Green v. Colvin

Filing 21

ORDER signed by Judge Rudolph T. Randa on 7/13/2015 REVERSING denial of benefits and REMANDING CASE to Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four). (cc: all counsel)(cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
NANCY GREEN,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 13-C-1218

CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
Nancy Green appeals from the denial of her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The Administrative
Law Judge found that Green suffered from the following severe impairments:
polyarthralgias1 of uncertain etiology (alternately diagnosed as an unspecified
connective tissue disease, possible lupus or rheumatoid arthritis, and other
diagnoses), obesity, and depression. However, the ALJ also found that Green
retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work with certain
limitations, and therefore could perform work that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy.
To uphold the denial of benefits, the ALJ’s decision must be supported

Polyarthralgia is defined as “aches in the joints, joint pains, arthralgia of
multiple
joints,
and
multiple
joint
pain.”
http://www.disabledworld.com/health/orthopedics/polyarthralgia.php (last visited 7/10/15).
1

by substantial evidence, which is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Barnett v. Barnhart,
381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004). To determine whether substantial evidence
exists, the Court reviews the record as a whole but does not attempt to
substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s by reweighing the evidence, resolving
material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses.
Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014).
First, Green argues that the ALJ erred by not incorporating the full
range of limitations imposed by state agency psychologist Dr. Thomas
Lehmann into the RFC. Dr. Lehmann wrote that Green
appears to have a below average ability to understand,
remember, or carry out even simple job instructions. She has an
average ability to respond appropriately to supervisors or
coworkers. She has a low average ability to maintain
concentration, attention, and pace on an uncomplicated
sequential task. She appears to have a below average ability to
withstand the stress of a routine workday or adapt to changes
and becomes anxious easily on the phase of stress. (R. 424).
The ALJ assigned this opinion “significant weight.” R. 29. However, the
hypothetical posed to the vocational expert was for an individual who could
perform simple, routine tasks with no fast-paced work requirements, and was
able to occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors.
The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ did not adopt the full range
of limitations set forth by Dr. Lehmann. The Commissioner argues that the

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ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Lehmann’s opinion “wholesale,” and
suggests that the ALJ “synthesized” multiple opinions (including that of Dr.
Lehmann) into his RFC. However, the hypothetical presented to the VE must
include all limitations supported by medical evidence in the record. Young v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1003 (7th Cir. 2004). Conversely, if the ALJ believed
only some portion of Dr. Lehmann’s opinion was entitled to significant weight,
the ALJ was obliged to explain why he rejected certain limitations set forth
therein. In this manner, the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge from the
evidence to his RFC — for example, that Green could perform simple, routine
tasks over the course of an 8-hour workday, even in spite of Dr. Lehmann’s
opinion that Green had “low average” ability to maintain concentration and
pace. See Shielder v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012).
Green also challenges the ALJ’s credibility finding. Courts defer to a
credibility finding that is not patently wrong, but the ALJ “still must
competently explain an adverse-credibility finding with specific reasons
‘supported by the record.’” Engstrand v. Colvin, 2015 WL 3505585, at *4 (7th
Cir. June 4, 2015) (quoting Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir.
2015)). “An erroneous credibility finding requires remand unless the
claimant’s testimony is incredible on its face or the ALJ explains that the
decision did not depend on the credibility finding.” Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d
1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 2014).

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The ALJ wrote that Green’s “medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent
with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” R. 25. This is the
infamous boilerplate language deemed meaningless by the Seventh Circuit.
See Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2012). The “assessment of a
claimant’s ability to work will often (and in the present case) depend heavily
on the credibility of her statements concerning the ‘intensity, persistence and
limiting effects’ of her symptoms, but the passage implies that ability to work
is determined first and is then used to determine the claimant’s credibility.
That gets things backwards.” Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 650, 645 (7th Cir.
2012).
Aside from using the boilerplate, the ALJ’s credibility finding is
problematic because he essentially ignored Green’s testimony and other
statements in the record. For example, Green testified about limitations with
the use of her hands and fingers, day-to-day pain exacerbation, her inability to
stand or walk for prolonged periods of time, depression symptoms, and the
extent of pain in her hips, back, and hands. R. 71-72, 74-75, 79-80, 86-87. An
ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence in the record, but he
cannot “ignore an entire line of evidence that is contrary to his ruling.”

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Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ also
suggested that Green’s testimony was not credible because she lost her job
due to downsizing, not her disability. However, when questioned on this topic
by the ALJ, Green testified that she was going to leave her job because of her
disability even if it hadn’t been downsized. R. 68.
Finally, the ALJ did not adequately evaluate the opinion of Dr. Alison
Lux. This opinion was entitled to deference because Dr. Lux was a treating
physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (listing factors for evaluating
treating source opinion).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner=s denial of benefits
is REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (sentence four).

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 13th day of July, 2015.
SO ORDERED:
__________________________
HON. RUDOLPH T. RANDA
U.S. District Judge

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