Renard v. Ameriprise Financial Services Inc

Filing 33

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 3/6/14: granting 7 Respondent's motion and application for an order confirming the 4/15/13 Arbitration Award; denying 14 Petitioner's motion to vacate the Arbitration Award and for judgment notwithstanding the Arbitration Award; and, denying as moot 31 Respondent's expedited non-dispositive motion to supplement the record. See Order. (cc: all counsel) (nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
PAUL J. RENARD,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-555-JPS

AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,

ORDER
Respondent.
On April 29, 2013, petitioner Paul J. Renard (“Renard”) commenced
a civil action against respondent Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc.
(“Ameriprise”) in Milwaukee County Circuit Court by filing a petition to
vacate an arbitration award pursuant to Wisconsin Statute § 788.10, and for
judgment notwithstanding the arbitration award pursuant to Wisconsin
Statute § 805.14(5)(b). (Docket #1-1). On May 16, 2013, Ameriprise removed
the action to federal court. (Docket #1). This matter comes before the court on
dueling motions: Ameriprise moves to confirm the arbitration award, and
Renard moves to vacate the award. (Dockets #7, #14). Also pending is a Rule
7(h) expedited non-dispositive motion to supplement the record, filed by
Ameriprise. (Docket #31). Briefing on the motions is completed and the
matter is ready for adjudication.
1.

Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Ameriprise is a financial

brokerage firm. In a franchise agreement dated August 6, 2009 (“Franchise
Agreement”), Renard affiliated with Ameriprise as an independent financial
advisor. (Docket #1-1). Between August 2009 and March 2011, Ameriprise
and Renard executed at least four promissory notes; Ameriprise characterizes
these promissory notes as “loans,” while Renard describes them as
“performance based bonuses.”

Renard received from Ameriprise a Notice of Special Regulatory
Supervision (“Notice of Supervision”) dated May 11, 2011. The Notice of
Supervision stated that the firm received a complaint alleging that a client
was solicited to purchase Electronic Transfer Funds (“ETF’s”)1 which were
unsuitable and resulted in a financial loss. The Notice of Supervision further
informed Renard that Ameriprise initiated an investigation, and that
Ameriprise placed Renard under special supervision as a result of the
ongoing review.
On June 22, 2011, Ameriprise issued a Notice of Immediate
Termination for Cause (“Notice of Termination”) in which it stated that an
investigation into Renard’s practice found Renard in breach of the Franchise
Agreement due to several violations, including soliciting purchases in
various leveraged and inverse ETF’s, and submitting client orders marked
as unsolicited when the orders were, in fact, solicited. As a result of the
termination, the unpaid balances on the promissory notes became
immediately due and owing to Ameriprise. When Renard did not satisfy the
notes, Ameriprise filed an arbitration claim with the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) Dispute Resolution requesting damages
totaling $529,539.27. Renard filed counterclaims asserting: a violation of the
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (“WFDL”), breach of contract, interference
with contractual relationships, interference with prospective advantage,

1

The Franchise Agreement memorializes a requirement that Renard comply
with standards set forth in Ameriprise’s Manuals, one of which is the Regulatory
Information Center (“RIC”). RIC Section 21.2.2a provides, “Due to inherent risk and
complexity, Ameriprise Financial does not permit its registered representatives to
make recommendations concerning certain investment instruments. The following
instruments may not be recommended (solicited) for purchase: Leveraged or
inverse ETF’s….”

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conversion, and misrepresentation; Renard sought damages in the
amount of $16,200,000.00. A three-person arbitration panel conducted a
three-day evidentiary hearing in April of 2013. The panel found Renard
liable for $448,200.00 in compensatory damages, and dismissed Renard’s
counterclaims outright. The panel also specified each party’s liability for
arbitration fees, and denied with prejudice each party’s request for attorneys’
fees.
In his petition, Renard does not oppose confirmation of the arbitration
award as it relates to the promissory notes and attorneys’ fees. Rather, he
argues that the award should be vacated as to its resolution of his WFDL and
intentional tort counterclaims, and that the court should determine and
award punitive damages.
2.

Choice of Law
The parties dispute which law governs their case: Renard maintains

that the Wisconsin Arbitration Act (“WAA”), Wis. Stats. Ch. 788, governs,
while Ameriprise asserts that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 et. seq., applies. (Docket #15 at 3-7; Docket #8 at 6-7). A comparison of the
WAA and FAA reveals no substantive textual differences. Indeed, as the
Seventh Circuit noted, the language of the WAA and FAA are “virtually
identical.” Flexible Mfg. Systems Pty. Ltd. v. Super Products Corp., 87 F.3d 96,
99 (7th Cir. 1996). Both statutes explicitly empower a court to vacate an
arbitration award in any of the following four instances: (1) if the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) if there was evident
partiality or corruption on the part of one or more arbitrators; (3) if the
arbitrators committed misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear material evidence, or committed
other misconduct that prejudiced the rights of a party; or (4) if the arbitrators
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exceeded their powers or did not execute a mutual, final, and definite
resolution of the issue. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); Wis. Stats. § 788.10. The text of the
statutes being the same, Renard’s argument focuses on judicial gloss;
according to Renard, choice of law is important in this case because, in
addition to the four instances articulated in the WAA, Wisconsin courts have
held that a court may vacate an arbitration award upon a showing of
“manifest disregard of the law.” (Docket #15 at 17-19). Ameriprise responds,
in part, that the Franchise Agreement requires application of the FAA, which
in the Seventh Circuit is read to have a very narrow “manifest disregard”
standard. (Docket #27 at 9).
The parties are correct that the WAA and FAA take different
approaches to the manifest disregard standard. As recently as 2010, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated manifest disregard as a ground for
vacating an arbitration award. Sands v. Menard, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 384, 397
(Wis. 2010) (a court may vacate the award if the arbitration panel “engages
in perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct, when the panel
manifestly disregards the law, or when the award itself is illegal or violates
strong public policy.”). In Wisconsin, an arbitrator manifestly disregards the
law if the decision is not supported by law. Stated differently, “[a]n arbitrator
cannot be said to have manifestly disregarded the law if substantial authority
sustains the arbitrator.” Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Libby Landfill Negotiating
Comm., 524 N.W.2d 883, 892 (Wis. 1994) (citations). In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit held, nearly twenty years ago, that the “grounds for setting aside
arbitration awards are exhaustively stated in” the FAA, and, accordingly,
courts may not set aside an arbitration award upon the finding of a manifest
disregard of the law. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706
(7th Cir. 1994). Instead, under the FAA in the Seventh Circuit, manifest
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disregard of the law is only shown where the arbitrators exceed their powers
and “direct the parties to violate the law.” Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLC,
450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany &
Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)) (further citations omitted). As explained
below, the parties’ exhaustive briefing on the WAA manifest disregard of the
law standard really amounts to a tempest in a teapot; as Ameriprise shows,
the Franchise Agreement governing the parties’ relationship specifies that the
FAA governs the parties’ dispute resolution via arbitration, and the court
will thus consider Renard’s petition under the federal law.
For direction as to choice of law, the court looks first to the Franchise
Agreement. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58
(1995); Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir.
2013) (“Arbitration is at bottom a matter of contract.”) (collecting cases). The
Franchise Agreement contains reference to three bodies of law: Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Federal. First, section 26A of the Franchise Agreement, which
falls under the title “Applicable Law,” states that the Agreement “shall be
interpreted and construed exclusively under the laws of the State of
Minnesota.” Specifically exempted from this statement, however, are “all
issues relating to arbitrability or the enforcement of this agreement to
arbitrate,” which the contract provides will be governed by the terms set
forth in the Franchise Agreement and by the rules of arbitration of FINRA.
Second, the Arbitration Section of the Franchise Agreement memorializes an
agreement to submit “any dispute, claim or controversy” between Renard
and Ameriprise to resolution via arbitration and sets forth several procedures
governing such arbitrations, including: “This Agreement to arbitrate is
governed by and enforceable under the terms of the Federal Arbitration
Act.” And finally, the parties executed a “State Addenda” to the Franchise
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Agreement with provisions that may supercede portions of the Franchise
Agreement; with regard to agreements governed by Wisconsin law, the
Addenda provides that the WFDL supercedes any inconsistent provision of
the Franchise Agreement.
Ameriprise maintains, and the court agrees, that the Franchise
Agreement memorializes the parties’ choice of law regarding arbitration, and
that choice is the FAA. Renard’s argument in favor of applying the WAA is
three-fold: first, that the FAA is limited to arbitration awards that raise a
federal question; second, that the parties chose for their award to be
enforceable under Wisconsin law when they conducted the arbitration in
Wisconsin; and third, that application of the FAA circumvents the WFDL.
(Docket #15 at 3-7). The court addresses each argument in turn.
Renard’s first argument is plainly wrong as a matter of law. Renard
cites a case from the Seventh Circuit, Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,
for support that “the FAA is limited to those arbitration agreements or
awards that raise a federal question.” (Docket #15 at 3). However, Lander Co.
actually explains that “the Federal Arbitration Act is limited to arbitration
agreements or award that arise out of disputes that could be litigated in
federal court.” 107 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1997). The category of “disputes
that could be litigated in federal court” encompasses more than just cases
raising a federal question, and includes cases in federal court on diversity
jurisdiction, such as the present case; Renard’s characterization of the case as
holding that a federal question is required is incorrect. See also Wise, 450 F.3d
at 266 (“But the [FAA] confers federal jurisdiction in cases involving
arbitration only of disputes that, were they litigated rather than arbitrated,
would be within federal jurisdiction.”).

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Renard’s second argument is equally unavailing; he argues that the
parties chose to have Wisconsin law govern the enforcement of the
arbitration award when they chose to conduct the arbitration hearing in
Wisconsin. (Docket #15 at 4). For support, Renard relies on Madison Beauty
Supply, LTD. v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 167 Wis.2d 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); this
reliance is misplaced. There, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that
the WAA governed the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate because the
parties “elected” to proceed in a Wisconsin circuit court under the WAA. 167
Wis.2d 237, 245. The court’s analysis is a bit puzzling—can it really be said
that the defendants “elected” anything by the plaintiff’s filing?—and it has
received some criticism. Michael A. Bowen, Brian E. Butler, Cassandra H.
McCauley & Joseph P. Wright, The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law § 10.6 (4th
Ed. 2012) (“[I]t is not clear what the court meant by this comment, unless it
was referring to the defendants’ failure to remove the case to federal court
after the plaintiff had filed it.”). In any event, Madison Beauty Supply is
distinguishable because here, Ameriprise immediately removed the action
to federal court and has vociferously contested the application of Wisconsin
Law; in light of these facts, the court will not conclude that Ameriprise
“elected” review under Wisconsin law. Additionally, Madison Beauty Supply
leaves Renard further unassisted in that it turns on the judicial forum in
which the parties contested the arbitration and does not consider the location
of the arbitration in the choice of law analysis; in that case, the parties’
contract required the parties to hold the arbitration in Illinois, but the
Wisconsin court does not consider applying Illinois law. Id. at 240. Renard
also cites Volt Info. Sciences v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989), for support
that “the procedure for enforcing the parties’ agreement to arbitrate may be
chosen by the parties.” This is, of course, true enough, but the case does not
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shed any light on which law was, in fact, “chosen by the parties” in this case.
In sum, neither of the authorities Renard cites support his argument that the
physical location of the arbitration hearing is somehow relevant in
determining choice of law.
Finally, Renard maintains that application of the FAA to his case
circumvents the WFDL. (Docket #15 at 4-7). Renard relies primarily on an
opinion and order from Magistrate Judge Stephen Crocker in the Western
District of Wisconsin: Wins Equipment, LLC v Rayco Mfg., Inc., 668 F.Supp.2d
1148 (W.D. Wis. 2009). Unfortunately for Renard, Magistrate Crocker’s
reasoning does not support his argument. First, in that case, the court
considered a motion to transfer pursuant to a forum selection clause in the
parties’ contract. 668 F.Supp.2d at 1148. One of the many arguments before
the court was that the forum selection clause was contrary to Wisconsin state
public policy as expressed in the WFDL. Id. at 1152. Magistrate Crocker’s
analysis on the issue is unhelpful to Renard because forum selection and
choice of law are treated differently in the WFDL. The WFDL explicitly
provides that a dealer may bring suit under the WFDL in “any court of
competent jurisdiction.” Wis. Stat. § 135.06. The WFDL further provides that
any contractual provision that purports to vary the terms of the WFDL is
void. Wis. Stat. 135.025(3). Taking these two provisions together, Magistrate
Crocker reasoned that the forum selection clause may violate the WFDL
because it limits the dealer’s right, as specified in the WFDL, to his or her
forum of choice. 668 F.Supp.2d at 1153. With regard to arbitration, the WFDL
contains no similar provision restricting the parties from agreeing to a
particular choice of law or from agreeing to arbitrate pursuant to a particular
set of laws. Thus, the reasoning of Wins Equipment and the other forum

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selection clause cases Renard cites do not mandate the application of the
WAA in this case.
The court is thus unpersuaded by Renard’s argument that the WAA’s
review provisions, including the expansive manifest disregard of law
standard, apply. As Ameriprise shows, the parties’ Franchise Agreement
specifies that any arbitration will be governed by and enforced under the
terms of the FAA. (Docket #8 at 7). The court thus proceeds within the
narrow confines of review provided by the FAA.
3.

Renard’s Petition to Vacate the Award
Renard argues that the arbitration award must be vacated for three

reasons: first, because the arbitrators exceeded their powers in denying
Renard’s WFDL and intentional tort claims; second, because the award was
procured by fraud due to Ameriprise’s misstatement of fact and law; and
third, because Renard was prejudiced when the arbitrators refused to keep
the record open to allow Renard to offer additional evidence. (Docket #1-1;
Docket #15 at 20-32). The court addresses each in turn.
3.1

Scope of the Arbitrators’ Powers

Renard first argues that the arbitrators exceeded their powers when
they manifestly disregarded the WFDL and Minnesota common law2 when
they denied his WFDL and intentional tort claims, respectively. (Docket #15
at 20). A court reviewing an arbitration award may vacate the award “where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). In determining whether the arbitrators

2

As stated above, the Franchise Agreement contained a general choice of
law provision stating that Minnesota law governs the contract. The parties do not
dispute that Renard’s intentional tort claims fall under this choice of law provision.

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exceeded their powers, the court employs a very narrow review. As the
Seventh Circuit has articulated, “[j]udicial review of arbitration awards is
tightly limited; perhaps it ought not be called ‘review’ at all.” Baravati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir.1994). The court further
explained:
By including an arbitration clause in their contract the parties
agree to submit disputes arising out of the contract to a
nonjudicial forum, and we do not allow the disappointed party
to bring his dispute into court by the back door, arguing that
he is entitled to appellate review of the arbitrators’ decision.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the court does not analyze whether the
arbitrators erred in their decision; “neither error nor clear error nor even
gross error is a ground for vacating an award.” IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal
Alliance Assoc., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001). Instead, review is
limited to the question of whether the arbitrators “violated the agreement to
arbitrate, as by […] exceeding their powers, etc.—conduct to which the
parties did not consent when they included an arbitration clause in their
contract.” Wise, 450 F.3d at 269.
The parties went before the arbitrators for resolution of their questions
of whether Renard breached his promissory notes, and whether Ameriprise
breached their contract, violated the WFDL, and violated common law.
Renard does not argue that these questions fell outside their agreement to
arbitrate, and for good reason: the Franchise Agreement’s arbitration clause
is broad, encompassing “any dispute, claim or controversy.” Instead, Renard
argues that the WFDL mandates certain notice requirements, and that
Ameriprise’s admitted noncompliance with those notice requirements must
result in judgment in his favor. (Docket #15 at 20-21). The question before this
court is not whether the arbitrators correctly interpreted the law—for legal
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error is not a sufficient basis for vacating an arbitration award—but instead,
the question before the court must be phrased as: did the arbitrators interpret
the law in determining their award? The court concludes that they did. At
arbitration, Renard provided the above-described interpretation of the
WFDL’s requirements. Ameriprise responded that it was within its rights to
immediately terminate Renard based on his alleged violations of federal
securities laws, because Ameriprise’s responsibilities under those securities
laws preempt any notice requirements found in the WFDL. The record before
the arbitrators supported findings that Renard solicited sales of leveraged
and inverse ETF’s, and then falsely marked those orders as unsolicited in his
reports. Ameriprise maintained that these inaccurate reports violated
multiple provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, and that immediate
termination was called for because Renard’s actions left Ameriprise
potentially exposed to liability. The record also contained testimony from
Renard’s WFDL expert opining that Ameriprise was required to comply with
the WFDL notice requirements “unless the–doing so would be in violation
of federal statute.” Thus, the court concludes that the award was the result
of interpretation of law and evidence before the arbitration panel, as the
record contained evidence in support of their award. Additionally, Renard
has not identified anything in the record showing that the arbitrators’
decision was based on something other than the evidence and argument in
the record. The court thus finds that the arbitrators could have agreed with
Ameriprise’s reading of the WFDL “without taking leave of their senses,”
Wise, 450 F.3d at 270, and did not exceed their authority in reaching their
award.
Renard also asserts that the arbitrators exceeded their authority when
they denied his claims for intentional interference with prospective business
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relations and conversion, both Minnesota common law causes of action.
(Docket #15 at 21-22). However, Renard concedes that if his immediate
termination was found to be justified, then he cannot prove either intentional
tort claim. (Docket #29 at 11). The court agrees. Having concluded that the
arbitrators did not exceed their authority in denying Renard’s WFDL claims,
the court likewise concludes that the arbitrators did not exceed their
authority in denying his tort claims, for all the reasons stated above.
3.2

Procurement By Fraud

Renard next argues that the court must vacate the arbitration award
because it was procured by fraud. Renard alleges that Ameriprise’s counsel
knowingly misstated fact (by stating that Renard was a criminal who broke
federal securities laws, when, in fact, Renard was not criminally charged) and
law (by representing that the WFDL is preempted by federal securities laws).
The FAA provides that an award may be vacated if it was “procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). To prevail on this
argument, Renard must establish the alleged fraud by clear and convincing
evidence. Gingiss Intern., Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995). The
term “procured by [ ] fraud” is not defined in the FAA, however, in the
context of a motion brought under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Seventh Circuit has defined “fraud on the court” as acts that
“defile the court.” In re Gold 255, Inc., 652 F.3d 806, 80 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). There is some authority to support that, when reviewing an
arbitration award, a court should require a showing of a greater level of
improper conduct as a reflection of the limited power of judicial review of
arbitration awards. Dean Foods Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 911
F.Supp. 1116, 1124 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (citing Pacific & Arctic Railway &
Navigation Co. v. United Transportation Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.
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1991)). In this instance, the court need not determine how strong the showing
of fraud must be because, on this record, Renard’s arguments are so
insubstantial they barely merit discussion.
With regard to the alleged misstatement of fact, Renard maintains that
it constituted fraud on the tribunal for Ameriprise’s counsel to refer to
Renard as a criminal who violated federal securities laws because Renard
was not charged with or convicted of violating the law.3 (Docket #15 at 26).
Renard cites no legal authority in support of his argument. In response,
Ameriprise points out that Renard testified that he knowingly mismarked
transaction tickets, that this behavior violated the law, and that it was
permissible for Ameriprise to comment on the evidence in the record during
its closing statement. (Docket #27 at 21). The court simply cannot conclude
that Ameriprise’s statements “defile[d] the court” so as to constitute fraud.
First, as Ameriprise argues, closing arguments are not evidence, they are
persuasion, and “counsel may make arguments reasonably inferred from the
evidence presented.” United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 1978)
(citations omitted). Ameriprise’s statements had a basis in the evidence
before the arbitration panel, and Ameriprise did not defile the court in
encouraging the arbitrators to view that evidence in the light most favorable
to it. Second, it is uncontested that Renard had the final word; if he believed
that Ameriprise misconstrued the record or encouraged a deduction
unsupported by the evidence, he had an opportunity to provide his
perspective in his rebuttal argument.
3

Ameriprise filed an expedited non-dispositive motion pursuant to Civil
Local Rule 7(h) to supplement the record with documents indicating that FINRA
suspended Renard for two years and fined him $60,000.00 for violating FINRA
rules. (Docket #31). The court will deny the motion as moot, as the record that was
before the arbitrators is sufficient to deny Renard’s motion.

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Regarding the alleged misstatement of law, Renard argues that
Ameriprise represented to the arbitrators that cases cited in its closing
argument directly held the WFDL to be preempted by federal law. (Docket
#15 at 27). Ameriprise replies that it cited cases in support of its argument,
and analogized the cases to the WFDL. (Docket #27 at 18). Again, Renard
does not meet his burden of showing clear and convincing evidence of fraud.
Rather, the record shows that Ameriprise utilized case law to support the
legal holding it desired; it goes without saying that if there is no existing case
law directly on point, counsel can only argue from analogy. Furthermore, as
with the allegedly fraudulent representation of fact, Renard offered a rebuttal
argument in which he had an opportunity to argue why Ameriprise’s
analysis was incorrect.
Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the court
cannot agree with Renard that the award was procured by fraud. Simply
stated, Ameriprise’s counsel was doing the job of an advocate and Renard
has not provided clear and convincing evidence of anything rising to the
level of fraud. Accordingly, the court will not vacate the award on this
argument.
3.3

Arbitrator Misconduct

Renard’s third and final argument urges the court to vacate the
arbitration award because the arbitrators did not keep the record open to
allow Renard to submit post-hearing briefs. (Docket #15 at 32). The FAA
provides that an award may be vacated if “the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown,
or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.…”
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). However, as Ameriprise amply demonstrates, Section
10(a)(3) offers Renard no avenue for relief in this case because it provides
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review when a party is prevented from offering evidence, and Renard does
not argue that he wanted to provide further evidence, but rather that he
wanted further opportunity to review and brief the law. (Docket #27 at 22).
Indeed, his request to the arbitrator was for “a couple of days just to verify
any law that may apply or—in addition to the one that we cited to.” (Docket
#10-3 at 75:22-24). Renard replies only that he would have put on further
evidence if given the chance. (Docket #29 at 13).
The court will not vacate the award on this basis. First, it is obviously
not in keeping with the letter or spirit of the FAA to vacate an award due to
the arbitrators’ refusing to hear more evidence when the parties never put
that request to the arbitrators in the first place. Second, Renard provides no
legal authority to support his argument that a failure to permit post-hearing
briefing on the law warrants vacating the award.
For all the reasons explained above, the court will deny Renard’s
motion to vacate the arbitration award. Because he did not show entitlement
to vacate the award, his motion for judgment notwithstanding the arbitration
award will be, likewise, denied.
4.

Ameriprise’s Motion for an Order Confirming the Award
Also before the court is Ameriprise’s motion for an order confirming

the arbitration award. (Docket #14). Under 9 U.S.C. § 9, a party to an
arbitration proceeding may ask a United States District Court to enter
judgment upon an arbitration award. Unlike petitions to vacate arbitration
awards, petitions to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9 are
“usually routine or summary.” Hasbro, Inc. v. Catalyst USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 689,
691-92 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “With few exceptions, as long as the
arbitrator does not exceed [her] delegated authority, her award will be
enforced.” Id. (citation omitted). Having concluded that Renard did not
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demonstrate any frailty in the arbitration award, the court will, accordingly,
grant Ameriprise’s motion for an order confirming the award.
Ameriprise also requests that the court award post-judgment interest
on the arbitration award, pursuant to FINRA Rule 13904(j), which provides
that an award bears interest from the date of the award if the award was
subject to a motion to vacate which was denied. (Docket #8 at 16-17).
Ameriprise requests $52.19 in daily interest from the date of the award
through the date of final judgment.4 Renard does not contest Ameriprise’s
request. Accordingly, the court’s judgment will include 323 days of interest,
in all totaling $16,909.56.
5.

Conclusion
By virtue of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their dispute, the

arbitrators were authorized to render a decision regarding Ameriprise’s
claim and Renard’s counterclaims. The arbitrators did exactly that. They
might have been correct or they might have been incorrect, but they
exercised the powers they were given. Therefore, their award will be
confirmed, and judgment will be entered accordingly.
Accordingly,

4

FINRA Rule 13904(j) provides that interest shall be assessed at the legal rate
established by the state in which the award was rendered. Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8)
establishes that rate as “1 percent plus the prime rate in effect on the day judgment
is entered, as reported by the federal reserve board in federal reserve statistical
release.” The prime rate on April 16, 2013 was 3.25%, so the total rate is 4.25%.
Multiplying the amount of the award, $448,200.00, by the 4.25% interest rate
yields $19,048.50 in annual interest. Dividing that figure by 365 days in the year,
yields $52.19 in daily interest.

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IT IS ORDERED that Ameriprise’s motion and application for an
order confirming the April 15, 2013, arbitration award (Docket #7) be and the
same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Renard’s motion to vacate the
arbitration award and motion for judgment notwithstanding the arbitration
award (Docket #14) be and the same is hereby DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Ameriprise’s Rule 7(h) expedited nondispositive motion to supplement the record (Docket #31) be and the same
is hereby DENIED as moot.
The clerk of court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 6th day of March, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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