International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline Division v. Frontier Airlines Inc et al

Filing 100

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/29/11 denying 90 Motion to Vacate the Injunction. (cc: all counsel) (dm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS AIRLINE DIVISION
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 10-C-0203

FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC. and
REPUBLIC AIRWAYS HOLDINGS, INC.
Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER
Last year, the Teamsters Union filed this action pursuant to the Railway Labor Act
(“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., against Frontier Airlines and the holding company that
owns it, Republic Airways Holdings, Inc. The dispute arose upon Republic’s acquisition of
Frontier and its subsequent decision to transfer Frontier’s maintenance work from Denver
to Milwaukee.

Frontier’s mechanics are represented by the Teamsters Union, and

although the union does not contend that the decision to transfer the work to Milwaukee
was unlawful, the union contends that the work must continue to be governed by the
collective bargaining agreements that were in force at the time Republic acquired Frontier.
Republic disagrees, arguing that because Republic’s acquisition of Frontier created a
single transportation system in which the Frontier mechanics are the minority, the
Teamsters Union no longer represents a majority of the bargaining unit and therefore the
collective bargaining agreements are no longer in effect.
Upon filing this lawsuit the Teamsters Union immediately sought a preliminary
injunction preventing Republic from repudiating the collective bargaining agreements. In

opposition to the union’s request for an injunction, Republic argued that I had no authority
to issue such an injunction because this case presented a “representation dispute” within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board, which is an independent agency
within the executive branch of the government, see 45 U.S.C. § 154 First, that, among
other things, is responsible for determining who, if anyone, is the legitimate representative
of a carrier’s workers, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth. I determined that this case did not involve
a representation dispute because it did not involve a dispute among employees over
representation – that is, no employee of either Frontier or any of Republic’s other airlines
disputed that the Teamsters Union was the legitimate representative of Frontier’s
mechanics. Int’l Bhd. of Teansters Airline Div. v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d
750 (E.D. Wis. 2010). I also enjoined Republic from assigning Frontier maintenance work
in violation of the existing collective bargaining agreements. Republic appealed, and on
appeal the Seventh Circuit held that the present dispute is a representation dispute. Int’l
Bhd. of Teansters Airline Div. v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 628 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2010).
However, the court also held that district courts have authority to issue preliminary
injunctions against employers in representation disputes without interfering with the
National Mediation Board’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 405-06.
Still, the Seventh Circuit found a problem in the injunction. Under the Railway Labor
Act, a union can’t represent any employees in the bargaining unit unless it enjoys the
support of a majority of them. Id. at 404. If Republic’s acquisition of Frontier created a
single transportation system, the Frontier mechanics would constitute only a minority of all
mechanics in the system, and therefore the Teamsters Union would represent only a
minority of the bargaining unit. The National Mediation Board has exclusive jurisdiction to
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determine both whether a single transportation system exists and who, if anyone,
represents the majority of the workers in the bargaining unit. Id. at 405. But under the
District of Columbia Circuit’s interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, the Board is not
authorized to hear representation disputes initiated by carriers, and so only a union or an
employee can initiate proceedings before the Board for purposes of determining whether
a single transportation system exists and whether a previously certified union continues to
represent a majority of the bargaining unit. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l
Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 665-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the present case, that
means that unless the Teamsters Union, some other union, or an employee of Frontier or
one of Republic’s other airlines brings this matter before the Board, the Board cannot
determine whether Republic’s acquisition of Frontier resulted in the creation of a single
transportation system. The Seventh Circuit concluded that issuing an unconditional
injunction against a carrier in circumstances in which no other union or employee is
interesting in obtaining a single-carrier determination from the Board would be inequitable
because it had the potential to preserve an illegal status quo – one in which a union was
allowed to represent a minority of the bargaining unit indefinitely. The court thus directed
that the injunction be modified “to condition its continuance on the union’s prompt
application to the Board for a ruling on the representation of Frontier’s mechanics: are they
represented by the union, or by no one?” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 628 F.3d at 407.
On remand, I modified the injunction in accordance with the Seventh Circuit’s
directions, and in compliance with the modified injunction the Teamsters Union filed an
application for a single-carrier determination with the Board.

Upon receipt of the

application, the Board issued a notice to the Teamsters and to Republic indicating that the
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Board understood the Teamsters to be alleging the existence of a representation dispute
involving the mechanics of Frontier Airlines. (Ex. 1 to Br. in Opp. [Docket #93].) The Board
directed Republic to post a notice of the Board proceedings in the workplace, and it set
deadlines for both Republic and the union to file position statements. Republic then filed
its position statement and set forth the facts and arguments supporting its position that
Frontier was now part of a single transportation system composed of Frontier and
Republic’s other airlines. In response, the union chose not to dispute Republic’s assertion
that it had created a single transportation system. Instead, the union argued that because
no other union or employee group disputed that the Teamsters Union was the legitimate
representative of Frontier’s mechanics, there was no representation dispute involving the
mechanics and that therefore the Board lacked jurisdiction under Section 2 Ninth of the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth. Upon receipt of the union’s position statement,
Republic filed in this court a motion to vacate the injunction on the ground that the union
had violated the condition in the injunction requiring the union to initiate representation
proceedings before the Board.
I conclude that there has been no violation. The Seventh Circuit determined that
it would be inequitable to allow the union to benefit from the injunction under circumstances
in which the union was “foreclos[ing] by deliberate inaction a determination of whether it
remains the legally authorized bargaining representative of the Frontier mechanics.” Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 628 F.3d at 407. In accordance with the court’s directive, the union
has abandoned its stance of deliberate inaction and initiated proceedings before the Board,
thus allowing Republic to argue to the Board that the Teamsters Union no longer
represents Frontier’s mechanics. Although in responding to Republic’s position statement
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the union has chosen to assert that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the dispute, this is not
the same thing as refusing to initiate Board proceedings in the first place. Had the union
not initiated proceedings before the Board, the Board would not be in a position to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over the dispute or whether the Teamsters Union is
still the representative of Frontier’s mechanics. As it stands, the union has initiated
representation proceedings and the ball is now in the Board’s court.
Republic asserts that the Seventh Circuit has already decided that this case
presents a representation dispute and that therefore the Board has jurisdiction. Assuming
that Republic’s assertion is accurate, however, that does not mean the injunction must be
dissolved. The National Mediation Board is capable of reading the Seventh Circuit’s
decision and determining for itself whether anything in that decision resolves the union’s
jurisdictional argument.

The Board does not have to dismiss the case for lack of

jurisdiction simply because the Teamsters Union says it should do so. Moreover, like any
tribunal, the Board cannot resolve a dispute on the merits unless it has jurisdiction. See
In re Application of Airport Employees Union, 20 N.M.B. 537, 542-43 (1993). So whether
the union raised the jurisdictional issue or not, the Board would be required to consider it.
Although Republic’s position is that the Seventh Circuit has already resolved the
jurisdictional issue, that is incorrect. The National Mediation Board is an independent
agency within the executive branch of government and was not a party to this case. The
Seventh Circuit’s jurisdictional determinations pertained to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in connection with representation disputes. To the extent the court made any
comments about the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction, those comments do not bind the
Board. Thus, the Board must determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction, and it is not
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inequitable to allow the union to present to the Board the facts and legal principles relevant
to the jurisdictional determination.
To be sure, if the National Mediation Board construes the union’s position statement
as a request for voluntary dismissal of the application and dismisses the application without
resolving either the jurisdictional question or the merits and the union does not object to
the Board’s action, then I might have to reconsider whether the union has violated the
injunction’s condition. But that has not happened, and based on what has happened I
conclude that the union is in compliance with the condition. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED
that defendants’ motion to vacate the injunction is DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 29th day of July, 2011.

/s__________________________________
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge

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