Williams et al v. C&D Technologies Inc

Filing 24

ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/23/11 denying as moot 21 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint; granting 13 Motion to Reopen Case, case shall be considered to have been open between 4/15/11 and today's date; granting 14 Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (cc: all counsel) (nts)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
EDMUND WILLIAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 11-C-0171

C & D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER
Wisconsin requires employers to count time that their employees spend on breaks
of less than thirty minutes as compensable time worked. Wis. Admin. Code DWD
§§ 272.12(2)(c) & 274.02(3). Despite this requirement, the United Steelworkers and C & D
Technologies, Inc. (“C & D”) entered into a collective bargaining agreement that allows
C & D to count portions of breaks shorter than thirty minutes as unpaid time. Specifically,
the agreement allows employees who work in C & D’s casting department three breaks per
shift: one twenty-minute break and two fifteen-minute breaks. The agreement states that
the twenty-minute break is unpaid and that ten minutes of the two fifteen-minute breaks
(e.g., five minutes per break) are unpaid. See Collective Bargaining Agreement (attached
to the original complaint as Exhibit 1) § 6.04. A group of employees in the bargaining unit
have filed this lawsuit, alleging that under Wisconsin law they are entitled to compensation
for all the time they spent on these breaks between February 15, 2009 and February 6,
2011.
C & D has moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that because Wisconsin rather
than federal law supplies the plaintiffs’ cause of action federal subject matter jurisdiction

is lacking. In response to this motion, plaintiffs offer a convoluted jurisdictional argument
that requires some explaining. As part of this argument, plaintiffs concede that their cause
of action for unpaid wages is supplied by Wisconsin law – specifically, Wisconsin Statute
§ 109.03(5), which gives an employee a right of action against her employer for unpaid
wages. Plaintiffs also concede that the substantive law entitling them to wages for all time
they spent on breaks shorter than thirty minutes is supplied by Wisconsin law – specifically,
Wisconsin Administrative Code DWD §§ 272.12(2)(c) & 274.02(3). However, plaintiffs
contend that in order to calculate the amount of damages to which they are entitled under
Wisconsin law – i.e., to determine how much plaintiffs should have been paid for the break
time that C & D counted as unpaid time – a court will have to interpret the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement relating to wages, rates of pay and fringe benefits.
Plaintiffs contend that the need to interpret these provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement brings a part of this case (the damages part) within the scope of Section 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which gives district courts
original jurisdiction over suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs
then contend that I may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of the case
(the merits part) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.1
The heart of plaintiffs’ jurisdictional argument is that the need to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement in the course of calculating damages under Wisconsin law
triggers federal jurisdiction, but plaintiffs’ theory as to why this is so is vague. They seem
to be saying that the need to interpret the collective bargaining agreement when calculating
1

Plaintiffs have not alleged that I may exercise diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
2

damages transforms this case into one for breach of the agreement, and that therefore
federal jurisdiction exists under Section 301(a). Yet, plaintiffs concede that there has been
no breach of the collective bargaining agreement, since the agreement allows breaks
shorter than thirty minutes to be unpaid. Although plaintiffs claim that Wisconsin law
renders these provisions of the collective bargaining agreement “null and void,” they do not
go on to argue that this means that C & D has breached the collective bargaining
agreement, thus giving them a cause of action under § 301(a). Instead, they argue that
their cause of action arises under the Wisconsin Statutes and Administrative Code.
Whether or not plaintiffs meant to argue that their claim is one for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement, it is clear that it is not such a claim. Claims for breach of
a collective bargaining agreement are governed by the federal law of labor contracts,
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), and under federal law
parties are free to agree to unpaid short breaks. So as a matter of federal law C & D has
not breached the collective bargaining agreement. Nontheless, Wisconsin law provides
an independent source of rights, and if Wisconsin law requires C & D to pay plaintiffs for
their short breaks, C & D can’t use the collective bargaining agreement as a defense to a
claim brought under Wisconsin law. Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430
(7th Cir. 2010) (“Nothing that labor and management put in a collective bargaining
agreement exempts them from state laws of general application.”). However, this does not
mean that Wisconsin law erases the words in the collective bargaining agreement stating
that short breaks are unpaid, such that plaintiffs can claim that the agreement actually
requires payment for such breaks and that C & D has breached the agreement by refusing
to pay.
3

Section 301(a) confers original subject matter jurisdiction only over “suits for
violation of contracts,” and “suits for violation of contracts” does not mean any case that
might in some way involve interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

Textron

Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers, 523 U.S. 653, 656-58 (1998). Rather, it means “suits that claim a contract has
been violated.” Id. at 657. As explained, plaintiffs do not and cannot claim that the
collective bargaining agreement has been violated,2 and thus § 301(a) does not provide
a basis for federal jurisdiction, even though this case might at some point require a court
to interpret the collective bargaining agreement.
The parties do not acknowledge Textron in their briefs; instead, they argue over the
meaning of cases dealing with § 301’s preemption of state-law claims. Plaintiffs argue that
the need to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to calculate damages brings this
case within the preemptive scope of § 301, while defendant argues that it does not. That
the parties have taken these positions is surprising. One would think that the defendant
would be arguing that plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted by federal law and that
plaintiffs would be arguing that they are not, since if plaintiffs are right and their claims are
preempted their claims would have to be dismissed on the merits. See Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1985). Lucky for plaintiffs, it turns out that they are
wrong. As the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.:
A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information such
as rate of pay and other economic benefits that might be helpful in
2

I also note that if plaintiffs had claimed that C & D had violated the collective
bargaining agreement, their claim would have to be grieved pursuant to the grievance
procedures established in the agreement. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 3.
4

determining the damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is
entitled. Although federal law would govern the interpretation of the
agreement to determine the proper damages, the underlying state-law claim,
not otherwise pre-empted, would stand. Thus, as a general proposition, a
state-law claim may depend for its resolution upon both the interpretation of
a collective-bargaining agreement and a separate state-law analysis that
does not turn on the agreement. In such a case, federal law would govern
the interpretation of the agreement, but the separate state-law analysis
would not be thereby pre-empted.
486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12 (1988) (internal citation omitted). Thus, although federal law would
govern any interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement that a state court might
need to make in the course of determining plaintiffs’ damages, the need to make such an
interpretation does not mean that plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted.3 Indeed, state
courts are allowed to interpret collective bargaining agreements, provided they apply
federal rather than state law when doing so, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
102 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), and so the need for
a state court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement in the course of calculating
plaintiffs’ damages under state law poses no threat to the uniformity of federal labor law
and would not “frustrate the federal labor-contract scheme established in § 301.” AllisChalmers, 471 U.S. at 209. There is therefore no reason to find plaintiffs’ state-law claims
preempted, and plaintiffs have not defeated their own claims by trying to use preemption
as a basis for federal jurisdiction under § 301.

3

Citing Lingle, plaintiffs argue that a claim is preempted whenever a court must
“interpret” rather than merely “refer to” a collective bargaining agreement, and that
therefore their claims are preempted. However, as the excerpt quoted in the text makes
clear, Lingle does not hold that a state-law claim is preempted whenever a court must
interpret a collective bargaining agreement in the course of calculating damages.
5

Although § 301(a) does not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over this
case, an argument could be made that this action “arises under” federal law within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 is usually
invoked by plaintiffs pleading causes of action under federal law, and as explained,
plaintiffs in the present case have not pleaded a federal cause of action. However, § 1331
also provides jurisdiction over state-law causes of action that “implicate significant federal
issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005). Thus, plaintiffs could have argued that applying the federal law of collectivebargaining-agreement interpretation in the course of calculating damages under state law
would raise significant federal issues, and that therefore jurisdiction exists under § 1331.
However, plaintiffs have not made this argument, and for this reason I may not exercise
jurisdiction under § 1331. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810
n.6 (1986) (“Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not
advanced.”) In any event, plaintiffs had good reason for not making this argument, in that
it is exceedingly unlikely that the need to apply federal law in the course of calculating
damages in this case would raise significant federal issues – that is, federal issues that are
“contested” and “substantial” and that indicate “a serious federal interest in claiming the
advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.” Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act does not
provide a basis for federal jurisdiction in this case, and therefore plaintiffs’ complaint must
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because it does not appear that the

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complaint could be amended to state a claim over which I would have jurisdiction, this
action will be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter final judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to reopen this case is
GRANTED to the extent that for statistical purposes this case shall be considered to have
been open between April 15, 2011 and today’s date.
FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended
complaint for purposes of attaching a copy of the collective bargaining agreement to the
amended complaint is DENIED as MOOT.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 23rd day of June, 2011.

s/ Lynn Adelman
LYNN ADELMAN
District Judge

4

In their brief, plaintiffs ask me to “rule that the plaintiffs’ response to the defendant’s
motion to dismiss does not constitute commencement of a wage and hour lawsuit, as those
terms are used in [Wisconsin Statute] § 109.11(2).” (Br. at 8.) Because I do not have
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, I may not make any rulings on the merits of such claims,
and so this request is denied.
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