Williams v. Stauche et al

Filing 95

ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 4/19/2016 DENYING 94 Motion for Recusal. (cc: all counsel and copy sent to the plaintiff by US Mail on 4/20/2016.) (kgw) (Main Document 95 replaced on 4/19/2016 - correction) Modified on 4/19/2016 (kmf).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
TRAVIS DELANEY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-cv-1078-pp

DAVE STAUCHIE,
MR. ISAAC,
ALVIN BIRDICK,
MEGAN KEEFER, and
GUARD RAY,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL (DKT. NO. 94)
______________________________________________________________________________
On April 7, 2016, the court received a six-page document from the
plaintiff asking Judge Pamela Pepper to withdraw from all four of his cases
pending in this court: Case Nos. 14-cv-452-pp, 14-cv-792-pp, 14-cv-1078-pp,
and 14-cv-1594-pp. Dkt. No. 94. The plaintiff says that he has been prejudiced
by the court’s decisions in each of these cases.
The plaintiff specifically takes issue with a number of decisions the court
made in its March 14, 2016 order in this case. Dkt. No. 78. For example, he
argues that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
appoint counsel, and denied his motion for partial summary judgment, and
took a different position regarding discovery than it took in an order in Case
No. 14-cv-792-pp. These arguments challenge the legal bases for the court’s
decision, not the court’s ability to be fair. A party who wishes a court to
reconsider the legal bases for a decision should file a motion under either Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 59 or 60, not a motion for recusal. Nevertheless, the court will
consider the plaintiff’s arguments in the context of his request that Judge
Pepper recuse herself.
Two statutes exist for disqualifying a judge in a federal case, 28 U.S.C. §§
144 and 455. Section 144 requires a federal judge to recuse herself for
“personal bias or prejudice.” Section 455(a) requires a federal judge to recuse
herself “in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” and under §455(b)(1), a judge shall disqualify herself if she “has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” Because the phrase “personal
bias and prejudice” found in §144 mirrors the language in §455(b), the court
may consider recusal under both statutes. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d
1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).
In deciding whether a judge must disqualify herself under 28 U.S.C. §
455(b)(1), the question is whether a reasonable person would be convinced the
judge was biased. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation omitted). Recusal under §455(b)(1) “is required only if actual bias or
prejudice is proved by compelling evidence.” Id. “The purpose of the statute ‘is
to preserve the appearance of impartiality.’” Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 F.3d
456, 461 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966, 979
(7th Cir. 2012)). Judicial rulings alone, however, almost never constitute a
valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality. Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

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Section 144 provides that when a party makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit alleging that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
against either him or in favor of the adverse party, the judge should proceed no
further and another judge should be assigned to the proceeding. The affidavit
must “state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice
exists.” 28 U.S.C. §144. The factual statements in the affidavit must support
an assertion of actual bias, and must be definite as to times, places, persons,
and circumstances. United States v. Balistreri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.
1985).
The plaintiff’s motion states that he is filing it “under 28 U.S.C. §1746.”
Section 1746 states that if a law requires a person to submit a sworn
declaration or affidavit, a person may comply with the affidavit requirement by
submitting an unsworn declaration, in writing, if (a) the persons subscribes
that the declaration is true under penalty of perjury, (b) dates the declaration,
(c) and substantially complies with the following format: “I declare (or certify,
verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on (date). (Signature)”.
What the plaintiff filed is neither a sworn affidavit, nor does it comply
with the unsworn declaration requirements of §1746. The motion the plaintiff
filed does not indicate that it is true under penalty of perjury. It does not
contain the declaration described above. It is not dated.
More to the point, it does not contain any facts or allegations
demonstrating that Judge Pepper has a personal bias against him, or in favor
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of any other party. It does not describe anything that Judge Pepper did (other
than making legal decisions that the plaintiff disagrees with) to show actual
bias toward him. It does not describe definite times, places, persons or
circumstances that would support an allegation that Judge Pepper is biased
against him. There is one instance in the motion, on page 3, where he states,
“The Judge does not reside with the plaintiff and does not take into
consideration documents submitted in support of his psychotropic meds being
discontinued. The plaintiff states with extreme clarity this Judge is biased
against him.” Dkt. No. 94 at 3. This is the only place in the motion in which the
plaintiff mentions “bias,” and he does not explain how the fact that Judge
Pepper does not reside with him, or the fact that his medication had been
discontinued, showed that Judge Pepper was biased.
The plaintiff does argue that because the court mentioned in its March
14, 2016 order that it had many cases before it, and thus had not ruled on the
plaintiff’s motions as quickly as he would like, that Judge Pepper should not
preside over his cases. Dkt. No. 94 at 5-6. Again, this argument does not
demonstrate that Judge Pepper is biased against the plaintiff.
Throughout the remainder of the motion, the plaintiff argues that Judge
Pepper “abused her discretion” in making certain decisions, or “erred” in
making certain decisions. These arguments challenge, as the court indicated
above, the legal bases for Judge Pepper’s decisions. “Adverse rulings do not
constitute evidence of judicial bias.” Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 849 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); Williams v.
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Illinois, 737 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff points to nothing other
than his belief that the judge should have made different legal decisions in his
case to support his request that Judge Pepper recuse herself. These allegations
do not demonstrate bias or prejudice, and do not disqualify the court under
either §§144 or 455.
The court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for recusal. Dkt. No. 94. The
court ORDERS the clerk of court to docket this order in each of the plaintiff’s
pending cases, and terminate the motion for recusal docketed in each case.
Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 19th day of April, 2016.

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