Prokop v. Regional Jail Authority of West Virginia, Charleston, WV
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court ORDERS that the 8 Proposed Findings and Recommendation by the Magistrate Judge be ADOPTED, the Plaintiff's 9 Objections OVERRULED, and the 4 Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and C osts filed by Robert C. Prokop DENIED; the Court ORDERS that this case be REMOVED from the Court's docket and that any pending motions be TERMINATED. Signed by Judge Irene C. Berger on 10/14/2015. (cc: Magistrate VanDervort; attys; any unrepresented party) (slr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BECKLEY DIVISION
ROBERT C. PROKOP,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-cv-05566
REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY OF
WEST VIRGINIA, CHARLESTON, WV,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff’s Complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Document 1) and amendment thereto (Document 6), the Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees and Cost (Document 4), the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings
and Recommendation (PF&R) (Document 8), and the Plaintiff’s Objections (Document 9). By
Standing Order (Document 3) filed on May 5, 2015, this case was referred to the Honorable R.
Clarke VanDervort, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court of proposed
findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B).
On June 15, 2015, the Magistrate Judge submitted his PF&R, wherein he recommended
that this Court dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint. Following careful consideration, the Court finds
that the Magistrate Judge’s PF&R should be adopted and the Plaintiff’s objections should be
overruled.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Magistrate Judge sets forth the factual allegations and procedural history in detail.
The Court now incorporates by reference those facts and the procedural history. To provide
context for the ruling herein, the Court provides the following summary.
The Plaintiff is an inmate at Southern Regional Jail in Beaver, Raleigh County, West
Virginia.
His complaint alleges that on May 20, 2014, the Defendant, the Regional Jail
Authority of West Virginia, allowed a Special Response Team (“SRT”) to “conduct training
exercises using live ammo on inmates at the Southern Regional Jail.” (PF&R at 1.) According
to the Plaintiff, he and his “cell mate had been locked down for over 24 hours when the SRT
members stormed their cell and shot Plaintiff without just cause.” (Id. at 1-2.) As a result, the
Plaintiff claims that he suffered scarring to his right leg, “muscle tissue damage,” and emotional
trauma. (Id. at 2.) As relief, he requests $700,000 in monetary damages, plus costs. (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of any complaint “in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a).
Before permitting the case to move forward or requiring a response from the
defendants, “the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” § 1915(b). The Magistrate Judge recommends, based on his screening of the case, that
the Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other
standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the
findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes
general and conclusory objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the
magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47
(4th Cir.1982). When reviewing portions of the PF&R de novo, the Court will consider the fact
that the Plaintiff is acting pro se, and his pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir.1978).
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge began with the established rule that complaints arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) must be directed at a “person,” and that the West Virginia
Regional Jail is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. (Id. at 3.) The Magistrate Judge
also found that suits against a state or state agencies in federal court are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the West Virginia Regional Jail
Authority, as an agency of the State of West Virginia, is thereby immune from the present suit.
(Id.) On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed timely objections to the PF&R. (Document 9.)
The Plaintiff raises two substantive objections to the PF&R. First, the Plaintiff argues
that the Eleventh Amendment is properly construed to bar controversies among the states in
federal court, rather than suits by a private party against a state or state agency. (Obj., at 2.)
Therefore, he claims that the Eleventh Amendment poses no obstacles to the Court’s
adjudication of this action. (Id.)
The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the language of the
Eleventh Amendment to bar suits in federal court by litigants seeking redress against a state or a
state agency. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 144 (1993); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently
applied this construction, as have the Courts in this district. See, e.g., Goodman v. Rockefeller,
et. al., 947 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court properly dismissed Section
1983 claims against State of West Virginia as barred by Eleventh Amendment); Harter v.
Vernon, 101 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 1996) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against any state in federal
court); Webb v. Parsons, 2011 WL 2076419 (S.D.W.V. May 6, 2011) (finding that the West
Virginia Jail Authority, an agency of the State of West Virginia, is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment).
The Plaintiff provides no textual or precedential support for his assertion that the Court
must radically depart from these established interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, and the
Court is unpersuaded by his argument. This Court is bound by the precedent of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, the Plaintiff’s
argument that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits by a private citizen against a state
must fail.
The Plaintiff’s second objection is that because West Virginia law permits claims against
the State of West Virginia and its officials and agencies under certain circumstances, and
establishes an exclusive forum for adjudication of some types of claims, the conclusions of the
Magistrate Judge as to the Eleventh Amendment are per se invalid. (Obj. at 2, citing W. Va.
Code, § 14-2-4.) The Plaintiff suggests that by authorizing citizens to seek relief from the State
under certain circumstances, the State of West Virginia has waived the sovereign immunity
granted by the Eleventh Amendment and consented to suit in federal court for claims arising
under Section 1983. (Obj. at 2.)
The Supreme Court has long held that while the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to suit
in federal court against a state or state agencies, states may waive that immunity by consenting to
suit. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 539 U.S. at 144; Edelman, 451 U.S. at 673.
However, the Supreme Court has set forth a rigorous test for determining whether a state has
consented to suit in federal court. Federal courts will only find waiver of a state’s constitutional
grant of sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment through “the most
express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as (will) leave no room for
any other reasonable construction.”
Edelman, 451 U.S. at 673, citing Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909). The Court finds that the West Virginia statutes cited by the
Plaintiff do not even approach that high threshold.
The Plaintiff relies first upon Section 14-2-4 of the West Virginia Code in arguing for
affirmative consent by the West Virginia Legislature to suit in federal court under Section 1983.
(Obj., at 2, citing W. Va. Code, § 14-2-4.) Section 14-2-1 states that “[t]he purpose of this article
is to provide a simple and impartial method for the consideration of claims against the state that
cannot … be determined in the regular courts of the state …” W.Va. Code § 14-2-1. The
statutory provision specifically cited by the Plaintiff, Section 14-2-4, creates a “court of claims,”
with a total of three judges. W. Va. Code, § 14-2-4. A review of Chapter 14, Article 2, of the
West Virginia Code in its entirety reveals no explicit references to waiver of West Virginia’s
constitutional right to sovereign immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment, and no discussion whatsoever of consent to suit in federal court under Section 1983
or any other cause of action. To the contrary, the West Virginia Legislature explicitly stated that
the purpose of the Chapter was to create a forum for claims against the State of West Virginia
which, for various reasons, were not cognizable in existing state courts. W.Va. Code § 14-2-1.
This Court thus concludes that the statutory provisions cited by the Plaintiff clearly fail to meet
the rigorous test for consent established by the Supreme Court.
Even if the Plaintiff were correct with respect to the interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, his claims would nonetheless require dismissal by this Court. As the Magistrate
Judge found, the Plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy the required pleading standard for a claim
arising under Section 1983.1 Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against “every
person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State”
deprives “any citizen” of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit has held that
under Section 1983, state agencies are not a “person.” See, e.g., Preval v. Reno, 203 F.3d 821
(2000) (unpublished) (holding that the Piedmont Regional Jail is not a “person” under Section
1983.) Therefore, because the Plaintiff’s complaint names only a state agency as Defendant, it
fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and requires dismissal by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, after careful consideration and for the reasons stated herein, the Court
ORDERS that the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommendation (Document 8)
1
The Plaintiff failed to object to the findings of the magistrate judge with respect to the pleading standard of
Section 1983.
be ADOPTED, the Plaintiff’s Objections (Document 9) OVERRULED, the Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Document 1) DISMISSED, and the Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of
Fees and Cost (Document 4) DENIED.
The Court further ORDERS that this case be
REMOVED from the Court’s docket, and that any pending motions be TERMINATED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to Magistrate Judge
R. Clarke VanDervort and to the Defendant.
ENTER:
October 14, 2015
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