Woltz v. Carter
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court does hereby ORDER that the Magistrate Judge's 19 Proposed Findings and Recommendation be ADOPTED. Further, the Court ORDERS that Defendants' 10 Mot ion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, that Plantiff's 1 Complaint be DISMISSED, and that this matter be STRICKEN from the docket of this Court. Signed by Judge Irene C. Berger on 9/6/2012. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (msa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BECKLEY DIVISION
HOWELL W. WOLTZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-cv-00908
THOMAS CARTER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
ADOPTING PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff, Howell W. Woltz, who was confined in Federal Prison
Camp in Beaver, West Virginia, filed a Complaint (Document 1) through counsel, Jeffery T.
Mauzy, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Plaintiff
named Thomas Carter, Michael Snow, Brigette Seafus, Sean Marler, Joel Ziegler, Timothy
Painter, Barbara Fletcher, and Dr. Michael Murry as Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-10.)
All
Defendants are Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) employees at FCI Beckley. Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, access to the Courts
and counsel, and free speech. By Order (Document 17) of February 24, 2012, this matter was
referred to Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort for Findings of Fact and Recommendations for
disposition. On August 8, 2012, Magistrate Judge VanDervort submitted his Proposed Findings
and Recommendations (“PF&R”), wherein it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 10), dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint and remove this matter from the Court’s docket. On August 24, 2012,
Plaintiff timely filed his objections to the PF&R. (Document 20).
I.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Magistrate Judge VanDervort's PF&R sets forth in detail the relevant allegations and facts
involved in this case, and the Court incorporates by reference those facts. For context of the
rulings herein, the Court provides the following summary: Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
violated his due process rights by ignoring BOP rules, regulations and policy, with respect to his
custody classification. Plaintiff alleges his Inmate Skills Development Plan (“ISDP”) contained
significant fraud and false claims not found in his Pre-Sentence Report. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants denied him direct home confinement and recommended 60 to 90 days
of residential reentry center [RRC] placement on this false and fraudulent information and that this
constituted a denial of his due process rights. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges the Defendants
refused to correct the information in his ISDP. Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hile there is no guarantee
of custody-level status, or its benefits, there is a process which determines such consideration, and
through fraud, false claims, and denial of Bureau of Prisons policy-driven mandates of due
process, Plaintiff has been denied these considerations.” (Compl. ¶ 65.)
As the Magistrate Judge correctly summarizes, Plaintiff alleges his equal protection rights
were violated “by [Defendants] (1) denying him a furlough when his mother became ill and died
when other inmates were granted furloughs under the same circumstances ([Compl.] ¶¶ 90 - 95.);
(2) terminating his job as clerk of general maintenance in January, 2011 ([Compl.] ¶¶ 96 - 104.);
and (3) falsely charging him in an incident report with communicating with an inmate when he
received a letter from an inmate as it was forwarded by a law firm to him and then after
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disciplinary proceedings, raising his custody level ([Compl.] ¶¶ 106 -117.).” (Document 19 at 3.)
Essentially, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Carter, Snow, Seafus, and Marler treated him differently
than other prisoners in the same situation. (Compl. ¶ 127.)
With respect to his claim that Defendants violated his right of access to the court and
counsel, Plaintiff alleges Defendants opened and tampered with his mail in violation of BOP
policies. (Compl. ¶¶ 148-164.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his free speech rights by
stealing copies of a book he was attempting to publish and tampering with his mail related to the
book, which caused the resignation of his editor and delays in publishing his book. (Compl. ¶¶
180-192.)
On February 10, 2012, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in Support, wherein Defendants argue that (1)
Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official capacity are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his action; (3)
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to this Bivens action; (4) Plaintiff fails to state
constitutional claims regarding custody classification and placement, furlough denials,
disciplinary action, selection of prison jobs, claims of retaliation, access to the courts, claims that
Defendants violated BOP regulations, presence of false information in Plaintiff’s central file, and
loss of mail; and (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Document 10 ¶¶ 1-5.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
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However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to
which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this
Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory objections
that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). When reviewing
portions of the PF&R de novo, the Court will consider the fact that Plaintiff is acting pro se, and his
pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe
v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978).
III.
DISCUSSION1
A. Official Capacity Claims
The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants in their official
capacity must be dismissed because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Document 19 at
15-16.) Thus, because Plaintiff sued Defendants Fletcher, Painter and Murry only in their official
capacities, the Magistrate Judge recommends this matter be entirely dismissed as to them. (Id. at
16.) Plaintiff does not object to either finding. Therefore, the Court is not required to provide de
novo review of these findings. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.
B. Qualified Immunity
In consideration of a qualified immunity defense, the Magistrate Judge properly observed
that “[f]ederal officials performing discretionary functions are generally protected from civil
1
Plaintiff makes several statements about this Court, the Magistrate Judge, the BOP, and the United States. See
(Document 1, 4-5.) The Court finds such statements are wholly irrelevant.
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liability if their ‘ [1]conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
[2] of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (Document 19 at 13-14) (citing and
quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 433
(4th Cir. 1996)). The Court may exercise discretion in deciding which prong to address first.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 226.
The Magistrate Judge determined that “[i]t is well established that Congress has delegated
inmates’ custody classification and placement in Bureau of Prisons programs and facilities to the
full discretion of federal prison officials.” (Document 19 at 16) (citations omitted). The
Magistrate Judge also found it is likewise clearly established that determining custody
classification and placement in BOP programs and facilities is a discretionary function of BOP
officials. (Id.) Moreover, the Magistrate Judge properly indicated that it is well established that
inmates have no liberty or due process rights with respect to the BOP classification and placement
determinations. In support, the Magistrate Judge cites Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889, (1994) for the proposition that “[t]he federal constitution itself
vests no liberty interest in inmates retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status
‘[a]s long as the [challenged] conditions or degree of confinement . . . is within the sentence
imposed . . . And is not otherwise violative of the Constitution.” (Document 19 at 16.) Thus, the
Magistrate Judge found “Plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim that his constitutional
rights were violated in Defendants’ determination of his custody classification and placement. It
makes no difference that the Defendants relied on false information in determining his custody
classification.” (Id. at 17.) Accordingly, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Magistrate
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Judge found Defendants’ are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct cannot be
found to have violated Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. (Id.)
Although Plaintiff does not specifically mention the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
Defendants Snow, Seafus, Marler and Ziegler are entitled to qualified immunity, he appears to
object to the finding that inmates have no liberty or due process rights with respect to BOP
classification and placement determinations. (Document 20 at 2-3.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues
the BOP policies “state that the change to ‘community’ custody was automatic.” (Id. at 2.)
Further, Plaintiff argues that by refusing to change his custody level, he was deprived of seeing
his mother before she died and also deprived of attending her funeral. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues
the failure to follow policy deprived him of the opportunity to be considered for home
confinement. Further, Plaintiff argues he clearly stated a constitutional due process claim under
the Accardi doctrine, which he contends the Magistrate Judge ignored. (Id. at 3.) Specifically,
Plaintiff contends, “Not following one’s own policies when that person works for the federal
government states a due process violation. . . [.]” (Id.)
The Court finds both of Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. The Supreme Court clearly
held that a prisoner has no constitutional or inherent right in being released before the completion
of lawful sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99
(1979)). However, a prisoner has a protectable right in those interests to which he has a
legitimate claim of entitlement. Id. Plaintiff argues his due process rights were violated because
the BOP was obligated to automatically classify his status as “community status” and grant him
furlough and place him directly on home confinement placement.2
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Plaintiff did not object to the finding that “[i]t makes no difference that the Defendants relied on false information in
determining his custody classification. Plaintiff’s claim in this regard falls under the Privacy Act, and documents
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However, Plaintiff fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Magistrate Judge correctly found that inmates have
no liberty interest or due process rights in BOP classification decisions because “[t]he federal
constitution itself vests no liberty interest in inmates retaining or receiving any particular security
or custody status ‘[a]s long as the [challenged] conditions or degree of confinement . . . is within
the sentence imposed . . . And is not otherwise violative of the Constitution.” Slezak v. Evatt, 21
F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff acknowledges in his Complaint that “there is no
guarantee of custody-level status, or its benefits, [but] there is a process which determines such
consideration . . . [.]” (Compl. ¶ 65.) Plaintiff simply fails to state a due process claim because
he has no protected liberty interest with respect to the BOP’s discretionary determination of
whether he is eligible for a furlough or community confinement. See Posey v. Dewalt, 86 F.
Supp.2d 565, 571 (E.D. Va. 1999), appeal dismissed by, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 971(2000) (stating that “[p]ut simply, petitioner has not stated a due process
claim because he has no protected liberty interest in a particular classification within BOP.”)
Finally, even assuming the Defendants violated a statutory or constitutional due process right,
such constitutional or statutory right is not clearly established such that the “violation” would
defeat the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s due process claim for alleged violation of BOP policies.
pertaining to his custody classification are exempt under that Act.” (Document 19 at 17.) Thus, the Court need not
consider whether the alleged falsification of documents would support a due process claim.
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C. Equal Protection Claim
The Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his right to equal
protection is insufficient and does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. (Document 19
at 18.) Plaintiff does not object to this finding. Therefore, the Court is not required to provide de
novo review of this finding. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.
D. Retaliation and Access to Courts Claim
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s right to access to the
court and retaliation claims. (Document 19 at 19.) The Magistrate Judge properly stated that an
inmate must allege facts specifically indicating that prison officials retaliated against him for
exercising a constitutional right and that the inmate must allege facts indicating that the retaliatory
acts actually impacted his exercise of the constitutional right. (Id. at 18.) (citing American Civil
Liberties Union of Maryland v. Wicomico County, Md., 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993)). The
Magistrate Judge assumed that Defendants retaliated against him for filing, but “Plaintiff has
nevertheless initiated numerous suits and appeals while he has been incarcerated . . . [.]”
(Document 19 at 19.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge found that it “does not appear that Plaintiff can
demonstrate that Defendants retaliatory acts, if any, impacted his right of access to the Court, and
his retaliation claim should be dismissed.” (Id.)
In his objection, Plaintiff argues the Defendants have not denied his claim of illegal mail
tampering. (Document 20 at 3.) He argues that no Court has heard his claim on illegal mail
tampering. (Id. at 4.) Importantly, Plaintiff fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
he has failed to state that this “illegal mail tampering” has led to an actual injury. (Document 19
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at 19.) Plaintiff has been able to file numerous suits and appeals while he has been incarcerated.
Plaintiff’s allegations of illegal mail tampering are insufficient to demonstrate that he has
suffered an actual injury. See Woltz v. Scarantino, 5:10-CV-00095, 2011 WL 1229994 (S.D.
W.Va. Mar. 31, 2011) reconsideration denied, 5:10-CV-00095, 2012 WL 851118 (S.D. W.Va.
Mar. 13, 2012) and aff'd, 12-6619, 2012 WL 3642857 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2012). Thus, Plaintiff’s
objection is overruled.3
E. Free Speech Claim
Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated
his right to free speech by stealing copies of a book he was attempting to publish and tampering
with his mail be dismissed. Plaintiff does not object to this finding. Therefore, the Court is not
required to provide de novo review of this finding. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Thus, based on the findings herein, the Court does hereby ORDER that the Magistrate
Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommendation (Document 19) be ADOPTED. Further, the
Court ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment (Document 10) be GRANTED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 1) be
DISMISSED, and this matter be STRICKEN from the docket of this Court.
3
Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that his retaliation claim should be dismissed. Therefore,
the Court is not required to provide de novo review of this finding. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.
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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to any
unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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September 6, 2012
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