Crawford v. Wisconsin Department of Community Corrections et al
Filing
96
DECISION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia J Gorence on 9/30/2011. The defendant Hengers motion for summary judgment (Docket # 54) is granted. Tne defendants Smith and Starks motion for summary judgment (Docket #78) is granted.This action be and hereby is dismissed. (cc: all counsel, Mr. Crawford via USPS) (mlm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
HERMAN L. CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 09-C-0616
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
JULIE SMITH,
JULIA STARK, and
JOE HENGER,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
The plaintiff has filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation
of his civil rights.
He was allowed to proceed on the following claims: (1) a Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination claim against defendants Joe Henger, Julie Smith, and Julia
Stark; (2) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against defendants Smith and Stark;
(3) an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against defendants Smith
and Stark; (4) a state law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against
defendants Smith and Stark; (5) an Eighth Amendment medical and mental health care
claim against defendant Smith; and (6) First Amendment retaliation claims against
defendants Henger, Smith, and Stark.
The defendants have filed the following motions: defendant Henger’s motion for
summary judgment (Docket #54) and defendants Smith and Stark’s motion for summary
judgment. (Docket #78). The motions are fully briefed and will be addressed herein.
The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the
matter arises under federal statutes. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The case
was assigned according to the random assignment of civil cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 72 (E.D. Wis.). The parties have consented to
United States magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and General
Local Rule 73 (E.D. Wis.).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable
substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
A dispute over “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by: “(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit or declaration used
to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
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would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS1
In October 2000, the plaintiff was convicted of kidnaping, a Class A felony, in the
State of Illinois. The plaintiff was discharged by the State of Illinois and he moved to
Wisconsin two years later. (Complaint at 4). He is currently a resident of Racine,
Wisconsin.
Defendant Julie Smith is a senior probation and parole officer with the State of
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC). She served as the plaintiff’s supervising
agent from November 30, 2006, through January 12, 2007. She again became his
supervising agent in March 2007, and has served in that capacity since that time.
Defendant Julia Stark is the corrections field supervisor at the Division of Community
Corrections in Sturtevant, Wisconsin. Defendant Stark was defendant Smith’s supervisor
at all times relevant.
Defendant Joseph Henger is a licensed clinical social worker, marriage and family
therapist and professional counselor. Defendant Henger conducted a group program for
participants in sex offender therapy (SOT) entitled “Sex Offender Cognitive Behavior
Management Assessment and Education Program.” In this program, defendant Henger
assessed the risk of the sex offender to the community and made recommendations to the
DOC based upon that assessment. The plaintiff was enrolled in defendant Henger’s SOT
1
The undisputed relevant facts are taken from the plaintiff’s com plaint which is a verified
com plaint (See Ford v. W ilson, 90 F.3d 245, 246 [7th Cir. 1996]), relevant attached exhibits, the plaintiff’s
affidavit and attached exhibits, and the proposed findings of fact of defendants Henger, Sm ith, and Stark.
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group between May 2006 and April 2007.
On May 16, 2006, the plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of a sex registry
violation pursuant to Wis. Stat. §301.45(g)(a)1. He was sentenced to state prison for 18
months and extended supervision for a period of two years. However, the sentence was
stayed and the plaintiff was placed on probation for a period of 30 months. The sentence
provided that the plaintiff “must obey all rules and regulations while on [p]robation.”
(Affidavit of R. Duane Harlow [Harlow Aff.] , Exh. A at 1). As part of his probation, the court
ordered the plaintiff to “[p]articipate in all treatment as recommended by the Department”
and “[c]omply with Sex Offender Registration under 301.45.” Id., Exh. A at 2. On
November 7, 2006, Racine County Circuit Court Judge John S. Jude approved a
settlement agreement and issued an order to transport under Wis. Stat. §51.20(1) in Case
No. 06-ME-287. The agreement and order set forth conditions for the plaintiff’s mental
health treatment. (Affidavit of Plaintiff Herman L. Crawford [Plaintiff’s Affidavit], Exh. C at
1).
On May 3, 2007, the plaintiff was terminated from defendant Henger’s SOT program
because of “UNAUTHORIZED SEXUAL CONTACT.” (Affidavit of Bradley Foley in Support
of Defendant Joe Henger’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Foley Aff.], Exh. C at 1).
On May 17, 2007, the plaintiff was informed that the DOC was seeking to revoke his
probation. In May 2007, defendant Henger terminated the plaintiff from his group therapy
sessions. Later, in November 2008, the plaintiff was notified that his veterans benefits
would no longer cover his medications. The plaintiff avers that defendant Smith failed to
pursue other “health remedies” for him at this time. (Complaint at 2).
On September 18, 2007, the plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
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alleging violations of his constitutional rights by various defendants, including defendants
Smith and Stark. Crawford v. Department of Corrections, Case No. 07-C-840 (E.D. Wis.
2008) (Crawford 1). Defendant Henger was added as a defendant in the plaintiff’s
amended complaint. Id. One of the claims involved a state law slander claim.
On November 29, 2007, the plaintiff served two notices of claim upon the Attorney
General for the State of Wisconsin. Other than these two notices of claim on November
29, 2007, the plaintiff has not served any other notices of claim upon the Wisconsin
Attorney General.
On January 22, 2008, after a hearing, an administrative law judge with the Division
of Hearings and Appeals revoked the plaintiff’s probation. Id., Exh. D at 6. The plaintiff
pursued an administrative appeal of the ALJ’s decision and the decision was sustained.
The plaintiff did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the appeal decision. In
August 2008, the plaintiff was released from prison and placed on extended supervision.
Defendant Smith was assigned as his supervising agent. However, an ALJ revoked the
plaintiff’s extended supervision on September 3, 2009. On February 9, 2010, the plaintiff
was released from prison and placed back on extended supervision, which was revoked
again on March 11, 2010. On February 6, 2009, Crawford I was dismissed with prejudice
for lack of prosecution.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, all three defendants assert that the present action should
be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata, since this court dismissed Crawford I with
prejudice. In response, the plaintiff contends that his claims are based on actions taken
subsequent to Crawford I.
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Defendants Smith and Stark assert that if the court does not dismiss this action on
the basis of res judicata, the action is subject to dismissal on other grounds. According to
defendants Smith and Stark, the due process claim relating to the revocation of the
plaintiff’s parole should be dismissed because the plaintiff was required to prevail on
certiorari and habeas corpus review before initiating the present action. They also contend
that the plaintiff had adequate post-deprivation state remedies regarding the due process
claim and that they are entitled to absolute immunity for the actions relating to a decision
to revoke probation.
Defendants Smith and Stark further submit that they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law with regard to the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because
requiring the plaintiff to participate in sex-offender treatment as a condition of probation
does not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants Smith and Stark also assert that
the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed on the basis of qualified
immunity. With regard to the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim, they contend that
the plaintiff has not shown that a desire to retaliate played a substantial part in the
defendants’ conduct. Finally, defendants Smith and Stark maintain that they are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the state law claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress because the plaintiff has not complied with notice requirements.
In opposing the motion, the plaintiff states that defendants Smith and Stark are not
entitled to immunity regarding the due process claim because he “is not arguing the
decision to revoke his probation, but rather, “conduct and misuse of information during his
supervision.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants Smith and Stark’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5 [Docket # 70]). The plaintiff also contends that the defendants are not
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entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the medical care claim because he was under
court-ordered medical treatment and “it became the responsibility of [the] agent to see that
all court conditions are met.” Id. at 5-6. The plaintiff further contends that the filing of
Crawford I was a motivating factor in defendants Smith’s and Stark’s conduct after that
date. In addition, with regard to his cruel and unusual punishment claim, he asserts that
defendant Stark cruelly and unusually punished him “by allowing [Smith] to continue
supervising plaintiff” and that defendant Smith “continued the same misconduct of the last
lawsuit and was never remorseful.” (Complaint at 2[a]). Finally, with regard to the state
law tort claim, the plaintiff asserts that “[i]t was the judge’s decision to allow a state law tort
claim.” Id. at 7.
Defendant Henger also asserts that this action should be dismissed on the basis of
res judicata. In the alternative, he maintains that the Fifth Amendment claim against him
should be dismissed because the plaintiff’s alleged forced admission was not used against
him in a criminal case, nor was it a basis for revocation of his parole. Defendant Henger
further contends that the First Amendment retaliation claim should be dismissed because
the plaintiff cannot prove that the filing of Crawford I was a motivating factor in defendant
Hanger’s decision to remove the plaintiff from his group therapy sessions.
The plaintiff responds that he “never claimed he was revoked because of the
information used by defendant Joe Henger.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Henger’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 [Docket #71]). Rather, the plaintiff maintains that the
information was used to “harass, provoke, and characterize that the plaintiff was in denial
of his offense which was detrimental in finding favor or credibility in his pursuits to clarify
his case.” Id. The plaintiff further asserts that defendant Henger’s conduct was motivated
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by Crawford I and that he “was denied treatment for exercising his right to speak against
the inaccuracy of his offense.” Id. at 6.
Res Judicata: Defendants Smith, Stark, and Henger
All the defendants submit that this suit should be barred by res judicata. At the
outset, the court notes that the district court, in granting the plaintiff leave to proceed in
forma pauperis in the present action, held that res judicata did not apply because the
earlier case, which was dismissed with prejudice, was not decided on the merits. However,
in LeBeau v. Taco Bell, Inc., 892 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1989) the court held that a
dismissal for failure to prosecute, unless the court specifies otherwise, “operates an
adjudication on the merits.”
See also, In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 814 F.2d 1226,
1234-35 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Phillips v. Shannon, 445 F.2d 460, 462 [7th Cir. 1971]). The
plaintiff’s earlier case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and, therefore,
the court will consider the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata in this case.
Under res judicata, parties are prohibited from re-litigating claims that were decided
in a prior lawsuit. See e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398
[1981]. The doctrine also applies to claims that could have been raised in a prior lawsuit.
Id. Res judicata bars a claim where there was: “(1) a judgment on the merits in an earlier
action; (2) an identity of parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) an identity of the cause
of action between both suits.” Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 338
[7th Cir. 1995]. “Two claims are one for the purposes of res judicata if they are based on
the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.” Id. at 339 (collecting cases); see also,
Shaver v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 840 F.2d 1361, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus, even if a
plaintiff’s claims are not identical, the doctrine of res judicata may still apply if the claims
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are based on the same allegations. Brzostowski, 49 F.3d at 339.
In Crawford I, the plaintiff asserted that defendants Smith and Stark violated his due
process rights by testifying falsely at probation hearings and that defendant Stark denied
him a preliminary hearing. The plaintiff also maintained that defendants Smith, Stark, and
Henger were deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and that, as a result, he suffered from depression and other bodily harm. As
part of his deliberate indifference claim, he asserted that all three defendants forced him
to admit that his crime was sexually motivated.
For instance, he maintained that
defendants Smith and Stark threatened him with incarceration and/or revocation if he did
not make such admissions.
Moreover, he averred that defendant Henger coerced
information from him and used that information against him by reporting it to defendants
Smith and Stark. Finally, in Crawford I, the plaintiff brought a state law slander claim
against defendant Smith for testifying against him in court.
In the present case, the plaintiff maintains that all three defendants violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination by forcing him to admit that his kidnaping crime
was sexually motivated and that defendant Henger subsequently shared the admission
with defendant Smith. According to the complaint, defendants Smith and Stark then used
the information against him by revoking his parole.
With regard to his Eighth Amendment claims, the plaintiff states defendants Smith
and Stark violated his right against cruel and unusual punishment. He asserts that
defendant Smith “continued the same misconduct of the last lawsuit and was never
remorseful” and that such “misconduct led to a lifetime mental illness of severe emotional
distress in his major depression diagnosis.” (Complaint at 2[a]). Further, the plaintiff states
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that defendant Stark cruelly and unusually punished him “by allowing [Smith] to continue
supervising plaintiff when she knew agent was the initiating source of the plaintiff’s mental
health issues from 2006-present.” Id. at 1(a). In addition, the plaintiff contends that
defendant Smith was deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs because
she failed to provide him with necessary treatment for his mental disorder after his veterans
benefits were terminated in November 2008. Id. at 2.
The plaintiff also asserts that all three defendants retaliated against him in violation
of the First Amendment. He contends that defendant Stark retaliated against him for the
filing of Crawford I by refusing to appoint a new parole officer for him. He also maintains
that defendant Smith continued the same misconduct and that defendant Henger
dismissed him from the sex offender program in retaliation for Crawford I. Additionally, the
plaintiff has filed a state law tort claim against defendants Smith and Stark.
A comparison of the present complaint and Crawford I reveals that res judicata
applies to the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim against all three defendants,2 the
due process claim against defendants Smith and Stark and the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim against defendant Smith. All of these claims are based on
the plaintiff’s averments that he was forced to falsely admit that his crime was sexually
motivated and that defendants Smith and Stark testified falsely against him at a preliminary
hearing regarding his probation revocation. (Complaint at 1-3). The plaintiff made identical
averments in Crawford I. Thus, these claims, which name the same defendants, are
2
Although the plaintiff did not specifically identify a self-incrim ination claim in Crawford I, his other
claim s in Crawford I were based on the sam e underlying allegations, nam ely that all three defendants
forced him to adm it that he was a sex offender. (Crawford I Am ended Com plaint at 1b-c, 2L, 2m ).
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subject to dismissal on res judicata grounds.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim involves conduct which
occurred in November 2008 – several months before Crawford I was dismissed for lack of
prosecution. As such, a claim involving this conduct could have been raised in Crawford
I. See e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
With regard to the plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claim against defendants
Smith and Stark, the plaintiff avers that the conduct on which this claim is based occurred
after Crawford I. He states that defendant Smith “continued the same misconduct” after
Crawford 1 and that defendant Stark violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment by
refusing to provide him with a new parole agent. (Complaint at 1[a]-2[a]). Defendants
Smith and Stark point out that the present case was filed less than four months after
Crawford I was dismissed. “Therefore, the only ‘new’ conduct that [the plaintiff] could have
asserted when he filed his complaint in Crawford II is the conduct that allegedly occurred
during the time period February 6, 2009, (the date of the dismissal order of Crawford I) to
June 17, 2009, (the date that [the plaintiff] signed his complaint in Crawford II).”
(Defendants Smith and Stark’s Reply Brief at 2). Defendants Smith and Stark assert that
the plaintiff fails to point to any specific conduct that occurred from February 2009 through
June 2009.
Res judicata bars only claims that revolve around the same set of factual
allegations. Here, the plaintiff states that defendant Stark refused to provide him with a
new parole agent after Crawford I and that defendant Smith’s conduct continued and
became more severe after Crawford I. Thus, regardless of the amount of time between
suits, the claims in the two suits are not based on the same set of factual allegations.
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Similarly, because the plaintiff avers that the conduct relating to the retaliation claim
against all three defendants occurred after Crawford I, this claim is also not barred by res
judicata. As such, this court will address these claims on the merits below.
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Defendants Smith and Stark
The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause prohibits the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 5 (1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976). “‘What constitutes an
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ however, ‘varies according to the nature of the
alleged constitutional violation.’” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5). Threats and harassment may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 612. However, “[s]tanding alone, simple verbal
harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a
protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.” Id.
The relevant undisputed facts fail to establish that defendant Smith inflicted
“unnecessary and wanton” pain on the plaintiff. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5. The plaintiff
merely asserts that defendant Smith “continued the same misconduct . . . and was never
remorseful.” (Complaint at 2[a]). This statement does not support the plaintiff’s contention
that defendant Smith’s behavior rose above “simple verbal harassment.” Id.
Because the undisputed facts fail to establish that defendant Smith cruelly and
unusually punished him, the facts also do not support the plaintiff’s assertion that
defendant Stark cruelly and unusually punished him by allowing defendant Smith to
continue supervising him. As such, the court will grant defendants Smith and Stark’s
motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claim.
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First Amendment Retaliation Claim: Defendants Smith, Stark, and Henger
“[A]n act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is
actionable under Section 1983.” Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1987).
Prison officials infringe upon a prisoner’s rights if the officials retaliate against an inmate
for exercising his or her right to access the courts. Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 810
(7th Cir. 1995).
To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in
activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation which would more
than likely deter his exercise of First Amendment rights in the future; and (3) the
defendant’s decision to retaliate was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s exercise of
his or her First Amendment rights. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must submit evidence that the filing of his
lawsuit was “a substantial or motivating factor” in the prison official’s conduct. Brookins v.
Kolb, 990 F.2d 308, 315 (7th Cir. 1993).
To show that a defendant was motivated by the plaintiff’s exercise of a First
Amendment right, the plaintiff must present a chronology of events from which a trier of
fact could reasonably infer a retaliatory motive. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1997); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir.
1988). Merely alleging that the defendant retaliated against the plaintiff is not enough.
Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). Additionally, the fact that the plaintiff
filed an earlier lawsuit against the defendant, without more, is not enough to imply
retaliation. Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985). Indeed, “[t]he burden to
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show that the protected conduct was the motivating factor for the retaliation is high.”
Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
In this case, the plaintiff asserts that defendant Stark retaliated against him by
allowing defendant Smith to continue supervising him and that defendant Smith retaliated
against him by placing a faulty monitoring device on him beginning in August 2008.
(Complaint at 2-2[a]). However, the relevant undisputed facts fail to support the plaintiff’s
assertion that these actions were motivated by Crawford I. Similarly, the plaintiff contends
that defendant Henger retaliated against him by removing him from his therapy group
because of Crawford I but does not offer any evidence in support of this statement.
Indeed, the relevant undisputed facts show that the plaintiff was terminated from his group
therapy for unauthorized sexual contact. Thus, the plaintiff’s retaliation claims must be
dismissed.
State Law Tort Claim: Defendants Smith and Stark
With regard to his state law tort claim against defendants Smith and Stark, the
plaintiff has failed to comply with the notice procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.82.
Wisconsin Statutes § 893.82 provides:
no civil action or civil proceeding may be brought against any state officer,
employee, or agent . . . unless within 120 days of the event causing the
injury. . . the claimant in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney
general written notice of a claim stating the time, date, location and the
circumstances of the event giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage or
death and the names of persons involved, including the name of the state
officer, employee or agent involved.
Here, the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiff served two notices upon the
Wisconsin Attorney General on November 29, 2007. Other than these two notices of
claim, the plaintiff has not presented any other notices of claim upon the Attorney General.
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Because the plaintiff has not complied with notice procedures, the state law tort claim must
be dismissed at the summary judgment stage.
In sum, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all
of the plaintiff’s claims, including his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim against all
three defendants, his due process claims against defendants Smith and Stark, his Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against defendants Smith and Stark, his
state law tort claim against defendants Smith and Stark, his Eighth Amendment medical
care claim against defendant Smith, and his First Amendment retaliation claim against all
three defendants.
CONCLUSION
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendant Henger’s motion for summary
judgment (Docket # 54) be and hereby is granted.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that defendants Smith and Stark’s motion for summary
judgment (Docket #78) be and hereby is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 30th day of September, 2011
BY THE COURT
s/ Patricia J. Gorence
Patricia J. Gorence
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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