Dietrich v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections et al

Filing 27

ORDER signed by Chief Judge Charles N Clevert, Jr on 10/11/2011 Granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP; Denying 6 Motion to Appoint Counsel; Denying as moot 7 Motion for Leave to File an Addendum; Denying 8 Motion for Preliminary Injuncti on; Denying 8 Motion for a Restraining Order; Denying as moot 12 Motion for a Liberal Interpretation of his Arguments; Denying as moot 14 Motion to Add Party; Denying as moot 16 Motion to Add Party; Denying 20 Motion to Compel; denying 20 Motion to Enlarge Answers; Denying 21 Motion for Order to Remove Defendants; Denying 24 Motion to Compel Discovery; and Denying 26 Motion to Amend Complaint. Further Ordering that Plaintiff's Amended pleading, curing the defects in the or iginal complaint, is due by 11/11/2011; and that the Secretary of the Wisconsin DOC is to collect the balance of the $344.94 filing fee as directed in this order and forward payments to the Clerk of Court. (cc: all counsel, Via US Mail to Plaintiff and Warden of Green Bay Correctional Institution) (nts)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JACOB T. DIETRICH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 11-CV-00352

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
KATHRYN ANDERSON, MICHAEL BAENEN,
SUSAN CASPER, RUSS CORCORAN, CHRIS EPLETT,
CATHERINE FRANCOIS, TOM GOZINSKE,
GARY H HAMBLIN, DAVID HINES, MICHAEL JONES,
MICHAEL MOHR, THERESA MURPHY, ISMAEL OZANNE,
TIM PIERCE, SUSAN A SCHMEICHEL, JUDY P SMITH,
DEWAYNE STREET, JOHN DORUFF,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-PLATTEVILLE,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM,
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN SYSTEM, DEBRA BECKER, PATRICIA A BRADY,
KELLY CURTISS, STEVE KLEISATH, DR DUANE FORD,
DR CHRISTINE SCHEDULES, DR CHRISTINE STORLIE,
WILLIAM F TREZEVANT, DR DAVID P VAN BUREN,
JAMES P REILY, MILWAUKEE AREA TECHNICAL COLLEGE,
BARBARA GEDDES, CARL MORENCY, JUDY TOLKAN,
SCOTT WALKER, and OFFICE OF THE WISCONSIN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DOC. 2), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
APPOINT COUNSEL (DOC. 6), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AN ADDENDUM (DOC. 7), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. 8), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A
RESTRAINING ORDER (DOC. 8), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION OF HIS ARGUMENTS (DOC. 12), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTIONS TO ADD PARTIES (DOCS. 14, 16), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
COMPEL (DOC. 20), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENLARGE ANSWERS
(DOC. 20), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO REMOVE
DEFENDANTS (DOC. 21), DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY (DOC. 24), AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PARTIALLY
AMEND COMPLAINT (DOC. 26).

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, has lodged a civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's petition to proceed in
forma pauperis. The plaintiff has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of
$5.06. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners, such as plaintiff,
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The court
may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327. “Malicious,” although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,” “is more
usefully construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109-10
(7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, plaintiff is
required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled
to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not necessary for plaintiff to plead specific facts
and his statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that offers
“labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint
allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should follow the principles
set forth in Twombly by first, “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he
was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer
v. Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v.

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Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give a plaintiff’s pro se
allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jacob T. Dietrich, is incarcerated at the Green Bay Correctional Institution.
He alleges that he was enrolled in the Incarcerated Individuals College Program (IIP)
“whereby certain inmates meeting eligibility criteria can participate in correspondence
courses, and receive federal government grants.” (Compl. at 8.) He was accepted into the
program on July 17, 2009. According to the complaint, plaintiff meets and exceeds all
qualifications for participation in the IIP.
To participate in the program, prisoners are required to earn thirteen or more credits
and maintain a cumulative grade point average of at least 2.0. The plaintiff earned a Din Algebra. However, he states that his grade point average was 3.81 at the end of 2009.
This grade point average does not reflect the Algebra grade.
Plaintiff asserts that he requested various accommodations under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), including a quiet testing room and additional time for testing,
but his requests were denied or ignored. He also sought to transfer various credits:
“Plaintiff challenged the credits which . . . [the University of Wisconsin-Platteville (UWP)]
would accept, and made progress, this is where the animosity began with the UWP staff.”
(Compl. at 10.)
Plaintiff received a letter from defendant Susan Casper, an IIP administrator, stating
that his continuing enrollment in the IIP for the 2010-2011 year was in question. The letter

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cited the Algebra grade as well as the plaintiff’s poor attitude, which “‘cause[d] the site
coordinator to dedicate too many resources to make special arrangements due to the
student’s actions.’” (Id. at 13; Exh. 14B.)
At some point during this time, plaintiff distributed religious flyers to University of
Wisconsin - Platteville and correctional institution staff. Plaintiff appears to allege that
university officials were “looking for a pretext to restrict plaintiff’s college education” and
used the religious flyers as a reason to do so. (Id. at 21-22.)
During the spring 2010 semester, defendant Casper and other defendants revoked
plaintiff’s privilege to take correspondence courses through the University of Wisconsin Platteville. The plaintiff alleges that the decision was “simplistic” and “deprived plaintiff of
meaningful post-deprivation review.” (Id. at 24, 27.) Plaintiff again applied for IIP courses
in spring 2011. He was again denied participation in the program. According to plaintiff,
the main reason for his dismissal involved the special accommodations he requested,
although “the special accommodations are being blamed on the plaintiff’s poor attitude
rather than on his disability.” (Id. at 56.)
Plaintiff claims that: (1) he was removed from the IIP in retaliation for invoking
protected rights under the ADA; (2) defendants violated the ADA by refusing to make
reasonable accommodations for him, including giving him a quiet room in which to take
exams; (3) defendants violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances and right to freedom of speech; (4) defendants
retaliated against him for exercising his freedom of speech when he distributed religious
articles; (5) defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right of Equal Protection (“for
plaintiff’s disability and ADA invoking, but for my being indigent, and having a disability both
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make education that much harder to access!”); (6) the defendants violated his due process
rights by “treat[ing] plaintiff as if he has already been expelled” and failing to use the proper
disciplinary procedures before expelling him; and (7) the defendants subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment. (Id. at 59-61.) The remainder of the claims he makes in the
complaint overlap with those noted above.

Plaintiff admits that the IIP program is

discretionary but states that “this does not mean they have the authority to violate federal
law and plaintiff’s civil rights, to discriminate against, and retaliate against plaintiff for
invoking rights under” the ADA. (Id. at 16.)
For relief, plaintiff asks to be immediately reinstated in the IIP. He also asks the
court “to give all students in prison the same access to the grievence [sic] and credit
transfer review system that students not in prison get.” (Id. at 72.) Finally, he asks for
injunctions ordering defendants to grant him access to the inmate grievance system and
for the court to remove a “flag” from his file regarding “illegal IIP and correspondence
restrictions.” (Id. at 73.)
ANALYSIS
1. Retaliation
A prisoner’s retaliation claim is subject to a liberal notice pleading standard; the
complaint need specify only the bare minimum facts necessary to notify the defendants
and the court of the nature of the claims. See Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.
2002). The “bare minimum” in a retaliation claim are the facts that would apprise the
defendants of what plaintiff did to provoke the alleged retaliation and what defendants did
in response. See id.; Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (“a plaintiff

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alleging retaliation must reference, at a minimum, the suit or grievance spawning the
retaliation and the acts constituting the retaliatory conduct”). Plaintiff must identify the
retaliatory action, name defendants, and assert a constitutionally-protected activity that
spurred the retaliation.
Here, plaintiff appears to allege that defendants retaliated against him for requesting
accommodations under the ADA. However, requesting accommodations under the ADA
is not a Constitutionally-protected activity. Instead, requesting such accommodations is
protected by the ADA itself - a federal law that is separate from the Constitution. See 42
U.S.C. § 12132 (2000 ed.). Plaintiff also appears to claim that defendants retaliated
against him for sending religious flyers to prison and university officials. This allegation
may suffice to form the basis of a retaliation claim, but plaintiff must explain what actions
defendants took in retaliation for this conduct. It is unclear from the complaint, which is 77
pages long and has 57 exhibits attached to it, whether plaintiff is alleging that his removal
from the IIP was in retaliation for his exercise of free speech.
2. ADA
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000 ed.). A “qualified individual with a disability” is
defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barrier, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
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provided by a public entity.” § 12131(2). The Supreme Court has held that the term “public
entity” includes state prisons. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153-54 (2006)(citing
Penn. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)).
The court cannot discern from the complaint whether plaintiff is claiming that he was
terminated from the program by reason of his disability. He appears to allege that
defendants retaliated against him because he requested accommodations under the ADA.
As it is unclear which legal theory upon which plaintiff relies, the court will allow the plaintiff
to amend his complaint in accordance with the standard under the ADA.
3. Due Process
To establish a procedural due process violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that
the state deprived him of a liberty or property interest created either by state law or the Due
Process Clause itself. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). A liberty
interest exists when prison officials restrain the freedom of inmates in a manner that
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Id. at 484.
Here, plaintiff has not alleged that he had a liberty interest in remaining in the IIP
program. Thus, he has not stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Again, plaintiff
may amend his complaint if he so chooses.
4. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
To make out an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, an inmate
must show that he has suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious injury, and that prison
officials inflicted the injury with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

8

834 (1994). An objectively, sufficiently serious injury is one that deprives the inmate “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). Only extreme deprivations will support an Eighth Amendment claim. Delaney v.
DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001). Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to
deprivations suffered by inmates if they have knowledge of the condition but refuse to take
steps to correct it. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of an objectively, sufficiently
serious condition. Thus, he has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
5. Personal Involvement
Section 1983 does not allow actions against persons merely because of their
supervisory roles. T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010); Palmer v. Marion
County, 327 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, plaintiff lists numerous defendants, some of
whom were not personally involved in the events described in the complaint. For instance,
the plaintiff lists Governor Scott Walker as a defendant because “[a]s the Governor of the
State of Wisconsin, he is responsible for the oversight of the heads of the departments
under his authority.” (Compl. at 7.) The Governor was involved only in a supervisory role
and thus cannot be liable under § 1983.

Similarly, he lists Carl Morency, the Dean in

charge of administering the IIP program at MATC, as a defendant. Again, defendant
Morency had no involvement other than a supervisory role. If the plaintiff chooses to
amend his complaint, he should take note that only those individuals who were personally
involved in the events are subject to suit.
6. Summary

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Thus, if the plaintiff wants to proceed, he must file an amended complaint curing the
deficiencies in the original complaint as described herein. The complaint should clearly
and succinctly list his allegations and claims: to satisfy the notice-pleading requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint should contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Such amended complaint must be filed on or before November 7, 2011 (30
DAYS). Failure to file an amended complaint within this time period may result in dismissal
of this action.
Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint must bear the docket number
assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint
supersedes the prior complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the
original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133
F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 1998). In Duda, the appellate court emphasized that in such
instances, the “prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the
amended pleading[.]” Id. at 1057 (citation omitted). If an amended complaint is received,
it will be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Otherwise, the court will screen the
original pleading.
Plaintiff is further advised that he should use the enclosed form to file his complaint.
The enclosed form notes that a plaintiff should state as briefly as possible the facts of his
or her case. If plaintiff files a lengthy complaint, the court may dismiss the case with
prejudice and not allow plaintiff to amend again.
ADDITIONAL MOTIONS

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1. Motion to Appoint Counsel (DOC. 6)
The plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. He states that he is unable to
afford counsel and that his imprisonment will limit his ability to litigate and receive a fair
hearing. He additionally states that he requires an attorney because the trial will involve
conflicting testimony.
Although civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed
counsel, the court has the discretion to request attorneys to represent indigents in
appropriate cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 653
(7th Cir. 2007); Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Zarnes v.
Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995)). However, this court has no access to funds to
compensate attorneys for such representation. This court, therefore, appoints counsel
under § 1915(e)(1) only in the rare case where the failure to appoint counsel would be so
fundamentally unfair that plaintiff's due process rights would be violated. McNeil v.
Lowney, 831 F.2d 1368, 1371 (7th Cir. 1987).
As a threshold matter, litigants must make a reasonable attempt to secure private
counsel on their own. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654; Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 288. Once this threshold
burden has been met, the court must address the following question: given the difficulty
of the case, does this plaintiff appear competent to try the case himself and, if not, would
the presence of counsel likely make a difference in the outcome of the case. Pruitt, 503
F.3d at 654-655 (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Here, plaintiff has contacted various legal groups for assistance, including Legal
Action of Wisconsin and Kasieta Legal Group LLC of Madison, Wisconsin. However, at

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this stage, plaintiff appears competent to try the case himself. Before the case may move
forward, plaintiff must submit an amended complaint. After he submits the amended
complaint, he may file another motion to appoint counsel, which the court will evaluate at
that time.
2. Motion for Leave to File (DOC. 7)
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to file an addendum to the complaint.
Because the court has ordered plaintiff to amend his original complaint, this motion is
moot. He may make the changes in the amended complaint.
3. Motion for Preliminary Injunction (DOC. 8)
Next, plaintiff has filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. He asks that the court
issue the injunction to immediately reinstate him in the IIP. He states that the harm he will
suffer “if this order is not granted is great . . . [n]ot having his degree upon release greatly
increases his chances at recidivism.:” (Mot. at 1.)
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that he is reasonably
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is experiencing irreparable harm that exceeds any
harm his opponent will suffer if the injunction issues, that he lacks an adequate remedy
at law, and that the injunction would not harm the public interest. Christian Legal Soc’y
v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006). “If the moving party meets this threshold
burden, the district court weighs the factors against one another in a sliding scale
analysis . . . which is to say the district court must exercise its discretion to determine
whether the balance of harms weighs in favor of the moving party or whether the

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nonmoving party or public interest will be harmed sufficiently that the injunction should
be denied.” Id.; see Joelner v. Vill. of Wash. Park, 378 F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir. 2004).
Here, the court cannot determine whether plaintiff is reasonably likely to succeed
on the merits of the case, as plaintiff must first file an amended complaint. Plaintiff may
file a second motion for a preliminary injunction after the amended complaint is
submitted.
4. Motion for Restraining Order (DOC. 8)
In his motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff also requested a restraining
order. He asks the court to restrain the DOC from transferring him in retaliation for his
claims.

Here, plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to be transferred.

Moreover, the proper motion to file regarding a transfer would be a motion for injunctive
relief.
5. Motion for Liberal Interpretation of Arguments and Pleading (DOC. 12)
Next, plaintiff has filed a motion for liberal interpretation of his arguments and
pleading. This motion will be denied as moot, as the court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s
pro se allegations a liberal construction. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, plaintiff need not file a motion requesting that
the court so construe the pleading.
6. Motions to Add Parties (DOCS. 14, 16)
Plaintiff has also filed several motions to add parties. These motions are moot, as
plaintiff may add the parties in his amended complaint.
7. Motion to Compel (DOC. 20)

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Next, plaintiff has filed a motion to compel defendants to answer interrogatories sent
by plaintiff on May 31, 2011. According to the motion, defendants “refuse . . . to answer
these interrogatories” because the court has not screened the case. (Mot. at 1.)
Rule 33(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[t]he responding
party must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served with the
interrogatories. A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered
by the court.” Here, because plaintiff mus file an amended complaint if he wishes to
proceed, plaintiff’s motion is premature. Defendants may wait until the amended complaint
is filed and the court issues a scheduling order to respond to the interrogatories.
8. Motion to Expand Answers and Limit (DOC. 20)
Plaintiff also asks the court to expand the twenty-five-question limit on
interrogatories to 150. Rule 33(a)(1) states that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered
by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than twenty-five written
interrogatories.”
However, at this stage of the proceedings, plaintiff’s discovery motion is premature.
9. Motion for Order of Deletion of Certain Defendants in Their Individual Capacity
(DOC. 21)
Plaintiff asks the court to remove several defendants from the suit, as these
defendants have “stepped up [to] do a good thing.” (Mot. at 1). However, this motion is
moot, as plaintiff may omit these defendants in his amended complaint.
10. Motion to Compel Discovery (DOC. 24)

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Next, plaintiff has filed a motion to compel discovery. This motion is premature and
is hence denied.
11. Motion to Partially Amend Complaint (DOC. 26)
Finally, plaintiff has filed a motion to partially amend his complaint “without having
to retype his 80 plus page complaint.” (Mot. at 1.) He wishes to add defendants, legal
theories, and exhibits to the original complaint.
The court denies this motion due to the length of the original complaint. Instead
plaintiff may submit a new complaint for screening. The court reemphasizes that the
amended complaint should contain a brief statement regarding the facts of his case and
underlying legal theories. In addition, the amended complaint should not contain exhibits.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(DOC. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (DOC. 6) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an addendum
(DOC. 7) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (DOC.
8) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a restraining order (DOC. 8)
is DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a liberal interpretation of his
arguments and pleading (DOC. 12) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motions to add parties (DOCS. 14, 16)
are DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to compel (DOC. 20) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to enlarge answers and limit
regarding interrogatories (DOC. 20) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for an order to remove defendants
(DOC. 21) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery (DOC. 24)
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to partially amend complaint
(DOC. 26) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before November 11, 2011 (30 DAYS),
plaintiff shall file an amended pleading curing the defects in the original complaint as
described herein. Plaintiff shall use the enclosed complaint form.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections or his designee shall collect from plaintiff’s prisoner trust account the $344.94
balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from plaintiff’s prison trust account
in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust
account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the

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account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be
clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the warden of the
institution where the inmate is confined
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall submit all correspondence and
legal material to:
Honorable Charles N. Clevert, Jr.
Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. It will
only delay the processing of the matter.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 11th day of October, 2011.

BY THE COURT

/s/ C. N. Clevert, Jr.
C. N. CLEVERT, JR.
Chief U.S. District Judge

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