Cox v. Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office et al
Filing
25
ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 11/4/13 granting 20 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; and, DISMISSING this case without prejudice. (cc: Plaintiff, all counsel) (nm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
DWAYNE COX,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 13-CV-434-JPS
MILWAUKEE COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
MR. ZIER, and
MR. DENIS STINGLE,
ORDER
Defendants.
The plaintiff, Dwayne Cox, a prisoner at Green Bay Correctional
Institution, filed his complaint in this case on April 19, 2013, alleging that he
was seeking relief under Skinner v. Switzer, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1297
(2011). (Docket #1). In Skinner, the Supreme Court held that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not bar a prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking
DNA testing of crime scene evidence, so long as the prisoner challenges the
state DNA-testing statute, as opposed to the state court’s adverse rulings.
Skinner, 131 S.Ct. at 1297–98. Indeed, Mr. Cox did seek DNA testing, and so
broadly could be understood as seeking relief under Skinner. (See Docket #1,
#8). However, in reviewing Mr. Cox’s complaint, the Court pinpointed a
potential problem: the fact that Mr. Cox seemed to be protesting a
Milwaukee County Circuit Court decision finding that Mr. Cox was not
entitled to DNA testing. (See Docket #8, at 5). He requested this Court to
remand the matter to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court (Docket #1, at 6),
which clearly rings of a direct challenge to the state court’s decision, and
would be barred under Rooker-Feldman, as discussed by Skinner, 131 S.Ct. at
1298.
Nonetheless, because the Court is required to give a liberal
construction to pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs, such as Mr. Cox, Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)), the Court determined that it would be appropriate to determine that
Mr. Cox was attempting to state a Skinner challenge to Wisconsin’s postconviction DNA testing statute, and allow him to amend his pleadings to
make that fact clear. (Docket #8, at 5–6). The Court, therefore, allowed Mr.
Cox to proceed in forma pauperis, and directed him to file an amended
complaint that more clearly set out a challenge to Wisconsin’s statute.
(Docket #8, at 7–8).
Mr. Cox filed the required amended complaint, which was served on
the defendants. (Docket #13). The defendants, thereafter, moved to dismiss
Mr. Cox’s amended complaint. (Docket #20). That matter is fully briefed
(Docket #21, #23, #24), and the Court now grants the defendants’ motion to
dismiss this case for the reasons that follow.
Simply put, Mr. Cox’s suit is effectively a direct challenge to the
Milwaukee County Circuit Court’s decision, and the Court, therefore, lacks
jurisdiction to hear the suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine holds that the lower federal
courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over actions that seek
review of state-court judgments; only the United States
Supreme Court has authority to review state judgments.
Rooker–Feldman is a narrow doctrine, confined to cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
Page 2 of 7
rejection of those judgments. Stated differently, Rooker–Feldman
is only concerned with situations in which the state court’s
decision is the source of the harm that the federal suit is
designed to redress.
Dookeran v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 719 F.3d 570, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Skinner, 131 S.Ct. at 1297;
Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2011);
Kelley v. Med–1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir.2008); Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006); Simmons v. Gillespie, 712 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th
Cir. 2013)). “The Rooker-Feldman principle prevents a state-court loser from
bringing suit in federal court in order to effectively set aside the state-court
judgment.” Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896,900 (7th Cir. 2010). In
fact, even if the state court’s judgment is clearly erroneous or
unconstitutional, the Court may not review that judgment, pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman bar. Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900; Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n,
374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004). However, in Skinner, the Supreme Court
found that Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal district court challenges to “a
statute or rule governing [a lower court] decision,” even if “the ‘same or a
related question’ was earlier aired between the parties in state court.” 131
S.Ct. at 1297–98 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 292–93 (2005); citing Gash Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th
Cir. 1993); In re Smith, 349 Fed. App’x 12, 18 (6th Cir. 2009); Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 487).
Page 3 of 7
So, the question here is whether Mr. Cox is, indeed, challenging a
statute or rule governing a state court decision, or is instead challenging the
state court’s decision, itself. If it is the former, then Mr. Cox may maintain his
suit under Skinner. If it is the latter, then the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and
accordingly must dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
This situation falls squarely in the latter category, and is barred under
Rooker-Feldman. In his amended complaint, Mr. Cox generally asserts that he
is challenging the statute and makes repeated references to the Skinner
opinion. (Docket #11). However, a broader review of his amended complaint
demonstrates that he is, in essence, still seeking a reversal of the state court’s
judgment, which is prohibited under Rooker-Feldman. Mr. Cox requests that
this court order the release of all of the evidence he sought to be tested in the
state court case. (Docket #11, at 4). Thus, seeing as the state court denied
precisely that type of relief, Mr. Cox is requesting that the Court “effectively set
aside the state-court judgment,” as is prohibited under Rooker-Feldman.
Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900. Moreover, Mr. Cox does not actually make any
constitutional claims other than stating generally that the statute and the
court’s decision violate his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution. (See Docket #11, at 1–2). In reality, the
crux of his complaint is that the state court’s decision was incorrect, as he is
seeking the precise same relief that he sought below and challenges only the
state court’s decision as it applies to him—not some broader statute or rule
as it applies to all prisoners; therefore, Rooker-Feldman squarely bars that form
Page 4 of 7
of review. See Whitmore v. Alvarez, 2013 WL 995770, at *4–*5 (N.D. Ill. March
13, 2013).
Moreover, this case is very similar to several that other circuit courts
of appeal have reviewed and found barred by Rooker-Feldman. The Second,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found that similar cases are
barred by Rooker-Feldman, as being “inextricably intertwined” with state
court judgments insofar as “the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that
the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704
F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012); Alvarez v. Attorney General for Florida, 679 F.3d
1257 (11th Cir. 2012); McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010); In re
Smith, 349 Fed. App’x, at 15. The source of the injury in all of these
cases—and the one at hand—is the state trial court’s decision, not the statute
or the rule of law, and the proper method of review for reviewing the state
decision is an appeal to the state appellate court. E.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at
1263 (citing McKithen, 626 F.3d at 154–55); In re Smith, 349 F.3d at 15. The only
proper path into federal court is through the state appellate court system,
after which point Mr. Cox may appeal his case to the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Commonwealth Plaza Condominium Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 693 F.3d 743,
745 (quoting Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 645 (7th
Cir. 2011); citing Skinner, 131 S.Ct. 1289; Remeer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist.,
205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, where Mr. Cox’s injury resulted only
from the adverse state court judgment—not from the statute or some rule of
law of the state, as was the case in Skinner—the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman bar. Commonwealth
Plaza, 693 F.3d at 696–97.
Page 5 of 7
For these reasons, the Court is obliged to grant the defendants’ motion
to dismiss Mr. Cox’s amended complaint, and will dismiss the case under
Rule 12(b)(1).1
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
amended complaint (Docket #20) be and the same is hereby GRANTED, and,
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, this case be and the same is hereby DISMISSED
without prejudice.
1
As an aside, the Court must make a further point: the Milwaukee County
District Attorney’s office is not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because it is
an arm of the state. Omegbu v. Milwaukee Cnty., 326 F. App'x 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Wis. Stat. §§ 978.01, 978.03, 978.04; Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908,
910 (7th Cir.2005); Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee County, 199 Wis.2d 549, 544
N.W.2d 888, 889 (1996); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989);
Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep't, 510 F.3d 681, 694 (7th
Cir.2007); Buchanan v. Kenosha, 57 F.Supp.2d 675, 679 (E.D.Wis.1999)). The Court
recognized this issue in its screening order, and requested that Mr. Cox amend his
complaint to allege his claim against Milwaukee County; of course, because
Milwaukee County has no authority over the district attorney’s office, that course
of action was ultimately incorrect and the state received and responded to Mr.
Cox’s complaint, anyway. Nonetheless, the Court points out that Mr. Cox’s claim
against the political body would not lie, whether it was against Milwaukee County,
the district attorney’s office, or the State of Wisconsin. There are lesser concerns
with his suit against the individual assistant district attorneys, but there may still
exist issues of immunity from suit if the Court were to sustain the suit against them.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,
261-62 (2006); Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 256-57 (7th Cir.1997). However,
because the Court dismisses this case under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
without reaching the merits, these issues are ultimately irrelevant to the outcome
of this case.
Page 6 of 7
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 4th day of November, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge
Page 7 of 7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?