Fields v. Zolkowski et al
Filing
45
DECISION AND ORDER signed by Chief Judge William C Griesbach on 8/2/2018 denying 14 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 23 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to set this matter for a telephone scheduling conference. (cc: all counsel via CM/ECF, Jason M Fields via U.S. Mail) (Griesbach, William)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JASON M. FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 17-C-1506
LIEUTENANT TODD A. ZOLKOWSKI,
OFFICER TED M. VANDENBERG,
& LIEUTENANT RUSSELL D. BLAHNIK,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jason Fields filed this pro se civil rights action against three Grand Chute law
enforcement officers alleging they used excessive force in effecting his arrest at the Extended Stay
Motel in Grand Chute, Wisconsin on March 8, 2015. His complaint also asserts state law claims for
battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fields filed the case in the Circuit Court for
Outagamie County, but the defendants removed it to federal court asserting jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. The case is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos.
14, 23. Fields has agreed to voluntarily dismiss his state law claims since he failed to comply with
the state law governing notice. Because a dispute as to the material facts exists as to the remaining
federal claim, both motions will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Shortly after midnight on March 8, 2015, Lieutenant Todd Zolkowski and Officers Ted
Vandenberg and Russell Blahnik of the Grand Chute Police Department were dispatched to the
Extended Stay America motel to arrest Fields, who was staying at the motel with a woman and a
child. Fields had three outstanding warrants for his arrest on felony charges of forgery, bailjumping
and fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 8, 37. The officers were advised by dispatch that Fields and the woman were
probably drinking and that Fields had a weapon and would probably run.
Armed with this information, the defendants, dressed in their uniforms and with their badges
displayed, stationed themselves in the hallway outside Field’s motel room and had the night auditor
at the motel call the room and tell Fields that there was someone waiting for him. As Fields stepped
outside the room, Officer Blahnik stated “police department.” Fields made the statement “the
police” and quickly stepped back into the room. With the door closing, Lieutenant Zolkowski
reached in and attempted to grab Fields. The ensuing struggle which continued out into the hallway
was partially captured on the officers’ body cameras and downloaded to a disc submitted in support
of the defendants’ motion. ECF No. 16, Ex. F. Fields contends that without provocation or
justification, Officer Vandenberg grabbed him and slammed him up against the wall, causing injury
to his face and neck. ECF No. 25 ¶ 8. The video depicts Fields struggling with the officers and
insisting that he is not resisting, while at the same time failing to comply with their command that
he stop struggling with them and face the wall so they can place handcuffs on him. At one point,
Fields is taken to the floor where he is eventually handcuffed, searched, and taken into custody. In
the course of the struggle, Fields sustained abrasions to the side of his face and to his chin.
Fields was later charged in Outagamie Circuit Court with bailjumping and resisting arrest
based on the events described above. Following a trial at which Fields and each of the defendants
testified, a jury returned a verdict finding Fields not guilty of each count. This lawsuit followed.
Fields contends that the defendants falsely claimed he was resisting as a pretext for using
excessive force against him and causing him unnecessary pain and suffering. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’
2
Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No. 34, ¶ 23. He argues that the jury’s verdict in his favor in the
criminal case conclusively establishes that he did not resist and thus the defendants’ use of force
against him was unreasonable. The defendants deny that the jury verdict in the criminal case has any
preclusive effect and contend that the force used to effect the arrest was reasonable. Alternatively,
the defendants argue that they acted in good faith and are therefore immune from liability.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
“At the summary judgment stage, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). However, “when the moving party has carried its burden
under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citing Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)). “The mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
3
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Issue Preclusion
Fields argues his acquittal for resisting an officer precludes the defendants from arguing that
he was resisting them while they arrested him. The Court must apply Wisconsin law to determine
whether a Wisconsin state court judgment has a preclusive effect. Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303,
306 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Whether a given decision has preclusive effect depends on state law”) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1738); see also Stericycle, Inc. v. City of Devalan, 120 F.3d 657, 658–59 (7th Cir.
1997) (“Federal courts must give Wisconsin judgments the same preclusive effect as would the state
courts of Wisconsin.”). “Issue preclusion . . . ‘is designed to limit the relitigating of issues that have
been actually litigated in a previous action.’” Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 219, 594
N.W.2d 370 (1999) (quoting Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 558, 515 N.W.2d 458 (1994))
(remaining citations omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel), applies “‘where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all
respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable
legal rules remain unchanged . . . .” State ex rel. Flowers v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 81 Wis.
2d 376, 387, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978) (quoting C.I.R. v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948)
(emphasis in original).
Flowers is dispositive as to how a Wisconsin court would treat whether Fields’ acquittal
would have preclusive effect on the issue of whether he was resisting officers during a civil case.
In Flowers, a defendant on parole was charged with reckless use of a weapon and battery. The first
4
charge was dismissed for lack of evidence, and a jury acquitted him of the second. Id. at 383.
Nevertheless, the defendant’s parole was revoked on these and other grounds. Id. Flowers alleged
that the government was collaterally estopped from using the conduct underlying the charges on
which he was acquitted as the basis of his parole revocation. Noting that the burden of proof in a
criminal case was beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the burden at a parole revocation was only
a preponderance of the evidence, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the acquittal could not
have a preclusive effect. Id. at 387–89; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4).
The Court explained that the “‘bundle of legal principles’ is not the same because different burdens
of proof apply, and the paramount considerations are different.” Id. at 387. The Court continued:
Collateral estoppel [issue preclusion] applies only where it is reasonably clear that the
issue in question has in fact been decided. On the present record it is impossible to
ascertain whether the question of possession was determined, or whether the charge
was dismissed because there was insufficient evidence of recklessness.
Id. at 389. It follows that Fields cannot use his acquittal to preclude the defendants from arguing
that Fields was resisting at the time they attempted to place him under arrest.
B. Excessive Force
Under the Fourth Amendment, the “force used to effect an arrest must be objectively
‘reasonable.’” Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir. 2008). To determine whether the
force used was reasonable, the court must engage in a “careful balancing of the nature of and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Id. (quoting Morfin v. City of E. Chi., 349 F.3d 989, 1004 (7th
Cir. 2003)). The court must consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses a threat to the safety of officers or
5
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest. Id. (citing Morfin, 349 F.3d at 1004–05 (citing
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979))). Under the reasonableness standard, the Court must
also recognize “that ‘police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)).
An officer’s use of force is unconstitutional if “judging from the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the arrest, the officer used greater force than was reasonably necessary to make the arrest.”
Id. (quoting Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 778 (2003)).
Here, the video evidence establishes that upon seeing the officers in the hallway, Fields
immediately attempted to re-enter the room and close the door. Given the three warrants for Fields’
arrest and the information the defendants had that he had a weapon and was likely to run, it was
entirely reasonable for the officers to use force to apprehend Fields before he could close the door
on them. Although Fields contends that Officer Vandenberg grabbed him “without provocation or
justification,” this is a legal conclusion which I can properly reject on the basis of the undisputed
facts and the video evidence. It is over what happens next that the dispute exists.
Fields alleges that the body camera videos, his testimony, and his acquittal for resisting arrest
show that the officers’ actions after pulling him into the hallway were unreasonable and, thus,
unconstitutional. The defendants allege that the body camera videos show that Fields stepped back
and was actively resisting arrest. Unfortunately, the body camera videos are not as conclusive as
either side believes, which is evident by the fact that both sides insist that the videos are sufficient
to grant summary judgment in their favor. While the video shows the officers alerting Fields to their
presence, Fields saying “oh it’s the police,” and Fields stepping back from the hallway back towards
6
the room, it does not clearly show either of the scuffles in which Fields alleges the defendants
unnecessarily slammed him into the wall or onto the floor, causing injury to his face and neck.
Additionally, given the position of the body cameras, most of Fields’ actions are not visible. As such,
there is still a material dispute as to Fields’ actions and whether he was actively resisting officers.
To be sure, Fields does not appear to be following their commands. For example, when they
had him facing the wall and were trying to place the handcuffs on him, Fields kept turning around
telling the officers that his three-year daughter was in the room. The fact that his daughter was in
the room was, of course, irrelevant, since her mother or Field’s girlfriend was in the room with her
and Fields was going to jail. Nevertheless, Fields continued to argue with the officers. The officers
eventually put him face down in the hallway so that they could place the handcuffs on him. Fields
claims that they unnecessarily slammed him up against the wall and then sat on his face and neck
when he was on the floor. Though the video does not show these acts, it does not conclusively
demonstrate they did not occur. I therefore cannot simply reject Fields’ version of the facts.
While it is true that “‘[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of the judge’s chambers,’ . . . violates the Fourth Amendment,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)), the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly
cautioned district courts that “that summary judgment is often inappropriate in excessive-force cases
because the evidence surrounding the officer's use of force is often susceptible of different
interpretations.” Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005)(stating “since the Graham
reasonableness inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and
to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment
7
as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly”); Catlin v. City of Wheaton,
574 F.3d 361, 367 (7th Cir.2009) (same). That is the case here. Given the rule requiring that the
evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, summary judgment cannot
be granted on behalf of either party.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that even if their actions are deemed unreasonable, the doctrine of qualified
immunity shields them from liability. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects offers “who act
in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful” from liability. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987)). In order to determine whether qualified immunity applies, the Court must
address two questions to determine whether the doctrine of qualified immunity applies; although, the
Court need not determine them in order. Id. at 691; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009) (holding that the two questions for qualified immunity are no longer required to be
addressed in order). The Court must determine whether the facts, when taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants violated a constitutional right and the Court must
determine whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). This right must be defined with
adequate specificity. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1151 (2018).
At the time of the incident, it was clearly established that an officer may not use excessive
force against an individual during an arrest. Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 687
(7th Cir. 2007). It was also clearly established that using a significant level of force on a nonresisting or passively resisting individual constitutes excessive force. Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203,
207 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2015) (denying
8
qualified immunity to officers who slammed a non-resisting detainee’s head into a concrete bunk and
used a taser while he was handcuffed); Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2007)
(denying qualified immunity to officers who improperly hobbled and repeatedly struck a non-resisting
suspect); Broadfield v. McGrath, No. 17-3071, __ F. App’x ___, 2018 WL 2722504, at *8–9 (7th
Cir. June 6, 2018) (denying qualified immunity to officers who pressed a non-resisting detainee’s
neck into concrete, thus preventing him from breathing, and carried him hogtied to his cell, thus
injuring his wrist).
Moreover, because there is a material dispute as to whether Fields was resisting arrest when
the force was used against him, summary judgment is inappropriate. “‘Because the facts are in hot
dispute, the officers cannot seek pretrial refuge behind a claim of qualified immunity.’” Alicea v.
Thomas, 815 F.3d 283, 292 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding it improper to determine qualified immunity
when there was a material dispute as to whether plaintiff was resisting arrest when force was used
upon him) (quoting Dufour-Dowell v. Cogger, 152 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1998)).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, both Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 23) and Defendants’
motion (ECF No. 14) are DENIED, and Plaintiff’s federal claim remains for trial. Plaintiff’s state
law claims, however, are dismissed. The Clerk is directed to set this matter on the Court’s calendar
for a telephone scheduling conference.
Dated this
2nd
day of August, 2018.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge
United States District Court
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?