Hackensmith v. Port City Steamship Holding Company
Filing
49
ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 4/9/13 as follows: pursuant to 42 the Stipulation of the parties, the following are dismissed with prejudice: Plaintiff's Jones Act negligence claim against Port City Steamship Holding Company; Plai ntiff's unseaworthiness claim against Port City Steamship Services, Inc.; Plaintiff's general maritime law loss of consortium claim against Port City Steamship Services, Inc.; any loss of consortium claim Plaintiff may have had against De fendant Port City Steamship Services, Inc., and, any claim for future loss of wages Plaintiff may have had against both Defendants under both her Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims; denying as moot 33 and 36 Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment; granting 30 Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's claim for punitive, loss of consortium, and other non-pecuniary damages under both her Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims; and denying 39 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend her complaint. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (nm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JEAN HACKENSMITH, Special
Administrator for the Estate of
RONALD L. HACKENSMITH, Deceased,
Case No. 12-CV-786-JPS
Plaintiff,
v.
PORT CITY STEAMSHIP HOLDING
COMPANY and
PORT CITY STEAMSHIP SERVICES, INC.,
ORDER
Defendants.
The plaintiff, Jean Hackensmith, filed this action against the
defendants, Port City Steamship Holding Company (the “Holding
Company”) and Port City Steamship Services, Inc. (“Steamship Services”),
on August 1, 2012. (Docket #1). Ms. Hackensmith’s filing of this action
followed the Holding Company’s earlier filing of an admiralty limitation of
liability complaint in the separate but related case In Re Port City Steamship
Holding Company, filed in this Court on March 19, 2012, under case number
12-CV-266.1 Both actions stem from the same set of facts: in a tragic accident,
Ms. Hackensmith’s husband, Ronald, was trapped in a piece of machinery on
a boat owned and operated by the defendants; he sustained substantial
injuries and ultimately passed away.
Thus, Ms. Hackensmith brought suit against the defendants alleging
various claims of liability against them. (Docket #1). On February 15, 2013,
1
At this time, case number 12-CV-266 still remains pending. There are
currently no outstanding motions or other matters to be resolved, and the Court
will not address that case further in the balance of this order.
the defendants filed a number of summary judgment motions, requesting
that the Court dismiss Ms. Hackensmith’s claims. (Docket #30, #33, #36).
Before filing her response briefs to those motions, Ms. Hackensmith filed a
motion to amend her complaint to add a claim, to which the defendants
object. (Docket #39, #41). The parties then stipulated to dismiss a number of
Ms. Hackensmith’s claims that were the subject of the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment. (Docket #42). That stipulation left very limited issues
open for resolution on defendants’ summary judgment motion, but the
parties nonetheless filed their response and reply briefs on those remaining
issues, making the defendants’ summary judgment motion ripe for decision.
(Docket #43, #44, #47).
At this stage, the parties do not wish for the Court to engage in an
extensive factual analysis, and there is a very small (and generally agreedupon) set of facts that is relevant to the limited issues remaining for
disposition in this order. (Docket #42, at 3–4). Therefore, the Court will avoid
a lengthy factual recitation. Nonetheless, the Court will set forth a short
background of the case and the parties’ claims. Next, the Court will address
the parties’ stipulation (Docket #42), and describe how that stipulation affects
the outstanding summary judgment motions. The Court will then turn to its
legal discussion of the remaining summary judgment issues. Finally, the
Court will address Ms. Hackensmith’s outstanding motion to amend (Docket
#39) at the conclusion of this order.
1.
BACKGROUND
As the Court just noted, it will begin by discussing the factual
background of this case and Ms. Hackensmith’s claims, before turning to
address the parties’ stipulation.
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1.1
Factual and Legal Background
The factual background of this case is relatively straightforward. Ms.
Hackensmith’s husband was fatally injured by machine equipment while
working as a Jones Act seaman on a boat owned and operated by the
defendants. There are other background facts that may be relevant for
trial—for example, as may relate to the defendants’ alleged willful, wanton,
or reckless behavior—but the parties agree that those facts are not relevant
to the summary judgment motions now before the Court. (Docket #42, at
3–4).
Several months after her husband’s injury, Ms. Hackensmith brought
this suit against the defendants. In her Amended Complaint, she sued both
defendants on the following claims:
(1)
Jones Act negligence, for which she requested:
(a)
(b)
financial damages on her own behalf for expenses
related to her husband’s death, as well as for lost
support; and
(c)
(2)
pain and suffering damages on behalf of the deceased;
such other damages as may be available; and
unseaworthiness of the vessel on which the deceased was
injured, for which she requested:
(a)
pain and suffering damages on behalf of the deceased;
(b)
financial damages on her own behalf for expenses
related to her husband’s death, as well as for lost
support;
(c)
punitive damages; and
(d)
such other damages as may be available; and
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(3)
loss of consortium under General Maritime Law, for which she
requested:
(a)
damages resulting from her loss of society and other
companionship;
(b)
punitive damages; and
(c)
such other damages as may be available.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5 (Jones Act negligence claim against the Holding
Company), 6 (unseaworthiness claim against the Holding Company), 7 (loss
of consortium claim against the Holding Company), 9 (Jones Act negligence
claim against Steamship Services), 10 (unseaworthiness claim against
Steamship Services), and 11 (loss of consortium claim against Steamship
Services)).
After a period for discovery, the defendants filed three separate
motions for summary judgment: Docket #30, Docket #33, and Docket #36.
Each motion addresses separate portions of Ms. Hackensmith’s claims.
1.2
Stipulation
However, before the court addressed any of those motions, the parties
entered a stipulation, noting Ms. Hackensmith’s dismissal of a number of her
claims that were the subject of those motions. (Docket #40). Accordingly, by
the parties’ stipulation, Ms. Hackensmith agreed to dismiss a number of her
claims while the defendants’ agreed to dismiss their corresponding motions
for summary judgment. (Docket #40).
More specifically, Ms. Hackensmith agreed to dismiss the following
claims with prejudice:
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(1)
her Jones Act negligence claim against the Holding Company
(Docket #42, at ¶ 2);
(2)
her unseaworthiness claim against Steamship Services (Docket
#42, at ¶ 1);
(3)
her General Maritime Law loss of consortium claim against
Steamship Services (Docket #42, at ¶ 1);
(4)
any loss of consortium claim she may have had against
Steamship Services under her Jones Act negligence claim
(Docket #42, at ¶ 4(b)); and
(5)
any claim for future loss of wages against either defendant in
both her Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims
(though Ms. Hackensmith notes that she is not dismissing any
loss of support claims she may have against the defendants
pursuant to those claims) (Docket #42, at ¶ 4(a)).
Therefore, given the dismissal of a number of those claims, the parties further
stipulated that the defendants would withdraw their summary judgment
motions filed at Docket #33 and Docket #36. (Docket #42, at ¶ 3).
2.
DISCUSSION
Thus, there exists only one summary judgment motion outstanding:
Docket #30, for partial summary judgment barring recovery of punitive or
loss of consortium damages. The parties have further stipulated that there is
only one issue remaining that the Court must decide at this juncture: whether
Ms. Hackensmith may recover punitive, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary damages under her remaining Jones Act negligence or
unseaworthiness claims against Steamship Services and the Holding
Company, respectively. (Docket #42, at 3–4).
Summary judgment on that issue is appropriate because the parties
do not disagree as to the relevant facts or evidence on that issue, and the
Court may determine on the basis of those items whether “the movant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Thomas v. H&R Block Eastern Enters.,
630 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Having extensively reviewed the parties’ briefs and the case law on
the topics presented therein, the Court is obliged to determine that the
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. Under
the state of current law, Ms. Hackensmith may not recover punitive, loss of
consortium, or other non-pecuniary damages under either her Jones Act or
unseaworthiness claims.
However, the Court notes that it encountered much difficulty in
reaching this decision. The law on the topic is somewhat unsettled. (At the
very least, given a recent Supreme Court decision, the law appears to be
unsettled.) Moreover, this is an issue of first impression in the Seventh
Circuit.
Two Supreme Court cases are particularly important to the Court’s
analysis: Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), and Atlantic Sounding
Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). Both cases deal with the recoverability
of forms of non-pecuniary damages under maritime law, and have been
interpreted by lower courts some to reach differing results. Which is to say
that, following Townsend, many lower courts reexamined their application of
Miles’ holding.
In Miles, the Supreme Court held that the administrator of a deceased
seaman’s estate could not collect non-pecuniary damages, such as for loss of
society, when bringing a general maritime action for wrongful death. Miles,
498 U.S. at 33. In reaching that decision, the Miles Court noted that it had
previously created a general maritime claim for wrongful death based on
unseaworthiness in a prior case, Moragne v. States Marine Lines. Miles, 498 U.S.
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at 27 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970)). However, to ensure
uniformity across general maritime law and the Jones Act, the Miles Court
prohibited the recovery of non-pecuniary damages in general maritime
wrongful death actions, just as Jones Act recovery is limited to non-pecuniary
damages under its incorporation of the Federal Employees Liability Act
(FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. (1908). Miles, 498 U.S. at 36.
Lower courts began applying the Miles decision to preclude all nonpecuniary damages, including punitive damages, in general maritime
wrongful death actions. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in
American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM . 74, 139–140 (1998).2
Courts continued to apply Miles in that way until the Supreme Court
decided Townsend. There, the Supreme Court noted that “[h]istorically,
punitive damages have been available and awarded in general maritime
actions, including some in maintenance and cure…nothing in Miles or the
Jones Act eliminates that availability.” 557 U.S. at 407. The Townsend Court
went on to hold that an injured seaman could recover punitive damages on
2
Citing, among many other cases, Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200 (1st
Cir. 1994); Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 915 (1993); Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Mgt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 708 (1996); Boyd v. Cinmar of Glouster, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.
Va. 1996); Long v. F/V Melanie, 918 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Hollinger v. Kirby
Tankships, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 571 (S.D. Ala. 1996); Carolina Clipper, Inc. v. Axe, 902 F.
Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1995); Clancy v. Mobil Oil Corp., 906 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1995);
Bell v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 855 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.La. 1994); Ledet v. Power Offshore
Servs., Inc., 1994 WL 150805 (E.D. La. 1994); Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F. Supp.
324 (E.D. Va. 1993); Jackson v. Unisea, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 895 (D. Alaska 1992); In re
Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1992); LaVoie v. Kualoa Ranch and
Activity Club, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 827 (D. Haw. 1992); In Re Aleutian Enter., Ltd., 777 F.
Supp. 793 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Haltom v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 771 F. Supp. 179
(E.D. Tex. 1991); Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 943 (D.R.I. 1991).
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a maintenance and cure claim.3 Id., at 425. However, in doing so, it noted
that,
unlike the facts presented in Miles, the Jones Act does not
address maintenance and cure or its remedy. It is therefore
possible to adhere to the traditional understanding of maritime
actions and remedies without abridging or violating the Jones
Act; unlike wrongful-death actions, this traditional
understanding is not a matter to which “Congress has spoken
directly.”
Id., at 420–21 (citing Miles, 498 U.S. at 31).
Thus, lower courts were left with a choice to make: should they follow
Miles and the established body of case law holding that punitive damages are
not recoverable in general maritime actions, or find that Townsend overruled
that body of case law, thus allowing recovery of punitive damages in
maritime actions. This choice is, of course, a very difficult one. While the
Townsend Court discussed the historical availability of punitive damages in
general maritime actions, it never expressly overruled any portion of Miles
that limited punitive damage award. 557 U.S. at 409–10. Indeed, the Townsend
Court actually discussed Miles with approval, stating that “[t]he reasoning
of Miles remains sound.” Id., at 420. In the end, as has been observed by other
courts, Townsend did not address anything other than maintenance and cure
claims, leaving open the question of whether punitive damages are available
for other general maritime claims. Snyder v. L & M Botruc Rental, Inc., --- F.3d
----, No. 12-0097, 2013 WL 594089, at * 4–*5 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2013).
3
Maintenance and cure claims concern “the vessel owner’s obligation to
provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the
ship.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001).
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With that unresolved background in place, lower courts began
interpreting Townsend’s impact. Many took Townsend as license to award
punitive and other non-pecuniary damages for general maritime claims. See,
e.g., Wolf v. McCulley Marine Services, Inc., 2012 WL 4077240, at *6 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 17, 2012); In re Complaint of Osage Marine Services, Inc., 2012 WL 709188,
at *2–*3 (E.D. Mo. March 5, 2012); Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010
WL 3566731, at *6–*8 (D. Haw. Sept. 13, 2010); Barrette v. Jubilee Fisheries, Inc.,
2011 WL 3516061, at *5–*6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 11, 2011). Others have applied
Townsend much more narrowly, continuing to bar punitive and other nonpecuniary damage recovery for general maritime negligence and
unseaworthiness claims. See, e.g., Snyder, 2013 WL 594089, at *5; McBride v.
Estis Well Service, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 511, 515, 521 (W.D. La. 2012); Doyle v.
Graske, 579 F.3d 898, 906–07 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that loss-ofconsortium damages are not recoverable under general maritime actions,
though addressing punitive damages issue only in dicta).
Each of those cases is instructive, but the Court faces a slightly
different and more specific question here: whether this Court should follow
Miles and hold that punitive damages are not recoverable in general
maritime wrongful death actions, or find that Townsend abridged that portion
of Miles’ holding. None of the cases cited above addresses the issue of
whether punitive and other non-pecuniary damages may be awarded to the
administrator of a deceased Jones Act seaman’s estate. Thus, however wellfounded those cases may be, they are ultimately inapplicable to the current
situation.
The Court finds the greatest instruction to come from the Supreme
Court’s Townsend decision, itself. As already noted, the Townsend Court
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expressly distinguished between allowing punitive damages for maintenance
and cure and allowing punitive damages for wrongful death. The Supreme
Court stated that “unlike wrongful-death actions, this traditional
understanding [awarding punitive damages for maintenance and cure
actions] is not a matter to which ‘Congress has spoken directly.’” Townsend,
557 U.S. at 420–21. This indicates that, if nothing else, the Supreme Court
views wrongful death actions much differently than actions brought by
injured seaman because Congress has spoken directly on wrongful death
claims in passing the Jones Act. Several lower court cases acknowledge this
reading. In Osage Marine Services, the Eastern District of Missouri stated:
the [Townsend] Court emphasized that Miles deals with
whether general maritime law should provide a remedy for
wrongful death actions where damages for such actions have
been limited by Congress. [Townsend], however grapples with
a completely different issue. Unlike in Miles, [Townsend] deals
with a cause of action (maintenance and cure) and remedy
(punitive damages) that has not been addressed or limited by
Congress.
2012 WL 709188, at *2–*3 (internal citations omitted) (citing Townsend, 557
U.S. at 420).
Put more simply, the Court does not view Miles’ central holding to
have been overruled by Townsend. That is, post-Townsend, despite any lower
court cases treating that decision as affecting recovery of punitive damages
in non-wrongful death cases, Miles still operates to bar punitive and other
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non-pecuniary damages in general maritime wrongful death claims, such as
the one at hand in this case.4
For that reason, the Court is obliged to conclude that, in accordance
with Miles, Ms. Hackensmith cannot sustain her claims for punitive, loss of
consortium, or other non-pecuniary damages against the defendants under
her maritime action. Accordingly, the Court must grant the defendants’
summary judgment motion on that issue.
3.
MOTION TO AMEND
The last item that the Court must resolve is Ms. Hackensmith’s motion
to amend her complaint. (Docket #39). As previously noted, Ms.
Hackensmith filed a motion to amend her complaint to add a request for
punitive damages under her Jones Act negligence claim—in essence allowing
her to file a second amended complaint. (Docket #39). The defendants filed
a response, objecting to the further amendment. (Docket #41). Plaintiffs failed
to file a reply brief within the allotted 14-day time period, and therefore the
matter is ripe for review.
Having examined the parties’ arguments on the matter, the Court
determines that it must deny Ms. Hackensmith’s motion. Under Federal Rule
4
The Court realizes that this approach has been criticized fairly extensively
in the academic literature. See, e.g., Robertson, Punitive Damages in American
Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR . L. & COM . 74; Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex
Marine Corporation: The Mischief of Seeking “Uniformity” and “Legislative Intent” in
Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 55 LA . L. REV . 745 (1995); David W. Robertson,
Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA . L. REV . 463
(2010). Moreover, the approach seems somewhat counterintuitive, allowing for
punitive damages to seamen who are injured but not deceased while prohibiting
punitive damages to the administrators of seamen’s estates when those seamen
have died. As illogical as that situation may ultimately be, though, the Court is still
bound by the Supreme Court’s Miles decision.
Page 11 of 15
of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may amend its complaint once as a matter
of course—which Ms. Hackensmith has already done. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1);
(Docket #21). To make any further amendments, the requesting party must
either receive consent from the other party or leave from the Court. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Because the defendants object in this instance, Ms.
Hackensmith must receive leave from the Court to amend her complaint.
While the Court should grant leave to amend freely, leave is not
automatically granted; the Court has “broad discretion to deny leave when
there is undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue
prejudice to the defendants, or where the amendment would be futile” and
lengthy delays increase the presumption against allowing amendment. Hukic
v. Aurora Loan Services, 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir.2009); Johnson v. Methodist
Medical Center of Ill., 10 F.3d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir.1993); King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d
720, 723 (7th Cir.1994). Here, there has been substantial delay—indeed, Ms.
Hackensmith did not file her motion until after the defendants had filed their
motion for summary judgment. Moreover, that delay may very likely unduly
prejudice the defendants, who would be required to conduct additional
discovery and file further summary judgment briefs during a period in which
they should be preparing for trial. Finally, any amendment would be futile.
Employing FELA’s provisions, the Jones Act does not allow recovery for
non-pecuniary damages, which has been repeatedly interpreted to mean that
punitive damages are not recoverable. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32; McBride, 872 F.
Supp. 2d at 515, 521; Miller, 989 F.2d at 1457 (“It has been the unanimous
judgment of the courts since before the enactment of the Jones Act that
punitive damages are not recoverable under [FELA]…Punitive damages are
not therefore recoverable under the Jones Act.”) (citing Kozar v. Chesapeake
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and Ohio Ry., 449 F.2d 1238, 1240–43 (6th Cir. 1971); Kopczynski v. The
Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 560–61 (9th Cir. 1984); Miles, 498 U.S. at 32); Kona,
2010 WL 3566731, at *6–*8. Thus, even if the Court were to permit Ms.
Hackensmith to amend her complaint, it would ultimately be futile, as the
Court would need to dismiss such claim if requested by the defendants in an
additional summary judgment motion.
Therefore, the Court is obliged to deny Ms. Hackensmith’s motion to
amend her complaint.
4.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court will now enter
judgment
first, dismissing those claims the parties have stipulated to dismiss;
second, denying as moot the defendants’ summary judgment motions
that correspond to those dismissed claims;
third, granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion on Ms.
Hackensmith’s requests for punitive, loss of consortium, and other
non-pecuniary damages under both her Jones Act negligence and
unseaworthiness claims; and
fourth, denying Ms. Hackensmith’s motion to amend her complaint.
In doing so, the Court notes that a number of issues still remain active
for trial. Trial is set in this matter for July 22, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. In the
meantime, should the parties need any assistance, including a referral to the
magistrate judge to conduct mediation, they may contact the Court’s
chambers.
Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties
(Docket #42, at ¶ 2), the plaintiff’s Jones Act negligence claim against the
defendant Port City Steamship Holding Company (Am. Compl., at ¶ 5) be
and the same is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties (Docket #42, at ¶ 1), the plaintiff’s unseaworthiness claim against Port
City Steamship Services, Inc., (Am. Compl., at ¶ 10) be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties (Docket #42, at ¶ 1), the plaintiff’s general maritime law loss of
consortium claim against the defendant Port City Steamship Services, Inc.,
(Am. Compl., at ¶ 11) be and the same is hereby DISMISSED with
prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties (Docket #42, at ¶ 4(b)), any loss of consortium claim the plaintiff may
have had against the defendant Port City Steamship Services, Inc., be and the
same is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties (Docket #42, at ¶ 4(a)), any claim for future loss of wages the plaintiff
may have had against both defendants under both her Jones Act negligence
and unseaworthiness claims be and the same is hereby DISMISSED with
prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties (Docket #42, at ¶ 1–2), the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment at Docket #33 and Docket #36, be and the same are hereby
DENIED as moot;
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ remaining motion
for summary judgment (Docket #30) be and the same is hereby GRANTED,
and the plaintiff’s claim for punitive, loss of consortium, and other nonpecuniary damages under both her Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims be
and the same are hereby DISMISSED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to amend her
complaint (Docket #39) be and the same is hereby DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 9th day of April, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge
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