Jail Authority are
subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution by denying him adequate access to showers. The Eighth
Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials who must provide humane conditions
of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526–27 (1984)). However, “[p]rison conditions may be ‘restrictive and even harsh.’”
Farmer, 511 U.S at 833 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (“To the
extent that [prison] conditions are restrictive or even harsh, they are part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”). “The Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions; it prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, not every
uncomfortable condition of confinement is actionable. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
Ultimately, this prohibition “does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those
deprivations denying the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities’ are sufficiently
grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
In order for Plaintiff to maintain a prima facie case that his conditions of
confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, he must show both (1) the deprivation of a
basic human need that was “sufficiently serious,” when measured by an objective
standard, and (2) that the responsible prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of
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mind.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Benjamin, 77
F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). “These requirements spring from the text of the
amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed upon an inmate cannot
properly be called ‘punishment,’ and absent severity, a punishment cannot be called ‘cruel
and unusual.’” Iko, 535 F.3d at 238. To satisfy the objective component, Plaintiff must
show that the challenged condition caused or constituted an extreme deprivation.
De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]o demonstrate such an
extreme deprivation, [Plaintiff] must allege a serious or significant physical or emotional
injury resulting from the challenged conditions or demonstrate a substantial risk of such
serious harm resulting from [his] exposure to the challenged conditions.” Odom v. South
Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting De’Lonta, 330
F.3d at 634). “Compelling a showing of significant physical or emotional harm, or a grave
risk of such harm, infuses an element of objectivity into the analysis, lest resolution of the
seriousness of the deprivation devolve into an application of the subjective views of the
judges deciding the question.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1370–80 (4th Cir. 1993)).
To fulfill the subjective component, Plaintiff must demonstrate a “deliberate
indifference” to his health or safety by the defendants. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The
Supreme Court explained:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence but less
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than malice. Flores v. Stevenson, Civil Action No. 2:11–cv–01278–TMC–BHH, 2012 WL
2803721 (D.S.C. May 11, 2012). Put simply, the staff at the Western Regional Jail had a
sufficiently culpable state of mind if they were aware of an excessive risk of harm to
Plaintiff’s health or safety, but disregarded it. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Brown v. North
Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow,
301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)) (“[T]he test is whether the guards know the plaintiff
inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they
fail to do so.”)
In addition to the legal principles set forth above, Plaintiff’s claims are governed
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The PLRA expressly
prohibits the filing of civil actions by prisoners “confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury.” Although the PLRA does not define “physical injury”
and the Fourth Circuit has not provided a definition, other courts have held that the
“physical injury” referenced by the Act need not be significant, but it must be more than
de minimis. See, e.g., Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2002); Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318 (S.D. Ind.
1997). In addition, “[a] plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress
cannot rely on conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress [or]
the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred, but, rather, the testimony must
establish that the plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional distress, which must be
sufficiently articulated.” Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 2001),
quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
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marks omitted).
In light of the governing standards and principles, Plaintiff must amend his
complaint in order for the undersigned to complete a preliminary review of the merits
and rule on the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Without such an amendment,
Plaintiff’s complaint will be subject to dismissal. Therefore, Plaintiff is ORDERED to
amend his complaint within forty-five (45) days and cure the following deficiencies in
pleading as indicated below:
1.

Plaintiff must set forth a factual basis upon which the Court can conclude that

the delay between showers constitutes an extreme deprivation of the basic necessities of
life, and that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and
safety by delaying his showers.
2.

Plaintiff must identify the nature of the injury he claims to have suffered as a

result of the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing.
3.

Plaintiff currently makes no specific claim for relief. Accordingly, the

complaint must be amended to state the relief requested (i.e. monetary, or injunctive, or
both).
Plaintiff is hereby given notice that a failure to amend the complaint as
ordered may result in a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for failure to
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P.
41 and L. R. Civ. P. 41.1. Plaintiffs is also reminded of his obligation to promptly notify
the Clerk of Court of any change in his contact information.
Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, (ECF No.
1), shall be held in abeyance pending initial review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint or
pending other further proceedings in this case.
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The Clerk is instructed to provide a copy of this order to Plaintiff.
ENTERED: October 25, 2017

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