Locke v. Schmaling et al
Filing
14
ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 7/16/13: dismissing Counts IV and VII of 1 Plaintiff's Complaint; directing the U S Marshal serve a copy of 1 the complaint, this order, and 11 the Court's previous order upon the defendants; the defendants shall file a responsive pleading to 1 the Complaint. See Order. (cc: Plaintiff, Warden of Green Bay Correctional Institution w/copy of 11 the Court's previous order, all counsel)(nm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ADAM A. LOCKE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13-CV-31-JPS
v.
SHERIFF CHRISTOPHER SCHMALING,
CAPTAIN WEARING, and
RACINE COUNTY.
ORDER
Defendants.
1.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Adam A. Locke (“Locke”), presently incarcerated at Green
Bay Correctional Institution in the State of Wisconsin and proceeding pro se,
brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various civil rights violations
suffered during pretrial detention in Racine County Jail in the State of
Wisconsin approximately one year ago. (Docket #1).
Locke organizes his complaint into seven counts, which may be
summarized as follows: (I) inadequate supply of laundry-eligible clothing;1
(II) failure to shield certain toilet facilities from view of prison visitors; (III)
denial of privacy in video conference visitation; (IV) inadequate supervision
1
In particular, Locke appears to allege a confluence of policies which render
a subset of the jail’s population (including himself) nude for a number of hours
each week: (i) only white undergarments are eligible for prison laundry – colored
undergarments are archived with a prisoner’s other belongings at intake; (ii)
prisoners who enter without white undergarments (and without means to purchase
white undergarments from the commissary) are resigned to making due without
undergarments; and (iii) only one uniform (a top and bottom) is provided to each
prisoner, so on laundry day Locke (who entered with colored undergarments and
lacks the means to purchase white undergarments from the commissary) and others
similarly-situated are left nude until laundry is complete. See (Docket #1, 3-4).
of inattentive prison employees; (V) deficient ventilation; (VI) lack of
recreation; and (VII) denial of access to voting ballots. (Docket #1, 3-8).
The court is required to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking
“redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “[A]ny portion of the complaint”
that “is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief” must be dismissed by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In a screening order dated June 19, 2013, the Court found that Locke
may proceed on each of the following counts as to his claim that conditions
of his pretrial confinement violated the Due Process Clause: inadequate
supply of laundry-eligible clothing (Count I); failure to shield certain toilet
facilities from view of prison visitors (Count II); deficient ventilation (Count
V); and lack of recreation (Count VI). (Docket #11, 5). With regard to the
balance of the counts – III (denial of privacy in video conference visitation),
IV (inadequate supervision of inattentive prison employees), and VII (denial
of access to voting ballots) – the Court found no allegation that Locke
personally suffered an injury and so ordered Locke to promptly supplement
his complaint “with a short and plain statement alleging with specificity
whether the conditions in each of Counts III, IV and VII in fact caused injury to him
personally” or else those counts would be “dismissed with prejudice and
without further notice.” (Id. at 5 and 7) (emphasis in original).
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Below, the Court addresses Locke’s timely-filed supplement
(“Supplement”). (Docket #12).2
2.
ANALYSIS
To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system,
the plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). His statement
need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the…claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, the complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (emphasis
added). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). The complaint allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should
follow the principles set forth in Twombly by first, “identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal conclusions must be supported by
2
The Supplement explicitly abandons Count VII (denial of access to voting
ballots) and so the Court will dismiss that count from Locke’s complaint. (Id. at 3).
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factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court
must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
“To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a
person or persons acting under color of state law.” Buchanan-Moore v. County
of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)). The court is obliged to give the
plaintiff’s pro se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Here, Counts I-VI allege unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
As the Seventh Circuit teaches in Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427-1428
(7th Cir. 1996):
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishment” of a prisoner. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to
violate the Eighth Amendment, the condition of confinement
must be a denial of “basic human needs” or “the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The
infliction must be deliberate or otherwise reckless in the
criminal law sense, which means that the defendant must have
committed an act so dangerous that his knowledge of the risk
can be inferred or that the defendant actually knew of an
impending harm easily preventable. Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d
634, 638 (7th Cir.1995) (discussing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)); Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). The Due Process
Clause prohibits any kind of punishment—not merely cruel
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and unusual punishment—of a pretrial detainee. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447
(1979); Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 239-40 (7th
Cir.1991); see also Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346,
348-49 (7th Cir.1988). A condition of confinement may be
imposed on a pretrial confinee without violating the Due
Process Clause if it is reasonably related to a legitimate and
non-punitive governmental goal. It may not be arbitrary or
purposeless. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874. “Retribution
and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives.” Id. at 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. at 1874 n. 20. Therefore, the
infliction may not derive from an intent to punish. “Such a
course would improperly extend the legitimate reasons for
which such persons are detained—to ensure their presence at
trial.” Sandin v. Conner, 515U.S. 472, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300,
132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Also, there “is no doubt that preventing
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal,”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101,
95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), that may, “in appropriate circumstances,
outweigh an individual's liberty interest,” id. at 748, 107 S.Ct.
at 2102. A prison official violates the constitutional rights of a
pretrial detainee only when he acts with deliberate
indifference. Conduct is deliberately indifferent when the
defendant acts in an intentional or criminally reckless manner.
Salazar, 940 F.2d at 238.
Having reviewed Locke’s Supplement with the benefit of these
teachings, the Court finds that Locke may proceed on Count III – denial of
privacy in video conference visitation – as to his claim that conditions of his
pretrial confinement violated the Due Process Clause because Locke now
adequately alleges personal injury as to that count. (Docket #12).
In contrast, Count IV of Locke’s complaint (Docket #1) alleges
generally that prison guards are unreasonably absent from their posts3 and
3
The Court previously summarized this count as “inadequate supervision
of inattentive prison employees” (Docket #11, 3).
Page 5 of 7
Locke’s Supplement fails to allege a personal injury caused by the
absenteeism. See (Docket #12). Therefore, in accordance with its warning
issued previously, the Court is obliged to and will dismiss Count IV.
In summary, the Court finds that Locke may proceed on each of the
following counts as to his claim that conditions of his pretrial confinement
violated the Due Process Clause: inadequate supply of laundry-eligible
clothing (Count I); failure to shield certain toilet facilities from view of prison
visitors (Count II); denial of privacy in video conference visitation (Count III);
deficient ventilation (Count V); and lack of recreation (Count VI).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Counts IV and VII of Plaintiff’s complaint
(Docket #1) be and the same are hereby DISMISSED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall
serve a copy of the complaint (Docket #1), this order and the Court’s prior
order (Docket #11) upon the defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4. The plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals
Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a).
The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The
full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). Although
Congress requires the court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service
precisely because in forma pauperis plaintiffs are indigent, it has not made any
provision for these fees to be waived either by the court or by the U.S.
Marshals Service;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants shall file a
responsive pleading to the complaint;
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this order and the Court’s
prior order (Docket #11) be sent to the warden of the institution where the
inmate is confined;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the Prisoner E-Filing
Program, the plaintiff shall submit all future correspondence and case filings to
institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. The Prisoner
E-Filing Program is in effect at Green Bay Correctional Institution and Waupun
Correctional Institution and, therefore, if the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at
either institution, he will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material
to:
Honorable J.P. Stadtmueller
c/o Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
The plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may
result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.
In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of
address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely
delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 16th day of July, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge
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