Imani v. Richardson

Filing 4

SCREENING ORDER signed by Judge William C Griesbach on 6/26/2020. This petition is DISMISSED and a certificate of appealability will be DENIED. (cc: all counsel, via US Mail to Imani)(Griesbach, William)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

SADIQ IMANI,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20-C-933

REED RICHARDSON,
Respondent.

SCREENING ORDER

Petitioner Sadiq Imani filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 on June 22, 2020. Imani was convicted by a jury of armed robbery and false imprisonment
in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to 20 years of prison and 10 years of
extended supervision on August 26, 2015. He timely filed a notice to seek postconviction relief,
but his motion seeking such relief was not filed until February 8, 2018. The trial court denied his
motion without an evidentiary hearing, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied his petition for review on March 20, 2019. Imani is currently
incarcerated at Stanley Correctional Institution.
I must give the case prompt initial consideration pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases, which reads:
If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. If the petition is not dismissed,
the judge must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response
within a fixed time . . . .

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Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. During my initial review of habeas petitions, I look to see
whether Imani has set forth cognizable constitutional or federal law claims and exhausted available
state remedies.
In his petition, Imani asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because (1) counsel did
not object to the use of a prior felony conviction to impeach Imani at trial, and (2) counsel advised
Imani to testify when counsel knew a rebuttal witness would contradict Imani’s alibi. The petition
also asserts as a third ground for relief the claim that Imani’s postconviction/appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to “detail or substantiate the cumulative prejudicial errors that occurred that
cast doubt on the reliability of the outcome.” It is clear from the face of the petition and the
attached exhibits, however, that Imani is not entitled to relief.
The decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals describe the evidence presented at
trial. A masked man armed with a silver handgun entered the TCF Bank in Milwaukee on August
2, 2013. He forced two employees into the vault and demanded money. After forcing one of the
employees to handcuff the other, the robber fled in one of the employee’s vehicles with $108,000
in U.S. currency. A surveillance system recorded the robbery, as well as the robber fleeing in the
parking lot. A dye pack concealed with the money exploded in the area of the parking lot as the
robber was fleeing. Police recovered the dye pack and the mask the robber was wearing. The
mask was analyzed and found to contain male DNA. Days later, dye-stained money was recovered
at the local casino. The two people using the money at the casino identified Imani as the person
who had given it to them. DNA obtained from Imani pursuant to a search warrant was found to
match the DNA that was found in the mask retrieved from the parking lot.
At trial, the state established the robbery occurred through the testimony of the bank
employees and the surveillance recording. The bank employees were unable to identify the robber,

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however, because he was wearing a mask. As a result, there was no eyewitness identification.
Instead, the identification of Imani as the robber was made through DNA analysis.
A DNA analyst from the Wisconsin Crime Lab testified that the DNA found in the mask
was identical to Imani’s. The analyst testified that she swabbed the areas of the nose and mouth
of the mask for DNA. Because the nose is a mucous membrane and the mouth constantly produces
saliva, the analyst testified that these are areas where she would expect to find the robber’s DNA,
particularly since it had been worn for more than a few minutes during the course of the robbery.
She testified that significant amounts of DNA were recovered, consistent with someone having
worn the mask for a period of time, and a single source DNA profile was developed, meaning the
DNA found in the mouth and nose area matched only one individual. The analyst testified that
she was later given the DNA swab taken from Imani and found that it matched the single source
DNA profile found in the mask. The State then rested.
Imani elected to testify in his defense that he was in Mississippi at the time of the robbery
with a woman named Heather Deckow. Before he made the decision to testify, however, the State
made clear that it intended to call Heather Deckow as a rebuttal witness if he testified. Imani’s
attorney also addressed with the court the number of prior convictions that would be admissible
for impeachment purposes.

Imani had three prior convictions, including a delinquency

adjudication for burglary as a juvenile, a possession of firearm as a felon from 1999, and a
misdemeanor possession of marijuana conviction from 2000. Unlike federal law, the applicable
Wisconsin rule at the time did not place limitations on how recent the conviction needed to be to
be admissible. Nor did it require that misdemeanors, to be admissible, needed to relate to
credibility. Instead, admissibility of prior convictions was largely left to the trial court’s discretion.
Imani’s attorney suggested that only the felony conviction should be admissible, but the trial court

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allowed all three, reasoning that the juvenile adjudication was tied to the felony possession
conviction and the State rule imposed no time limits.
Despite these obstacles, Imani testified that he was in Mississippi at the time of the robbery
and that he had traveled there with Deckow. In rebuttal, the State called Deckow, who denied she
had driven Imani to Mississippi prior to the robbery. The State also called the detective who
interviewed Imani after his arrest and showed portions of the video recording interview that were
inconsistent with his testimony. The jury found Imani guilty of both armed robbery and false
imprisonment.
Imani’s petition for federal relief is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief
only when a state court’s decision on the merits was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” decisions from the United States
Supreme Court, or was “based on an unreasonable application of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
see also Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 315–16 (2015). A state court decision is “contrary to . . .
clearly established Federal law” if the court did not apply the proper legal rule, or, in applying the
proper legal rule, reached the opposite result as the Supreme Court on “materially
indistinguishable” facts. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). A state court decision is an
“unreasonable application of . . . clearly established federal law” when the court applied Supreme
Court precedent in “an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id.
A state court decision is “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” when it is so clearly incorrect that it would
not be debatable among reasonable jurists. Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015) (“If reasonable
minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question, on habeas review that

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does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.” (internal quotations and brackets
omitted)). The determination of a factual matter made by a state court is presumed to be correct,
and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1);
Janusiak v. Cooper, 937 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The petitioner must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the findings were unreasonable.”). Although habeas courts cannot
“second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts,” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010),
“deference does not imply abandonment of or abdication of judicial review . . . .” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Goudy v. Basinger, 604 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“[A] decision involves an unreasonable determination of facts if it rests upon fact-finding that
ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.”).
This is, and was meant to be, an “intentionally” difficult standard to meet. Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). “To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to ‘show
that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Woods, 575 U.S. at 316 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S.
at 103).
Imani’s petition clearly fails to allege facts sufficient to meet this standard. Moreover, the
state court decisions he has filed with his brief demonstrate he is not entitled to federal relief.
Those decisions show that both the trial court and the court of appeals properly applied clearly
established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel in rejecting his claims. A claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is governed by well-established law set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, the
petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s representation was deficient in that it fell below an

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objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel’s deficient performance deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 687–88. A petitioner satisfies the first prong if he demonstrates that
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. To satisfy the
second prong, a petitioner must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
“It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction
or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has
proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particularized act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable.” Id. at 689. For this reason, the Supreme Court has made clear that “judicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. That is, “a court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance,” and that “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
Here, the state courts explicitly applied Strickland in reaching their decisions. The trial
court reasonably concluded that Imani had failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy either prong
of Strickland’s two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals found
it unnecessary to decide whether counsel was ineffective in light of the unique and compelling
evidence of Imani’s guilt. It thus concluded that Imani’s claim failed because regardless of
whether his attorney’s performance was deficient in the manner claimed, the evidence was so
overwhelming that the result would undoubtedly have been the same. Imani does not dispute the
factual statements of either court. His challenge is to their reasoning and conclusions. Given the

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deference that AEDPA and the Strickland standard requires, it is clear he is not entitled to federal
relief. Accordingly, the petition will be summarily denied, and the case dismissed.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this petition is summarily dismissed pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. A certificate of appealability will be DENIED. I
do not believe that reasonable jurists would believe that the petitioner has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the case.
The petitioner is advised that the judgment entered by the Clerk is final. A dissatisfied
party may appeal this court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in
this court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4. In
the event the petitioner decides to appeal, he should also request that the court of appeals issue a
certificate of appealability.
SO ORDERED at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 26th day of June, 2020.
s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach, District Judge
United States District Court

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