Williams v. Haines

Filing 22

DECISION AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia J Gorence on 8/6/14. IT IS ORDERED that the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be and hereby is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is DISMISSED. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment accordingly. (cc: all counsel)(mlm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MANUEL WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-825

TIM HAINES
Respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

On July 22, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254.

The petitioner was convicted after entering a guilty plea to

possession of a firearm as a repeat offender. The Circuit Court for Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin entered the judgment of conviction on September 8, 2010.
The petitioner challenges the judgment of conviction on the following grounds: 1)
the petitioner=s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated because the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to
justify stopping or detaining him; 2) the Wisconsin Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court’s denial of the petitioner=s motion to suppress.
The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1331 because
the matter arises under federal statutes. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. ' 1391. The
case was assigned according to the random assignment of civil cases pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 72(a) (E.D. Wis.). The parties have
consented to United States magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c)
and General Local Rule 73 (E.D. Wis.).
A preliminary examination of the petition was conducted in accordance with Rule 4
of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases. By order filed September 4, 2013, this court
determined that “it does not plainly appear from the 'face of the petition' that the petitioner
is not entitled to relief." Thus, this court ordered the respondent, Tim Haines, to answer
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The respondent answered the petition.

Subsequently, the parties briefed the petition which is ready for disposition and will be
addressed herein.
APPLICABLE LAW
The habeas corpus statute was amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 100 Stat. 1214 (1996), which provides in
pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claimB
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d). This provision entitles federal courts acting within their jurisdiction
to interpret the law independently, but requires them to refrain from Afine tuning@ state
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court interpretations. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870-77 (7th Cir. 1996), rev=d on
other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). AThus, although this court reviews the state court’s
legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, that review is >tempered
by AEDPA=s deferential constraints.=@ Hereford v. McCaughtry, 101 F.Supp.2d 742, 746
(E.D. Wis. 2000) (quoting Sanchez v. Gilmore, 189 F.3d 619, 623 [7th Cir. 1999]).
A state court’s decision is Acontrary to . . . clearly established Federal law as
established by the United States Supreme Court@ if it is Asubstantially different from
relevant [Supreme Court] precedent.@ Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir.
2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 [2000]). The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit recognized the narrow application of the Acontrary to@ clause:
under the Acontrary to@ clause of ' 2254(d)(1), [a court] could grant a writ of
habeas corpus . . . where the state court applied a rule that contradicts the
governing law as expounded in Supreme Court cases or where the state
court confronts facts materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court
case and nevertheless arrives at a different result.
Washington, 219 F.3d at 628. The court went on to explain that the Aunreasonable
application of@ clause was broader and Aallows a federal habeas court to grant habeas
relief whenever the state court >unreasonably applied [a clearly established] principle to
the facts of the prisoner's case.=" Id. (quoting Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523).
To be unreasonable, a state court ruling must be more than simply "erroneous"
and perhaps more than "clearly erroneous." Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334 (7th
Cir. 1997). Under the Aunreasonableness@ standard, a state court’s decision will stand Aif
it is one of several equally plausible outcomes.@ Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742,
748-49 (7th Cir. 1997). In Morgan v. Krenke, the court explained that:
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[u]nreasonableness is judged by an objective standard and under the
Aunreasonable application@ clause, Aa federal habeas court may not issue
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.
Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.@
232 F.3d 562, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1522). Therefore,
before a court may issue a writ of habeas corpus, it must determine that the state court
decision was both incorrect and unreasonable. Washington, 219 F.3d at 628.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of November 7, 2009, Officers Dwight Copeland and Angela Ware
of the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) responded to the report of a shooting near the
3300 block of West Hampton Avenue in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a Ahigh risk area@ for
Adrug or gun related arrests.@ (Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Respondent=s Brief], Exh. 4 [Wisconsin Court of Appeals Decision] at 2). Upon arrival,
the officers saw a group of people, including the petitioner. The officers did not observe
a shooting or hear shots fired. See Petitioner=s Habeas Corpus Brief [Petitioner=s Brief],
Exh. 2 [Transcript of Wisconsin Circuit Court Suppression Motion Hearing] at 15. As
they approached the group of people, they heard someone yell Athey got a gun over
there,@ while pointing in the petitioner=s direction. (Respondent=s Brief, Exh. 4. at 2). The
officers did not have a description of the suspect and did not know the petitioner prior to
the incident, but they were drawn to the petitioner because of the peculiar way his arms
cradled something underneath his jacket. (Petitioner=s Brief, Exh. 2 at 10-11). One of the
petitioner=s hands was underneath his jacket, and the other was outside Alike he was
cradling a child.@ (Respondent=s Brief, Exh. 4. at 2).
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Officer Copeland testified that the petitioner was looking around and the officer
thought he was looking for a path to run. The officers stopped their squad car and exited
with their guns drawn. When the officers asked the petitioner what he had in his arms,
the petitioner responded, AI have a gun.@ Id. at 3. He then dropped a shotgun and ran.
The officers apprehended the petitioner and placed him under arrest. Subsequently, the
petitioner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm as a repeat offender.
Wis. Stat. '' 941.29 (2); 939.62(1)(b).
The petitioner filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that the police stop
preceding his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing and found that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The
trial court denied the petitioner=s motion to suppress. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court decision to deny the motion. (Respondent=s Brief, Exh. 4 at 4-5).
On June 12, 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the petition for review.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner asserts that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
denial of his motion to suppress. The petitioner alleges that the police officers lacked a
reasonable suspicion when they stopped their police car in front of him and exited the car
with their guns drawn. The petitioner also maintains that he did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his challenge in state court because the trial court and the court of
appeals based its decision on the unconstitutional stop and Afailed to apply the applicable
law to the facts in [his] case.@ (Petitioner’s Brief at 12).
The respondent asserts that the petitioner received a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his Fourth Amendment challenge when the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
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before denying his suppression motion. Thus, the respondent asserts that the petitioner
is precluded from bringing a federal habeas corpus challenge.

The respondent

maintains that A[t]here is no indication that the state courts were >careless of [the
petitioner=s] right to present his claim= and no evidence that the state judges were bribed,
sleepwalking, or had their minds closed.@ (Respondent=s Brief at 6). The respondent
also states that the petitioner has failed to explain why he lacked a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his Fourth Amendment challenge in state court.
As long as a petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus “enjoyed ‘an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim’ in state court, federal habeas review
of the claim is barred.” Miranda v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984, 997 (7th Cir. 2005), (quoting
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 [1976]). In Stone, the Supreme Court “limited the
role of the federal courts in evaluating Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners who,
relying on the exclusionary rule, contend that allegedly unconstitutionally seized evidence
should not have been used against them.” Cabrera v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 530 (7th
Cir. 2003).
The Court in Stone stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to
deter unlawful police conduct, would not be served by applying the rule in collateral
attacks on criminal proceedings.

The Court concluded that “where the State has

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial.” 428 U.S. at
495.
A petitioner has received an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
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Amendment claim when “(1) he clearly apprised the state court of his Fourth Amendment
claim along with the factual basis for that claim, (2) the state court carefully and
thoroughly analyzed the facts, and (3) the court applied the proper constitutional case to
those facts.” Liebach, 394 F.3d at 997; Pierson v. O’Leary, 959 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir.
1992). The third factor does not require that the state court resolved the claim correctly.
Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F. 3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2002); see also, Cabrera, 324 U.S. at
531. The requirement for a full and fair hearing applies at both the trial court level, as
well as on direct review of the petitioner’s conviction. Id. (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 489).
The petitioner asserts that the Wisconsin state courts incorrectly applied the law to
the facts of this case. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court conducted a suppression
hearing where both the state and the petitioner had the opportunity to call and
cross-examine witnesses. The state called the only witness, Officer Dwight Copeland,
one of the two officers who was present at the scene. Officer Copeland described in
detail the events that led to the stop of the petitioner, including his and Officer Ware=s
dispatch to a report of a shooting, the way the petitioner placed his hands in his jacket and
cradled Asomething,@ and someone calling out that there was a gun while pointing in the
petitioner=s direction. (Respondent=s Brief, Exh. 4 at 2). The petitioner’s counsel had
ample opportunity to further explore the issues by asking follow-up questions regarding
what the officer observed or calling other witnesses to testify regarding the stop. The
trial court considered all of the facts and concluded that the investigatory stop was
reasonable.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. In upholding
the denial of the motion to suppress, the court weighed several factors and determined
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that there was reasonable cause for the stop. A brief, investigatory stop that demands
only a limited intrusion into an individual=s privacy is permitted under the Constitution
when it is based upon Aspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.@ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 (1868). The court of appeals stated:
Based on the testimony from the trial court hearing, the Circuit Court found:
! the officers were sent to a shooting in a Ahigh risk area@;
! when police arrived, they noticed [the petitioner] Abecause of the way he was
holding or cradling something@; Abecause of the jacket and the placement of his
hands@; and because Ahe looked like he planned to run@;
! Asomeone called out that there was a gun@
! when the police asked [the petitioner] AWhat [do] you got,@ [the petitioner]
answered A>A gun,= and dropped it.@
These findings are supported by the testimony at the suppression hearing
and are therefore not clearly erroneous. Based on these findings, the
circuit court ruled Athe officer had a reasonable suspicion@ to stop and
question Williams. We agree. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
124 (2000) (A[T]he fact that the stop occurred in a >high crime area= [is]
among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.@)
(A[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion.@).
(Respondent=s Brief, Exh. 4 at 4-5).
Contrary to the petitioner=s assertions, the Wisconsin state courts properly applied
the relevant case law to the facts.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Copeland

explained in great detail why he stopped the petitioner. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
laid out Officer Copeland=s testimony and the pertinent, articulable facts of the case
supporting reasonable suspicion. Thus, the petitioner was afforded a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. Therefore, his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus will be denied.
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CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Finally, in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases as
amended, the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters
a final order adverse to the application.” “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
To make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the petitioner
must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 and
n. 4 [1983]).
In this case, reasonable jurists would not find the court’s decision to deny the
petition debatable. Thus, the court will deny a certificate of appealability as to all of the
petitioner’s claims.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petitioner's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus be and hereby is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is dismissed.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment accordingly.

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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 6th day of August, 2014
BY THE COURT:

s/ Patricia J. Gorence
PATRICIA J. GORENCE
United States Magistrate Judge

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