Locke v. Schmaling et al

Filing 11

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 6/19/13 granting 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; on or before 7/9/13 Plaintiff shall supplement his complaint as specified; the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Co rrections or his designee shall collect from Plaintiff's prisoner trust account the $300 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiffs prison trust account; and, defendants Racine County Jail, Racine County Jail Administration and the City of Racine are dismissed from this action. See Order. (cc: Plaintiff, all counsel) (nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ADAM A. LOCKE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-31-JPS

SHERIFF CHRISTOPHER SCHMALING,
CAPTAIN WEARING, RACINE COUNTY,
RACINE COUNTY JAIL,
RACINE COUNTY JAIL ADMINISTRATION,
and CITY OF RACINE,

ORDER

Defendants.

Plaintiff Adam A. Locke (“Locke”), presently incarcerated at Green
Bay Correctional Institution in the State of Wisconsin and proceeding pro se,
brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various civil rights violations
suffered during pre-trial detention in Racine County Jail in the State of
Wisconsin approximately one year ago. (Docket #1). In this connection, the
plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket #2).1
The court is required to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking
“redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “[A]ny portion of the complaint”
that “is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief” must be dismissed by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th

1

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the plaintiff has been assessed
and has paid the requisite initial partial filing fee.

Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. “Malicious,”
although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,” “is more usefully
construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109-10
(7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system,
the plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). His statement
need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the…claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, the complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (emphasis
added). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). The complaint allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should
follow the principles set forth in Twombly by first, “identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal conclusions must be supported by
factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court
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must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
“To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a
person or persons acting under color of state law.” Buchanan-Moore v. County
of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)). The court is obliged to give the
plaintiff’s pro se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Here, Locke organizes his complaint into seven counts, which may be
summarized as follows: (I) inadequate supply of laundry-eligible clothing;2
(II) failure to shield certain toilet facilities from view of prison visitors; (III)
denial of privacy in video conference visitation; (IV) inadequate supervision
of inattentive prison employees; (V) deficient ventilation; (VI) lack of
recreation; and (VII) denial of access to voting ballots. (Docket #1, 3-8).

2

In particular, Locke appears to allege a confluence of policies which render
a subset of the jail’s population (including himself) nude for a number of hours
each week: (i) only white undergarments are eligible for prison laundry – colored
undergarments are archived with a prisoner’s other belongings at intake; (ii)
prisoners who enter without white undergarments (and without means to purchase
white undergarments from the commissary) are resigned to making due without
undergarments; and (iii) only one uniform (a top and bottom) is provided to each
prisoner, so on laundry day Locke (who entered with colored undergarments and
lacks the means to purchase white undergarments from the commissary) and others
similarly-situated are left nude until laundry is complete. See (Docket #1, 3-4).

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Counts I-VI allege that Locke was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. As the Seventh Circuit teaches in Antonelli v.
Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427-1428 (7th Cir. 1996):
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishment” of a prisoner. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to
violate the Eighth Amendment, the condition of confinement
must be a denial of “basic human needs” or “the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The
infliction must be deliberate or otherwise reckless in the
criminal law sense, which means that the defendant must have
committed an act so dangerous that his knowledge of the risk
can be inferred or that the defendant actually knew of an
impending harm easily preventable. Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d
634, 638 (7th Cir.1995) (discussing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)); Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). The Due Process
Clause prohibits any kind of punishment—not merely cruel
and unusual punishment—of a pretrial detainee. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447
(1979); Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 239-40 (7th
Cir.1991); see also Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346,
348-49 (7th Cir.1988). A condition of confinement may be
imposed on a pretrial confinee without violating the Due
Process Clause if it is reasonably related to a legitimate and
non-punitive governmental goal. It may not be arbitrary or
purposeless. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874. “Retribution
and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives.” Id. at 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. at 1874 n. 20. Therefore, the
infliction may not derive from an intent to punish. “Such a
course would improperly extend the legitimate reasons for
which such persons are detained—to ensure their presence at
trial.” Sandin v. Conner, 515U.S. 472, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300,
132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Also, there “is no doubt that preventing
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal,”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101,
95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), that may, “in appropriate circumstances,
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outweigh an individual's liberty interest,” id. at 748, 107 S.Ct.
at 2102. A prison official violates the constitutional rights of a
pretrial detainee only when he acts with deliberate
indifference. Conduct is deliberately indifferent when the
defendant acts in an intentional or criminally reckless manner.
Salazar, 940 F.2d at 238.
Having reviewed Locke’s complaint with the benefit of these
teachings, the Court finds that he may proceed on each of the following
counts as to his claim that conditions of his pre-trial confinement violated the
Due Process clause: inadequate supply of laundry-eligible clothing (Count
I); failure to shield certain toilet facilities from view of prison visitors (Count
II); deficient ventilation (Count V); and lack of recreation (Count VI).
However, with regard to Counts III (denial of privacy in video
conference visitation), IV (inadequate supervision of inattentive prison
employees), and VII (denial of access to voting ballots), the Court finds no
allegation that Locke personally suffered an injury and so is obliged to dismiss
each of these counts for lack of standing unless Locke promptly supplements
his complaint with a short and plain statement alleging with specificity whether
the conditions in each of Counts III, IV and VII in fact caused injury to him
personally.
With regard to the constellation of defendants set forth in Locke’s
complaint, the Court: (i) finds that Racine County (as opposed to the City of
Racine) is the relevant municipal entity and party-in-interest with regard to
a claim of unconstitutional conditions at Racine County Jail; and (ii) finds no
state law authority indicating that either Racine County Jail or Racine County
Jail Administration is “a legal entity separable from the county government
which it serves” and so finds that neither is suable. See Whiting v. Marathon

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County Sheriff’s Dept., 382 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss Locke’s complaint as against those three defendants.
Lastly, Locke purports to sue each defendant in their individual and
official capacities. (Docket #1, 8). Pursuing Sheriff Schmaling and Captain
Wearing in their official capacities adds nothing to this action because the
municipal entity they serve – Racine County – is already a named defendant.
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“[T]he real party in interest in an
official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named
official…Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose
individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color
of state law.”). Therefore, the Court construes Sheriff Schmaling and Captain
Wearing as defending Locke’s claims in their individual capacities. With
regard to Racine County, the capacity distinction does not exist and so the
Court recognizes no such distinction as to that defendant.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (Docket #2) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before July 9, 2013, the
plaintiff shall supplement his complaint with a short and plain statement
alleging with specificity whether the conditions in each of Counts III (denial
of privacy in video conference visitation), IV (inadequate supervision of
inattentive prison employees), and VII (denial of access to voting ballots) in
fact caused injury to him personally – failure to respond accordingly by the
deadline set forth immediately above will result in Counts III, IV and VII
being dismissed with prejudice and without further notice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Secretary of the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff’s
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prisoner trust account the $300.00 balance of the filing fee by collecting
monthly payments from the plaintiff’s prison trust account in an amount
equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust
account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the
amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number
assigned to this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall submit all
correspondence and legal material to:
Honorable J.P. Stadtmueller
c/o Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S
CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following defendants are
DISMISSED from this action: Racine County Jail, Racine County Jail
Administration and the City of Racine.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 19th day of June, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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