Langenhuizen v. Saul
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph. IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED. (cc: all counsel)(asc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
KEVIN J. LANGENHUIZEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 20-CV-250
ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
Kevin J. Langenhuizen seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration denying his claim for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). For the reasons below, the Commissioner’s decision will be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
sentence four.
BACKGROUND
On April 26, 2016, Langenhuizen protectively filed a Title II application for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits and a Title XVI application for supplemental
security income, alleging disability beginning March 31, 2014 (Tr. 16) due to a shattered heel
and a heart condition (Tr. 356). Langenhuizen’s applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. (Tr. 16.) Langenhuizen filed a request for a hearing, and a hearing was held
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 27, 2018. (Tr. 34–79.) Langenhuizen
testified at the hearing, as did Leslie Goldsmith, a vocational expert. (Tr. 34.)
In a written decision issued October 31, 2018, the ALJ found that Langenhuizen had
the severe impairments of coronary atherosclerosis, status-post cardiac bypass surgery with
aortic and mitral valve replacement; history of left foot fracture, status-post surgical open
reduction internal fixation (“ORIF”); and obesity. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ found that
Langenhuizen did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (the
“Listings”). (Id.) The ALJ further found that Langenhuizen had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work, with the following limitations: he can only
operate foot controls with the left lower extremity on an occasional basis; he can only climb
ramps and stairs occasionally; he can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and he can never
work at unprotected heights or around moving mechanical parts. (Id.)
Although Langenhuizen was unable to perform his past relevant work as a
laborer/construction worker (Tr. 24), the ALJ found that given Langenhuizen’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that he could perform. (Tr. 24–26.) As such, the ALJ found that Langenhuizen was
not disabled from March 31, 2014 through the date of the decision. (Tr. 26.) The ALJ’s
decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied
Langenhuizen’s request for review. (Tr. 1–6.)
DISCUSSION
1.
Applicable Legal Standards
The Commissioner’s final decision will be upheld if the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and supported his decision with substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is not
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conclusive evidence; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Although a decision denying benefits need not discuss every
piece of evidence, remand is appropriate when an ALJ fails to provide adequate support for
the conclusions drawn. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811. The ALJ must provide a “logical bridge”
between the evidence and conclusions. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
The ALJ is also expected to follow the SSA’s rulings and regulations in making a
determination. Failure to do so, unless the error is harmless, requires reversal. Prochaska v.
Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the entire record, the court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reconsidering facts, reweighing
evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Estok v. Apfel,
152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). Finally, judicial review is limited to the rationales offered
by the ALJ. Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2010)).
2.
Application to This Case
2.1
Medical Background
2.1.1 Left Foot Injury
On March 31, 2014, his alleged onset date, Langenhuizen fell approximately five feet
from scaffolding at work, landing on a plank on the ground. (Tr. 456.) He suffered a
comminuted1 left calcaneus2 fracture of his left foot. (Tr. 457.) Langenhuizen underwent
ORIF surgery in April 2014, with orthopedic plates and screws placed in his left heel. (Tr.
“Comminuted” indicates that the bone was broken into several pieces. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary,
Comminuted (27th ed. 2000).
2
The largest of the tarsal bones; it forms the heel and articulates with the cuboid anteriorly and the talus
superiorly. Stedman’s, Calcaneus.
1
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574.) Langenhuizen attended physical therapy from July 2014 until September 2014, when
he had ORIF wound debridement surgery to address his non-healing wound from the April
surgery. (Tr. 476–91.) Langenhuizen continued with physical therapy from October 2014
through early January 2015. (Tr. 491–558.) At the conclusion of his physical therapy,
Langenhuizen treated with the podiatrist who performed his surgeries, Dr. Todd Derksen.
(Tr. 563.) In December 2014, Dr. Derksen noted that Langenhuizen continued to have a
considerable amount of postoperative edema, fifty percent decreased subtalar joint range of
motion, mild decreased midtarsal motion, and tenderness with palpation and manipulation
of the joint. (Id.) Dr. Derksen stated that Langenhuizen would continue to have ankylosing
of the joint which would “likely give him a low disability rating”; however, he found that
Langenhuizen “made enough progress that we can get him back to more normal duty at this
point.” (Id.) Dr. Derksen cleared Langenhuizen to return to work, but limited him to a 15-20
minute sit-down break every two hours. (Id.)
In January 2015, Langenhuizen followed-up with Dr. Derksen. (Tr. 562.) At this
point, Dr. Derksen found that after physical therapy, Langenhuizen had reached his
maximum medical improvement and assigned him a permanent partial disability rating of
25%—15% representing the ankylosing of the subtalar joint and 10% for the moderate pain
that limits his daily activities and work. (Id.) Dr. Derksen stated that Langenhuizen “will have
permanent work restrictions of must be allowed to sit every two hours.” (Id.) Dr. Derksen
stated that Langenhuizen should follow-up as needed, and noted that he may eventually need
a subtalar fusion surgery. (Id.)
In February 2015, Langenhuizen began working with the Wisconsin Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation (“DVR”). (Tr. 600.) The DVR assessed Langenhuizen with serious
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limitations in mobility (Tr. 601) and noted in September 2015 that he would need a job “that
is sedentary in nature” (Tr. 605). Langenhuizen reported that the longest he could stand was
for one and a half hours, before needing to sit and elevate his left foot due to pain. (Tr. 606.)
On June 4, 2015, State Agency physician Dr. Pat Chan assessed Langenhuizen’s
functioning at the initial level. (Tr. 89.) Dr. Chan noted that Dr. Derksen restricted
Langenhuizen to sitting every two hours due to swelling and decreased range of motion in
the left ankle. Dr. Chan gave Dr. Derksen’s statements “great weight considering the medical
findings support statements,” and noted that “break restrictions are permitted w/two 15 min
breaks and one 30 min lunch break w/n a 8 hour workday.” (Tr. 88–89.) Dr. Chan opined
Langenhuizen should be limited to light work. (Tr. 87.) On reconsideration, State Agency
physician Dr. George Walcott agreed with Dr. Chan’s assessment. (Tr. 122–23.)
After not treating with Dr. Derksen for approximately a year and a half, Langenhuizen
returned in August 2016, complaining of throbbing heel pain on a daily basis, worse with
weightbearing, and pain extending out to the ball of his foot. (Tr. 946.) Langenhuizen
described the pain as feeling “like he is walking on a stone,” and stated that the pain began
during physical therapy but had slowly gotten progressively worse. (Id.) Langenhuizen stated
that the more active he gets, the sharper the pain. (Id.) Upon physical examination, Dr.
Derksen noted mild edema throughout the rear foot, mild decreased ankle range of motion,
and moderately decreased subtalar joint range of motion, about 50% of normal. (Id.) Dr.
Derksen found that Langenhuizen could likely improve the metatarsalgia non-operatively,
but would more than likely require eventual surgery to address the subtalar joint pain. (Id.)
Dr. Derksen recommended cortisone injections, prescribed Meloxicam, and gave him
Powerstep arch supports with metatarsal pads. (Tr. 946–47.) A few weeks later, during a
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comprehensive physical exam, Langenhuizen reported left heel pain to his treating provider,
who noted that he “[f]avors left foot some with initial steps after sitting for awhile.” (Tr. 952.)
In November 2016, Dr. Chan again reviewed Langenhuizen’s file at the initial level.
(Tr. 131–35.) This time, Dr. Chan limited Langenhuizen to medium work (Tr. 131) and gave
Dr. Derksen’s permanent work restrictions “little weight,” stating that needing a rest period
to sit down at least every two hours was “open for interpretation.” (Tr. 133.) At the
reconsideration level in January 2017, State Agency physician Dr. William Fowler agreed
with Dr. Chan’s subsequent assessment of medium work. (Tr. 171.)
In late December 2016, Langenhuizen sought a second opinion on his foot with Dr.
Richard Hammond. (Tr. 1000.) Langenhuizen reported pain, primarily in the plantar aspect
of his left forefoot underneath the fifth metatarsal, stating that it felt like “he is walking on a
stone.” (Id.) Langenhuizen stated that the over-the-counter inserts given to him by Dr.
Derksen did not help his foot and he was also experiencing joint stiffness and numbness. (Id.)
Upon physical examination, Dr. Hammond noted full range of motion of the bilateral ankle
joints without pain; but limited range of motion in eversion, supination, and pronation
motions of the subtalar joint on the left without pain. (Tr. 1001.) He found moderate pain to
palpation on the plantar aspect of the 5th metatarsal head on the left and a pes planus foot
type (i.e., flat foot) when ambulating. (Id.) Langenhuizen was fitted for orthotics and felt some
immediate relief from the pain and discomfort. (Tr. 1015.)
In March 2018, Langenhuizen treated with his primary care provider, who noted that
Langenhuizen was not engaging in regular exercise due to ongoing problems with his left
heel. Langenhuizen stated that he planned on rechecking his ankle with Dr. Derksen. (Tr.
1031.) It was recommended that Langenhuizen use a stationary bike for exercise because his
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ankle issues made it difficult for him to walk. (Tr. 1035.) In June 2018, Langenhuizen was
treated in the emergency room after he sprained his ankle while mowing the lawn, causing
increased pain and swelling. (Tr. 1072.) At the administrative hearing, Langenhuizen testified
that his ankle continued to swell and that motion was difficult. (Tr. 49–50.) He stated that if
he performs an activity on his feet like mowing the lawn, after approximately one and a half
hours, he needs to sit and elevate his ankle. (Tr. 61–62.)
2.1.2 Cardiac Impairment
During a pre-operative assessment prior to foot surgery in April 2014, Langenhuizen
treated with Dr. Thomas Lewandowski, who noted that while Langenhuizen suffered from
coronary artery disease, he was otherwise asymptomatic with moderate activity. (Tr. 471–
74.) In October 2015, Langenhuizen underwent a cardiac catheterization after having an
abnormal nuclear stress test and increased symptoms of angina. (Tr. 627, 630.) The
catheterization showed severe coronary artery disease and chronic total occlusion in the midright coronary artery. (Tr. 637.) On May 3, 2016, Langenhuizen underwent a triple coronary
artery bypass grafting surgery and mitral and aortic valve replacement. (Tr. 646.)
Langenhuizen participated in cardiac rehabilitation through July 2016. (Tr. 869–922.) While
doing cardiac rehabilitation, the therapist noted that Langenhuizen was planning on having
his heel looked at again when he was done with rehab and that his left heel limits his
workloads. (Tr. 869, 873, 876, 882, 888, 891, 894, 897, 900, 903.) Langenhuizen testified that
he has had few problems with his heart since the surgery, except some occasional shortness
of breath when mowing the grass or shoveling snow. (Tr. 54–55.)
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2.2
Light vs. Medium Work
The crux of Langenhuizen’s argument is that the ALJ erred in limiting him to medium
level work. In so doing, the ALJ rejected Dr. Derksen’s permanent work restrictions and the
State Agency physicians’ previous limitation to light work based on those restrictions, instead
adopting the State Agency physicians’ subsequent opinions limiting him to medium work.
The ALJ justifies rejecting the State Agency physicians’ previous opinions on the subsequent
evidence of record allegedly showing that Langenhuizen had attained greater exertional
capacity. (Tr. 23–24.) Specifically, the ALJ relies on Dr. Hammond’s physical examination
showing less pain and greater range of motion, as well as the records allegedly showing that
subsequent to his ORIF surgery, Langenhuizen “was able to recover functionality through a
course of treatment that included PT, medications, and the use of orthotics.” (Tr. 22.)
The shift from light to medium work is significant. At the time Dr. Chan and Dr.
Walcott first assessed Langenhuizen’s limitations (on June 4 and August 24, 2015,
respectively), Langenhuizen was 53 years old (DOB August 30, 1961), or a “person closely
approaching advanced age,” under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). When Dr. Chan
and Dr. Fowler assessed Langenhuizen again in November 2016 and January 2017, he was
55 years old, or a “person of advanced age.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). This change is
significant given Langenhuizen’s classification under the “grids.” The grids are a series of
tables broken into separate rules ‘“which classif[y] a claimant as disabled or not disabled,
based on the claimant’s physical capacity, age, education, and work experience.’” Haynes v.
Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th
Cir.1987)); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(a) (“Where the findings of
fact made with respect to a particular individual’s vocational factors and residual functional
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capacity coincide with all of the criteria of a particular rule, the rule directs a conclusion as to
whether the individual is or is not disabled.”).
Under grid rule § 202.14, an individual of closely approaching advanced age, with a
high school education, and a lack of transferability of skills, is not disabled when limited to
light work. However, under grid rule § 202.06, this same individual, but now of advanced
age, is disabled under the grid. In contrast, the same individual, limited to medium work, is
not disabled whether of advanced or closely approaching advanced age. See grid rules §§
203.15, 203.22.
In Langenhuizen’s case, the change from light to medium work says little about his
actual functional limitations. This is because the main difference between light and medium
work is the amount of weight that a person can lift. When it comes to walking, standing, and
sitting, whether under light or medium work, a person must be able to do “a good deal of
walking or standing,” specifically standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately
6 hours of an 8-hour workday with sitting occurring intermittently during the remaining time.
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10. The record does not indicate that Langenhuizen has
any upper extremity limitations. In fact, in assessing Langenhuizen capable of performing
light work in June 2015, Dr. Chan specifically noted that Langenhuizen had no upper
extremity limitations, but was limited to light work due to Dr. Derksen’s permanent work
restrictions of sitting every two hours for 15-20 minutes. (Tr. 87, 99.) Thus, perhaps if not for
the grid consideration, the change would not be error.
But given Langenhuizen’s change in age category, the shift from light to medium work
is indeed significant. And neither the State Agency physicians’ explanations, nor the ALJ’s
rationale for adopting the change to medium work, comports with the record. It is entirely
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unclear why Dr. Chan would give great weight to Dr. Derksen’s permanent work restrictions,
finding they were supported by the record, and two years later give the same restrictions little
weight because the restriction is now “open for interpretation.” (Tr. 133.) And the ALJ
overstates Langenhuizen’s level of improvement. Langenhuizen did not completely “recover
functionality” through PT, medications, and orthotics as the ALJ asserts (Tr. 22); rather, these
methods allowed Langenhuizen to reach a healing plateau requiring the need to sit every two
hours for approximately 15-20 minutes. It is clear from the record that subsequent to
completing physical therapy in early 2015, Langenhuizen continued to experience heel pain
while standing and walking. Although he did not treat for the remainder of the relevant time
period (besides seeking a second opinion in December 2016), this is not surprising, given that
the physical therapist and podiatrist found that Langenhuizen had reached a healing plateau.
The record does not support the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Derksen’s permanent work restrictions
or support the State Agency physicians’ changed assessment from light to medium level work.
Again, given the standing, walking, and sitting requirements are the same for light or
medium level work and assuming Langenhuizen does not “grid out,” the Commissioner
argues that the VE in this case did identify jobs that Langenhuizen could perform that
although classified as medium, allow a person to sit for at least two hours. (Commissioner’s
Br. at 21, Docket # 17.) The key distinction, however, is that medium and light work, by
definition, require at least 6 hours of standing and/or walking with “sitting intermittently
during the remaining time.” SSR 83-10. SSR 83-10 states that for medium work, “being on
one’s feet for most of the workday is critical.” Thus, this type of work permits intermittent
sitting. The record, however, supports that after being on his feet for one and a half to two
hours, Langenhuizen needs a sustained period of continuous sitting (as Dr. Derksen found,
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15-20 minutes), before returning to his feet. At the hearing, Langenhuizen’s counsel
specifically asked whether work was available for an individual, limited to medium work,
who “would need to sit every two hours for 15 to 20 minutes.” (Tr. 73.) The VE clarified
“Continuously, like take away from standing and sit for 15 or 20 minutes?,” to which counsel
responded affirmatively. (Tr. 74.) The VE then testified under those circumstances, “that
would probable preclude these jobs.” (Id.) For these reasons, the ALJ must re-examine on
remand whether the record supports Langenhuizen’s ability to stand and/or walk for six out
of eight hours, consistent with medium and/or light level work, given his permanent work
restrictions.
2.3
Cardiac Condition
Although this case is being remanded on other grounds, I will briefly address
Langenhuizen’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt limitations specific to his
heart condition. Langenhuizen argues that the ALJ failed to include any limitations for his
cardiac condition, despite finding the condition to be a severe impairment. He argues that a
severe impairment, “[b]y definition . . . means the condition significantly limits
Langenhuizen’s ability to do basic work activities.” (Pl.’s Br. at 21, Docket # 13.) I do not
agree that the ALJ erred as to Langenhuizen’s cardiac condition. Langenhuizen
acknowledged that his bypass surgery was successful and testified that he has had few
problems with his heart since the surgery, except some occasional shortness of breath when
mowing the grass or shoveling snow. (Tr. 54–55.) Thus, it is unclear what limitations he
believes the ALJ should have included based on his cardiac impairment. A finding that a
claimant’s impairment is “severe” does not necessarily mean that the impairment will affect
the RFC. See, e.g., Winston v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-419-BH, 2017 WL 1196861, at *13 (N.D.
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Tex. Mar. 31, 2017), aff’d, 755 F. App’x 395 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The ALJ must clearly consider
the severe impairments in determining the claimant’s RFC, not necessarily assess limitations
for each severe impairment.”); Sarah B. v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-0080-BL, 2018 WL 3763837,
at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-080-C-BL,
2018 WL 3756944 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2018) (“[T]hat Step 2 only requires ‘a de minimis
showing’ provides an apt reminder that courts must vigilantly keep in mind the differences
between an assessment of RFC and a Step 2 severity finding.”) (internal citation omitted);
Dowell v. Colvin, No. 1:12CV1006, 2015 WL 1524767, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2015) (“[A]
finding that a claimant has a severe impairment at step two does not necessarily require a
corresponding restriction in the RFC.”); Carrier v. Astrue, No. CIV. SAG-10-3264, 2013 WL
136423, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2013) (“One of her arguments is the ALJ’s RFC was inconsistent
with his Step Two findings of bilateral severe hand impairments. That argument is deficient,
because there is no requirement that every severe impairment correlate with a particular
restriction in the RFC.”). Thus, I do not find the ALJ erred in this regard.
CONCLUSION
I find that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Langenhuizen’s RFC as to his left foot
impairment and in the corresponding hypothetical to the VE. Because the ALJ’s decision is
not supported by substantial evidence, this case is remanded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
sentence four for reconsideration consistent with this decision.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 31st day of March, 2021.
BY THE COURT
Y TH
THE
T
_________
NANCY JOSEPH
JOSEPH
SEP
United States Magistrate Judge
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