Crowe v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers AFL-CIO CLC

Filing 11

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 4/8/09 granting 5 plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court. (cc: all counsel) (nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
____________________________________________ S H A R O N E. CROW E , P l a i n t if f , v. IN T E R N A T IO N A L BROTHERHOOD OF E L E C T R IC A L W O R K E R S , D e fe n d a n t. ____________________________________________ Case No. 08-CV-836

ORDER
O n September 10, 2008, plaintiff, Sharon Crowe, filed her Complaint (Docket # 1 , Ex. A) in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges th re e state law contract claims. Defendant, International Brotherhood of Electrical W o rke rs ("IBEW "), removed the action on October 6, 2008, to the U.S. District Court fo r the Eastern District of W is c o n s in , alleging that plaintiff's state law contract claims a re preempted by federal law, thus, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1337. Plaintiff, however, does not agree that federal law should g o ve rn , and has filed a Motion to Remand to State Court (Docket #5). Upon

c o n s id e ra tio n of the parties' briefs on this matter, the court concludes that plaintiff's c la im s are not preempted by federal law, and thus grants plaintiff's motion to re m a n d . I. F AC T S D u rin g 2007, plaintiff was working as an employee of the IBEW Great Lakes T ra in in g Trust Fund ("Lakes Trust Fund"). (Compl. ¶ 5) . In November of 2007, the

I B E W approached plaintiff about working with the IBEW to establish a national tra in in g trust fund ("national trust fund"). (Compl. ¶ 6). According to plaintiff, she a n d the IBEW entered into a verbal agreement whereby she would remain employed b y the Lakes Trust Fund, which the IBEW would reimburse for her services. (Compl. ¶ 7). When the Lakes Trust Fund was dissolved in December 2007, plaintiff alleges th e arrangement was changed to one in which she was employed by IBEW Local 2 1 5 0 ("Local 2150"), which leased her to the IBEW . (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10). Under this a r ra n g e m e n t , she would continue working for the IBEW developing the national trust fu n d , but would technically be employed by Local 2150, which the IBEW would re im b u rs e for her salary and expenses. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10). Plaintiff alleges the IBEW d ire c te d her to draft an agreement memorializing the arrangement, which she did, a n d which she and Local 2150 both signed. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, 16). Despite the fact th a t the IBEW did not sign the contract, she alleges that the IBEW 's conduct and c o u rs e of dealing show that the IBEW assented to the terms of the agreement. (C o m p l. ¶ 17). Accordingly, she asserts that when the IBEW terminated its

r e la t io n s h ip with her, without providing the thirty days' notice specified in the a g re e m e n t, that the IBEW breached the implied contract between the parties, as well a s the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-22, 29-33). She further c la im s that the doctrine of "Promissory Estoppel" should apply. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-28).

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II.

AN AL Y S IS A. Law

"S e c tio n 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 provides ju ris d ic tio n in federal district courts for '[s]uits for violation of contracts between an e m p lo ye r and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting c o m m e rce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations." U n ite d Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 616 (1981) (q u o tin g 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)). The term "between" in the phrase "between any such la b o r organizations" refers to "contracts" not "suits." Wooddell v. IBEW Local 71, 5 0 2 U.S. 93, 98, 100 (1991). The phrase "between . . . labor organizations" includes c o n tra c ts between an international labor organization and one of its affiliated local la b o r organizations. United Ass'n, 452 U.S. 615. A claim arising from a contract c o v e re d by § 301(a) is completely preempted by federal law, and thus "[a]ny such s u it is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would p ro vid e a cause of action in the absence of § 301." Franchise Tax Bd. of State of C a l. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1 9 8 3 ) (quoted in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)). A c c o rd in g ly, § 301 claims are within the federal district courts' "original jurisdiction." A v c o Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace W o rke rs , 390 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1968). This means that, even though state courts m a y have concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 claims, defendants have an absolute rig h t to remove such claims to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. -3-

B.

D i s c u s s io n

G ive n the fact that the parties agree that Local 2150 and the IBEW are "labor o rg a n iz a tio n s " for the purposes of § 301(a), and that the alleged contract was " b e t w e e n " Local 2150 and the IBEW and plaintiff, it would seem on its face that p la in tiff's motion to remand should be denied. However, such a result would

e p ito m iz e placing form over substance. Though the contract that forms the basis for p la in tiff's claim is technically within the ambit of § 301, it certainly is not at all the type o f contract which Congress sought to regulate when it passed the National Labor R e la tio n s Act. Indeed, an arrangement pertaining to the employment of one

in d ivid u a l does not raise any of the concerns addressed in any of the cases applying § 301. A primary purpose of the Labor Management Relations Act was "to promote th e achievement of industrial peace through encouragement and refinement of the c o lle c tive bargaining process." Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 5 0 9 (1962). Indeed, until the Supreme Court's decision in Retail Clerks Intern. A s s 'n , Local Unions Nos. 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962), it was argued that collective bargaining agreements were the only contracts covered b y § 301. However, in Retail Clerks Intern., the Court rejected that view, stating that th a t would make the "between any such labor organizations" language superfluous. 3 6 9 U.S. 26. The Court accordingly held that a "strike settlement agreement" b e tw e e n an employer and labor organizations was a contract covered by § 301. Id. a t 26-28. Of particular import to the instant case, is the fact that the Court explained -4-

its rationale for so holding by stating: "if this kind of strike settlement were not e n fo rc e a b le under § 301(a), responsible and stable labor relations would suffer, and th e attainment of the labor policy objective of minimizing disruption of interstate c o m m e rce would be made more difficult." Id. at 27. Thus, even though it was clear th a t the contract at issue met the technical definition of § 301, the Court still thought it necessary that its decision be based on furthering the purposes of § 301. The fact that a contract meets the technical definition of being a contract b e tw e e n an employer and a labor organization, or between labor organizations, in a n d of itself does not appear to have ever been considered sufficient to trigger § 301. Thus, even after the Retail Clerks Intern. ruling, it was still unclear as to w h e th e r the constitution of an international union (which is clearly a contract between la b o r organizations, namely the local unions) was a "contract" within the meaning of § 301. Parks v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 915 (4th Cir. 1 9 6 3 ). Indeed, it was not until the Court's ruling in 1981, in United Ass'n, that the is s u e was definitively resolved. 452 U.S. 615. Again, though the Court found that th e technical definitions were clearly met, much of the Court's opinion was dedicated to explaining how applying § 301 to disputes between local unions and their in tern a tio n a l union, founded on the international union's constitution (a "contract"), fu rth e re d the congressional intent of § 301. The Court explained that § 301

"p ro vid e d federal jurisdiction for enforcement of contracts made by labor o rg a n iz a tio n s to counteract jurisdictional defects in many state courts that made it d iffic u lt or impossible to bring suits against labor organizations by reason of their -5-

s tatu s as unincorporated associations." 452 U.S. at 624. Furthermore, the Court s ta te d , "[s]urely Congress could conclude that the enforcement of the terms of union c o n s titu tio n s -d o c u m e n ts that prescribe the legal relationship and the rights and o b lig a tio n s between the parent and affiliated locals-would contribute to the a c h ie ve m e n t of labor stability." Id. Thus, once again, the Court found it necessary to explain how application of § 301 to the contract at issue would contribute to labor s t a b ilit y . T h e question of whether to subject a contract between labor organizations to fe d e ra l law, instead of any number of various state laws, could, of course, become a very contentious and difficult question. It was argued by the respondent in United A s s 'n that § 301 jurisdiction should only be triggered if the contractual dispute had a "significant impact" on labor-management relations. Id. at 625. The Court rejected th is argument. Id. However, very importantly to the instant case, the Court stated: "W e do not need to say that every contract imaginable between labor organizations is within § 301(a)." Id. at 627. Clearly this statement indicates that the fact that a c o u rt is presented with a contract between labor organizations is not alone sufficient to trigger § 301 (for if it were, then every contract imaginable between labor o rg a n iz a tio n s would be within § 301(a)). So, while the Court has not stated what c rite ria delineates which contracts between labor organizations do trigger § 301, it s e e m s evident that while a "significant impact" on labor-management relations is not re q u ire d , what is required is that applying uniform federal law to the contract (as

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o p p o s e d to allowing whichever state's law would be applicable apply) must further the congressional intent of achieving labor stability. C o m m o n sense standing alone dictates such a test. Consider if, in the instant c a s e , Local 2150 was leasing a piece of equipment or a building to the IBEW . C e r ta in ly that situation would involve a contract between labor organizations. H o w e v e r, it is fairly evident that subjecting that contract to federal law would in no w a y further the aims of the Labor Management Relations Act, and thus any c o n tra c tu a l dispute on the matter would properly involve state law. Similarly, a d is tric t court in Maryland held that a settlement agreement between two unions (a c o n tra c t between labor organizations) was not properly removed to federal court, b e c a u s e , though the technical requirements of § 301 were met, "the [contractual] p ro vis io n s on which th[e] case [was] founded . . . [had] absolutely nothing w h a ts o e ve r to do with the important federal interests undergirding the complete p re e m p tio n doctrine." Maryland Correctional Law Enforcement Union v. Federation o f Maryland Teachers and Public Employees, 1999 W L 182554, 4 (D. Md. 1999). T h e settlement agreement in Maryland Correctional was not in any way related to la b o r issues, thus that case is not exactly on point with the instant case. Similarly, the hypothetical previously given (the lease of equipment or a building) would have n o th in g to do with labor, thus that hypothetical is not exactly on point with the instant c a s e either. The instant case does relate to labor, in that the contract at issue pertains to the duration of plaintiff's relationship with the IBEW , as well as her salary. However, -7-

it is important to note that though those aspects do relate to "labor," they do not do s o in a way that implicates § 301 concerns. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that if the contract were only between the IBEW and plaintiff, then § 301 would not be re le va n t. Korzen v. Local Union 705, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7 th Cir.1996) ("A simple employment contract is not within the scope of section 301, e ve n when the employer is a union."). Rather, § 301 is only relevant because Local 2 1 5 0 was a party to the alleged contract. However, Local 2150 appears to have no in te re s t in this suit; Local 2150 is not a party, nor does it appear that Local 2150 was h a rm e d by the alleged breach. Thus, even though technically the contract in the in s ta n t case was not "a simple employment contract" between only an employee and a n employer ­ which happened to be a union ­ as was the case in Korzen, the fact is that as a substantive matter, that is precisely what this matter presents. See 75 F .3 d at 288 (holding that a suit based on a contract between a labor organization a n d an individual, be they employee or member, is not within the scope of § 301). III. C O N C L U S IO N B e c a u s e the contract forming the basis of the suit in the instant case is e s s e n tia lly an employment contract between an employee and a union, bringing it w ith in the ambit of federal labor law would not in any way assist in achieving national la b o r stability, nor would it further any other interest protected by § 301. This, c o u p le d with the fact that the removal statute is to be given strict construction, S h a m r o c k Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 61 (1941), as well as the fact th a t remand is necessary when federal jurisdiction is doubtful, Mulcahey v. Columbia -8-

O r g a n ic Chemicals Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994), leads the court to c o n c lu d e that remand is the appropriate action in the instant case. A c c o r d in g ly , IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court (Docket #5) b e and the same is hereby GRANTED. D a te d at Milwaukee, W is c o n s in , this 8th day of April, 2009. BY THE COURT:

J .P . Stadtmueller U .S . District Judge

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