Neisler v. Larson et al

Filing 53

ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 3/7/2017 GRANTING 14 the defendants' motion for summary judgment and DISMISSING case. (cc: all counsel; by US Mail to plaintiff) (pwm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
MATHEW NEISLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-cv-655-pp

DONNA LARSON and
BELINDA SCHRUBBE,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 14) AND DISMISSING CASE
______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Mathew Neisler is incarcerated at Waupun Correctional
Institution, and represents himself. On June 6, 2014, he filed a civil rights
complaint against the defendants. Dkt. No. 1. He amended that complaint on
June 18, 2014. Dkt. No. 5. On August 14, 2014, Judge Rudolph T. Randa
screened the amended complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and permitted the
plaintiff to proceed on Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need claims against defendants Donna Larson and Belinda Schrubbe.
Dkt. No. 9. On December 29, 2014, the case was reassigned from Judge Randa
to Judge Pepper. On February 16, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. Dkt. No. 14. This motion is now fully briefed.1 For the

In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
filed a motion for discovery. Dkt. No. 21. The court granted the motion, and
gave the plaintiff additional time to obtain potentially relevant information from
the defendants. Dkt. No. 28. In addition, the court stayed the proceedings from
September 2, 2015 to March 15, 2016, so that the plaintiff could obtain his
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reasons explained below, the court will grant the defendants’ motion, and
dismiss the case.
I.

FACTS2
Judge Randa allowed the plaintiff to proceed against Donna Larson and

Belinda Schrubbe on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need claims involving a prosthetic limb. Dkt. No. 16 at ¶1. The
plaintiff alleges that Larson and Schrubbe placed him in an unsafe
environment when his prosthetic limb was damaged. Id. at ¶2. He also alleges
that Larson and Schrubbe again placed him in an unsafe environment after he
received his new, replacement prosthetic limb, because he did not receive a
follow-up appointment for five months. Id. at ¶3.
The plaintiff was housed at Waupun Correctional Institution (WCI) from
May 16, 2006, to January 6, 2010, and again from January 18, 2010, to the
present. Id. at ¶4. Defendant Schrubbe is a registered nurse, and was the
health service manager in the Health Services Unit (HSU) at WCI at all times
relevant. Id. at ¶5. Schrubbe since has retired and is no longer employed at
WCI. Dkt. No. 49 at ¶5. Defendant Larson is a nurse clinician 2 in the HSU at
WCI. Dkt. No. 16 at ¶6.

medical records from non-party Aljan. Once the plaintiff obtained the
documents from Aljan, the court lifted the stay and gave the plaintiff thirty
days to file an amended response to the defendants’ summary judgment
motion. Dkt. No. 45.
The court takes facts from the Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Facts, Dkt.
No. 16, and from Plaintiff’s Additional Proposed Facts, Dkt. No. 47 at 32-36.
2

2

A.

Health Services Unit

Inmates may submit a Health Services Request (HSR) to the HSU to
request to be seen in the HSU, or to request information related to their
medical care. Id. at ¶7. A medication/medical supply refill request is not the
proper form for requesting treatment. Dkt. No. 47 at ¶92. An inmate is to use
an HSR for this purpose. Id.
B.

Neisler’s Damaged Prosthetic Limb

On March 9, 2012, Nurse Larson saw the plaintiff “in the HSU after he
was involved in an incident that caused damage to his left lower leg
prosthesis.” Dkt No. 16 at ¶14. Larson observed that the prosthetic foot
“turned around:” the last time this occurred, WCI’s Engineering, Maintenance
and Construction (EMC) staff had repaired the prosthesis by tightening it with
an Allen wrench. Id. Larson also noted that the plaintiff had a one-inch
laceration. Dkt. No. 16 at ¶15. She “cleaned the wound and applied a
bacitracin ointment, which is used to prevent skin infections, and a bandaid.”
Id. Larson called the EMC and made arrangements for help with the
prosthesis. Id. She gave the plaintiff “bandaids and instructed him on selfwound care.” Id.
The parties dispute certain aspects of the plaintiff’s March 9, 2012,
appointment with Nurse Larson. According to the defendants, Larson observed
that the plaintiff “had a steady gait while wearing his prosthetic.” Dkt. No. 16
at ¶15. The defendants also state that Nurse Larson sent the plaintiff “to EMC
and advised him to notify HSU if EMC was unable to fix the prosthesis.” Id. The
3

plaintiff, on the other hand, alleges that Larson advised EMC to call her back if
they were unable to effect repairs. Dkt. No. 47 at ¶90. In addition, the plaintiff
states that he “did not stand or walk at this examination, making it difficult to
witness Neisler walk with a ‘steady gait.’” Id. at ¶91.
“None of the EMC personnel at WCI are licensed to practice medicine,
nor are they certified in prosthetics.” Dkt. No. 47 at ¶89. “Prosthetics are
specialized pieces of medical equipment, and under Wisconsin DHS § 105.40
(2), persons who develop, fit, or alter prosthetics [should be] certified in
prosthetics.” Id.
Between March and July 2012, the plaintiff submitted forms or had
interactions with medical staff in which he did not mention any issue with his
prosthetic.3 The plaintiff questions the relevance of his failure to raise the issue
on the forms or during these interactions, given that they were not the proper
forms to seek medical treatment or because the appointments were unrelated
to prosthetics.
“On July 22, 2012, the HSU received a HSR from [the plaintiff] in which
he asked if an appointment had been made with Aljan to repair/replace his

Specifically, on March 18, 2012, the plaintiff sent a Medication/Medical
Supply Refill Request to HSU. Dkt. No. 16 at ¶16. At that time, he did not
complain of pain or problems with his prosthetic. Id. On March 29, 2012,
another nurse went with the plaintiff on a “telemed appointment with the
University of Wisconsin Gastroenterology clinic.” Id. at ¶17. Again, the plaintiff
“did not complain of pain or problems with his prosthetic.” Id. The HSU
“received health service requests or medication/medical supply requests from
[the plaintiff] on or around the following dates: April 3, April 8, two on April 20,
April 30, May 6, May 18, June 11, June 19, June 25, July 9, July 14, and July
17.” Id. at ¶18. The plaintiff did not complain about pain or problems with his
prosthetic in any of those requests. Id.
3

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prosthetic . . . .”4 Dkt. No. 16 at ¶19. The plaintiff had indicated that the limb
was “causing skin breakdown and swelling making it difficult to put on and
unbearable to walk.” Id. The plaintiff’s HSR indicated that there never had been
any follow-up for this incident. Id.
“Another HSU nurse forwarded the July 22, 2012 HSR to Larson.” Id. at
¶20. Before she received the HSR, Larson had not been aware that the plaintiff
was continuing to have problems with his prosthetic. Id. The last time Larson
had seen the plaintiff was on March 9, 2012. Id. The plaintiff did not contact
HSU with his complaint about his prosthetic until this July HSR. Id.
The HSU program assistant is responsible for scheduling off-site
appointments. Id. at ¶21. Nurse Larson “does not have control over the
scheduling of off-site appointments.” Id.5
On July 25, 2012, Nurse “Larson saw the plaintiff in the HSU for his
complaints of the broken prosthesis.” Id. at ¶23. Larson saw that the
prosthesis “was broken in three places and EMC was unable to fix it.” Id. She
saw a one-inch fissure on the plaintiff’s left residual limb, but she didn’t see
any signs of infection. Id. “Larson placed [the plaintiff[] on sick cell (room

“Aljan Company is an independent provider of orthotic, prosthetic, and
pedorthis services located in Madison, Wisconsin.” Id. ¶21. It is an “off-site
provider of prosthetic patient care;” in 2011, the plaintiff had had Aljan make
some adjustments to his prosthetic limb. Id.
5 The plaintiff disputes Nurse Larson’s assertion that she does not have control
over the scheduling of off-site appointments. He cites to an instance when
Larson contacted Aljan and asked that a previously scheduled appointment be
moved up, and indicates that Aljan “cooperated” with Larson’s request. Dkt.
No. 47 ¶ 95. The fact that Larson once successfully sought to reschedule an
appointment with Aljan, however, does not demonstrate that Larson has
control over the scheduling of off-site appointments.
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confinement),” gave him crutches, and excused him from work until August 25,
2012. Id. Larson made a note that she would consult with the plaintiff’s
physician to send him “to Aljan to fix or replace his prosthesis.” Id. The plaintiff
“verbalized self-wound management and that he had the necessary supplies.”
Id. “A copy of the medical restriction order was given to [the plaintiff].” Id.
On July 25, 2012, the plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Paul Sumnicht, “submitted a
request for replacement of the plaintiff’s prosthesis.” Id. at ¶25. The next day,
Dr. Hoftiezer, the DOC’s acting medical director, approved that request. Id. at
¶26. “On August 15, 2012, Dr. Sumnicht signed off on the approval.” Id. at
¶27.
On August 20, 2012, a person at Aljan named Ken Crooker saw the
plaintiff, and recommended replacement of the prosthetic. Id. at ¶28. “Mr.
Crooker noted that Aljan would call with a delivery date.” Id. “Dr. Sumnicht
signed off on the recommendations from Aljan in [the plaintiff’s] physician
orders, making the order official.” Id. at ¶29. The order read: “Replace
prosthetic—Aljan will call for delivery date.” Id.
On August 25, 2012, the plaintiff’s medical restrictions expired, and he
did not seek an extension. Id. at ¶31. “It is the inmate’s responsibility [to]
request an extension when they have special restrictions that are about to
expire.” Id. Because the HSU manages the health care “for approximately 1,250
inmates at WCI,” HSU staff “do not have the resources to review every inmate’s
chart on a daily basis to make sure the patient’s needs have not changed.” Id.

6

“If an inmate needs an extension of a medical restriction, they are responsible
for requesting one.” Id.
Despite the fact that the plaintiff did not ask to have his restriction
extended, on August 27, 2012, Nurse Larson extended the plaintiff’s
restrictions until September 30, 2012. Id. at ¶32. “On October 1, 2012, Larson
again extended [the plaintiff’s] restrictions until November 12, 2012. Id. at ¶33.
“When HSU places an inmate on medical restrictions, a medical
restriction/special needs form, DOC 3332B, is filled out detailing the
restrictions.” Id. at ¶34. A copy of this form is placed in the inmate’s medical
chart, and a copy given to the inmate at the time of the appointment. Id. “A
copy for the inmate’s unit correctional officer is placed in the HSU’s outgoing
institution mail.” Id. “This mail is delivered to the unit officer or sergeant every
day by the nurse who is responsible for delivering medication refills to the
units.” Id. “At most, it takes one day for the medical restriction to be delivered
to the inmate’s unit officer.” Id. “Finally, a copy is given to the special needs
committee clerk, who enters the restriction into an electronic database that is
accessible by institution staff.” Id. “The entry of the restriction into the
database can take a few days because the clerk only works part-time.” Id.
The defendants assert that “WCI practices only allow nurses to give
restrictions for one month at a time.” Id. at ¶24.  The plaintiff disputes, stating
that it “is common place at WCI for registered nurses to issue/authorize
Medical Restrictions/Special Needs for terms exceeding 30 days, and quite
often without an expiration date.” Dkt. No. 47 at ¶96.
7

On October 3, 2012, Nurse Kris DeYoung saw the plaintiff in the HSU for
‘a medical issue unrelated to his prosthetic.” Id. at ¶35. During that
appointment, the plaintiff asked “about the progress of his prosthetic.” Id.
“Nurse DeYoung noted that [the plaintiff’s] residual limb wound was wellhealed.” Id. The parties dispute what the plaintiff said at this appointment
about his medical restrictions. According to the defendants, the plaintiff
returned his crutches, and “told Nurse DeYoung that he wanted to be released
from his housing medical restrictions, but he wanted to maintain his work
restrictions because of his inability to lift heavy objects.” Id. The plaintiff, on
the other hand, states that he asked for his restrictions to continue. Dkt.
No. 47 at ¶97.
“On October 15, 2012, [the plaintiff] was placed on “no work” activity
level status. Dkt. No. 16 at ¶36. Robert Tuckwell, WCI’s food service
administrator, had asked for the medical classification report to be completed.
Dkt. No. 47 at ¶98.
The plaintiff “was seen in the HSU” on October 25 and October 31, 2012.
Dkt. No. 16 at ¶37. At these appointments, the plaintiff did not ask that his
housing restrictions be reinstated, and did not mention any pain associated
with his prosthetic. Id.
“On November 6, 2012, [the plaintiff] was sent to Aljan to get his
replacement prosthetic.” Id. at ¶38. Aljan attempted to deliver the prosthetic
limb, but it was not the right size, so the plaintiff needed to be refitted. Id.

8

“Aljan was to call WCI to setup [sic] an appointment for refitting once the
adjustments were made.” Id.
On November 30, 2012, the plaintiff sent a letter to Nurse Schrubbe,
asking when he would receive his replacement. Id. at ¶40. The defendants
allege that “Schrubbe was not aware of his issue, so Larson responded on
behalf of Schrubbe.” Id. Larson wrote, “UW is working on your device. We are
not able to speed this up.” Id. “Larson mistakenly wrote UW instead of Aljan.”
Id.
The plaintiff disputes that Schrubbe was not aware of his issue. Dkt. No.
47 at ¶40. He asserts that she “was made aware of the issue several times.” Id.
He asserts that Robert Tuckwell contacted Schrubbe about the plaintiff’s
“medical care/status” on September 27, 2012. Dkt. No. 48 at ¶25; see also,
Dkt. No. 48-1 at 29 (Tuckwell declaration, stating that on September 27, 2012,
he asked Schrubbe to “remove [the plaintiff] from food service due medical
reasons and the institutional need to fill the position.”) He also argues that it
wasn’t true that Schrubbe could not “speed things up,” noting again that
Larson had been able once before to get Aljan to move up an appointment. Id. 
On December 14, 2012, [the plaintiff] was sent to Aljan, where he
received his replacement prosthetic. Dkt. No. 16 at ¶41. “Mr. Crooker
recommended light duty for one month and to follow-up in one month.” Id.
C.

Post New-Prosthetic

“After the plaintiff’s December 14, 2012 Aljan appointment, Nurse
DeYoung entered Mr. Crooker’s recommendations in [the plaintiff’s] physician
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orders.” Id. ¶ at 43. Someone named Dr. Hennesay “reviewed the information
and signed off on the order, making it official.” Id. The order stated: “light duty
x 1 month per off site Aljan.” Id. “The order did not include scheduling a followup appointment at Aljan.” Id. Neither Larson nor Schrubbe were involved in
any part of this process. Id.
On December 15, 2012, the plaintiff submitted an HSR “requesting two
prosthetic socks from Aljan and a lift of his work restriction.” Id. at ¶45. In this
request, the plaintiff did not complain of pain or problems with his prosthetic.
Id. According to the plaintiff, he did not complain of sores in that request
because “he only had possession of the new prosthetic for a few hours, and was
in transport most of the time.” Dkt. No. 47 at ¶99. He asserts that because the
new prosthetic “was not under normal use, the sores had not yet manifested”
at the time he wrote the request. Id.
“On December 19, 2012, Larson saw [the plaintiff] in the HSU. Dkt. No.
16 at ¶46. “She gave him his prosthetic socks and made a note to ask his
physician to change his medical classification pursuant to [the plaintiff’s]
request.” Id. On the same day, “Dr. Hennessay reviewed this request and
authorized [the plaintiff] for ‘any activity’ level indicating he [was] physically fit
to perform any type work/recreation.” Id. at ¶47. The plaintiff alleges that
Hennessay did not conduct “an examination to verify that the action was
appropriate.” Dkt. No. 47 at ¶100.
The parties dispute whether the plaintiff complained about any injuries
at his December 19, 2012, appointment with Nurse Larson. According to the
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defendants, the plaintiff “did not have any complaints of pain or injury from his
new prosthetic.” Dkt. No. 16 at ¶48. They allege that if he had communicated
such complaints, “Larson would have included it in the progress note,
pursuant to her routine practice.” Id. The plaintiff, on the other hand, states
that he complained about “three half dollar sores on his knee, caused by the
new prosthetic.” Dkt. No. 49 at ¶48. According to the plaintiff, Larson
examined the sores, and gave him Bacitracin and band-aids. Dkt. No. 47 at
¶101. The plaintiff also states that Larson told him that Mr. Crooker had asked
for a follow-up, and “that the sores would be addressed at that time.” Id.
“Larson did not have [the plaintiff’s] file with her at the appointment,
thus the notes for the visit were made after [the plaintiff] departed.” Id. at ¶102.
“On December 16, December 28, January 5, January 14, January 25,
February 6 and February 15, 2013, [the plaintiff] submitted HSRs and
Medication/Medical Supply Refill Requests to the HSU.” Dkt. No. 16 at ¶49.
Again the defendants assert that the plaintiff did not include in any of those
requests complaints about pain. Id.
On January 25, 2013, the plaintiff asked for “a medical record review.”
Id. at ¶50. Nurse Larson “forwarded his request to the records staff to schedule
an appointment for his review.” Id.
On February 20, 2013, Nurse Larson saw the plaintiff in the HSU for the
file review. Id. at ¶52. She noted he had a “steady gait.” Id. The parties dispute
whether the plaintiff asked Larson about a follow-up appointment with Aljan.
According to the defendants, if the plaintiff had asked Larson about a follow-up
11

appointment with Aljan, “Larson would have documented it in his medical
records pursuant to her usual practice.” Id. According to the plaintiff, he
“confronted Larson” about the Aljan follow-up request. Dkt. No. 47 at ¶103. He
says that Larson told him “that an appointment had been made,” but that she
didn’t provide any additional information. Id. The plaintiff says he asked
Larson why “his complaints about the sores were not in the December 19,
2012, progress notes.” Id. He says that Larson “did not recall what she had
written, and did not have time to review her notes because she was facilitating
other file reviews at the same time.” Id.
On February 21, 2013, the plaintiff submitted “an HSR asking if his onemonth follow-up appointment with Mr. Crooker had been scheduled.” Dkt. No.
16 at ¶54. Nurse Waltz (who is not a defendant) responded, stating, “No it
hasn’t so I gave it to her.” Id. “Nurse Waltz was referring to the program
assistant who schedules the offsite appointments.” Id. “Nurse Waltz scratched
out the word ‘again.’” Id. The same day, “the recommendation for a follow-up
appointment with Aljan was entered into [the plaintiff’s] prescriber’s orders. Id.
at ¶ 55.
On March 19, 2013, Nurse Schrubbe entered into the plaintiff’s
physician orders “a telephone recommendation from Aljan that [the plaintiff]
was to follow-up with Aljan when problems arise.” Id. at ¶57. “Dr. Manlove
signed the order.” Id.
The defendants indicate that Nurse Schrubbe was not aware that the
plaintiff “was having problems with his new prosthesis until she received a
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letter from him on March 28, 2013.” Id. at ¶58. “In the letter, [the plaintiff]
stated Ken Crooker from Aljan recommended a follow-up appointment, one
month after his December 19, 2012 appointment.” Id. at ¶59. The plaintiff
asked “why he was not included in the March 18, 2013 offsite appointment to
Aljan.” Id. Sometime around April 3, 2013, Schrubbe responded to the
plaintiff’s questions, telling him that he did not have an appointment at Aljan
on March 18, 2013, and asking whether he was “experiencing any issues”
relating to the prosthetic. Id. at ¶60.
“On April 12, 2013, [the plaintiff] submitted an HSR stating that he
complained about the fit of his new prosthetic in December and he had
inquired several times about an appointment for repair.” Id. at ¶62. “He asked
how much longer he needed to wait for an appointment.” Id. In this request,
the plaintiff did not ask for crutches or a wheelchair. Id. Nurse Larson
forwarded the HSR to Schrubbe, who responded on April 24, 2013, telling the
plaintiff, “I will get you back down to be seen.” Id.
On April 14, 2013, the plaintiff sent “Schrubbe a letter documenting his
communications with HSU regarding his prosthetic between March 9, 2012
and April 12, 2013.” Id. at ¶63. On May 8, 2013, Schrubbe responded, telling
the plaintiff “that HSU had attempted several times to get his prosthetic issue
resolved, but were having difficulties with the off-site provider.” Id. Schrubbe
told the plaintiff that he was “scheduled to go to Aljan sometime that month
(May).” Id.

13

On May 20, 2013, the plaintiff “was seen at Aljan for a follow-up
appointment.” Id. at ¶65. “Aljan ordered another one-month follow up to
realign the door on the prosthetic.” Id. The plaintiff was again seen at Aljan on
June 26, 2013 “for his one-month follow-up appointment.” Id. at ¶67. This was
the plaintiff’s last appointment at Aljan. Id.
To Nurse Larson’s knowledge, the plaintiff has not filed any further HSRs
or complaints related to problems with his prosthetic. Id.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir.
2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute
over “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed
must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion
only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do
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not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a
motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies for his second claim—the claim that Larson and
Schrubbe placed him in an unsafe environment after he received his new,
replacement prosthetic limb in December 2012, because he did not receive a
follow-up appointment for five months. Dkt. No. 15 at 9. In response, the
plaintiff states that he believed that the prosthetic issue was ongoing, and that
as long as the defendants had failed to remedy the issues that had arisen
before he received the replacement limb, anything related to a prosthetic limb
was part of the same, single claim. Dkt. No. 46 at 5. He asserts that the receipt
of the new prosthetic was merely one step in resolving the situation, one which
required follow-up appointments with a prosthetics specialist for proper
resolution. Id.
Prisoners must properly exhaust all available administrative remedies
before pursuing claims regarding prison conditions in federal court. 42 U.S.C.
§1997e(a); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006) (holding that
“complet[ing] the administrative review process” is “a precondition to [a
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prisoner] bringing suit in federal court”). Federal courts strictly enforce the
exhaustion requirement, and a prisoner fulfills this duty by adhering to “the
specific procedures and deadlines established by the prison’s policy.”
Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting King v. McCarty,
781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219
(2007) (noting that “’the applicable procedural rules’ that a prisoner must
properly exhaust are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance
process itself”). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof is
on the defendants. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing
Jones, 549 U.S. at 203-04).
The Inmate Complaint Review System (ICRS) in Wisconsin prisons is the
administrative remedy available to inmates with complaints about prison
conditions or the actions of prison officials. Wis. Admin. Code §DOC
310.01(2)(a). “Before an inmate may commence a civil action . . . , the inmate
shall exhaust all administrative remedies that the department of corrections
has promulgated by rule.” Wis. Admin. Code §DOC 310.05. The ICRS is
available for inmates to “raise significant issues regarding rules, living
conditions, staff actions affecting institution environment, and civil rights
complaints.” Wis. Admin. Code §DOC 310.08(1).
In order to use the ICRS, an inmate must file a complaint with the
institution complaint examiner within fourteen days after the occurrence giving
rise to the complaint. Wis. Admin. Code §§DOC 310.07(1) & 310.09(6).
Complaints submitted later than fourteen days after the event may be accepted
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“for good cause.” Wis. Admin. Code §DOC 310.09(6). After reviewing and
acknowledging each complaint in writing, the institution complaint examiner
either rejects the complaint or sends a recommendation to the “appropriate
reviewing authority.” Wis. Admin. Code §§DOC 310.11(2) & 310.11(11). The
appropriate reviewing authority makes a decision within ten working days after
receiving the recommendation. Wis. Admin. Code §DOC 310.12. Within ten
days of the date of the decision, a “[c]omplainant dissatisfied with a reviewing
authority decision may . . . appeal that decision by filing a written request for
review with the corrections complaint examiner . . . .” Wis. Admin. Code §DOC
310.13(1).
“Some inmate complaints are rejected at the institution level, pursuant
to Wis. Admin. Code §DOC 310.11(5) for particular reasons specified in that
part of the Code.” Dkt. No. 16 at ¶78. Pursuant to §DOC 310.13(3), the
corrections complaint examiner does not review a rejected complaint. In those
situations, the appropriate reviewing authority shall only review the basis for
the rejection of the complaint, according to §DOC 310.11(6), Wis. Admin. Code.
Id. at ¶79.
The plaintiff received his new prosthetic limb on December 14, 2012.
Dkt. No. 16 at ¶41. The plaintiff did not file an offender complaint related to
any events that occurred after he received his prosthetic on December 14,
2012. Id. at ¶86.

17

Admittedly, he did file some complaints in the month or so before he
received the new limb, and his exchanges with institution staff about those
complaints continued on past the date he received the new limb.
The plaintiff submitted an inmate complaint on November 23 or 29,
2012. Dkt. No. 47 at ¶108. In that complaint, he stated:
I was involved in a work related accident on 3-9-12
while working in food service. I suffered some skin
tears, and a broken prosthetic leg. I was seen at HSU,
and was assured that an Aljan appointment would be
made for repairs. I was then returned to work. After a
few months without repair, I began to have great
difficulty walking because of the broken prosthetic. I
complained to F.S. staff, to no avail. I submitted an
HSR on 7/20/12 and was seen on 7/25/12. I learned
no action had been taken to repair the prosthetic. I
was placed on cell confinement. On 10-1-12 I lost my
job because of my inability to work (see complaint
WCI-2012-21424). I received a medical reclassification
on 10/15/12 stating “no work” on 11/1/12 all medical
restrictions except “no work” were allowed to expire. It
has been 8 months since the accident, yet no repairs
have been made, despite being seen by Aljan on two
separate occasions. I believe this to be cruel and
unusual punishment because the institution knew of
the accident, medical implications, physical hardships,
and dangers of continued use. I feel that taking more
than 8 months to make a 10 minute mechanical repair
is just a “little” excessive.
Dkt. No. 19-2 at 10. The plaintiff indicates that this complaint was returned to
him, with instructions that he should write a “confidential correspondence” to
Schrubbe. Dkt. No. 47 at ¶108.
After receiving a reply from Larson, the plaintiff re-submitted the
complaint on December 10, 2012. Id. at 8. The institution complaint examiner

18

filed the complaint and numbered it WCI-2012-25575. Id. In this offender
complaint, the plaintiff stated:
On 11/23/12, I attempted to file a complaint against
HSU for their lack of action with regards to a broken
prosthetic, caused by a 3/9/12, work related accident.
The ICE advised me to contact HSM Schrubbe via
confidential correspondence. I followed this instruction
on 11/29/12, advising of the situation and safety
issue (a copy is enclosed). I received a response on
12/6/12 from Nurse Larson, not HSM Schrubbe. Ms.
Larson wrote that the “’UW’ is working on your device.”
This is false. I have never been seen at the UW for my
prosthetic. I was seen at Aljan on 8/20/12, and
11/6/12, to have repairs made. There was no attempt
to make repairs at those appointments. Second, Aljan
nor the “UW” is working on my device. It has been in
my possession, and utilized on a daily basis. The issue
here is safety because of personal indifference to my
medical needs. In Complaint WCI-2012-21424, HSM
Schrubbe acknowledged safety issues related to the
broken prosthetic, and I was reclassified as “no work”
because of it. This was also the reason for cell
confinement from 7/25 to 11/1. Why the restrictions
were allowed to expire is beyond me, for the reason for
them was never taken care of, and still has not, 9
months after the accident. I believe taking 9 months to
make a 10 minute mechanical repair is just a “little
excessive,” especially when it only takes 3 months to
make a new prosthetic. The continued use of the
broken prosthetic causes sores, and is a safety issue.
The lack of action by HSU staff for 9 months knowing
the medical implications and safety issues is cruel and
unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment.
Id.; Dkt. No. 16 at ¶¶81-82. On December 26, 2012, the institution complaint
examiner rejected as moot WCI-2012-25575, stating as follows:
Inmate Neisler claims that his prosthetic is not being
worked on by the UW or Aljan.
HSM Schrubbe states Donna Larson did make the
mistake of saying the UW was working on the
prosthetic and she meant Aljan was working on it.
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HSU did call Aljan on several occasions to determine
the status of Prosthetic. Inmate Neisler did go to Aljan
on 12-14-12 and he did receive new prosthesis.
Considering the inmate has received his prosthetic,
the issue of the complaint is moot by definition in DOC
310.03(13) whereas, “the issue or complaint is one
which seeks to determine an abstract question which
does not arise upon existing facts or rights, or where
there would be no practical effect to any remedy
because the issue or complaint is already resolved.”
This complaint is rejected in accordance with DOC
310.11(5)(f).
Dkt. No. 19-2 at 6.
On January 4, 2013, the institution complaint examiner’s office received
a Request for Review of Rejected Complaint from the plaintiff. The plaintiff
stated:
According to the “ICE” the reason for the complaint
was that my prosthetic was not being worked on. This
is not the case. The issue was clearly stated, “the issue
here is safety” in the “supplemental” complaint. It also
notes that HSM Schrubbe acknowledged the safety
issue in Complaint WCI-2012-21424 as being the
reason for a medical re-classification on 10/15/12 to
“no work.” It also notes that I was placed on cell
confinement from 7/25 to 11/1 (for the same reason)
and asks why the restrictions were allowed to expire,
despite the broken prosthetic still being a safety issue.
HSU knew of the accident that broke the prosthetic,
the medical implications, and the safety issues of
continued use. Yet I was returned to “normal activity”
on 11/1 (with the exception of “no work”). This was the
issue, not the broken prosthetic. The use of the broken
prosthetic and the excessive time for repair is nothing
more than descriptive, to put into perspective the
seriousness of the safety issue at hand.

20

Dkt. No. 19-2 at 11. On January 16, 2013, the reviewing authority affirmed the
rejection noting that “the rejection made by the ICE was appropriate.” Dkt. No.
16 at ¶85.
The November 29, 2012 complaint, re-submitted on December 10, 2012,
was the only inmate complaint that the plaintiff filed regarding his prosthetic
limb. He filed that complaint before he received the new limb on December 14,
2012. While the institution complaint examiner did not reject the complaint
until after the plaintiff had received his new limb—and while the plaintiff did
not ask the institution to review that decision until after he’d received his new
limb—it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not file any ICRS complaints
regarding any issues he had with his new prosthetic after he received it.
The plaintiff contends that he did not have to file a grievance related to
the issues with his new prosthetic, because the general issue of his prosthetic
was ongoing. He also asserts that when his offender complaint was rejected, he
believed his remedies were exhausted. According to the plaintiff, when an
inmate files an inmate complaint, and reasonable notification of finality has
been made, the exhaustion requirement is no longer valid. Dkt. No. 47 at ¶107.
The plaintiff believed this to be true when the ICE Receipt of Rejected of Appeal
stated, “the reviewing authority’s decision is final pursuant to DOC 310.11(6).”
Id.
Prisoners need not file multiple, successive grievances raising the same
issue if the objectionable condition is continuing. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that prisoner’s complaints centered around
21

continuing prison policies, including illegal lockdowns, and one occurrence of
notice from prisoner was sufficient to give the prison a chance to correct the
problems) (citing Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1219
(11th Cir. 2010) (prisoner “not required to initiate another round of the
administrative grievance process on the exact same issue each time” a
deprivation occurred). “Separate complaints about particular incidents are only
required if the underlying facts of the complaints are different.” Id. at 649; see
also Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 728-29 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no
exhaustion where prisoner complained of inadequate medical care for
Hepatitis C but not for gout). “Thus, once a prison has received notice of, and
an opportunity to correct, a problem, the prisoner has satisfied the purpose of
the exhaustion requirement.” Turley, 729 F.3d at 650.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s belief, his situation does not involve a
“continuing violation,” because the plaintiff is not challenging a policy, and
because the underlying facts from the second claim are different from those of
the first. In WCI-2012-25575, the plaintiff complained of the delay in repairing
or replacing his prosthetic. Four days after filing WCI-2012-25575, the plaintiff
received the new prosthetic, which is why his complaint was rejected as moot.
The plaintiff no longer could complain about his old limb being unrepaired or
broken, because he had received his new prosthetic.
The plaintiff disagrees with the institution complaint examiner’s
characterization of WCI-2012-25575 as pertaining to the delay in repairing or
replacing his broken prosthetic. The court concedes that arguably what the
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plaintiff wanted was a prosthetic that functioned properly, and that the issue
was not resolved until the new prosthetic, which did not fit properly, was refitted. Under this scenario, the improperly fitted prosthetic would be a sort of
“continuing violation” which was not resolved until the plaintiff obtained a
proper fit with the new prosthetic at his follow-up appointment with Aljan.
The institution complaint examiner, however, rejected WCI-2012-25575
as moot, finding that the issue had been resolved because the plaintiff had
received his new prosthetic. Despite the multiple ways that one might, in
hindsight, characterize WCI-2012-25575, the underlying issue the plaintiff
raised in that grievance was the fact that the plaintiff’s prosthetic was broken.
On December 14, 2012, the plaintiff received a new prosthetic. On
December 26, 2012, the grievance was rejected as moot because the plaintiff
received the new prosthetic. The issues that arose after the plaintiff received
his new prosthetic—his complaint that he did not receive his recommended
one-month follow-up appointment at Aljan and that the new prosthetic did not
fit properly—are distinct.
The plaintiff also argues that he was led to believe that his remedies were
fully exhausted. The court agrees that the plaintiff fully exhausted his remedies
as to his first claim—the claim that his old prosthetic needed repair or
replacement. With regard to his second claim—that the new prosthetic did not
fit properly and that he did not get a follow-up for five months—the record does
not support the plaintiff’s assertion that he was led to believe that the response
he received to WCI-2012-25575 would have exhausted his remedies as to
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issues that arose with his new prosthetic. In fact, the grievance rejection states:
“Considering the inmate has received his prosthetic, the issue of the complaint
is moot.” Dkt No. 19-2 at 6. It is not reasonable to infer that any issues arising
with the new prosthetic would be exhausted based on this rejection of WCI2012-25575. The fact that the complaint was rejected as moot makes clear that
the institution considered any problems with the old prosthetic resolved; the
institution would not have any way of knowing that the plaintiff had a problem
with the new prosthetic unless he filed a new complaint, saying as much.
The court finds that the plaintiff did not file an inmate grievance alerting
the institution to problems he had with his new prosthetic. The plaintiff has
not exhausted remedies as to his second claim. The court will dismiss that
claim without prejudice. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir.
2004) (stating that a dismissal for failure to exhaust should be a dismissal
without prejudice).
C.

Eighth Amendment Claim
1.

The Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Standard

“The Eighth Amendment safeguards the prisoner against a lack of
medical care that ‘may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests
would serve any penological purpose.’” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750
(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
828 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
“Prison officials violate the Constitution if they are deliberately indifferent to
prisoners’ serious medical needs.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750 (citing Estelle, 429
24

U.S. at 104). “[A] claim based on deficient medical care must demonstrate two
elements: 1) an objectively serious medical condition; and 2) an official’s
deliberate indifference to that condition.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750 (citation
omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a prisoner
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the
Constitution.” Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 828 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
2.

The Serious Medical Condition Prong

The defendants do not argue that the plaintiff did not have a serious
medical need with regard to the first claim. It seems clear that he had a serious
medical need at several points during the relevant period, beginning on
March 9, 2012 (when he had the accident that broke his prosthesis) through
December 14, 2012 (when he received his replacement prosthesis). During this
time, the plaintiff sought and received medical care related to his prosthesis
and injuries from the accident. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373
(7th Cir. 1997) (serious medical is one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention). In any event, because
the parties do not appear to dispute the objectively serious medical issue
factor, the court will focus on the subjective deliberate indifference prong of an
Eighth Amendment medical care claim.
3.

The Deliberate Indifference Prong 

To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant “acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” something akin to
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recklessness. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011). A prison official
acts with a sufficiently culpable state of mind when he or she knows of a
substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard
of that risk. Id. A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment unless the official “’knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.’” Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Deliberate indifference ‘is more than
negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing.’” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 759
(quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Deliberate indifference does not, however, include medical malpractice; “the
Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Duckworth v. Ahmad,
532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
a.

Nurse Larson

The defendants contend that the court should grant their motion for
summary judgment as to Nurse Larson because she did not have actual
knowledge of the plaintiff’s ongoing issues with his prosthetic, she provided the
plaintiff with reasonable treatment under the circumstances, and she did not
have the requisite personal involvement in the delivery of the replacement
prosthetic.
In response, the plaintiff contends that the fact that Nurse Larson did
not place movement restrictions on him until July 25, 2012, resulted in his
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having to place his full weight on the injured area, which caused great pain
and did not allow the injury to heal due to continued use of the injured limb.
The plaintiff also contends Nurse Larson did not provide him with reasonable
treatment because she sent him to people she knew did not have the proper
training or certifications to perform the necessary repairs. The plaintiff also
contends that Nurse Larson imposed medical restrictions beginning on July 25,
2012, but allowed them to expire for days before reinstating them, and that she
again allowed them to expire on November 1, 2012.
It is undisputed that Nurse Larson saw the plaintiff on March 9, 2012,
after he was involved in an accident that damaged his prosthesis. At this
appointment, Nurse Larson noted that the last time his prosthesis was
damaged, WCI’s Engineering, Maintenance, and Construction (EMC) staff had
fixed it by tightening it with an Allen wrench. Nurse Larson treated the
plaintiff’s injuries, and she called the EMC to arrange for assistance with the
prosthesis. She then sent the plaintiff to the EMC—one of the decisions that
the plaintiff alleges showed deliberate indifference.
After that appointment, Nurse Larson was unaware that the plaintiff
continued to have problems with his prosthesis until another nurse forwarded
to her the plaintiff’s July 22, 2012 HSR. In that HSR, the plaintiff asked if an
appointment had been made to repair or replace his prosthetic. He also wrote
that his broken prosthetic was causing skin breakdown and swelling, making it
difficult to put weight on and unbearable to walk.

27

Nurse Larson saw the plaintiff three days after that HSR—on July 25,
2012. She noted that his prosthesis was broken in three places, and that EMC
had been unable to fix it. She saw that the plaintiff had a one-inch wound on
his left residual limb; she placed him on “sick cell” (confinement to his room),
gave him crutches, and excused him from work until August 25, 2012. She
gave him a copy of the medical restriction order. She also noted that she would
consult with his doctor to make arrangements for a visit to Aljan to fix or
replace his prosthesis—and she did, in fact, consult with the doctor for just
that purpose. The plaintiff ended up going to Aljan on August 20, 2012, where
Mr. Crooker recommended replacement of his prosthetic. Despite this fact, the
plaintiff argues that Larson was deliberately indifferent, because she waited
until July 25 to impose the work restriction.
The plaintiff also takes issue with the fact that Nurse Larson imposed the
restrictions for only one month. The parties dispute whether nurses could or
would impose medical restrictions for a longer than a one-month period of
time. It is undisputed, however, that it is the inmate’s responsibility to request
an extension when they have special restrictions that are about to expire. The
plaintiff could have requested a restriction, which he did not do.
As a result of his failure to request an extension, the plaintiff’s medical
restrictions expired on August 25, 2012. Yet two days later, on August 27,
2012, Nurse Larson extended the plaintiff’s restrictions until September 30,
2012—even though he had not asked for the extension. On October 1, 2012,

28

she again extended his medical restrictions until November 1, 2012.6 Despite
this fact, the plaintiff argues that Larson “let” his restrictions lapse, which
showed deliberate indifference.
Because Nurse Larson is a medical professional, the court cannot find
that she was deliberately indifferent unless her treatment decisions were “such
a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards . . . as to demonstrate” that she were not relying “on a professional
judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir.
2008). Conduct that is akin to criminal recklessness—but not medical
malpractice or negligence—violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 836-39.
The only decision that Nurse Larson made that could potentially run
afoul of this standard was her decision on March 9, 2012 to refer the plaintiff
to the EMC to repair his prosthetic. It is undisputed that the EMC personnel at
WCI are not licensed to practice medicine, and are not certified in prosthetics.
The plaintiff cites to Wis. Admin. Code §DHS 105.40 (Durable medical
equipment and medical supply vendors), which provides in relevant part that
“prosthetists who develop and fit appliances for recipients shall be certified by
the American board for certification in prosthetics[.]” Wis. Admin. Code §DHS

6
 At the plaintiff’s October 3, 2012, appointment with Nurse DeYoung, she

noted that the plaintiff’s residual limb wound was well-healed. The parties
dispute what was said at this appointment about the plaintiff’s medical
restrictions, but that dispute is not material to resolution of the plaintiff’s claim
against Nurse Larson.
29

105.40(2). This provision, however, does not apply to Nurse Larson and or the
EMC staff. Neither Nurse Larson nor the EMC staff were “prosthetists who
develop and fit appliances for recipients.” So the plaintiff cannot base his
deliberate indifference claim on Nurse Larson’s failure to follow an
administrative code regulation that does not apply to her.
The question is whether Nurse Larson’s decision to refer the plaintiff to
the EMC when she noticed that his prosthetic foot was “turned around”
constituted “such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards . . . as to demonstrate” that she were not
relying “on a professional judgment.” The court concludes that it was not. It
appears that Larson noticed two things on March 9—that the foot was “turned
around”—implying that whatever held the foot in the proper position had come
loose—and that the plaintiff had a laceration. She provided care for the
laceration—cleaning the wound, applying Bacitracin, and giving the plaintiff
band-aids. With regard to the mechanical problem with the “turned around”
foot, she used the process that had worked successfully in the past—she asked
EMC to effectuate a repair. As it turns out, that action did not solve the
problem this time—that does not mean that Nurse Larson was deliberately
indifferent in trying it. Without any indication that Larson saw any physical
harm or injury to the plaintiff beyond the laceration, the court cannot conclude
that her decision to ask the EMC to repair whatever was making the foot turn
around constituted deliberate indifference.

30

As to the plaintiff’s other allegations, it is undisputed that Nurse Larson
did know until July 25, 2012, that the EMC did not fix the prosthetic. Given
that, she would have had no reason to put the plaintiff on work restrictions
before that date. Once she found out that EMC hadn’t repaired the limb, she
consulted with a doctor to make arrangements to send the plaintiff to Aljan for
repair and/or replacement. She also immediately put the plaintiff on a work
restriction for thirty days. The fact that the plaintiff allowed that restriction to
lapse without requesting a renewal is not attributable to Nurse Larson—in fact,
it was Nurse Larson who asked—twice—to renew the plaintiff’s work restriction,
even when he had failed to do so.
This record does not support a finding that Nurse Larson’s actions were
a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 262 (7th
Cir. 1996). A reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Nurse Larson acted
with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s serious medical need as to the
plaintiff’s first claim. The court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Nurse Larson.
b.

Nurse Schrubbe

The defendants contend that Nurse Schrubbe did not violate the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights because she did not have actual knowledge that
the plaintiff’s prosthetic was broken, and because she was not personally
involved in the delivery of the replacement prosthetic.
31

In response, the plaintiff states that a copy of the incident report from
the March 9, 2012, incident was forwarded to Schrubbe on March 15, 2012.
Dkt. No. 46 at 11. Also, on September 27, 2012, Robert Tuckwell contacted
Schrubbe, asking that Schrubbe remove the plaintiff from the work program
due to the March 9, 2012, injury. Dkt. No. 48-1 at 29.
The plaintiff’s first interaction with Nurse Schrubbe with regard to his
prosthesis was on November 30, 2012, when he sent her a letter asking when
he would be getting the new prosthesis. The defendants have presented
evidence that Schrubbe wasn’t aware of the plaintiff’s situation at that time,
and so Larson answered. The plaintiff asserts that Schrubbe was aware of his
situation—as early as March 2012, and at least as of September 2012. Whether
Schrubbe was or was not aware before November 30, 2012 that the plaintiff
was having trouble with his prosthesis, the plaintiff has presented no evidence
that Schrubbe had any involvement with the events that transpired between
March 9, 2012 and November 30. On November 30, 2012, the plaintiff sent
Schrubbe a letter asking when he’d get his new prosthesis; while Schrubbe did
not respond, Larson did. And two weeks later, the plaintiff received the new
limb. Schrubbe did not see the plaintiff (and there is no evidence that he asked
her to). All the plaintiff has alleged is that he sent Schrubbe a letter (about, as
it turns out, a situation with which she was not familiar).
The court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
this claim against Nurse Schrubbe.

32

III.

CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt.

No. 14. The court ORDERS that the plaintiff’s first claim is dismissed WITH
PREJUDICE, ON THE MERITS. The court ORDERS that the plaintiff’s second
claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust his
remedies.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 7th day of March, 2017.

33