Hatfield et al v. Garrison et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court ORDERS that the Magistrate Judge's 20 Proposed Findings and Recommendation be ADOPTED; that Plaintiffs' 1 and 3 Applications to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Plaintiffs' 14 Motio n for Default Judgment be DENIED; the Court ORDERS that Plaintiffs' 5 and 7 Complaints be DISMISSED and that this matter be STRICKEN from the Court's docket. Signed by Judge Irene C. Berger on 5/2/2012. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (slr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BECKLEY DIVISION
REX HATFIELD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-cv-00498
ROBERT L. GARRISON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Documents 5 and 7), wherein Plaintiffs
claim an entitlement to relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Plaintiffs name the following as Defendants: (1) Robert L. Garrison, Assistant United States
Attorney; (2) Ralph Moore, DEA Agent; and (3) Davy Pierson, Assistant Chief of Police.
(Document 5 at 4.) By Standing Order (Document 2) entered on July 22, 2011, this action was
referred to the Honorable R. Clarke VanDervort, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission
to this Court of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636.
On March 12, 2012, Magistrate Judge VanDervort submitted his Proposed Findings and
Recommendations (“PF&R”), wherein it is recommended that the Court deny Plaintiffs’
Applications to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Documents 1 and 3), deny Plaintiffs’
Motion for Default Judgment (Document 14), dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Documents 5 and
7) and remove this matter from the Court’s docket. Plaintiff Rex Hatfield was granted an
extension of time to file objections to the PF&R, which he subsequently filed on March 30, 2012
(Document 23).
I.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the PF&R, Magistrate Judge VanDervort explains in great detail the relevant facts and
procedural history surrounding Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ do not object to or dispute the
general facts contained in the PF&R. Therefore, the Court hereby incorporates the facts and
procedural history included in the PF&R. Nevertheless, the Court provides a brief summary of
the salient facts contained in the PF&R without further citation to the record.
A. Criminal Convictions
On October 29, 2008, Plaintiffs Rex and Everly Hatfield were convicted on a two count
Superseding Indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. In
Count One, Plaintiffs were convicted of Conspiracy to Commit Pharmacy Burglaries, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2118(b) and (d). In Count Two, Plaintiffs were convicted of
Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(c), and 846. As part of Count Two, the jury
returned Special Jury Verdicts finding the Plaintiffs’ distribution of drugs resulted in the death
and/or serious bodily injury of several individuals.1 Plaintiffs Rex and Everly Hatfield were both
originally sentenced to a total term of life imprisonment, which consisted of one hundred twenty
(120) months on Count One, and life imprisonment on Count Two. The sentences for both
counts were to be served concurrently.
1
The jury found both Plaintiffs’ distribution of controlled substances resulted in the death of Carol Walker and the
serious body injury of Richard Ward. Further, the jury found Plaintiff Rex Hatfield’s distribution of controlled
substances resulted in the deaths of Deborah Smith and Mark Honaker. Finally, the jury found Plaintiff Everly
Hatfield’s distribution of controlled substances resulted in the death of Jimmy Dishmon.
2
Plaintiffs appealed the Special Jury Instruction defining the term “resulting from” as it
related to their conviction on Count Two. The Seventh Circuit entirely affirmed the convictions
on Count One. Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed Plaintiffs’ substantive convictions on
Count Two, the appellate court reversed and remanded Count Two based on an error in the
Special Jury Instruction relating to “resulting from.” On remand, the Government moved to
dismiss the allegations in Count Two relating to the distribution of drugs resulting in the death
and/or serious bodily injury of several individuals. The District Court granted this motion and
dismissed the “resulting from” allegations (contained in Count Two) over Plaintiffs’ objection
and set the case for re-sentencing.
Several months later, Plaintiffs moved for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. Plaintiffs contended the Government committed Brady2 and Napue3 violations during
the 2008 prosecution. First, Plaintiffs argued the Government violated Brady by failing to turn
over exculpatory evidence relating to hotel registration records.
Plaintiffs argued the
Government violated Napue by failing to correct the false testimony of two witnesses at trial
when they knew the information was false. The District Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a
new trial finding that the Governments’ errors were not material. This decision was affirmed on
appeal. Plaintiffs Rex and Everly Hatfield were both re-sentenced to a total term of three hundred
sixty (360) months in prison, which represented one hundred twenty (120) months on Count One
and two hundred forty (240) months on the substantive conviction on Count Two. The sentences
for both counts are to be served concurrently.
2
A prosecutor must disclose to a defendant all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in the
government’s possession if the evidence is material to the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976);
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
3
“[A] conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
3
B. Plaintiffs’ present claims
Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated their constitutional rights during their 2008 criminal
trial. First, Plaintiffs allege Defendants Garrison and Moore conspired to deprive them of their
right to a fair trial by withholding exculpatory evidence. (Document 5 at 4.) Next, Plaintiffs
allege Defendant Garrison violated their due process rights by failing to correct the false
testimony of two witnesses. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiffs allege Defendants Garrison, Moore, and
Pierson “vindictively with malice and evil, conceived in the spirit of mischief, conspired to frame
[them] with distributing drugs.” (Id. at 4-5.) On August 10, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to
Amend Complaint (Document 7), wherein Plaintiff Rex Hatfield contends he has “learned from
newly discovered evidence that Robert Garrison and the U.S. Marshals Office refused me
desperately needed medical attention in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (Document 7 at 1.)
In support, Plaintiff states he “waited seven months in jail to see a psychiatrist and lung doctor.”
(Id.) It appears only Plaintiff Rex Hatfield alleges an Eighth Amendment violation. On
November 14, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default Judgment (Document 14), wherein they
argue default judgment should be entered because the Defendants failed to timely respond to
their Complaint.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other
standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the
findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes
general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the
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magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47
(4th Cir.1982). When reviewing portions of the PF&R de novo, the Court will consider the fact
that Plaintiffs are acting pro se, and their pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978).
III.
PF&R AND PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
A. Screening Standard
The Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiffs’ Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
This provision requires the Court to dismiss any portion or all of the complaint if it is “frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(b)(1). A complaint is “frivolous” if it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), or if the claim lacks “an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court must also dismiss any
portion or all of the complaint if the prisoner “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. at § 1915A (b)(2).
B. Claims from Plaintiffs’ 2008 Convictions
The Magistrate Judge first considered Plaintiffs claims that their constitutional rights
were violated by the Defendants during their criminal prosecution in the Southern District of
Illinois. From the nature of the allegations, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “Plaintiffs are
implying that their convictions for conspiracy to burglarize pharmacies and distribution of
controlled substances are invalid as a result of various constitutional violations during their
criminal trial in the Southern District of Illinois.” (Document 20 at 11.) The Magistrate Judge
found that Plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim under Bivens pursuant to Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Id.) The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
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Plaintiffs’ “convictions for conspiracy to burglarize pharmacies and distribution of controlled
substances and reversed and remanded as to the “results from” charge.” (Document 20 at 11.)
The Magistrate Judge indicated that “[a]lthough the District Court found that the United States
withheld exculpatory evidence and failed to correct false testimony, the District Court denied the
Motion for New Trial finding that the errors were not material.” (Id. at 12.) The Magistrate Judge
concluded that because “Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their criminal convictions for
conspiracy to burglarize pharmacies and distribution of controlled substances have been
invalidated, Plaintiffs’ Bivens claim is not cognizable pursuant to Heck.” (Id.) Therefore, the
Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ above mentioned claims.
In their objections, Plaintiffs first contend they “are in no way challenging the criminal
convictions sustained through the constitutional violations perpetrated by the defendants as
incorrectly assumed by the magistrate judge . . . [.]” (Document 23 at 1.) Rather, Plaintiffs are
“asking for [an] award of damages for the acts committed by the defendants which violated the
plaintiff’s (sic) constitutional rights.” (Id.) Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s application
of the Heck rule. (Document 23 at 1.) Plaintiffs argue Heck does not apply because “plaintiffs
are not challenging legitimate acts of judicial process but instead are challenging the illegal and
criminal acts committed by the defendants which (sic) are clearly outside the scope of the
essential functions of their employment.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs argue absolute immunity does
not apply because the defendants were not operating in their traditional function as advocates.
(Id.) Plaintiffs also argue only qualified immunity applies to Defendants Moore and Pierson (Id.
at 2.) Thus, Plaintiffs argue “this case should not be summarily dismissed based upon the
magistrate’s argument that the prosecutor has absolute immunity since this case involves more
defendants then just the prosecutor . . . [.]” (Id.) Plaintiffs argue, even if Heck applies, their
previous sentence of life imprisonment was overturned in part because the prosecution withheld
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evidence so they have met the standard to bring a claim. Finally, in reference to the Magistrate
Judge’s finding that Plaintiffs’ did not allege that Defendant Garrison violated their
constitutional rights by presenting the Special Jury Instruction to the District Court, Plaintiffs
argue “you can best believe that this was to be included” in their Complaint. (Document 23 at 4.)
Plaintiffs’ objections are clearly without merit. First, the principles outlined in Heck
clearly apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege the Defendants conspired to frame them,
withheld exculpatory evidence and failed to correct false testimony all of which took place
during the Plaintiffs’ prosecution. The Heck rule states that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Plaintiffs contend they successfully had their
sentenced reversed on direct appeal because the prosecution withheld evidence and did not
correct false testimony. However, a closer reading of the Seventh Circuit’s decision reveals
Plaintiffs’ convictions for conspiracy to burglarize pharmacies and distribution of controlled
substances were affirmed, and only the “results from” charge in the Special Jury Instruction was
reversed and remanded.
Therefore, the sentences were not rendered invalid based on
Defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional actions, but rather on an impermissible jury instruction.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ objections are overruled because Heck clearly applies and their claims do
not comply with its requirements.
Also as a reason to support their claim, Plaintiffs’ seize on the Magistrate Judge’s
observation that they do not allege that Defendant Garrison violated their constitutional rights by
presenting the Special Jury Instruction to the trial court. (Document 20 at 11 n. 6.) Plaintiffs fail
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to appreciate the alternative nature of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling. For the sake of argument,
the Court assumes Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Garrison violated their constitutional rights
by tendering the Special Jury Instruction to the trial court. With this assumption, Plaintiffs
would meet the Heck standard because the Special Jury Instruction was successfully appealed.
However, the Magistrate Judge correctly held that Defendant Garrison is entitled to absolute
immunity on such a claim. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions performed
as “an officer of the court.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-343 (2009).
Moreover, prosecutors are absolutely immune “for their conduct . . . in presenting the State’s
case, insofar as that conduct is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.’” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430-431 (1976)). Clearly, in tendering a jury instruction to the Court, Defendant Garrison was
acting as “an officer of the court” and this conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.” Therefore, the Court finds Defendant Garrison is absolutely
immune from Plaintiffs’ claim based on the Special Jury Instruction, even had Plaintiffs made
such a claim. Additionally, as noted by the Magistrate Judge, Defendant Garrison would likewise
be absolutely immune from Plaintiffs’ claims for withholding exculpatory evidence and failure to
correct false testimony even if the claims were not precluded by Heck. Finding no merit in any
of Plaintiffs’ objections, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ claims are not cognizable under Heck and
should, therefore, be dismissed.
C. Eighth Amendment Claim4
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that prisoners are guaranteed “adequate
medical care” under the Eighth Amendment as part of the protection against the infliction of
“cruel and unusual punishment.” (Document 20 at 13.) The Magistrate Judge correctly laid out
4
As noted above, only Rex Hatfield is a Plaintiff with respect to this claim.
8
the applicable law regarding the establishment of an Eighth Amendment violation based on a
prisoner’s “conditions of confinement.” It is as follows:
an inmate must allege and prove (1) a “sufficiently serious” deprivation under an
objective standard and (2) that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference”
to the inmate’s health and safety under a subjective standard. Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 297 (1991). A sufficiently serious deprivation occurs when “a prison
official’s act or omission . . . result[s] in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. at 298 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at
347). “In order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a
prisoner must prove two elements – that ‘the deprivation of [a] basic human need
was objectively sufficiently serious,’ and that ‘subjectively the officials act[ed]
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166
(4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir.
1993)(quotation omitted)). See also White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, 269 (4th Cir.
1991) (“In Strickler, we held that a prisoner must suffer ‘serious or significant
physical or mental injury’ in order to be ‘subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the’ Eighth Amendment.”)
(Document 20 at 14) (parallel citation omitted).
Plaintiff must initially allege and ultimately establish “a ‘sufficiently serious’ deprivation
of medical care and resulting ‘serious or significant physical or mental injury’ in order to
maintain and prevail upon his Eighth Amendment claim.” (Document 20 at 14.) “To establish
the subjective component of deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege and prove each
defendant’s consciousness of the risk of harm to the inmate.” (Document 20 at 14)(citing Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either
actual intent or reckless disregard.” Id. This subjective component may be established “by
showing that prison officials’ delay in providing medical treatment caused unnecessary pain or
the worsening of his condition.” (Document 20 at 15) (citing Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 853
(4th Cir. 1990) (“Failure to respond to an inmate’s known medical needs raises an inference that
there was deliberate indifference to those needs.”)).
The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the
subjective component of deliberate indifference because he did not allege that the Defendants
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knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. (Document 20 at 15.) Instead,
the Magistrate Judge indicated that “Rex Hatfield merely states that Defendants denied him
adequate medical treatment because he has ‘waited seven months in the jail to see a psychiatrist
and lung doctor.’” (Id.) Therefore, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations that Defendant Garrison and the U.S. Marshal Service failed to provide psychological
and medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment and
recommends the Court dismiss this claim. (Document 20 at 16-17.)
In his objections, Plaintiff Rex Hatfield argues he was “denied adequate and effective
medical treatment of his serious medical needs by officials who were deliberately indifferent.”
(Document 23 at 3.) Plaintiff argues Defendant Garrison knew he needed “mental health
treatment before trial which is why [Defendant Garrison] could not allow [Plaintiff Rex Hatfield]
to be given a mental health evaluation, so [Defendant Garrison] interfered with this medical
treatment when he instructed the U.S. Marshals not to approve treatment [for] him . . . [.]” (Id.)
In support, Plaintiff cites to his medical records. See (Document 9). Additionally, Plaintiff
states that “the U.S. Marshals refused to treat (at the direction of the prosecutor) [his] pulmonary
condition and mental health issues, this could have been fatal.” (Document 23 at 3.) Plaintiff
also indicates he might never be the same as a result of this deliberate indifference. (Id.) Finally,
Plaintiff also argues that “affidavit with attached exhibits was meant to show denial of medical
treatment . . . [.]” (Id. at 4.)
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff wholly fails to allege that Defendant Moore or Pierson
deprived him of medical care resulting in a “serious or significant physical or mental injury.” In
fact, Plaintiff points to no wrongful conduct by either Defendants Moore or Pierson.
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge correctly pointed out that Plaintiff’s allegations against the
U.S. Marshals Service may not proceed because “Bivens claims are not actionable against the
10
United States, federal agencies, or public officials acting in their official capacities.” (Document
20 at 15 n. 8.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff failed to allege Defendant Garrison committed any wrongful
conduct with respect to his medical care. However, Plaintiff now essentially argues in his
objections that the U.S. Marshals ignored his recommended medical treatment at Defendant
Garrison’s direction. (Document 23 at 3.) Plaintiff argues neither Defendant Garrison nor the
U.S. Marshal are qualified to make a decision on his medical treatment which he argues
amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id.)
The Court finds Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Plaintiff acknowledges he was
in the sole custody of the U.S. Marshal. The U.S. Marshal is responsible for providing adequate
psychological and medical treatment to federal detainees in the Marshal’s custody. (Id.)
Defendant Garrison did not have any authority to direct the type of medical treatment Plaintiff
was provided while he awaited trial or any other time for that matter. Moreover, Defendant
Garrison was not responsible for providing Plaintiff with adequate medical care. Rather this
responsibility rested with the U.S. Marshal. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations cannot be construed to implicate the violation of a constitutional right for which relief
can be granted under Bivens and must be dismissed.
D. Default Judgment
Finally, the Magistrate Judge considered Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment
(Document 14), wherein Plaintiffs argue that default judgment is proper under Rule 55(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “no answer or other defense has been filed by the
defendants.” (Document 14 at 1.) The Magistrate Judge found that Defendants did not default
by failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint because Defendants were not served or required to
respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at the time the motion for default judgment was filed.
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(Document 20 at 16.) Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court deny Plaintiffs’
Motion for Default Judgment. Plaintiffs did not object to this finding and, therefore, the Court is
not required to review this finding de novo. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.
CONCLUSION
Thus, based on the findings herein, the Court does hereby ORDER that the Magistrate
Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommendation (Document 20) be ADOPTED. The Court
ORDERS Plaintiffs’ Applications to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Documents 1 and 3)
and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Document 14) be DENIED. Further, the Court
ORDERS Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Documents 5 and 7) be DISMISSED and that this matter be
STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to
any unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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May 2, 2012
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