Meetz v. Wisconsin Hospitality Group LLC

Filing 110

ORDER granting 43 Motion to Certify Class with modifications described in the order. (cc: all counsel) (Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

WAYNE MEETZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-C-1313

WISCONSIN HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION AND
NOTICE TO POTENTIAL FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiff Wayne Meetz brought this action against his employers, Wisconsin Hospitality
Group LLC and PH Hospitality Group LLC d/b/a Pizza Hut, on his own behalf and on behalf of
other similarly situated pizza delivery drivers, who he claims were subject to a common vehicle
expense reimbursement policy that failed to reasonably approximate their actual expenses, resulting
in their failure to receive the federal minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (FLSA). Presently before the Court is Meetz’s motion for conditional
certification of a collective action and court-facilitated notice to potential class members. As part
of this motion, Meetz requests that this Court appoint his counsel of record as Collective Action
Counsel, approve his proposed notice to potential class members, order Defendants to provide
Collective Action Counsel with an updated list of potential class members, and establish a deadline
for putative class members to opt into this lawsuit. For the reasons that follow, Meetz’s motion for
conditional certification and court-facilitated notice will be granted.

BACKGROUND
Defendants operate seventy-three Pizza Hut restaurants across Wisconsin. Weiss Dep.
31:9–13, ECF No. 92-1. PH Hospitality Group owns and operates the individual restaurants, while
Wisconsin Hospitality Group provides management services for the franchise group. Id. Currently,
Defendants jointly employ approximately 550 delivery drivers across the seventy-three restaurants,
and they have jointly employed approximately 2,486 drivers since September 30, 2013. Weiss Decl.
¶ 6, ECF No. 101; Weiss Dep. 87–88. Drivers spend the majority of their working time fulfilling
customers’ delivery orders for pizza and other food items. Weiss Decl. ¶ 7. However, drivers also
periodically perform non-delivery tasks, such as preparing pizzas or serving as host or hostess at the
restaurants where they work. Id. ¶ 8.
At all restaurants operated by Defendants, a driver’s compensation varies throughout each
shift depending on whether the driver is performing delivery work or non-delivery work. Most
drivers receive a base wage of $7.25 per hour while performing non-delivery work and $5.25 per
hour while performing delivery work, and Meetz no longer seeks to include drivers paid at different
rates in the proposed class.1 Weiss Dep. 61:3–5. In addition to the base wage, drivers performing
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During her Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, June Weiss, Vice President of Human Resources for
Wisconsin Hospitality Group, explained a handful of exceptions to the otherwise standard base wage
policy of $5.25 per hour for delivery work and $7.25 per hour for non-delivery work. Weiss Dep.
63–72, ECF 92-1.
To enhance recruiting efforts, some drivers at Milwaukee-area
restaurants—specifically, the East Capitol, Midtown, and Silver Spring locations, and possibly the
Brown Deer location—received base wages ranging from $5.25 per hour to $9.25 per hour for
delivery work and $7.25 per hour to $8.00 per hour for non-delivery work. Id. at 63–67. When one
of those restaurants closed, drivers who moved to other restaurants operated by Defendants
continued to receive the higher base wage. Id. at 66. In light of the different policies at these
Milwaukee-area locations, Meetz represents that he is “willing to narrow the proposed collective
class to those . . . that have paid . . . employees an in-restaurant wage of $7.25 per hour and a
delivery wage of $5.25 per hour thereby excluding the East Capitol, Midtown, and Silver Spring
[restaurants] which have been identified as having hourly rates higher than minimum wage.” Pl.’s
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delivery work also receive tips, against which Defendants claim a $2 tip credit, and a per delivery
reimbursement fee. Id. at 71–72, 106. On a single “run” from the restaurant, a driver will make
anywhere from one to four deliveries, and drivers receive a reimbursement for each delivery that they
make. Weiss Decl. ¶ 19. Each store pays a consistent, per delivery reimbursement fee to all of its
drivers. Weiss Dep. 110. Although the fee varies between $1 and $2 per delivery, depending on the
particular restaurant, the majority of locations pay $1 per delivery. Id. at 107–08.
Defendants pay drivers the per delivery reimbursement to defray the costs of operating their
delivery vehicles. Id. at 105:4–9. Rather than owning and operating a fleet of delivery vehicles,
Defendants require drivers to provide their own. Id. at 88–89. Each driver must provide a vehicle
that complies with safety and maintenance requirements listed in an Employee Handbook provided
to drivers at all restaurants operated by Defendants. Id. at 46–47; see also Employee Handbook
40–41, ECF No. 92-5. After a vehicle safety check, drivers must sign a form acknowledging, “I
agree it is solely my responsibility to keep all aspects of my vehicle . . . in good condition in
compliance with all laws at all times.” Employee Handbook 40. In practice, delivery drivers
therefore “incur[] vehicle expenses including fuel, oil changes, brakes/pads, axel, tires, tire rotations,
batteries, insurance, registration, and other items necessary to meet Pizza Hut’s requirement to
maintain the vehicle in clean and good repair.” Meetz Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 44; see also, e.g., Schuler
Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 46 (opt-in plaintiff similarly declaring responsibility for vehicle expenses).
Meetz was employed by Defendants as a delivery driver at an Appleton Pizza Hut location
between January 26, 2015, and November 19, 2015. Meetz Decl. ¶¶ 2–3. Meetz filed this lawsuit

Reply 8, ECF No. 108. Meetz, however, asks that delivery drivers at the Brown Deer restaurant
remain in the class at the conditional certification stage so that additional discovery can illuminate
the actual pay practices at that location. Id. at 8 n.8.
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on his own behalf, and on behalf of all other delivery drivers he alleges to be similarly situated,
claiming that Defendants failed to reasonably approximate the drivers’ actual vehicle expenses and
that the drivers’ compensation therefore fell below the federal minimum wage. Compl., ECF No. 1;
see also Am. Compl., ECF No. 18. Since the filing of the Complaint on September 30, 2016, a net
total of 25 opt-in plaintiffs have consented to join this action by filing written consent forms with the
Court. See ECF Nos. 3–4, 6, 8–9, 13, 17, 27–28, 32–33, 35, 38–40, 97; see also ECF Nos. 41, 98.
In the motion currently before the Court, Meetz originally asked for conditional certification of the
following collective action:
All persons who have worked as a delivery driver for a Pizza Hut franchise operated
by Wisconsin Hospitality Group, LLC and PH Hospitality Group, LLC d/b/a/ Pizza
Hut at any time since September 30, 2013.
Pl.’s Mot. for Conditional Certification & Ct. Facilitated Notice 1, ECF No. 43. After briefing on
this motion, however, Meetz indicates that he is “willing to narrow the proposed collective class to
those . . . that have paid . . . employees an in-restaurant wage of $7.25 per hour and a delivery wage
of $5.25 per hour.” Pl.’s Reply 8, ECF No. 108.
ANALYSIS
I.

Conditional Certification
The FLSA permits collective actions “against any employer . . . by any one or more

employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29
U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike a typical class action suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, in
which unwilling plaintiffs must “opt out” of the class, a collective action under Section 216(b) of the
FLSA requires employees or former employees to “opt in” to the class by providing written consent
to join the collective action. Woods v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579–80 (7th Cir. 1982)
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(discussing differences between Rule 23 class action and FLSA collective action). To implement the
opt-in procedure in an FLSA collective action, district courts may, in their discretion, facilitate notice
to potential plaintiffs. See Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989); Woods,
686 F.2d at 580.
“The critical inquiry in determining whether a court should exercise its discretion to authorize
the sending of notice to potential plaintiffs is whether the representative plaintiff has shown that she
is similarly situated to the potential class plaintiffs.” Austin v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 232 F.R.D.
601, 605 (W.D. Wis. 2006). “Generally, in order to determine whether the representative plaintiff
is ‘similarly situated’ to potential opt-in plaintiffs, this Court follows a two-step certification
approach.” Ehmann v. Pierce Mfg., Inc., No. 16-CV-247, 2016 WL 5957275, at *2 (E.D. Wis.
Oct. 13, 2016) (citing Adair v. Wis. Bell, Inc., No. 08-CV-280, 2008 WL 4224360, at *8 (E.D. Wis.
Sept. 11, 2008)).
In the first stage, the court examines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a “reasonable
basis” for believing he is similarly situated to potential class members. Miller v. ThedaCare Inc.,
No. 15-CV-506, 2016 WL 4532124, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2016). The plaintiff must make “at
least a modest factual showing” that collective action is appropriate. Adair, 2008 WL 4224360, at
*4. To establish that factual support, the plaintiff may present affidavits, declarations, deposition
testimony, or other documents that “demonstrate some ‘factual nexus between the plaintiff and the
proposed class or a common policy that affects all the collective members.’” Ehmann, 2016 WL
5957275, at *2 (quoting Nehmelman v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (N.D.
Ill. 2011)). Although the “modest factual showing” standard is lenient, it is not a “mere formality.”
Adair, 2008 WL 4224360, at *3. Because “a plaintiff’s discovery demands upon conditional
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certification may impose ‘a tremendous financial burden to the employer,’” courts must be careful
to avoid wasting the parties’ time and resources in cases that do not warrant certification. Id. at *4
(quoting Woods, 686 F.2d at 581). If the class is conditionally certified, notice may be sent to other
potential class members, and discovery may proceed.
At the second step, which usually arises on the defendant’s motion for decertification, the
court must determine whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are, in fact, similarly situated. Miller,
2016 WL 4532124, at *4 (citing Brabazon v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., No. 10-CV-714, 2011 WL
1131097, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2011)). In this phase, the court assesses whether continuing as
a collective action provides efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact.
See Hoffman–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170.
Meetz seeks to proceed under the first step’s lenient standard, but Defendants argue that
sufficient discovery has already occurred to warrant application of a more rigorous standard. See
Miller, 2016 WL 4532124, at *5 (“[W]here the parties have engaged in some discovery prior to the
motion for conditional certification, a higher standard of review may be applied.”) Described by
many district courts in the Seventh Circuit as an “intermediate level of scrutiny,” a heightened
standard may be appropriate “where significant discovery has taken place because there is a reduced
need for notice and basic discovery on the question of whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated to
the proposed class members.” Id. A court deciding whether to apply an intermediate level of
scrutiny to a motion for conditional certification after discovery has begun should consider factors
that include the “length of discovery, amount and kind of documents exchanged, number of
depositions taken, and the extent other factual material has been made part of the record,” as well
as whether the defendant has disclosed a list of employees who may qualify for the prospective class.
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Id. at *7; see also Freeman v. Total Sec. Mgmt.–Wis., LLC, No. 12-CV-461, 2013 WL 4049542,
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2013) (“An intermediate standard may be appropriate when a court has
expressly allowed ‘discovery on the issue of whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated’ and the
plaintiffs have been given access to a ‘list of other . . . potential members of the proposed class.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Bunyan v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., No. 07-CV-0089, 2008 WL
2959932, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 2008))).
Here, Defendants contend that the 48 declarations filed by Meetz and the opt-in plaintiffs,
6 declarations filed by Defendants, and 3 depositions of Defendant’s representatives taken by Meetz,
as well as the company policies in the record, provide the Court with sufficient factual information
to proceed under a heightened standard. Defs.’ Resp. 13–14, ECF No. 99. Defendants also point
to the fact that they have already provided Meetz with more than 3,400 pages of documents,
including a list of delivery drivers employed by Defendants since September 30, 2013. Id. at 9. But
Meetz counters that he still lacks requested reimbursement rate data for all but 12 of Defendants’
Pizza Hut restaurants, as well as complete payroll and time data for half of the opt-in plaintiffs. Pl.’s
Reply 6, ECF No. 108. He also notes that only four months elapsed between the Rule 26(f)
conference on November 29, 2016, and the filing of Meetz’s motion for conditional certification on
March 24, 2017. Id. at 5; see also ECF Nos. 21 & 43.
Regardless of whether the lenient standard or the heightened intermediate standard applies
here, I conclude that conditional certification of a collective action under the FLSA is proper because
Meetz has made an adequate showing that he and the other current and former delivery drivers in
the putative class are similarly situated. Ample evidence in the record indicates that delivery drivers
at all of Defendants’ Pizza Hut restaurants shared consistent job requirements, including
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responsibility for providing a delivery vehicle, maintaining it in a safe, working condition, and
procuring an insurance policy that provided minimum coverage levels. See Employee Handbook
38–42, ECF No. 92-5; see also, e.g., Connor Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 102; Boneck Decl. ¶¶ 6–9, ECF
No. 45; Meetz Decl. ¶¶ 6–9, ECF No. 44. Indeed, June Weiss, Wisconsin Hospitality Group’s
Vice President of Human Resources, acknowledged the broad applicability of these policies across
restaurants, as well as the consistent distribution of the employee handbook explaining them. Weiss
Dep. 46–47, 92–99, ECF No. 92-1. Weiss also repeatedly explained that Defendants paid delivery
drivers according to a standard minimum wage policy across all restaurants—$7.25 per hour for nondelivery work and $5.25 per hour, with a $2 tip credit, for delivery work—and the exceptions to that
policy identified by Weiss are no longer relevant in light of Meetz’s concession narrowing the
proposed class. Id. at 66:8–11, 69:16–20, 72:6–23, 79:1–11, 184:3–6; see Pl.’s Reply 8, ECF No.
108. Defendants, moreover, applied a single reimbursement model to all delivery drivers by paying
a per delivery fee that approximated the drivers’ actual vehicle expenses. Weiss Dep. 106–07; see
Westhoff Dep. 27:12–14, ECF No. 92-2. Finally, Meetz has alleged that Defendants’ per delivery
reimbursements failed to reasonably approximate the delivery drivers’ vehicle-related expenses
incurred on Defendants’ behalf, and he has presented evidence suggesting that the consequent underreimbursement caused drivers’ wages to fall below the federal minimum wage. See Am. Compl.
¶ 33, ECF No. 18; Pl.’s Reply 12 (citing Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 8–9, ECF No. 107, describing weekly
reimbursement and delivery data permitting calculation of estimated under-reimbursement).
Because this record evidence suggests that delivery drivers employed by Defendants were
subject to a common compensation and reimbursement policy that resulted in their failure to receive
the federal minimum wage, I conclude that they are similarly situated and that conditional
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certification of a collective action under the FLSA is therefore appropriate. This conclusion aligns
with decisions by district courts throughout the country, which have consistently granted conditional
certification of FLSA collective actions when pizza delivery drivers allege federal minimum wage
violations as a result of per-delivery reimbursement policies that fail to reasonably approximate actual
vehicle expenses. See Tegtmeier v. PJ Iowa, L.C., 208 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (S.D. Iowa 2016);
Bellaspica v. PJPA, LLC, 3 F. Supp. 3d 257 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Smith v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 09-CV1632, 2012 WL 1414325 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2012); Darrow v. WKRP Mgmt., LLC, No. 09-CV1613, 2012 WL 638119 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2012); Perrin v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., No. 09-CV1335, 2011 WL 4089251 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2011); Wass v. NPC Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2254, 2011
WL 1118774 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2011); Bass v. PJComn Acquisition Corp., No. 09-CV-1614, 2010
WL 3720217 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2010); Luiken v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. 09-516, 2010 WL
2545875 (D. Minn. June 21, 2010).
Defendants point to evidence that they contend supports the reasonableness of the per
delivery reimbursement as an approximation of the drivers’ actual vehicle expenses, Defs.’ Resp.
9–13, ECF No. 99, but in doing so they overemphasize Meetz’s obligation to prove an actual FLSA
violation at this stage in the litigation. It is well-established that proof of an actual FLSA violation
is not a prerequisite to conditional certification. Jimenez v. GLK Foods LLC, No. 12-CV-0209,
2013 WL 3936928, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2013) (“Significantly, the focus of the inquiry is ‘not
on whether there has been an actual violation of law but rather on whether the proposed plaintiffs
are similarly situated . . . with respect to their allegations that the law has been violated.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Brabazon, 2011 WL 1131097, at *3)). Although plaintiffs pursuing a putative
collective action must of course plead a claim that does not fail as a matter of law, they need not
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prove a violation of law to secure conditional certification, so long as some evidence in the record
substantiates their allegations. Compare Wass v. NPC Int’l, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1283 (D.
Kan. 2010) (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where pizza delivery drivers failed to
allege violation of law because 29 C.F.R. § 778.217(c) permits an employer to reasonably
approximate employees’ expenses for reimbursement purposes, and the drivers “alleged only
defendant’s failure to pay their actual expenses and not defendant’s failure to approximate those
expenses reasonably”), with Wass, 2011 WL 1118774, at *4 (later granting same plaintiffs’ motion
for conditional certification where third amended complaint was supported by evidence suggesting
that failure to reasonably approximate drivers’ expenses resulted in failure to pay minimum wage).
Defendants likewise cannot defeat conditional certification by relying on drivers’ tips in
excess of the $2 tip credit to offset any deficiencies in the payment of the federal minimum wage to
the drivers resulting from Defendants’ failure to reasonably approximate the vehicle use
reimbursement. Under the FLSA, an employer does not meet the minimum wage requirement if “the
employee ‘kicks-back’ directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer’s
benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. Although
an employer may use a tip credit to count an employee’s tips toward the employer’s minimum wage
obligations, the employee must receive advance notice of the tip credit. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m);
29 C.F.R. § 531.59(b); see also Perrin v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 707, 727 (E.D.
Mo. 2015) (“Defendants may not claim a tip credit in an amount greater than the difference between
Plaintiffs’ cash wage and minimum wage because they failed to notify Plaintiffs in advance that they
were doing so.”). Accordingly, Defendants may not rely on Meetz’s tips in excess of the tip credit
to offset any deficiencies in his receipt of the federal minimum wage arising from under10

reimbursement of his vehicle expenses as a result of Defendants’ alleged unreasonable approximation
of his actual expenses.
Nor do variations between individual members of the putative class defeat conditional
certification at this step, as Defendants contend they should.

Whether individual inquiries

predominate over common questions of law and fact is a question better answered at the second step
of the certification analysis. See Dekeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 449, 456
(E.D. Wis. 2016) (“Factors relevant to the FLSA certification question include any disparate factual
and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, the various individualized defenses available to
the defendant, and fairness and procedural considerations.” (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102–03 (10th Cir. 2001))). Already, Meetz has conceded that the class
should be narrowed to those drivers who earned base wages of $7.25 per hour for non-delivery work
and $5.25 per hour for delivery work, eliminating from the class those drivers who earned higher
base wages and were therefore less likely to receive total wages below the federal minimum as a
result of under-reimbursement of vehicle expenses. Pl.’s Reply Br. 7–8, ECF No. 108. In light of
that concession, additional assessment of whether individual inquiries prevail is best left until the
second step of the certification analysis, after additional discovery provides more detailed
information about the nature of reimbursement practices across Defendants’ operations and about
the drivers’ actual vehicle expenses. For now, “[t]he mere possibility that some members of the
proposed class may have different damages (or no damages at all) is not reason to refuse to notify
all potential class members in the first instance.” Smith, 2012 WL 1414325, at *5.
In light of the foregoing discussion, I conditionally certify a class of similarly situated
employees defined as follows:
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All persons who have worked as a delivery driver for a Pizza Hut franchise operated
by Wisconsin Hospitality Group, LLC and PH Hospitality Group, LLC d/b/a Pizza
Hut at any time since September 30, 2013, and who received an in-restaurant wage
of $7.25 per hour and a delivery wage of $5.25 per hour.
By incorporating Meetz’s concession narrowing the class, this definition appropriately captures the
common policy that the potential plaintiffs were subject to in this case.
II.

Court-Authorized Notice
District courts have discretion in appropriate cases to implement the opt-in provision of

Section 216(b) of the FLSA by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs. Hoffman–La Roche, 493
U.S. at 169; Woods, 686 F.2d at 580. With his motion for conditional certification, Meetz submitted
a proposed notice to potential class members. ECF No. 43-1. In their brief in opposition to the
motion, Defendants raised several objections to the proposed notice and requested time to meet and
confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the proposed notice. Meetz submitted a revised proposed
notice with his reply brief. ECF Nos. 107-1 (clean) & 107-2 (changes tracked).
Defendant identified four specific objections to the original proposed notice: (1) the proposed
notice mischaracterized the basis for the lawsuit by stating in Section I, “The lawsuit alleges that
Pizza Hut violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (‘FLSA’) by failing to fully reimburse the
vehicle expenses incurred by its Delivery Drivers”; (2) the proposed notice failed to appropriately
characterize Defendants’ defense that it reasonably approximated the drivers’ expenses and that the
drivers received the minimum wage for every hour worked; (3) the proposed notice failed to inform
the putative class members that they would be bound by any negative outcome of the litigation; and
(4) the proposed 75-day notice period was too long.

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Meetz addressed each of these objections in his reply brief and revised proposed notice.
First, Meetz contends that the notice does not mischaracterize the claim in Section I because Section
IV explains the claim in greater detail:
This lawsuit alleges that Pizza Hut violated the FLSA by 1) requiring Delivery
Drivers use their own vehicles to deliver pizza, 2) paying at or near minimum wage
for time spent delivering pizzas, and 3) paying a per-delivery reimbursement that
failed to fully reimburse the Delivery Drivers for their actual vehicle expenses.
Specifically, the lawsuit alleges that Delivery Drivers’ pay illegally fell below the
minimum wage when their actual vehicle expenses exceeded the per-delivery
reimbursement paid by Pizza Hut.
Revised Proposed Notice 2, ECF No. 107-1 (emphasis added). Because this accurate description
of the lawsuit appears in a section clearly marked with the heading “WHAT IS THIS LAWSUIT
ABOUT?” and therefore provides the notice’s primary characterization of the case, I conclude that
the language Defendants’ identify in Section I is not misleading. Second, I also conclude that the
language added to Sections I and IV of the revised proposed notice accurately describes Defendants’
characterization of their own defenses and therefore neutralizes any mischaracterization of
Defendants’ position by the original proposed notice. Third, the revised proposed notice adopts
Defendant’s suggestion by adding language to Section VI informing potential plaintiffs that, by
opting into the lawsuit, they will not be able to bring a separate claim to recover wages, if the suit
is unsuccessful. Finally, the revised proposed notice adopts Defendants’ suggested 45-day notice
period. Because I am satisfied that these changes address the objections raised in Defendants’ brief
in opposition, I will allow Meetz to send his revised proposed notice to the conditionally certified
class.

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CONCLUSION
Based on the record before the Court, Meetz’s motion for conditional certification and court
authorization to send notice to potential class members (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED with the
modifications described in this order. As set forth above, the collective class is certified as follows:
All persons who have worked as a delivery driver for a Pizza Hut franchise operated by Wisconsin
Hospitality Group, LLC and PH Hospitality Group, LLC d/b/a Pizza Hut at any time since
September 30, 2013, and who received an in-restaurant wage of $7.25 per hour and a delivery wage
of $5.25 per hour.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT (1) counsel of record is appointed as Collective
Action Counsel; (2) the form and content of the revised Notice of Right to Join Lawsuit for Unpaid
Wages Against Wisconsin Hospitality Group, LLC and PH Hospitality Group, LLC d/b/a Pizza Hut
(ECF No. 107-1) is approved; (3) Defendants must within 10 days provide Collective Action
Counsel a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with an updated list identifying all persons known to
Defendants to meet the definition of the collective class set forth in this order, including their first
names, last names, last known street address, city, state, zip code, phone numbers, and dates of
employment; and (4) the collective class members are allowed 45 days from the mailing of the notice
to opt into this action.
Dated this 29th

day of August, 2017.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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