Mauldin v. Young

Filing 54

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Vacating the Court's 30 Memorandum Opinion and Order; directing that Petitioner's 34 Motion Requesting to File Delayed Response from the Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated 4/30/2018; and the Delayed Respon se from the Proposed Findings and Recommendation Dated 3/27/2018, With Request for Appointment of Counsel/Co-Counsel and 41 Motion for Administrative Hearing, with Motion for Summary Judgment be CONSTRUED AS OBJECTIONS and OVERRULED, and that the [ 25] Proposed Findings and Recommendation be ADOPTED; directing that Civil Action 5:17-cv-2312 and Civil Action 5:17-cv-2626 remain CONSOLIDATED, with Civil Action 5:17-cv-2312 being the lead case, and all further documents to be docketed therein; dis missing for lack of jurisdiction all claims other than the Petitioner's claim concerning the calculation and application of his ESGCT; referring this matter to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, U. S. Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition relating to the Petitioner's ESGCT claim. Signed by Judge Irene C. Berger on 1/16/2019. (cc: Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley; attys; any unrepresented party) (slr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BECKLEY DIVISION
ALFRED LEE MAULDIN,
Petitioner,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-cv-02312
(Consolidated with Civil Action No. 5:17-cv-02626)

D. L. YOUNG, Warden, FCI Beckley,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On April 12, 2017, in Civil Action 5:17-cv-02312, the Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed
a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Document 3 therein). By Standing
Order (Document 4) entered on April 13, 2017, the action was referred to the Honorable Dwane
L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court of proposed findings of
fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Subsequently, on May 1, 2017, in Civil Action 5:17-cv-02626, the Petitioner, proceeding
pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Document 1 therein).
By Standing Order (Document 3) entered on that date, the action was referred to the Honorable
Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court of proposed
findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
On March 27, 2018, the Magistrate Judge submitted a consolidated Proposed Findings and
Recommendation (PF&R) (Document 25 in Civil Action 5:17-cv-02312; Document 23 in Civil
Action 5:17-cv-02626) wherein it is recommended that this Court: consolidate Civil Action 5:17cv-02312 and Civil Action 5:17-cv-02626; dismiss for lack of jurisdiction all claims other than the

Petitioner’s claim concerning the calculation and application of his Earned Statutory Good
Conduct Time (ESGCT); and leave this matter referred to the Magistrate Judge for additional
proceedings concerning the ESGCT claim.
Objections to the Magistrate Judge=s PF&R were due by April 13, 2018, and none were
timely filed by either party. Therefore, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order
(Document 30) adopting the PF&R. On May 21, 2018, the Petitioner filed a Motion Requesting
to File Delayed Response from the Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated 04/30/2018; and the
Delayed Response from the Proposed Findings and Recommendation Dated 03/27/2018, With
Request for Appointment of Counsel/Co-Counsel (Document 34). On July 16, 2018, the Petitioner
filed a Motion for Administrative Hearing, With Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 41).
In both documents, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the PF&R or the Court’s opinion
adopting the PF&R until May 11 and May 15, 2018, seeks to file objections to the PF&R out of
time, and sets forth the basis of his objections.
The Court finds it appropriate to address the Petitioner’s untimely objections in light of his
statement that he did not receive the PF&R promptly. The Court will therefore vacate the opinion
adopting the PF&R without objection (Document 30) and consider Documents 34 and 41 as
Petitioner’s objections to the PF&R.

For the reasons stated herein, however, following

consideration of the Petitioner’s objections, the Court concludes that the PF&R should be adopted
and the objections overruled.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Magistrate Judge’s PF&R sets forth the factual and procedural background of this case
in detail. The Court hereby incorporates those factual findings, but to provide context for the
ruling contained herein, provides the following summary.
2

The Petitioner was convicted of three felony drug and firearm offenses following a jury
trial in 1995. He was sentenced to 322 months of imprisonment. After an unsuccessful direct
appeal, he filed numerous motions or petitions for post-conviction relief, in both the Middle
District of Tennessee, where he was convicted and sentenced, and in other courts.
The Petitioner filed two petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, both asserting challenges
to his arrest, conviction, and sentence, as well as an asserted effort by the Bureau of Prisons to
conceal the alleged unlawful circumstances surrounding his arrest and conviction. In addition, he
challenges the calculation of Earned Statutory Good Conduct Time (ESGCT). The Magistrate
Judge recommends consolidating the two cases, and the Court will address them jointly.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation
to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this
Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory objections
that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982). When reviewing
portions of the PF&R de novo, the Court will consider the fact that Plaintiff is acting pro se, and
his pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir.1978).

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DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the ESGCT claim be re-referred for further
proceedings, and the remaining claims be dismissed. 1 He explains that challenges to the validity
of a conviction and sentence generally cannot be brought in a § 2241 petition but must instead be
brought in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 filed in the court of conviction. The Magistrate
Judge analyzed the case law related to the “savings clause” permitting certain challenges to
convictions and sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and concluded that the Petitioner’s claims could
be considered only under § 2255, as the Petitioner did not allege a change in settled law impacting
his claims. The PF&R further explains that claims regarding conditions of confinement are not
cognizable in habeas corpus.
The Petitioner objects, arguing that he “did not petition for a Write of Habeas Corpus under
28 USCS §2241.” (Document 34 at 1.) He asserts that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 451 2 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1101. 3 The Petitioner
again challenges his arrest, conviction, and sentence and asserts that the BOP and the court system
are working to cover up the past misconduct. He alleges that he was falsely arrested and falsely
imprisoned, is innocent of the charges for which he was convicted and was convicted based on
false testimony and legal errors. The Petitioner also presents argument and evidence in support of
his claim that the BOP has miscalculated his good-time credit.

The Petitioner made allegations related to the calculation of his ESGCT in both cases. Therefore, the Magistrate
Judge recommends consolidating the cases to “permit additional proceedings only with respect to Mauldin’s claim
concerning the calculation of his ESGCT.” (PF&R at 8.)
2
28 U.S.C. §451 is a definitions section to Title 28, defining terms related to the federal court system.
3
The Petitioner may be referring to Fed. R. Evid. 1101, which sets forth the applicability of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
1

4

Generally, as the PF&R explains, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides the exclusive means for a
prisoner in federal custody to test the legality of his detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

However,

Section 2255(e) contains a savings clause, which allows a district court to consider a habeas
petition brought by a federal prisoner under Section 2241 where Section 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality” of the detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also United States v. Poole,
531 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008). The fact that relief under Section 2255 is procedurally barred
does not render the remedy inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner’s detention.
In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000). In the Fourth Circuit, a Section 2255 petition is
only inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention when:
(1) [A]t the time of conviction, settled law in this circuit or the
Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2)
subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion,
the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the
prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the
prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provision of § 2255 because
the new rule is not one of constitutional law.
Poole, 531 F.3d at 269 (quoting In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34). The Fourth Circuit recently
found that the savings clause may apply to certain sentencing challenges. It explained:
we conclude that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the
legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law
of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the
sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first §
2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed
and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the
prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of §
2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this
retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently
grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.
United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).

5

Although the Petitioner asserts that he seeks to bring his habeas claims under other
provisions, the citations he provides do not reference alternative legal causes of action. The Court
has considered and applied the habeas provisions that most closely align with the Petitioner’s
complaints. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–82, (2003) (“Federal court sometimes will
ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in
order to place it within a different legal category,” including “to create a better correspondence
between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis.”). The Petitioner
has identified no other legal framework for the Court to apply. In the interests of fully addressing
his claims and objections, the Court has considered the applicability of § 2241.
The Petitioner has not alleged any change in substantive law relevant to his case. He
alleges various violations and errors that, if true, were legally erroneous at the time of the trial,
conviction, and sentencing. Therefore, as the Magistrate Judge reasoned, he cannot satisfy the
savings clause to proceed under § 2241, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims
under § 2255. Any transfer to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for consideration of a motion for
leave to file a second or successive § 2255 petition would be futile, given that the Petitioner has
not identified factual or legal changes during the time since his previous unsuccessful motions.
Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s PF&R and overrules the Petitioner’s
objections. The Court further finds that the PF&R appropriately recommended consolidation of
cases 5:17-cv-2312 and 5:17-cv-2626, for further consideration of the Petitioners ESGCT claims,
and those recommendations will be adopted without objection.

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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the
Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion and Order (Document 30) be VACATED, that the
Petitioner’s Motion Requesting to File Delayed Response from the Memorandum Opinion and
Order Dated 04/30/2018; and the Delayed Response from the Proposed Findings and
Recommendation Dated 03/27/2018, With Request for Appointment of Counsel/Co-Counsel
(Document 34) and Motion for Administrative Hearing, With Motion for Summary Judgment
(Document 41) be CONSTRUED AS OBJECTIONS and OVERRULED, and that the
Magistrate Judge’s consolidated Proposed Findings and Recommendation (PF&R) (Document 25
in Civil Action 5:17-cv-02312; Document 23 in Civil Action 5:17-cv-02626) be ADOPTED and
incorporated herein.
The Court ORDERS that Civil Action 5:17-cv-02312 and Civil Action 5:17-cv-02626
remain CONSOLIDATED, with Civil Action 5:17-cv-02312 being the lead case, and all further
documents to be docketed only therein. The Court further ORDERS that all claims other than the
Petitioner’s claim concerning the calculation and application of his ESGCT, be DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court ORDERS that the matter be
referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, who shall consider
the pleadings and evidence therein and submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and
recommendation for disposition relating to the Petitioner’s ESGCT claim.

7

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to the Honorable
Dwane L. Tinsley, to counsel of record, and to any unrepresented party.

ENTER:

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January 16, 2019