Sanders v. Boeck et al

Filing 76

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge William E Duffin. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's 68 motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' 58 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (cc: all counsel, plaintiff) (asc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
QUORDALIS V. SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-CV-293

PETER BOECK and
SCOTT M. KELAND,
Defendants.

ORDER

Quordalis V. Sanders, a pro se plaintiff, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. The court screened Sanders’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a) and allowed him to proceed with his claim
that that defendants wrongfully arrested him without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This matter is now before the Court on the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Sanders’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, both of which are fully briefed. Despite Sanders styling his motion as a
“Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,” the court will construe the filing as a motion
for summary judgment because Sanders relies on documents outside of the pleadings.

For the reasons set forth below, Sanders’s motion is denied and the defendants’
motion is granted.

I. RELEVANT FACTS
The facts in this section are primarily taken from the defendants’ proposed
findings of fact (ECF No. 60), which are admitted for the purpose of deciding summary
judgment because Sanders failed to respond to them. See Civil Local Rule 56(b)(4) (E.D.
Wis.). Additional facts are taken from Sanders’s proposed findings of fact (ECF No. 67)
and his sworn amended complaint (ECF No. 8), which the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has instructed district courts to construe as an affidavit at the summary
judgment stage. Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1996). Specific citations to
documents in the record other than those already mentioned are also included.
Sanders

is

currently

incarcerated

at

Waupun

Correctional

Institution.

Defendants Peter Boeck and Scott Keland are police officers employed by the Racine,
Wisconsin Police Department. On December 6, 2013, Officer Alicia Davalos (a non-party)
completed an incident report stating that, while she was on patrol, she was dispatched to
the Super Steak and Lemonade for a report of indecent exposure. (ECF No. 62-2 at 5.)
Specifically, “E.M.” (a minor) reported that, while she was cleaning, Sanders had been in
the parking lot watching her with his genitals exposed and masturbating. (Id.) E.M. told
the officer that Sanders had been engaged in this type of conduct for approximately

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three years and that, although she obtained the paperwork to file a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against Sanders, she had not yet filed it. (Id. at 6.)
Officer Davalos also noted in her report that Sanders had been mentioned in a
previous indecent exposure call on September 29, 2013, and in a stalking call on
November 19, 2013. (Id.) At the November call, the officer had provided E.M. with
information about filing a TRO and had advised Sanders that he was not welcome at the
restaurant’s property and would be cited for trespassing in the future. (Id.) Based on the
foregoing, Officer Davalos submitted a warrant recommendation for Sanders for
exposing genitals to a child, disorderly conduct, and trespassing. (Id.)
On January 15, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed and a warrant was issued for
Sanders’s arrest on two counts: 1) exposing genitals or pubic area; and 2) disorderly
conduct. (ECF No. 62-2 at 3-4.) The warrant indicated that on both charges Sanders was
a “repeater” because he had been convicted of at least one felony or three misdemeanors
in the previous five-year period immediately preceding the commission of these
offenses. (Id.)
On January 29, 2014, Officers Boeck and Keland observed Sanders pulling out of
an alley. Sanders failed to turn on his turn signal while exiting the alley, so Boeck pulled
him over, and Keland, who was in a separate squad car, pulled up behind him. (ECF
No. 67 at 2; ECF No. 63-1 at 3.) Keland, who was familiar with Sanders because he had
reviewed his most recent booking photograph, knew that Sanders was wanted on an

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outstanding warrant. Sanders was informed that there was a warrant for his arrest and
he was taken into custody. Boeck also issued four traffic citations to Sanders, all of which
Sanders concedes are legitimate. Sanders was not given a ticket for failing to use his turn
signal when exiting the alley.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2011). “Material facts” are those that “might affect the
outcome of the suit.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a “material fact” is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by: “(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit

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or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment, and thus both
simultaneously argue that no genuine issues of material fact exist, does not empower a
court to enter judgment as it sees fit. See 10A Charles Alan Wright et al. § 2720 at 327-28
(3d ed. 1998). A court may grant summary judgment only if one of the moving parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the material facts not in dispute.
The proper procedure is to assess the merits of each summary judgment motion
independently. Each party, as a movant for summary judgment, bears the burden of
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Importantly, the fact that one party fails to satisfy that
burden on its own motion does not automatically indicate that the opposing party has
satisfied its burden and must be granted summary judgment on the other motion.

III.

ANALYSIS

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because
probable cause existed for the arrest, and probable cause is an absolute defense to a
claim of wrongful arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sanders argues that he is entitled to
summary judgment because the Racine Police Department failed to conduct a proper
investigation after receiving E.M.’s complaint. Had they done so, they would have

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noted that she made similar claims at the end of 2010 for which he was arrested. Sanders
contends that he was found not guilty of the 2011 charge, casting doubt on the reliability
of E.M.’s statements. In addition, he argues that Boeck is the officer who arrested him,
even though Keland indicates in a police report that he conducted the arrest.
Generally, a plaintiff cannot base a Fourth Amendment claim on an arrest made
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant; that is so even if the arrest warrant is later
determined to have an inadequate factual determination. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d
345, 351 (7th Cir. 1992). Although the court presumes “the validity of a warrant and the
information offered to support it, the presumption is premised on an assumption that
there will be a truthful showing of probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410
(2010). The presumption may give way if a plaintiff can show that an officer “knowingly
or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to the
judicial officer, and that the false statements were necessary to the judicial officer[‘s]
determination [ ] that probable cause existed for the arrest [ ].” Id. (quoting Beauchamp v.
City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2003) (other citations omitted).
Sanders argues that the arrest warrant was not supported by probable cause
because the witness upon whose statements it was based was unreliable. He states that
had the Racine Police Department done a proper investigation they would have
discovered that the witness had previously made similar charges for which he had been

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arrested but later acquitted. Such information would have undermined her reliability
and negated the probable cause for the warrant.
Sanders does not allege, let alone offer evidence, that the defendants (who did
not seek the arrest warrant but only executed it) knew about the prior case in which
E.M. had been a witness. The presumption that a warrant is valid can be overcome only
when an officer “knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth”
manipulates a judicial officer by including or omitting information that would affect the
determination that probable cause exists. See Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410. Sanders argues
only that the Racine Police Department was negligent because it failed to properly
investigate E.M. before relying on her statements to support the request for a warrant.
However, negligence is insufficient to negate the presumption that the warrant is valid,
especially when, as here, the claim of negligence is not even directed at the defendants.
Moreover, Sanders’s assertion that he was found not guilty of E.M.’s prior
accusations in 2011 is a generous characterization of the truth. According to Racine
County court records, Sanders was found not guilty of Wisconsin Statute § 948.055(1)
(causing a child 13-18 to view sexual activity). But he was found guilty of § 947.01
(disorderly conduct) and § 944.20(1)(a) (lewd, lascivious behavior in public). See Case
No. 11-CF-4 (Racine County, Wis.) The fact that a jury decided that the state had not
met its burden on one of three charges where E.M. was a witness does not call E.M.’s
credibility into doubt to such an extent that her later complaints to the police should

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have been disregarded. Thus, even if the defendants had known of this information, it
would not have caused them to doubt whether probable cause existed for Sanders’s
arrest. See Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 672, 686 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a police
officer has probable cause to arrest if, at the time of the arrest, the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to permit a prudent person
to believe that the suspect committed an offense).
Sanders’s other attacks on the arrest also fail. He asserts that Keland falsified a
report when he stated that he rather than Boeck was the arresting officer. Sanders
conceded at his deposition that both officers were present throughout the stop and both
were present at the time of his arrest. (ECF No. 63-1 at 3.) It is insignificant which of
the two officers completed the administrative report and identified himself as the
arresting officer because the stop and arrest appear to have been a joint effort. Even
Sanders agreed that it would make sense for one officer to complete the traffic citations
and for the other to complete the arrest report. (ECF No. 63-1 at 5.) That is precisely
what occurred here.
Next, Sanders claims that Boeck told him he had pulled him over for failing to
use his turn signal, but Boeck did not issue a citation for that offense. Sanders has not
challenged the legality of the traffic stop (he cannot – he has admitted that he did not
use his turn signal), and in any event this argument is irrelevant to the legality of his
subsequent arrest.

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In short, because the defendants have established, based on the undisputed
material facts, that they arrested Sanders pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, Sanders’s
Fourth Amendment claim fails.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 68) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 58) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court DISMISS this action and
enter judgment accordingly.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 14th day of August, 2015.

WILLIAM E. DUFFIN
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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