Johnson Bank v. Haster

Filing 31

ORDER signed by Judge Rudolph T. Randa on 6/16/2015. 22 Haster's Motion to Stay GRANTED to the extent that she must file response and supporting papers to Johnson Bank's summary judgment motion by 9/4/2015; any reply thereto must be filed by 9/28/2015. Haster's motion is DENIED in all other respects. (cc: all counsel, via mail to Jean Haster) (cb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JOHNSON BANK,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
-vs-

Case No. 14-C-403

JEAN M. HASTER,
Defendant-Counterclaimant.

DECISION AND ORDER
Pro se Defendant-Counterclaimant Jean M. Haster (“Haster”) has
filed a motion (ECF No. 22) to stay briefing and defer consideration of
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant Johnson Bank’s (the “Bank”) summary
judgment motion (ECF No. 17). Haster relies on Rule 56(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the Bank’s summary judgment
motion is premature because it was filed before discovery closed, and she
needs to complete discovery, retain counsel to assist her with key
depositions, and engage expert witnesses. Haster filed a 26-page
declaration in support of her motion and has submitted a proposed
amended schedule.
Rule 56(d) provides: “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to

justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or
deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery. . . .” The nonmoving party’s Rule 56(d) affidavit should explain
why the additional discovery is necessary and demonstrate that it has not
been dilatory in seeking such discovery. See Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462
F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2006); Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d
1049, 1057 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000).1 Simply claiming that a party has not had
the opportunity to conduct discovery is not enough to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. “Rule 56 does not require that discovery take place in
all cases before summary judgment can be granted. . . . In fact, [the
Seventh Circuit] has noted that ‘the fact that discovery is not complete—
indeed has not begun—need not defeat [a motion for summary judgment].’”
Waterloo Furniture Components, Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F.3d 641, 648
(7th Cir. 2006).
Haster avers that she intends to take the depositions of Jeffery
Cummisford and the Bank; that for a couple of months she has had
unresolved disputes with the Bank about her written discovery requests;
and that she needs to conduct discovery regarding the particular

1 Rule 56(d) was formerly designated as Rule 56(f).
Advisory Comm. Notes, 2010.

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,

circumstances of her alleged loan default, notice of the alleged default and
her right to cure, the Bank’s alleged mistaken filing of a satisfaction of
mortgage, and other matters. (Haster Decl. ¶¶ 105, 107 112.) (ECF No. 23.)
The Bank asserts that it responded to Haster’s interrogatories on
December 22, 2014, and supplemented its answers on February 13, 2015,
as well as producing 246 documents in response to her first request for
production of documents. (Pl. Br. Opp’n Stay 3.) (ECF No. 26.) The Bank
also states that the case was removed from state court on April 8, 2014,
allowing Haster over a year to conduct discovery; that despite representing
herself in this action, Haster’s filings indicate she has a good
understanding of federal procedure and law; and that its summary
judgment motion is only on its claims, not Haster’s counterclaims.
Under Rule 26(d)(1), discovery could not begin until after the June
23, 2014, Rule 26(f) conference. (See Rule 26(f) Reports.) (ECF Nos. 9, 10.)
Haster’s declaration offers sufficient detail regarding the facts she hopes to
elicit, how they are expected to create a material issue of fact, the efforts
she has made to obtain them, and why the efforts have been unsuccessful.
Furthermore, Haster’s issues for discovery relate to her affirmative
defenses, which are relevant to the Bank’s summary judgment motion.
Thus, Haster’s motion for a stay is granted to the extent that she may file
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her response and supporting papers to the Bank’s summary judgment
motion on or before September 4, 2015. Any reply thereto must be filed on
or before September 28, 2015. In all other respects, Haster’s motion is
denied.
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Haster’s motion for a stay (ECF No. 22) is GRANTED to the extent
that she MUST file any response and supporting papers to the Bank’s
summary judgment motion on or before September 4, 2015. Any reply
thereto MUST be filed on or before September 28, 2015. In all other
respects, Haster’s motion is DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 16th day of June, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

__________________________
HON. RUDOLPH T. RANDA
U.S. District Judge

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