Saddy v. Agnesian Health Care et al

Filing 104

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 9/16/14 ADOPTING 100 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein; and, DENYING 18 and 36 Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. See Order. (cc: all counsel)(nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
DAVID SADDY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-519-JPS

AGNESIAN HEALTH CARE,
DR. THOMAS W. GROSSMAN,
DR. ENRIQUE LUY,
MARGARET M. ANDERSON, and
WAUPUN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

ORDER

Defendants.
On May 8, 2013, David Saddy filed a complaint alleging an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim. (See
Docket #1, #8). He has sued Agnesian Healthcare, Dr. Thomas Grossman,
Margaret Anderson, and Waupun Memorial Hospital, who have been
referred to in this case as the “Agnesian defendants.” He also sued a state
employee, Dr. Enrique Luy.
Dr. Luy and the Agnesian defendants separately moved for summary
judgment on the basis of exhaustion. (Docket #18, #36). The Court considered
those motions and took them under advisement pending an evidentiary
hearing to be conducted by Magistrate Judge Aaron Goodstein, pursuant to
Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). (Docket #42).
Magistrate Goodstein recruited counsel to represent Mr. Saddy
(Docket #66), and on May 28, 2014, after a period for discovery on the
exhaustion issue, held the evidentiary hearing (Docket #92). The parties filed
several post-hearing briefs (Docket #94, #95, #97, #98, #99).

On August 11, 2014, Magistrate Goodstein issued a report and
recommendations. (Docket #100). In essence, he recommends that Mr. Saddy
be allowed to proceed on his Eighth Amendment claim as against all of the
defendants. (See Docket #100 at 9–12). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
and (C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), written objections to Magistrate
Goodstein’s report and recommendation were due within fourteen days of
its issuance. Dr. Luy did not file an objection. The Agnesian defendants filed
their objections on August 21, 2014 (Docket #101), making a response due
fourteen days thereafter, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); the Court did
not receive a response thereto, and so finds that those objections are fully
briefed. Mr. Saddy filed objections on August 25, 2014 (Docket #102), and the
Agnesian defendants responded, meaning that Mr. Saddy’s objections are,
likewise, fully briefed.
In the end, the Court fully agrees with Magistrate Goodstein’s
report and recommendations. Accordingly, it will adopt the report and
recommendations and, therefore, deny both outstanding motions for
summary judgment. More specifically, Magistrate Goodstein reached the
following conclusions, the import of which the Court describes more fully
below:
(1)

Wisconsin’s administrative remedies procedures apply to the
Agnesian defendants, meaning that Mr. Saddy’s failure to
exhaust those remedies as against the Agnesian defendants
could be fatal to his case (Docket #100 at 9–10);

(2)

Mr. Saddy was led to believe that he did not need to exhaust
his remedies as against the Agnesian defendants and,

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therefore, his technical failure to exhaust is not fatal, as it was
not, as a matter of fact, available to him (Docket #100 at 10);1
(3)

Mr. Saddy’s inmate complaint alleged ongoing pain, meaning
that his inmate complaint against Dr. Luy was not untimely
(Docket #100 at 10–11); and

(4)

even if Mr. Saddy’s inmate complaint against Dr. Luy was
untimely filed, Mr. Saddy was prevented from timely doing so
by the chain of command, thus excusing any late filing (Docket
#100 at 11).

Mr. Saddy has objected to the first of those findings and the Agnesian
defendants have objected to the second. The Court finds that the first of
those findings is well-founded: there is ample reason to believe that the
Agnesian defendants, as state contractors, are subject to the same exhaustion
requirements as the state. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Stevie, No. 2:11-CV-515, 2013
WL 1194720 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013) (finding that “claims against
private employees providing services in a state-run prison are…subject
to exhaustion,” on the basis of the fact that the Sixth Circuit has held
that prisoners in privately-run facilities are subject to the exhaustion
requirements, Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.
2004)); Bruce v. Correctional Medical Servs., Inc., No. 3:06-CV-33, 2012 WL
4372378 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (finding that movant had not established
applicability of the state’s administrative remedy procedure, and therefore
was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion); Peoples
1

This is important to note, because the availability of remedies is a question
of fact; it “is not a matter of what appears on paper, but, rather, whether the paper
process was in reality open for the prisoner to pursue.” Wilder v. Sutton, 310 F.
App’x 10, 13 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006)).

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v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01189-NKL, 2012 WL 1854730 (W.D. Mo.
May 21, 2012) (holding that there was a material issue of fact as to whether
the state’s administrative remedies applied to a private contractor, because
evidentiary submissions did not establish that grievance procedure would
affect the contractor); Hallock v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., No. 10-CV-0060-DRH,
2010 WL 2574163 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2010) (finding that, where a complaint
sought relief against a “private contractor providing medical services to
prisoners,” the exhaustion requirement applied because the suit involved
prison conditions); Giampaolo v. Bartley, No. 07-526-DRH, 2010 WL 2574203
(S.D. Ill. June 23, 2010) (finding that the exhaustion requirement applied to
private contractor working for prison); see Stevens v. Goord, 2003 WL
21396665, *5 (S.D. N.Y., June 16, 2003) (holding that private contractor had
burden to establish that prison grievance procedure would have actual
authority over the private contractor, thus leaving open a dispute on a
material fact), adhered to on reargument, 2003 WL 22052978 (S.D.N.Y., Sept.
3, 2003). Moreover, because the Court ultimately sides with Magistrate
Goodstein’s second finding, that first finding is of little importance.
As to the second finding, Magistrate Goodstein was correct that the
circumstances effectively prevented Mr. Saddy from knowing that he needed
to exhaust his remedies as against the Agnesian defendants. While the
Wisconsin administrative procedures apply to the Agnesian defendants as
contractors, Mr. Saddy had no reason to know of that application. The
Agnesian defendants urge the Court to find the opposite because Mr. Saddy
knew of a contract between the Agnesian defendants and the state and
further that the Agnesian defendants had been closely aligned with the state
in providing medical care. (Docket #101 at 3–8). But mere knowledge of those
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general facts does not establish that Mr. Saddy knew (or even should have
known) that he was required to exhaust his remedies as against the Agnesian
defendants. Wis. Adm. Code § DOC 310.05 provides that inmates must
exhaust their remedies against “agents” of the state, and there is nothing to
indicate that Mr. Saddy knew of an agency relationship between the
Agnesian defendants and the state. Therefore, particularly in light of the fact
that it is the defendants’ burden to establish nonexhaustion, Santiago v.
Anderson, 496 F. App’x 630, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2012), reh'g denied (Sept. 24, 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 769 (2012) (citing Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th
Cir. 2006)), the Court must adopt Magistrate Goodstein’s report and
recommendations.
Dr. Luy has not filed an objection as to Magistrate Goodstein’s third
and fourth findings—the two that require the Court to deny Dr. Luy’s
motion for summary judgment—but, even if he had, the Court would still
adopt Magistrate Goodstein’s report and recommendation on them. The
existence of ongoing pain makes the complaint timely filed and, if not, the
time spent completing the chain of command effectively excuses any late
filing.
Because it is adopting Magistrate Goodstein’s report and
recommendations in full, the Court is likewise obliged to deny both
outstanding motions for summary judgment. The Court will issue an
updated trial scheduling order shortly that provides the parties with further
guidance for the continuation of this case.
Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Goodstein’s report and
recommendation (Docket #100) be and the same is hereby ADOPTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment (Docket #18, #36) be and the same are hereby DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 16th day of September, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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