Thompson v. Humphreys et al
Filing
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SCREENING ORDER dismissing all claims against Racine Correctional Institution and Wisconsin Department of Corrections. The case will proceed against the remaining defendants and a responsive pleading is due within 60 days of the date of this order. Signed by Judge William C Griesbach on 9/6/2012. (cc: all counsel via CM/ECF, Jeffery L Thompson and Warden Lizzie Tegels (New Lisbon Correctional Institution) via U.S. Mail)(Griesbach, William)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JEFFERY L. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 12-C-844
WARDEN ROBERT HUMPHREYS,
UNKNOWN RECORDS CUSTODIAN,
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
Plaintiff Jeffery Thompson, currently a prisoner at New Lisbon Correctional Institution, filed
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for a violation of his
constitutional rights. Thompson alleges that he was confined at Racine Correctional Institution for
a period of eighty-eight days after the completion of previously imposed sentences. He claims that
such confinement violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.
He has paid the full filing fee.
Regardless of a plaintiff’s fee status, the Court is required to screen complaints brought by
prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner
has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
As indicated above, Thompson seeks damages for the period of time he was kept in custody
after his earlier sentences were completed. Incarcerating a prisoner beyond the termination of his
sentence without penological justification can violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment if it is the product of deliberate indifference. Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d
695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Russell v. Lazar, 300 F. Supp. 2d 716, 720 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
Here, Thompson has alleged that his confinement exceeded the sentences that were properly
imposed. The weakness in his case seems to be that he has failed to allege, at least in specific terms,
that his continued confinement was the result of deliberate indifference on the part of a named
individual defendant. He has named Robert Humphreys, the warden at Racine Correction
Institution, where the “holding past maximum discharge occurred.” (Compl. at 2.) There is no
allegation in the complaint, however, from which it could be inferred that Warden Humphreys knew
anything about Thompson’s situation. Absent evidence that Warden Humphrey’s knew that
Thompson was continued in custody after his sentence expired, Thompson cannot prevail on his
claim against him. See Campbell, 256 F.3d at 700 (noting that “the extended incarceration must
also be the product of deliberate indifference before a constitutional violation, as opposed to an error
of state law, is implicated”).
This is not a reason to dismiss the case at the screening stage, however. Thompson alleges
that it is obvious that no one from DOC took the time to look through his file and actually calculate
the days he spent in custody. He claims that no action has been taken to rectify these errors to date.
In an accompanying affidavit, he states that while confined at Racine Correctional Institution, he
sent interview requests and other correspondence to staff informing them of his illegal detention,
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but no action was taken until after he spent an additional 88 days in custody. Discovery may enable
Thompson to name these individuals as defendants or to develop evidence sufficient to support his
claim against the warden.
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that “when the substance of a pro se civil rights
complaint indicates the existence of claims against individual officials not specifically named in the
caption of the complaint, the district court must provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend
the complaint.” Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996). The
Court explained in Donald the various means a district court should consider to ensure that the
claims of a pro se litigant are given a fair and meaningful consideration:
Depending on the particular circumstances of the case, the court may assist the
plaintiff by providing counsel for the limited purpose of amending the complaint;
by ordering the named defendants to disclose the identities of unnamed officials
involved; by allowing the case to proceed to discovery against high-level
administrators with the expectation that they will identify the officials personally
responsible; by dismissing the complaint without prejudice and providing a list of
defects in the complaint; by ordering service on all officers who were on duty during
the incident in question; or by some other means. A plaintiff's failure to explicitly
name a John or Jane Doe defendant in the caption of the complaint does not relieve
the district court of its responsibility to assist the pro se plaintiff who confronts
barriers to identifying the appropriate defendants.
Id. at 556; see also Billman v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 56 F.3d 785, 788-90 (7th Cir. 1995)
(duty of district court to assist prisoner plaintiff in making the investigation necessary to identify
proper defendants); Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1290 n. 9 (7th Cir. 1981) (pro se plaintiff's
failure to name a particular defendant in connection with one of his claims no bar; current defendant
could readily determine who would bear responsibility); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 656
(7th Cir. 1981) (“understandable that a pro se litigant would name only the administrative officer,
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whose identity he knows, as a defendant in his civil rights lawsuit”; “district court should proceed
on the claim and allow the named defendant to assert his own noninvolvement, if that is the case,
and designate those who would likely have been responsible for whatever deprivation may have
occurred”).
With these admonitions in mind, I conclude that Thompson’s claim against the Warden
should be allowed to proceed with the expectation that the Warden is in a position to identify the
individuals, if any, who received Thompson’s correspondence concerning his sentence or were
otherwise involved in calculating his release date. Further, I direct the Warden, or his designee, to
identify to Thompson the person or persons, if any, who appear to have been involved. Of course,
if Thompson’s basic claim that he was continued in custody after his sentences expired is mistaken,
the defendants can seek early summary judgment on that basis instead. In any event, the case will
proceed for now with the understanding that Thompson will eventually have to name the individuals
who he claims were deliberately indifferent to his continued wrongful incarceration.
Thompson has also named as defendants Racine Correctional Institution and the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections. Racine Correctional Institution and the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections will be dismissed. Both are entities of the State of Wisconsin, and the State is not a
proper person subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58 (1989). In all other respects, the case will go forward.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s claims against Racine Correctional
Institution and the Wisconsin Department of Corrections are dismissed. The case will proceed
against the remaining defendants and pursuant to an informal service agreement between the
Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, copies of plaintiff’s complaint and this order are
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being electronically sent today to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on the state
defendants.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service agreement between the
Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the defendants shall file a responsive pleading to
the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the warden of the institution
where the inmate is currently confined.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the plaintiff shall submit all correspondence and legal
material to:
Honorable William C. Griesbach
% Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
Jefferson Court Building
125 S. Jefferson St., Suite 102
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54301
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. It will
only delay the processing of the matter. Copies of pleadings and correspondence filed with the
Court need not be served on opposing counsel, since they will be electronically scanned and counsel
will receive notice through the electronic case filing system. Discovery requests should be sent to
counsel for the defendants, however, and not filed with the Court unless plaintiff has need to file
a motion to compel discovery. The plaintiff should also retain a personal copy of each document
he sends to the Court or counsel. If the plaintiff does not have access to a photocopy machine, he
may send out identical handwritten or typed copies of any documents.
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In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to
do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal
rights of the parties, and even lead to sanctions, including dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Dated at Green Bay, Wisconsin, this
6th
day of September, 2012.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach
United States District Judge
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