Jones v. City of Milwaukee et al

Filing 41

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 1/23/09 granting 28 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
____________________________________________ J A M E S LANIER JONES, Plaintiff, v. C IT Y OF MILW A U K E E , D e fe n d a n t. ____________________________________________ C a s e No. 07-CV-369

ORDER
O n April 20, 2007, pro se plaintiff James Lanier Jones ("Jones"), filed a c o m p la in t, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of Milwaukee ("the City"), the Milwaukee Police Department ("MPD") and MPD police officer Nannette Hegerty. J o n e s alleges that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the F o u rte e n th Amendment when they refused to accept and investigate Jones's c o m p la in t that he had been attacked at a bus stop. In an order dated April 25, 2007, th e court reviewed Jones's motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U .S .C . § 1915. The court dismissed Jones's claims against the MPD and Officer H e g e rty, but permitted Jones to proceed on his claim against the City. (See Order, A p ril 25, 2007, 4-6). The City now moves for summary judgment. B AC K G R O U N D O n December 10, 2006, Jones alleges that someone attacked him at a bus s to p on the corner of North 27th Street and Vliet Avenue in Milwaukee, W is c o n s in . (C o m p la in t, April 20, 2007). On December 22, 2006, Jones went to the MPD's

d is tric t three police station to report the attack to police. (Defendant's Proposed F in d in g s of Fact ("DPFF") ¶ 4, Docket #31). Neither party has provided the court with an precise account of what occurred n e x t . W h a t is clear is that Jones quickly became dissatisfied with officers at the d is tric t three station. Jones filled out a complaint against MPD sergeant Louis S tan ton , alleging Stanton would not investigate Jones's alleged attack. (DPFF ¶ 4). C a p ta in James Harpole, who was in charge of the district three station at the time, a tte m p te d to speak with Jones. (DPFF ¶¶ 1, 4-5). According to Harpole, Jones b e c a m e hostile, and stated that he wanted officers to immediately make a report on th e December 10th attack incident and provide it to him. (DPFF ¶ 6, 8-9). Harpole to ld Jones that a police report would not be made until officers had a chance to in ve s tig a te the incident. (DPFF ¶ 10). Harpole then claims that, despite perceiving J o n e s to be mentally imbalanced, he instructed officer Ryan DeW it t to handle the in ve s tig a tio n . (DPFF ¶¶ 7, 12-13). However, when DeW itt began to question Jones o n the details of his attack, Harpole claims that Jones "became irate" and refused to answer any questions. (DPFF ¶ 15). A c c o rd in g to Harpole, Jones then alleged that Harpole was refusing to help h im and Jones added Harpole's name to his earlier complaint against Stanton. (D P F F ¶¶ 16-18). Eventually, Jones stormed out of the police station. (DPFF ¶ 20) H a rp o le claims that Jones never provided sufficient information for police to properly in ve s tig a te Jones's alleged attack. (DPFF ¶ 23).

-2-

In his complaint, Jones offers a completely different story. Jones alleges that b o th Stanton and Harpole refused to file a report on the December 10th incident. A c c o rd in g to Jones, Stanton and Harpole told Jones that he was mentally ill. AN AL Y S IS T o prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish th a t there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U .S . 317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those facts that "might affect the outcome o f the suit," and a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if a reasonable finder of fa c t could find in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 4 7 7 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where a party has fa ile d to make "a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element e s s e n tia l to that party's case and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at tria l." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary judgment must set fo rth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, and may not rely o n allegations or denials in the opposing party's pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In c o n d u c tin g its review, the court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Tanner v. Jupiter Realty Corp., 433 F.3d 913, 915 (7 th Cir. 2006). In its motion, the City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for two re a s o n s . First, it asserts that Jones has failed to establish that his equal protection rig h ts were violated because he has not shown that he was treated differently from -3-

a n y other individual seeking to report a crime. Second, the City asserts that even if Jones could establish a constitutional violation, Jones has not shown that a m u n ic ip a l policy or practice caused that violation. The court addresses each of th e s e grounds in turn. To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must first s h o w that the defendant treated him or her differently from similarly situated persons b e c a u s e of his or her membership in a protected class of individuals. See

S c h ro e d e r v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations o m itte d ) . A plaintiff must also show that this discrimination was intentional or

p u rp o s e fu l. Id. at 951. Here, the court finds that Jones has failed to show either of th e s e elements. Jones alleges that he was treated differently by the MPD because o f his race and because of his mental deficiencies. W h ile it is true that a municipality m a y not "selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities w itho u t violating the Equal Protection Clause," DeShaney v. Winnebago County D e p 't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U .S . 356 (1886)), Jones has not demonstrated any such denial of services based on e ithe r Jones's race or his mental capacity. In opposing defendant's motion, Jones presented no specific facts other than th e allegations in his complaint that officers Stanton and Harpole refused to help him b e c a u s e they told him he was mentally ill. Instead, Jones states that he cannot b e lie ve that the City could refuse law enforcement services to someone based on m e n ta l illness. At the summary judgment stage, bare allegations are insufficient to -4-

ra ise a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Geschke v. Air Force A s s 'n , 425 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 2005). While the court construes Jones's

p le a d in g s liberally, Jones must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure like any o th e r litigant. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations o m itte d ). Moreover, because Jones has not responded to the City's proposed fin d in g s of fact, under Civil L.R. 56.2(e), the court must conclude that no genuine is s u e s exist as to those facts. The City's proposed facts establish that the officers o f MPD's district three station did not treat Jones differently than any other person w h o might seek to report a possible crime. According to Officer Harpole, officers a tte m p te d to get information from Jones about his alleged December 10th attack d e s p ite Jones's hostile attitude. Jones then left the police station before officers c o u ld gather sufficient information to investigate the matter. Even in a light most fa vo ra b le to Jones, the court is unable to conclude that a reasonable jury could c o n c lu d e that Jones was treated differently from any other similarly situated person, le t alone that any possible disparate treatment was because of Jones's race or m e n ta l capacity. Because Jones has not presented sufficient evidence to show that h is equal protection rights were violated, the court is obliged to grant the City's m o tio n and dismiss this action. T h e court is also compelled to dismiss this action because Jones has failed to show the City is liable for the alleged unconstitutional actions of officers at the d istric t three station. To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a p la in tiff must show a municipal policy or custom caused a deprivation of the plaintiff's -5-

c o n s titu tio n a l rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 6 5 8 , 690 (1978). A discriminatory policy or custom may be shown by one of the fo llo w in g : (1 ) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional d e p riva tio n ; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by w rit te n law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well s e ttle d as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) a n allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with fin a l policymaking authority. R o a c h v. City of Evansville, 111 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting McTigue v. C ity of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995)). Because a municipality may not b e held vicariously liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the municipality's p o lic y or practice itself was the "moving force behind the constitutional violation," ra th e r than the independent misconduct of its employees. See Montano v. City of C h ic a g o , 535 F.3d 558, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A s the court noted in its October 19, 2007 order, the only basis for municipal lia b ility in this case is the possibility that one of the MPD officers, with whom Jones m e t at the district three station, was a person with final policymaking authority. (O rd e r, October 19, 2007 5-6, Docket #15). Jones has failed to demonstrate that a n y MPD officer at the district three station held such authority. Captain Harpole s ta te d that policymaking authority in the MPD rests solely with the chief of the d e p a rtm e n t, subject to review by the City's Fire and Police Commission. (DPFF ¶ 2). A s the officer in charge of the district three station, a jury could infer that Harpole m a y have had authority to implement police policies for citizens reporting crimes.

-6-

H o w e ve r, Jones has presented no evidence demonstrating Harpole had authority to set any policies; showing Harpole had such authority would be required for liability to accrue to the City in this case. See Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 7 4 0 (7th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing between police officers having authority to set p o lic ie s and those tasked with implementing pre-existing policies). As a result, the c o u rt finds that Jones has failed to present sufficient evidence to show a c o n s titu tio n a l violation, and has failed to establish that the City of Milwaukee is liable u n d e r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the conduct of its officers in this case. A c c o r d in g ly , IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket #28) b e and the same is hereby GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be and the same is h e re b y DISMISSED with prejudice; T h e Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Dated at Milwaukee, W is c o n s in , this 23rd day of January, 2009. BY THE COURT:

J .P . Stadtmueller U .S . District Judge

-7-