Marine Travelift Inc v. ASCOM SpA et al

Filing 144

ORDER on claim construction signed by Chief Judge William C Griesbach on 4-21-15. Plaintiff may respond to the Defendants motion for partial summary judgment on or before May 15, 2015. A reply, if any, may be filed by May 31, 2015. (cc: all counsel)(Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MARINE TRAVELIFT, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-C-443

ASCOM SpA, and INTERNATIONAL
BOATLIFT EXCHANGE, INC.
Defendants.

DECISION ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

The parties have filed a joint claim construction statement and briefs addressing their
proposed interpretations of two disputed claim terms. The claim terms involve Plaintiff’s mobile
boat lifting devices, as discussed more fully in this court’s decision denying a preliminary
injunction. (ECF No. 88.) I construe the terms as follows.
I. The Law of Claim Construction
The interpretation and construction of patent claims are issues of law for the court to
determine. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en
banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The overall purpose of claim construction is to clarify the
meaning of disputed claim terms and phrases so that the Court or, if there are factual disputes, a
jury, can determine whether the claims are (1) valid and (2) infringed upon by the accused product.
See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that
courts need only construe claim language “in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to
resolve the controversy”). Claims are construed the same way for validity and infringement. Amgen
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

II. A sensed position a predetermined distance from a programmed position
In Claim 15 of the ‘441 patent, the inventor discloses
A steering system for controlling the steering mode of a lifting apparatus comprising:
a frame structure having a plurality of wheels;
a user interface for selecting a steering mode; and,
a controller communicatively coupled to the user interface,
the controlled configured to monitor the position of the plurality of wheels in response to
a selected steering mode, wherein the controller is further configured such that when at least
one wheel has a sensed position a predetermined distance from a programmed position
the controller stops movement of the remaining wheels.
(ECF No. 98-4 at 13:4-16.)
The Defendants argue that the emboldened phrase means “the angular position of at least
one wheel, compared to its programmed position, determined by the motorized master control
potentiometer, and adjusted depending on engine RPM.” For support, the Defendants point to
intrinsic evidence in the specification, which discusses, for example, a controller adjusting the rate
of change of each wheel’s position based on the engine’s RPM (col 2:1-4), or the controller sensing
the position of each wheel and disabling movement if it determines one wheel is not moving at the
right rate (col 2:56-61.) But as the Plaintiff notes, limitations from examples in the specification
cannot be used to rewrite the language of the claims. Tellingly, much of the language cited by the
Defendants follows the phrase “in one embodiment” or something similar, which indicates that the
specification is merely giving examples of the technology’s implementation rather than redefining
or limiting the terms themselves.

In fact, the Defendants merely cite the language from the

specification without actually arguing that it could conceivably be used to import language from the
specification into the claims.
meaning.

Accordingly, I will give the claim terms their plain and ordinary

III. an “engine” drive
Claims 9 and 23 of the ‘299 patent use the phrase “disable an engine drive.” The Defendants
argue that the term “engine” refers to “the primary diesel or gasoline engine of the crane, such as
that to be found within the cabinet depicted in Figure 3 of the ‘299 Patent.” The Plaintiff argues that
the phrase needs no special interpretation and stands on its own.
The Defendants’ argument is premised on the fact that there is a difference between an
engine and a motor. An engine creates rotational mechanical power by consuming fuel, while a
motor converts forms of energy into mechanical energy to create motion. Motors drive the rotation
of the wheels, while an engine drives the crane itself. Although this might be true, that does not
mean that the “engine” must therefore be defined itself in the claim terms. That is, if an engine is
something that consumes fuel and creates rotational power, than that will be how the claim is
interpreted using its plain and ordinary meaning, without the need to explicitly “construe” it and
impose other nuances onto the term that aren’t found in the claim itself. This is especially true as
the term is used in Claim 9, which discusses an “engine drive of the crane.” It would be mostly
redundant to interpret “engine drive of the crane” as “the primary diesel or gasoline engine of the
crane,” as Defendants propose. Accordingly, I will give the term its plain meaning.
The Plaintiff may respond to the Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on or
before May 15, 2015. A reply, if any, may be filed by May 31, 2015.

SO ORDERED this 21st day of April, 2015.
/s William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge
United States District Court