Oxley v. Blankenship et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court ORDERS that Defendants Joseph Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of Hinton's 7 MOTION to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint and City National Bank of West Virginia Inc.'s 14 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's 1 Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court ORDERS that any pending motions be TERMINATED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Irene C. Berger on 10/9/2015. (cc: attys; any unrepresented party) (slr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BECKLEY DIVISION
LILA OXLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-cv-07057
JOSEPH BLANKENSHIP, et al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 1), Defendants Joseph
Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of Hinton’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Document 7), Defendants Joseph Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of Hinton’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 8),
the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants Joseph Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of
Hinton’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 11), Defendants Joseph
Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of Hinton’s Reply to the Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendants Joseph Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of Hinton’s Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 13).
In addition, the Court has reviewed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint of
Defendant City National Bank of West Virginia, Inc. (Document 14), the Memorandum of Law in
Support of City National Bank of West Virginia Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Document 15), the Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition of City National Bank of West
Virginia, Inc., Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Document 17), and the Reply to Plaintiff’s Response
in Opposition to City National Bank of West Virginia Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Document 18). The Court has also reviewed all attached exhibits. For the reasons
stated herein, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
The Plaintiff, Lila Oxley, initiated this suit with a complaint filed on June 2, 2015. She
named the following defendants: Joseph Blankenship, Mayor; Richard Gunnoe, City Attorney;
The City of Hinton, a Municipality; and City National Bank.
Ms. Oxley alleges that she and her family were politically active in Summers County and
the City of Hinton. Joseph Blankenship was elected mayor of the City of Hinton in 2006, and
convinced the City Council to replace the previous City Attorney with defendant Richard Gunnoe.
(Compl. ¶ 2.) Mr. Blankenship won re-election, although Ms. Oxley campaigned against him.
(Id. at ¶ 5.) Ms. Oxley believes that Mayor Blankenship and Attorney Gunnoe hold her political
opposition against her and are using their official positions to deprive her of her civil rights. (Id.
at ¶ 7.) She asserts that Mr. Blankenship acted in a “dual role” as both Mayor of the City of
Hinton and as an employee and representative of City National Bank. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Ms. Oxley alleges that Mayor Blankenship and City Attorney Gunnoe selectively
prosecuted her for nuisance violations on her property as retribution for her political opposition.
(Id. at ¶ 8.) Mayor Blankenship served as the Municipal Judge presiding over the charges, and
Attorney Gunnoe as the prosecutor. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Ms. Oxley was convicted and fined $3,600.
Her appeal to the Circuit Court of Summers County remains pending. (Id.) She was served with
another violation in February, 2014, but the Defendants did not pursue it. (Id.) Ms. Oxley has
1 For purposes of this opinion, the Court accepts all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true.
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complained to both the City Council and City National Bank, where Mr. Blankenship is employed,
but neither has taken measures to stop the alleged harassment and selective prosecution. (Id. at
¶¶ 13–19.) Ms. Oxley further alleges that Defendants Blankenship and Gunnoe have “label[ed]
her as a trouble maker” and instructed the city manager and staff not to respond to her requests
filed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (Id. at ¶ 6.) She alleges that the
Defendants have defamed and slandered her, and conspired with one another and with other city
employees to do so. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Ms. Oxley’s complaint lists the following causes of action: Count One (untitled, alleging
violations of state and federal civil and constitutional rights); Count Two – Municipal Liability;
Count Three – State Law Claims (alleging tort of outrage); Count Four – City National Bank
(supervisory liability); and Count Five – Miscellaneous Claims (asserting various conspiracies).
She alleges violation of state and federal civil and constitutional rights, malicious and/or selective
prosecution, the tort of outrage, and conspiracy to deprive her of constitutional rights, to defame
her, and to subject her to malicious and/or selective prosecution. She alleges that immunity is not
available for any of the Defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or
pleading. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521
F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Additionally, allegations “must be simple, concise, and direct.”
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed
factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a complaint must contain “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, “a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Court must also “draw[ ] all reasonable factual
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
244 (4th Cir. 1999). However, statements of bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Furthermore,
the court need not “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice . . . [because courts] ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In other words, this “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate more than ‘a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Francis, 588
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F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must, using the complaint, “articulate
facts, when accepted as true, that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief.”
Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Determining whether a complaint
states [on its face] a plausible claim for relief [which can survive a motion to dismiss] will . . . be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
DISCUSSION
A. City National Bank
Defendant City National Bank moves to dismiss on the grounds that all allegations against
its employee, Mr. Blankenship, involve his conduct in his role as Mayor of the City of Hinton.
Further, City National Bank contends that Ms. Oxley’s allegations against it are too vague and
conclusory to meet the applicable pleading standard. Ms. Oxley contends that City National Bank
encouraged employees’ civic involvement, anticipating that such involvement would attract
customers and enhance the bank’s reputation. Thus, she argues, Mr. Blankenship acted in a dual
role, as both Mayor and a bank employee, when he allegedly violated her rights. She notes that
he was permitted to conduct city business while he was at work.
The Court finds that the allegations must be dismissed against City National Bank.
Although the bank encouraged civic involvement, there is no allegation that it exercised control
over its employees’ non-work activities. Ms. Oxley argues that City National Bank should have
taken steps to stop Mr. Blankenship, acting as Mayor, from targeting her alleged nuisance
violations. However, she cites no legal authority for the proposition that a private employer is
liable for the actions of its employees outside the scope of their employment. Indeed, an employer
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exerting pressure on an employee’s decisions in his separate capacity as an elected official—or the
employee’s compliance with that pressure—would raise significant ethical issues.
The
Complaint does not contain any specific factual allegations regarding the conduct of City National
Bank. Thus, accepting as true the factual allegations, but not the legal conclusions, set forth in
the complaint, Ms. Oxley has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against City National Bank.
B. Mayor Blankenship, Attorney Gunnoe, and the City of Hinton
Mr. Blankenship, Mr. Gunnoe, and the City of Hinton seek dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and assert that they are entitled to immunity. They assert that the
complaint contains only legal conclusions and naked assertions of wrongdoing without the factual
content necessary to state a plausible claim. (Def.s’ Mem. at 7.) The Defendants argue that the
asserted facts do not support a claim for malicious prosecution because the proceedings have not
terminated and Ms. Oxley has not been exonerated, and that selective prosecution is a defense in
criminal matters rather than an independent civil cause of action. (Id. at 7–8.) They argue that
Ms. Oxley has not set forth a cause of action for defamation because she has not pled any facts
regarding the content or falsity of the statements allegedly made.
Furthermore, Defendant
Blankenship argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity, the City of Hinton asserts that it
cannot be held liable for any intentional torts, is entitled to qualified immunity for any claims
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and Defendant
Gunnoe asserts that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Ms. Oxley argues in response that she pled sufficient facts to put the Defendants on notice
regarding her claims.
She “contends that Mayor Blankenship and City Attorney Gunnoe
conspired to selectively prosecute and violate her rights and that the City of Hinton was fully aware
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of their actions and misconduct.”
(Pl’s Mem. Resp. at 8.)
She argues that “[s]electively
prosecuting for enforcement for a city ordinance and acting as the attorney for the City does not
evoke the absolute immunity” for Defendant Gunnoe. (Id. at 9.) Ms. Oxley asserts that Mayor
Blankenship is not entitled to qualified immunity because his actions violated her clearly
established rights. She contends that the City of Hinton “developed a custom and practice of
allowing the Mayor and City Attorney to unilaterally selectively determine which residents would
be subject to enforcement of the ordinances without any safeguards.” (Id. at 10.) Further, she
asserts that the City is liable for the alleged defamation and violation of constitutional rights
because they “sprung from the initial selective prosecution.” (Id.) Likewise, she argues that she
adequately pled a conspiracy, with the selective prosecution as the overt act.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts supporting any cause of
action properly before the Court. The only factual allegations contained in the complaint, beyond
background information regarding the Defendants’ supposed motive, relate to Ms. Oxley’s
prosecution for violating the City of Hinton’s nuisance ordinance.
She asserts that this
prosecution was unfair, and that it is currently under appeal in state court. She also asserts that
Mayor Blankenship referred to her as a “troublemaker.”
A private citizen asserting a cause of action for defamation must prove the following
elements: “(1) defamatory statements; (2) a nonprivileged communication to a third party; (3)
falsity; (4) reference to the plaintiff; (5) at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (6)
resulting injury.”
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 74 (W. Va. 1983).
“[S]tatements of opinion are absolutely protected under the First Amendment and cannot form the
basis for a defamation action.” Syl. pt. 7, Long v. Egnor, 346 S.E.2d 778, 780 (W. Va. 1986).
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For reasons detailed below, this Court cannot consider allegations related to Ms. Oxley’s
prosecution. Referring to someone as a “troublemaker” is a statement of opinion, which cannot
support a defamation claim. Ms. Oxley’s complaint does not articulate facts that, when accepted
as true, demonstrate a plausible claim for relief. Her claim for defamation must therefore be
dismissed.
Ms. Oxley’s claim for selective or malicious prosecution must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Although the parties did not brief the Court regarding jurisdiction, the
Court must satisfy itself that it possesses jurisdiction prior to considering the merits of a claim. It
is a long-standing principle that federal courts cannot sit in review of state court decisions. “The
Rooker–Feldman doctrine divests the district court of jurisdiction where ‘entertaining the federal
claim should be the equivalent of an appellate review of [the state court] order.’” Jordahl v.
Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 201–02 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted).
The doctrine applies “to claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment,” as
well as to the claims directly considered by the state court. Id. at 199.
Ms. Oxley alleges that she has appealed the City of Hinton’s finding that she violated the
city ordinance to the Circuit Court of Summers County. (Compl, ¶ 9.) In addition to monetary
relief, she seeks “an order expunging the fine and charge” brought against her. (Compl., § VI, ¶
2.) Thus, she asks this Court to review decisions made by the municipal court and currently under
review in state court.2 The Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
involving Ms. Oxley’s prosecution, and those claims must accordingly be dismissed.
2 West Virginia Code § 8-34-1 provides for appeals of municipal convictions or sentences to the circuit court in the
county in which the municipality is located.
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Ms. Oxley’s allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for conspiracy, for the tort of outrage,
and/or other claims for violations of her state and federal civil and constitutional rights must also
be dismissed. First, Ms. Oxley’s response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss suggests that all
of her claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the alleged selective and/or malicious prosecution
over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. Second, the complaint simply does not contain sufficient
facts to state a claim under § 1983, for conspiracy, or for the tort of outrage. To the extent Ms.
Oxley is asserting any other claim, neither the Defendants nor the Court have been put on adequate
notice as to what that claim may be. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Blankenship, Gunnoe, and the City of Hinton must be granted.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, following careful consideration and for the reasons stated herein, the Court
ORDERS that Defendants Joseph Blankenship, Richard Gunnoe and the City of Hinton’s Motion
to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 7) and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
of Defendant City National Bank of West Virginia, Inc. (Document 14) be GRANTED and that
the Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court
further ORDERS that any pending motions be TERMINATED AS MOOT.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to counsel of record
and to any unrepresented party.
ENTER:
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October 9, 2015
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