McGinn et al v. JB Hunt Transport Inc et al

Filing 17

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 10/27/10 denying 10 plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (nm)

M c G i n n et al v. JB Hunt Transport Inc et al

D o c . 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
____________________________________________ T H O M A S McGINN, and SHARON McGINN, P la in t iffs , T A R G E T CORPORATION, In vo lu n ta ry Plaintiff, v. J .B . HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., A B C INSURANCE COMPANY, JOHN DOE, NYK LOGISTICS, DEF INSURANCE COMPANY, GHI INSURANCE COMPANY, and JCL INSURANCE COMPANY D e fe n d a n ts . ____________________________________________ Case No. 10-CV-610

ORDER
O n August 16, 2010, plaintiffs Thomas McGinn ("Mr. McGinn") and Sharon M c G in n filed a Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (Docket # 10) asserted by d e fe n d a n ts NYK Logistics and J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. ("J.B. Hunt") in their re s p e c tive Answers (Docket #'s 5, 7). The plaintiffs claim that defendants' affirmative d e fe n s e s based on the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, are legally in s u ffic ie n t and, thus, it is proper for the court to strike them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 (f). BACKGROUND T h is matter arose out of an accident which occurred when plaintiff Mr. McGinn a tte m p te d to unload boxes from a trailer that J.B. Hunt delivered to the Target

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D is trib u tio n Center in Oconomowoc, W is c o n s in . Mr. McGinn alleges that he suffered s e ve re personal injuries when the boxes fell and struck him as he entered the trailer to unload the product. (Compl. ¶ 13). Mr. McGinn was an employee of Target C o rp o ra tio n at the time of the accident. (Compl. ¶ 11). The plaintiffs commenced th is action in state court alleging the defendants were negligent in the scope of lo a d in g or transporting goods. (Compl. ¶ 20). The action was brought to recover d a m a g e s for personal injuries. (Compl. ¶ 21). After removing the matter to federal c o u rt on diversity and federal jurisdiction grounds, J.B. Hunt and NYK Logistics filed a n s w e rs asserting affirmative defenses that claimed all or part of the plaintiffs' claims m a y be barred by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Specifically, d e fe n d a n ts assert that plaintiffs' state law claims may be preempted by the Carmack A m e n d m e n t and possibly barred by the Amendment's statute of limitations. Plaintiffs th e n moved to strike these affirmative defenses. For the reasons set forth below, the c o u rt will deny plaintiffs' motion to strike. D IS C U S S I O N I. M O T IO N TO STRIKE T h e court may strike any affirmative defenses if they present "an insufficient d e fe n s e , or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. C iv. P. 12(f). Typically, courts look with disfavor upon motions to strike because they o fte n serve only to delay. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1 2 8 6 , 1294 (7th Cir.1989). Ordinarily, defenses will not be struck if they are

s u ffic ie n t as a matter of law or if they present substantial questions of law or fact. -2-

Id . Likewise, if the insufficiency of the defense is not clearly apparent on the face of th e pleadings, or cannot reasonably be inferred from any state of facts in the p le a d in g s , the motion cannot be granted. United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 5 1 4 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir.1975). "The purpose of such narrow standards is `. . . to p ro vid e a party the opportunity to prove his allegations if there is a possibility that his d e fe n s e or defenses may succeed after a full hearing on the merits.'" Id. (quoting U n ite d States v. 187.40 Acres of Land, Huntingdon County, Pa., 381 F.Supp. 54, 56 (M .D .P a .1 9 7 4 )). Thus, affirmative defenses will be stricken only when "it appears to a certainty that [the] plaintiff[s] would succeed despite any state of the facts which c o u ld be proved in support of the defense." Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1 3 8 8 , 1400 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). In considering a motion to strike, the c o u rt views the challenged pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving p a rty. See Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-C-2361, 2003 W L 21087109, at *3 (N .D . Ill. 2003). Moreover, motions to strike will generally be denied unless the p o rtio n of the pleading at issue is prejudicial. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder C o ., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1294. II. T H E CARMACK AMENDMENT T h e Carmack Amendment and its applicability to the plaintiffs' claims is at the c o re of the parties' present dispute. The Carmack Amendment, presently codified a t 49 U.S.C. § 14706, is a section of the Interstate Commerce Act adopted by C o n g re s s in 1906. The Amendment deals with the liability of carriers for lost or

d a m a g e d goods. The relevant portions of the Amendment are: -3-

A common carrier ... subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate C o m m e r c e Commission ... shall issue a receipt or a bill of lading for p ro p e rty it receives for transportation.... That carrier ... and any other c o m m o n carrier that delivers the property and is providing tra n s p o rta tio n or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission ... are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of la d in g . The liability imposed under this paragraph is for actual loss or in ju ry to the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the d e l iv e r in g carrier, or (C) another carrier over whose lines or route the p ro p e rty is transported into the United States....

4 9 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1).

It is well established that the Carmack Amendment

p re e m p ts state law with respect to carrier liability for the loss or damage of goods in in te rs ta te commerce. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 2 3 7 U.S. 597, 603 (1915); Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 2 9 9 U.S. 28 (1936). III. AN AL Y S IS H e re , plaintiffs seek damages for personal injuries, not for damaged property. T h e re fo r e , plaintiffs claim the Carmack Amendment does not apply to ­ and th e re fo re does not preempt ­ their state law personal injury claims because the A m e n d m e n t only governs loss or injury to property caused by a carrier in the course o f interstate shipment. Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that the Amendment does not a p p ly to them since they are not "shippers" as defined by the Amendment. Plaintiffs p o in t to the Carmack Amendment's provision stating that carriers "are liable to the p e r s o n entitled to recover under the receipt of bill or lading" to support this claim. (P ls.' Br. in Supp. 6) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1)).

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In response to plaintiffs' first contention, defendants argue that several d e c is io n s "squarely apply the Amendment to personal injury claims and hold that the s ta tu te preempts various state law claims for personal injuries." (J.B. Hunt Br. in O p p o s itio n to Pls.' Mot. to Strike 3-4) (Docket # 15). Defendants also rebut plaintiffs' s e c o n d argument by asserting that a genuine question exists as to whether the A m e n d m e n t applies solely to Target Corporation's claims as the "shipper" (the in vo lu n ta ry plaintiff and employer of Mr. McGinn), or whether the Amendment re a c h e s Mr. McGinn's claims, as an employee or agent of Target. Plaintiffs counter th a t Target is not making an independent claim against the defendants but rather w a s obliged to join the lawsuit under W is . Stat. § 102.29, and, therefore, Target's s ta tu s as a "shipper" is irrelevant to the plaintiffs' individual claims. The plaintiffs' arguments clearly have merit; however, the defendants also ra is e legitimate questions regarding the Carmack Amendment's applicability to the c a s e that weigh against plaintiffs' claims of legal insufficiency. Thus, at this stage o f the proceedings, it does not appear to a certainty that [the] plaintiff[s] would s u c c e e d despite any state of the facts which could be proved in support of the d e fen s e ." Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis added). Though th e defendants' affirmative defenses based on the Carmack Amendment may well tu r n out to be insufficient as a matter of law, the court finds, based on the evidence n o w before it, that the more appropriate vehicle for deciding the merits of the d e fen s e s is in the context of a dispositive motion or trial. Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (Docket # 1 0 ), be and the same is hereby DENIED. D a te d at Milwaukee, W is c o n s in , this 27th day of October, 2010. BY THE COURT:

J .P . Stadtmueller U .S . District Judge

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