Moreland v. Napolitano

Filing 68

DECISION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph on 8/17/2017 denying 67 Motion for Reconsideration. (cc: all counsel) (llc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
KIMBERLY A. MORELAND,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 12-CV-1125

JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Kimberly A. Moreland sued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The
DHS moved for summary judgment on Moreland’s claim and I granted the DHS’ motion.
Presently before me is Moreland’s motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). For the reasons I explain below, Moreland’s motion is denied.
Rule 59(e) allows a party to move the court for reconsideration of a judgment within
28 days following the entry of the judgment. A motion for reconsideration serves a very
limited purpose in federal civil litigation; it should be used only “to correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal &
Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.
Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A ‘manifest error’ is not
demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the ‘wholesale disregard,
misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.’” Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069
(N.D. Ill. 1997)). Apart from manifest errors of law, “reconsideration is not for rehashing
previously rejected arguments.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 90
F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996). Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration “is left to
the discretion of the district court.” Id.
Moreland argues the court erred by finding she failed to meet her burden of
establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. (Pl.’s Br. at 4-5, 8-10, Docket # 67.) This is
simply a rehashing of previously rejected arguments and is not a proper basis for
reconsideration.
Moreland further argues that the court misinterpreted Title VII because the court
concluded Moreland failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action and
the statute does not contain the language “adverse employment action.” (Id. at 6.) Moreland
argues the court “has relied on a judicially created interpretation of the statute which is
inconsistent with the statutory language and the interpretation of the statute by the EEOC.”
(Id.) The Seventh Circuit has stated that a retaliation claim requires proof that the plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action because of her statutorily protected activity. Lord v.
High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). While Moreland may disagree
with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, I am bound by its interpretation. If
Moreland wishes to argue to the Seventh Circuit that its interpretation is wrong, she is free
to do so. However, it is not a proper ground for reconsideration.
Because Moreland has failed to meet her burden of showing a manifest error of law
or fact, her motion for reconsideration is denied.

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ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration (Docket # 67) is DENIED.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 17th day of August, 2017.

BY THE COURT
s/Nancy Joseph_____________
NANCY JOSEPH
United States Magistrate Judge

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