Jones v. McClain

Filing 59

ORDER signed by Chief Judge William C Griesbach on 4/25/2018 Denying 44 Motion for Sanctions, Denying 47 Motion for Sanctions, Denying 48 Motion to Strike, Denying 56 Motion for Sanctions. (cc: all counsel, via US Mail to Jones) (Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JERMEL JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-C-1523

RYAN MCCLAIN,
Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jermel Jones, an inmate currently serving a state prison sentence at Waupun
Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Defendant Ryan McClain violated his civil rights by spraying him with an incapacitating agent
after he threatened to hang himself using a towel. This matter comes before the court on four
motions Jones has filed under Civil Local Rule 7(h) seeking sanctions for alleged discovery
violations. ECF Nos. 44, 47, 48, 56. The first two motions were filed on April 9, 2018, and the
third on April 12, 2018, meaning the deadline for McClain to respond to these three motions has
passed. Because McClain has not filed a response, those three are ready for decision. Although
Jones filed the fourth motion more recently, on April 23, 2018, it largely duplicates arguments raised
in the earlier motions. For the reasons stated below, all four motions will be denied.
Jones’ first motion seeks sanctions against McClain under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37 on the grounds that McClain lied under oath. ECF No. 44 at 1. Comparing McClain’s responses
to Jones’ requests for admissions with McClain’s own incident report, incident reports by other
officers involved in extracting Jones from his cell, and a video of the incident, Jones argues that

McClain lied about the presence of a ligature around Jones’ neck at the time he sprayed him with an
incapacitating agent. Id. at 1–2.
Jones’ second motion similarly seeks sanctions under Rule 37 on the grounds that McClain
lied under oath. ECF No. 47. This time comparing McClain’s responses to Jones’ requests for
admissions with McClain’s responses to Jones’ interrogatories, as well as conduct reports written
by McClain, Jones argues that McClain lied when he said that he did not know that Jones had asthma
at the time McClain sprayed him with an incapacitating agent. Id. at 1–2.
Jones’ third motion seeks a different remedy than his first two, asking that the court “strike
all [of] defendant’s testimony, answers and whatever the court deems necessary” under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12. But he returns to the argument that McClain lied about Jones having anything
tied around his neck at the time of the incident, once again comparing McClain’s statements about
the incident to incident reports by the other officers involved. ECF No. 48 at 1.
Jones’s fourth motion returns to his argument seeking sanctions under Rule 37 on the
grounds that McClain lied under oath. ECF No. 56 at 1. He also asks the court to treat the motion
as a motion to strike under Rule 12. Id. Once again, Jones points out the inconsistencies between
McClain’s incident report and discovery responses, on the one hand, and the incident reports by
other officers, on the other. Id. at 1–2. He also directs the court to a Department of Corrections
use of force inquiry into McClain’s conduct, which concluded that McClain’s conduct was neither
desirable nor reasonable. Id. at 5–6.
All four of Jones’ motions raise similar arguments that McClain’s statements about the
incident are inconsistent with the other evidence available regarding that day. But to say that a
defendant’s version of events is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s version does not, by itself, mean that
the defendant is lying. Instead, at this stage in the litigation, it suggests at most that there could be
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a genuine dispute of material fact. As a magistrate judge in another district recently observed,
[A] discrepancy alone does not compel sanctions. Motions to compel discovery are
not intended to resolve underlying factual disputes . . . . Plaintiff may explore [an]
apparent discrepancy [between witnesses’ statements] through further discovery.
Moreover any discrepancies in the record may raise [an] issue of fact that can be
relevant in determining a dispositive motion or at trial. But, for now the Court is
satisfied that the statements discussed above do not warrant sanctions.
Crawford v. Hughes, No. 13-CV-6638-FPG-JWF, 2018 WL 1413091, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,
2018). So too here. Inconsistencies between witnesses’ statements and documentary evidence are
a normal occurrence in a case approaching the summary judgment phase, as this one is. But those
inconsistencies should be resolved on motions for summary judgment or at trial—not through a
motion for sanctions.
Notably, Jones filed a motion for summary judgment shortly after filing the first three of these
motions for sanctions. ECF No. 50. In support of that motion, he has filed a 28-page brief, 49
pages of supporting evidence, proposed findings of fact, and a declaration relating his own testimony
as to the incident. ECF No. 51–54. That motion for summary judgment properly places Jones’
argument about the undisputed material facts before the court and provides McClain with an
opportunity to respond to the merits of his arguments within an established time frame. Accordingly,
that motion for summary judgment, rather than these misdirected motions for sanctions, is the
appropriate context for the court to consider these alleged factual disputes.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jones’ motions for sanctions (ECF Nos. 44, 47, 48,
56) are DENIED.
Dated this 25th day of April, 2018.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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