Ludke et al v. Baenen et al

Filing 22

ORDER signed by Judge J P Stadtmueller on 9/30/13: DENYING 18 Plaintiff Ludke's request to be reinstated as a plaintiff in this case and is prohibited from further participation in this case; the Court IMPOSES MONETARY SANCTIONS upon Mr. Lud ke in the amount of $3,850.00; the Court ENJOINS Mr. Ludke from filing any further cases or documents in this district until he has fully paid the imposed $3,850.00 sanctions amount; in keeping with this injunction, the Clerk of Court shall refuse to accept for filing and shall return to Mr. Ludke any filings that do not pertain to a request for habeas corpus relief or involve a credible allegation that Mr. Ludke is in danger of imminent harm. (cc: Plaintiffs, all counsel)(nm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
BRIAN A. MAUS and JASON M. LUDKE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-1009-JPS

MICHAEL BAENEN, SARAH COOPER,
PETER ERICKSEN, CATHY FRANCOIS,
MICHAEL MOHR, MARK LESATZ,
LT. SWIEKATOWSKI, SGT. ARTS,
DONALD CLUSEN, JAMES MURPHY,
SCOTT WALKER, JAMES DOYLE,
EDWARD WALL, GARY HAMBLIN,
DONALD WESTFIELD, CATHY A. JESS,
CHARLES FACKTOR,
CINDY O’DONNELL, LENA TAYLOR,
JEFF ROEMER, C.O. GUERRERO,
C.O. ROUSE, DIANE LONGSINE,
WILLIAM POLLARD, C.O. ADAMCZYK,
DITTMAN, TERRI MAGRAY, JOHN DOE,
and JUDY DINSE,

ORDER

Defendants.
It would be a vast understatement to call Jason M. Ludke a nuisance
litigant. In the past five years, alone, he has filed no less than eleven civil
rights suits in this Court. (See e.g., (1) Case No. 10-CV-146-LA; (2) Case No.
11-CV-506-CNC; (3) Case No. 11-CV-577-CNC; (4) Case No. 11-CV-655-CNC;
(5) Case No. 11-CV-830-CNC; (6) Case No. 12-CV-495-CNC; (7) Case No. 13CV-740-CNC; (8) Case No. 13-CV-868-CNC; (9) Case No. 13-CV-878-CNC;
(10) Case No. 13-CV-1009-JPS; (11) Case No. 13-CV-1058-JPS). Not one of
those suits has ever been successful. In fact, only one has ever moved past the

screening stage, and that one was thereafter dismissed for failure to state a
claim. (Case No. 11-CV-506-CNC).
Under his standard operating procedure, Mr. Ludke files his cases
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Often, he then files a number of motions
requesting various forms of relief, such as the restraining order and order
allowing communication with another inmate, which he requests in this case.
(See Docket #5; Docket #13). Finally—occasionally before and occasionally
after the presiding Court has entered an order requiring that Mr. Ludke pay
his initial partial filing fee—Mr. Ludke files a notice of voluntary dismissal,
thus dismissing his suit.1 In several recent cases, including the one now
before the Court, Mr. Ludke has continued to file items even after his
voluntary dismissal, resulting in both confusion and an inordinate amount
of extra work for this district’s staff. (See, e.g., Case No. 13-CV-740-CNC).
The case at bar is a perfect example of this process. Mr. Ludke filed
this suit jointly with another inmate. (Docket #1). The Court prepared an
order assessing an IPFF against both plaintiffs. However, just before the
Court entered that order, Mr. Ludke filed a voluntary dismissal. (Docket
#15). Thus, the Court revised its order to reflect the presence of a single,
remaining defendant, and entered that revised order. (Docket #17). Of
course, almost immediately after the Court entered its order, Mr. Ludke
changed his mind and filed a letter requesting that he be reinstated as a
plaintiff in this case. (Docket #18).
The Court will not allow him to do so, here. Mr. Ludke’s willy-nilly
decisions to file his case, then dismiss it, then request its reinstatement (the
1

The only exception to this pattern has been the previously-mentioned
occurrence in which Mr. Ludke's suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(Case No. 11-CV-506-CNC).

Page 2 of 7

latter two actions taking place not more than two days apart from one
another) is exemplary of his vexatious approach to litigating in this district.
Mr. Ludke routinely creates confusion and additional, unnecessary work for
the staffmembers of this district. Thus, the Court has no choice but to find
that this latest of his filings has been made in bad faith, and therefore deny
the request contained therein. Mr. Ludke made his bed in voluntarily
dismissing his case, and now he finds himself resting in it.
Moreover, with this order, the Court will go further and bring to a
conclusion Mr. Ludke’s continued abuse of this Court’s limited resources. As
already noted, Mr. Ludke routinely abuses process, creating both confusion
and an unbelievable amount of work for the Court’s staff. Therefore, the
Court has no choice but to sanction him and at the same time limit his ability
to submit further filings with this court, all for the reasons that follow.
What is most troubling about Mr. Ludke’s behavior is that he abuses
two distinct privileges provided to him. The first of those privileges is his
ability to e-file. This district recently instituted a pilot program with the
Green Bay Correctional Institution, where Mr. Ludke is currently housed.
That program, which has thus far worked very well for a vast majority of
inmates, allows prisoners to e-file documents with this district. It has served
well to reduce the amount of paper and also cuts down on the transit time
between a prisoner’s filing and the Court’s receipt of same. The program is
not, however, an open invitation to traipse down to the filing room every
three hours to file a scrawled-off letter to the Court each time his mood
changes. Mr. Ludke seems to think otherwise. Yet, just as we expect
attorneys not to abuse the e-filing system, we also expect prisoners to use it
responsibly. Mr. Ludke, quite clearly, cannot handle that responsibility.

Page 3 of 7

The second privilege that he abuses is the 21-day window that this
district routinely provides prisoner litigants to dismiss their case prior to
screening. That window allows prisoner litigants to re-think the merits of
their suit before the Court enters a screening order; if they dismiss their suit
voluntarily, they may avoid a strike that would otherwise be imposed if the
Court determined their suits to be frivolous. They may also avoid being
required to pay the full filing fee. Mr. Ludke regularly abuses this privilege.
He files his cases—which he most certainly knows and understands to be
frivolous—then automatically dismisses them before the Court can enter a
screening order, which would likely otherwise assess a strike against him. In
this way, Mr. Ludke has avoided receiving three strikes. But, there can be
little doubt that he would have those three strikes if this district did not grant
him the opportunity to dismiss his case. Of course, even though he has
avoided receiving three strikes, all of his cases still required court staff to
expend substantial resources to address the numerous filings therein.
Moreover, strikes, though they were not imposed, likely would have been
appropriately issued in many of those cases.
Given Mr. Ludke’s demonstrated bad-faith, the Court finds it
appropriate to bring an end to this onslaught of filings and impose a bar on
any further filings from Mr. Ludke.
Fortunately, the Court has the inherent power to limit Mr. Ludke’s
access to the Court due to his excessive and frivolous litigation. See, e.g., In
re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1994); Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d
185, 186–87 (7th Cir. 1995). The Court has the responsibility to ensure that
“[f]rivolous, vexatious, and repeated filings by pro se litigants [do not]
interfere with the orderly administration of justice by diverting scarce judicial

Page 4 of 7

resources from cases having merit and filed by litigants willing to follow
court orders.” United States ex rel. Verdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor Cty., 73
F.3d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1995). In such cases, the Court may take actions such
as issuing injunctions that limit a litigant’s filings, so long as those actions are
tailored to the abuse of process at issue. See, e.g., McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453
F.3d 882, 892 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
44–45 (1991); Mack, 45 F.3d at 186).
Thus, it is perfectly clear, here, that such an action is warranted. Mr.
Ludke’s actions significantly interfere with the ability of this district’s judges
to carry out their duties. The Court will, therefore, impose a monetary
sanction of $3,850.002 upon Mr. Ludke for his continued abuse of this
district’s process. It will further impose a bar upon his filing of any cases or
materials in this district until such time as that $3,850.00 sanction amount is
paid in full. In the interim, the Clerk of Court shall return to Mr. Ludke any
filing he may make, other than in cases seeking habeas corpus relief or those
in which Mr. Ludke credibly alleges that he is in danger of imminent harm.
Mr. Ludke is hereby warned, as well, that the Court will not hesitate to
impose additional sanctions, which may include a further restriction on his
ability to file cases in this district, if it finds that he has filed a complaint that
it either: (1) frivolous but that he captioned as alleging imminent harm; or (2)
that appears to allege facts that would support imminent harm but which the
Court later determines not to be credible or frivolous. Finally, the Court notes
that this monetary penalty and injunction are tailored to Mr. Ludke’s
circumstances. Given his propensity to file actions, requiring this district’s
2

This amount is equivalent to the $350.00 filing fee (without the additional
$50.00 administrative fee) multiplied by the eleven frivolous cases Mr. Ludke has
filed in this district.

Page 5 of 7

staff to devote its limited resources to address such conduct, only after which
time he voluntarily dismisses the action, the Court believes that only a bar on
his filing of future cases will address the problems at hand.
For all of these reasons, the Court is obliged to deny Mr. Ludke’s
request to be reinstated as a plaintiff in the immediate action and further to
bar him from filing any future cases or other materials in this district until
such time as he has fully paid the $3,850.00 sanction that this Court now
orders.
Parenthetically, the Court notes that this order has no effect upon the
remaining plaintiff, Brian Maus. The Court awaits Mr. Maus’ submission of
his initial partial filing fee and will screen his complaint after he has
submitted that fee.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that, for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ludke’s request
to be reinstated as a plaintiff in this case (Docket #18) be and the same is
hereby DENIED and Mr. Ludke is prohibited from further participation in
this case; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the Court’s inherent
powers, see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45, and Mack, 45 F.3d at 186, the Court
hereby IMPOSES MONETARY SANCTIONS upon Mr. Ludke in the
amount of $3,850.00; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the Court’s inherent
powers, see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45, Mack, 45 F.3d at 186, and McCready,
453 F.3d at 892, and the Court’s responsibility to ensure that pro se litigants
like Mr. Ludke do not interfere with the orderly administration of justice,
Verdone, 73 F.3d at 671, as further discussed above, the Court hereby

Page 6 of 7

ENJOINS Mr. Ludke from filing any further cases or documents in this
district until he has fully paid the above-imposed $3,850.00 sanctions amount;
in keeping with this injunction, the Clerk of Court shall refuse to accept for
filing and shall return to Mr. Ludke any filings that do not pertain to a
request for habeas corpus relief or involve a credible allegation that Mr. Ludke
is in danger of imminent harm.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 30th day of September, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

Page 7 of 7