Poulos v. Village of Pleasant Prairie et al

Filing 37

AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia J Gorence on 3/20/2012. The plaintiff's motion for leave to file a proposed statement of facts is granted. (Docket #32).The defendant Village of Pleasant Prairie and the Pleasant Prairie Police Department are dismissed. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. (Docket #22). This action be and hereby is dismissed. (cc: all counsel)(mlm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JASON POULOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF PLEASANT PRAIRIE
ANDREA KERN and,
WILLIAM LARSON

Case No. 10-C-394

Defendants.

AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Jason Poulos, filed this civil rights action against the Village of Pleasant
Prairie and two police officers, Andrea Kern and William Larson, alleging that they unlawfully
arrested and detained him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also asserts that the
defendants discriminated against him because of his disability by restricting him from the
Prime Outlet Mall, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12181 et seq.
This claim also is based on the plaintiff’s alleged wrongful arrest by the individual defendants.
The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the
matter arises under federal statutes. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The case was
assigned according to the random assignment of civil cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 72(a) (E.D. Wis.). The parties have consented to

United States magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and General Local
Rule 73 (E.D. Wis.).
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket # 22) and the plaintiff has
filed a motion for leave to file a proposed statement of facts. (Docket # 32). These motions
are ready for resolution and will be addressed herein.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); see
also, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986); McNeal v. Macht, 763 F. Supp. 1458, 1460–61 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
"Material facts" are those facts that under the applicable substantive law "might affect the
outcome of the suit." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over "material facts" is
"genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Id.
The burden of showing the needlessness of a trial – (1) the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact and (2) an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law – is upon the movant.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must consider the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Matter of Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1992).
However, when the nonmovant is the party with the ultimate burden of proof at trial, that
party retains its burden of producing evidence that would support a reasonable jury verdict.
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see also, Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)
("When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party
may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must –
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] – set out specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial."). "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, . . . upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is
competent to testify on the matters stated. If a paper or part of a paper is
referred to in an affidavit, a sworn or certified copy must be attached to or served
with the affidavit. The court may permit an affidavit to be supplemented or
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or additional affidavits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1); cf. Halloway v. Milwaukee County, et al, 180 F.3d 820, 827 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1999) (upholding district court’s exclusion, on summary judgment, of portions of affidavit
as hearsay).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that affidavits in support of
summary judgment must "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence . . .."

The

Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay
evidence, therefore, does not meet this evidentiary requirement. See Schindler v. Seiler, 474
F.3d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, any proposed findings of fact which do not set forth
facts that would be admissible in evidence have not been included in the relevant facts.

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“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(4).
To the extent that an objection to a proposed finding of fact fails to cite specific evidentiary
support, the objection has no weight. See Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1057
(7th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Cunningham, 30 F.3d 879, 881, 882 (7th Cir. 1994).
The plaintiff filed four proposed facts which were included in his response to the
defendants’ proposed findings of fact. However, none of these additional facts contain a
citation to parts of the record, affidavits or other supporting materials relied upon to support
the facts described in that paragraph. See Civil Local Rule 56(2)(B)(ii). Therefore, these facts
are not properly considered on a motion for summary judgment and have not been included
in the undisputed facts.
Furthermore, to the extent that an objection is non-responsive to the proposed finding
of fact, the objection does not create a dispute of fact. Similarly, arguments have no place in
proposed findings of fact or responses to such findings. Any such responses or arguments
have not been included in the undisputed facts.
Plaintiff’s Motion to File Proposed Statement of Facts
In response to the defendants’ objections to the plaintiff’s proposed statement of facts,
the plaintiff moves to file a new proposed statement of facts. The plaintiff disputes the
defendants’ contentions and states that under the local court rules, the non-moving party is
not required to submit a proposed statement of facts. The defendants oppose the plaintiff’s
motion for a number of reasons, including the fact that all summary judgment materials already
have been submitted and that motion is ready for resolution.
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Civil Local Rule 56(b)(2) (E.D. Wis.) provides as follows:
2) Opposing Party’s Materials in Opposition. Each party opposing a
motion for summary judgment must file within 30 days of service of the motion and
the materials required by subsection (b)(1), above:
(A) a memorandum of law;
(B) a concise response to the moving party’s statement of facts that must contain:
(i) a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement of
facts followed by a response to each paragraph, including, in the case of any
disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record,
and other supporting materials relied upon, and
(ii) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any
additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment,
including references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record,
and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts
described in that paragraph. A non-moving party may not file more
than 100 separately-numbered statements of additional facts; and
(C) any opposing affidavits, declarations, and other materials referred
to in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Although the plaintiff maintains that a non-moving party is not required to submit
proposed statements of fact under the local rules, if that non-moving party wants to present
additional facts not addressed in the moving parties proposed facts, that party needs to file his
own proposed statement of facts. Civil L.R. 56(b)(2). Moreover, if statements of material fact
are uncontroverted, the court will deem them admitted. Civil L.R. 56(b)(4).
Even though the plaintiff’s proposed statement of facts is untimely, the court will grant
the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file new proposed statement of facts. To the extent that these
facts comport with the requirements of the federal procedural rules and local court rules, they
will be considered in addressing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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Relevant Undisputed Facts1
On October 31, 2008, Officer Gerald Paul of the Pleasant Prairie Police Department
was at the Prime Outlets Mall investigating a minor traffic accident when he was contacted by
mall security officers about the presence of an unwanted person on mall property. That
person was the plaintiff. Mall personnel informed Officer Paul that the mall previously had told
the plaintiff that he was not permitted at the mall. The plaintiff visited the Prime Outlets Mall
on numerous occasions for the purpose of shopping and other activities.
Officer Paul made contact with the plaintiff and told him that both the Yankee Candle
store and the mall itself did not want him on their premises. Officer Paul also informed the
plaintiff that the mall and the stores in the mall are private property, that they are private
businesses, and that they can choose to exclude people from their property.
The plaintiff initially did not know that he was not welcome at the Yankee Candle store
and after receiving such notice, he did not enter the Yankee Candle store. The plaintiff states
that he never received notice that he was not wanted on the mall property, only that he was
not wanted at the Yankee Candle store. However, in his response to defendants’ proposed
finding of fact, he states: “[E]xcept from the officers, [the plaintiff] denies ever having received
notice that he was unwanted on the mall property, only that he was unwanted at Yankee
Candle.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Proposed Finding of Fact #17). Officer Paul
states that he told the plaintiff that if he returned to the mall in the future he would be subject

1

As a general m atter, unless accom panied by citation, the relevant facts are taken from the parties'
proposed findings of fact which are not disputed. Citations to sources of quoted excerpts have been included even
when those excerpts are undisputed.

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to arrest for trespass or disorderly conduct. The plaintiff told Officer Paul that he understood
the information the officer had given him.
The mall has posted two different signs identifying the mall as private property. One
sign states:

“NOTICE

PRIVATE PROPERTY OPEN ONLY TO PERSONS DOING

BUSINESS WITH SHOPPING CENTER OR TENANTS. RULES OF CONDUCT POSTED AT
MANAGEMENT OFFICE”. (Affidavit of Andrea Kern [Kern Aff,] Exh. 2). The other sign states:
NO TRESPASSING DURING NON-BUSINESS HOURS (PRIVATE PROPERTY) (Kerns Aff.
Exh. 3). The plaintiff was not on mall property outside of business hours. Officer Kern
obtained a map of the mall, and marked the locations of eight signs stating that the mall is
private property. (Kern Aff., Exh. 1).
Subsequent to October 31, 2008, the plaintiff made numerous phone calls to the police
department, the mall security office and the Yankee Candle store. On November 21, 2008,
Officer Paul called the plaintiff in reference to the numerous calls the plaintiff had made to the
police department. During the call, Officer Paul told the plaintiff that he was not allowed to
return to the mall, or the Yankee Candle store. Officer Paul also told him to stop making
harassing phone calls to the police department and the Yankee Candle store. The plaintiff
stated that he understood, that he would not go to the mall, and that he would stop making the
phone calls.
On November 18, 2008, Jacquelyn Davis, the manager of the Yankee Candle store in
the mall filed a court action in Kenosha County Circuit Court, requesting entry of a permanent
restraining order against the plaintiff. On that day, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was
entered, which barred the plaintiff from visiting the Yankee Candle store at the mall.
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Subsequently, after a hearing, the TRO was dissolved, no permanent injunction was issued
and the action was dismissed.
On or about December 17, 2008, the plaintiff called the police department and said that
the restraining order against him had been lifted and, therefore, he was free to go to the mall.
Officer Paul told plaintiff that he was not allowed on the mall property, or at the Yankee Candle
store, and that he would be arrested for trespassing if he entered those premises. The plaintiff
told Officer Paul that he understood the information given to him.
On May 12, 2009, the plaintiff was shopping at the Prime Outlets Mall. On that day,
mall personnel called the police department, stating that the plaintiff was trespassing on the
mall again. Officer Andrea Kern was dispatched to the mall to investigate the complaint.
Upon arriving at the mall, Officer Kern was flagged down by a mall security officer named Billy,
who told her that the plaintiff was near the mall's food court. Billy described the clothes that
the

plaintiff

was

wearing

and

also

pointed

to

the

plaintiff

to

identify

him.

Officer Kern found the plaintiff on mall property and arrested him for trespassing on
private property. Prior to arresting the plaintiff, Officer Kern was aware that the plaintiff had
been warned verbally by Officer Paul on a number of occasions to stay away from the mall.
When he was arrested, the plaintiff was “informed by [Officer Kern] that [he] had violated an
‘order’ restricting [him] from visiting the mall.” (Affidavit of Jason Poulos [Plaintiff’s Aff.], ¶12).
The plaintiff informed Officer Kern that there was no Court order of any kind which prohibited
him being on mall property. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Kern was the only officer involved in the arrest
of plaintiff on May 12, 2009; Officer Larson was not involved.

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Officer Kern contacted the police department dispatcher and had a conversation with
the dispatcher.2 She then took the plaintiff, who was under arrest, to the police station where
he formally was charged with criminal trespass. Subsequently, all trespass charges against
the plaintiff were dismissed by the district attorney and no other charges have been brought
or prosecuted against the him.
Officer Larson’s first contact with the plaintiff was his phone call to the plaintiff and his
father on or about October 26, 2009. He called the plaintiff’s residence to inform the plaintiff
that he was not allowed on the mall property for any reason. He left a message advising the
plaintiff that he was criminally trespassing during a recent visit to the mall and asked the
plaintiff to return his call.
On the same day, Thomas Poulos, the plaintiff’s father returned Office Larsen’s call.
Officer Larsen stated that mall personnel had called the police again and complained that the
plaintiff was trespassing. Officer Larson said that if the plaintiff was found on the mall
premises in the future, he would be arrested.
On August 18, 2009, and October 16, 2009, plaintiff’s counsel sent certified letters to
the Pleasant Prairie Police Department, stating that he was retained to represent the plaintiff,
that the plaintiff had never received notification by any party or authority that he did not have
a right to visit the mall, that no restraining or other orders existed which prevented him from
visiting the mall, and that he had a right to visit the mall as any other law abiding citizen.
(Complaint, Exhs. A & B).

2

The parties dispute the substance of that conversation.

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ANALYSIS
In seeking summary judgment, the defendants maintain that Officer Kern had probable
cause to arrest the plaintiff. They assert that the mall is private property with numerous signs
advising the public that the mall is private property. They further state that mall personnel had
advised the Pleasant Prairie Police Department that they repeatedly had told the plaintiff he
was not welcome at the mall. Mall personnel also contacted the police department on a
number of occasions to complain that the plaintiff was on mall property without permission.
The defendants also assert that, contrary to the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint,
Officer Larson was not involved in or present at the arrest and, therefore, cannot be held liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawfully arresting and detaining the plaintiff while acting under
color of law. The defendants further point out that although the Village of Pleasant Prairie is
named as a defendant, the complaint alleges in ¶ 33 that “‘the defendant, Pleasant Prairie
Police Department, by its officers, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act . . ..’”3
(Defendants’ Brief Supporting Summary Judgment at 10 [unnumbered], quoting Plaintiff’s
Complaint, ¶ 33.) The defendants assert that a police department is not a separate legal
entity capable of being sued and that the plaintiff’s sole allegation that the Village employs the
defendants is insufficient to state a claim against the village.
In opposing the motion, the plaintiff asserts that he never received oral or written notice
that he was not allowed at the Prime Outlets Mall, only that he was not allowed at the Yankee
Candle store. Therefore, he maintains that there was nothing preventing him from being at

3

The Pleasant Prairie Police Departm ent is not nam ed as a party in the body of the com plaint, nor listed
in the caption of the com plaint. See Com plaint, “Prelim inary Statem ent” and “Parties”, at 1-2.

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mall. He also maintains that he was falsely arrested for trespass because Officer Kern lacked
probable cause to arrest him on May 12, 2009. In addition, he asserts that Officer Larson did
not have cause to allegedly threaten him with arrest for going to the mall.
At the outset, the court notes that the plaintiff did not address the defendants’ assertion
that the Village of Pleasant Prairie, or for that matter, the Pleasant Prairie Police Department
are not proper defendants in this action. Nor did he address his claim that the Pleasant Prairie
Police Department, by its officers, violated the ADA by discriminating against him because of
his disability in restricting him from the full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services of
the Prime Outlet Mall.
A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 solely on the grounds of
respondeat superior. Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978). To hold the defendant municipality liable under §1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate
the constitutional deprivation was caused by "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers." Id. at 690. The plaintiff
has presented no facts to the court to show that the alleged constitutional violation was the
result of a policy, regulation, officially adopted decision or custom. Moreover, to the extent the
plaintiff seeks to sue the Pleasant Prairie Police Department, a police department is not a
suable entity under §1983. Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Chan
v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1007 [7th Cir. 1997]).
The plaintiff’s second claim alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. §12181 et seq., which
prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. Section 12182(a) of Title 42 sets forth the
general rule as follows:

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No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.
“A ‘public accommodation,’ under Title III is a private entity whose operations affect
commerce.” Baaske v. City of Rolling Meadows, 191 F. Supp.2d 1009, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
“A private entity is any entity other than a public entity,” such as a local government or its
departments or agencies. Id.; see also, 42 U.S.C. §12181(6) (“The term ‘private entity’ means
any entity other than a public entity (as defined in section 201(1) [42 U.S.C. 12131(1)]).
As noted, the plaintiff is suing the Village of Pleasant Prairie (or its police department)
and police officers under the Title III of the ADA which only applies to private entities. The
defendants are public entities or public officials and the statute does not apply to them.
Accordingly for the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be
granted in favor of all defendants with respect to the plaintiff’s ADA claim. The defendants’
motion also will be granted with respect to all claims against the Village of Pleasant Prairie and
(to the extent it may be applicable) to the Pleasant Prairie Police Department.
“Probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim of wrongful arrest asserted under
section 1983 against police officers.” Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Wagner v. Wash. County, 493 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2007 (per curiam). To prevail on
a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must show that the arresting officer did not have probable cause
to make the arrest. Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS *11
(February 12, 2012) (citing Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 638 [7th Cir. 2010]). “A police
officer has probable cause to arrest ‘if, at the time of the arrest, the “facts and circumstances

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within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed
or is about to commit an offense.’” Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634) (quoting Wagner v. Wash.
County, 493 F.3d at 836) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 [1979]).
The determination of probable cause involves "a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all of the circumstances set forth . . . there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238,
(1983); see Evans, 27 F.3d at 1228; United States v. Foxworth, 8 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir.
1993). “While probable cause requires more than the mere suspicion, we do not require it to
reach the level of virtual certainty.” United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir.
1995); see also, Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13, ("[P]robable cause requires only a probability
or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.").
In this case, on October 31, 2008, Officer Paul was advised by mall personnel at the
Prime Outlet Mall that the plaintiff was at the mall, even though they had told him that he was
not permitted on the premises. The mall has signs posted identifying it as private property.
Officer Paul talked to the plaintiff and told him that the mall and stores were private property,
that as private businesses they can exclude people from the premises. and that neither the
Yankee Candle store nor the mall wanted the plaintiff on the property. In November 2008, the
manager of the Yankee Candle store obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
plaintiff from being in that store. Subsequently, the TRO was dissolved and the case was
dismissed.

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Some time later, after the plaintiff made numerous calls to the Pleasant Prairie Police
Department, the mall and the Yankee Candle Store, Office Paul called the plaintiff and
reaffirmed that he was not allowed to return to the mall and that he should stop making the
calls. The plaintiff told Officer Paul that he understood and he would stop making the calls and
would not go to the mall.
Although the plaintiff denied every receiving notice that he was unwanted at the mall,
he stated in his response to defendants’ proposed finding of fact: “[E]xcept from the officers,
[the plaintiff] denies ever having received notice that he was unwanted on the mall property,
only that he was unwanted at Yankee Candle.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Proposed
Finding of Fact #17). He also understood Officer Paul’s statement that he was not allowed to
return to the mall.
On May 12, 2009, mall personnel called the Pleasant Prairie Police Department to
report that the plaintiff was trespassing at the mall. Officer Kern was dispatched to investigate
the mall complaint. She found the plaintiff on mall property and arrested him for trespassing
under state statute. She was the only officer involved in the arrest. The plaintiff was formally
charged with trespassing, but ultimately the charges were dismissed.
At the time of the arrest, Officer Kern had been advised that the plaintiff had been
warned a number of times to stay away from the mall. She knew the mall was private property
and that mall personnel had reported that the plaintiff was not wanted at the mall and was
trespassing. She also spoke to mall security who advised her where the plaintiff was located
when she arrived at the mall. She located the plaintiff and then placed him under arrest and
transported him to the police station. Although the plaintiff stated that he did not receive notice
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that he was not wanted on mall property, he acknowledged that officers told him he could not
be on the property.
Officer Kern had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff based on the information provided
by mall personnel and her knowledge that the plaintiff had been told to stay away from the
premises. She knew that the mall was posted as private property and that, as such, the mall
could restrict access. Thus, based on all facts known to her, she had reason to believe that
the plaintiff was committing a crime by trespassing on mall property. See Wheeler, 539 F.3d
at 634. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on a false arrest
claim against Officer Kern will be granted.
The plaintiff’s claim against Officer Larson also is based on alleged unlawful arrest and
detention. See Complaint ¶ 29. However, Officer Larson was neither involved in the plaintiff’s
arrest nor his detention. Rather, the plaintiff argues that the officer did not have cause to
threaten him with arrest for going to the mall. Officer Larson contends that he merely advised
the plaintiff’s father that if his son went to the mall, he could be arrested. Even construing the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has not presented sufficient facts
to state a constitutional claim against Officer Larson.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be granted on all claims.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a
proposed statement of facts be and hereby is granted. (Docket #32).

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IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the defendant Village of Pleasant Prairie and the Pleasant
Prairie Police Department be and hereby are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment be and
hereby is granted. (Docket #22).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is dismissed.
FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 20th day of March, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Patricia J. Gorence
PATRICIA J. GORENCE
United States Magistrate Judge

O:\CIV\poulos sj ord.wpd

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