Farris v. Racine Correctional Institution et al
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Pamela Pepper on 6/22/2015 GRANTING 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis and Screening Plaintiff's Complaint. (cc: all counsel; by US Mail to plaintiff and Warden at Racine Correctional Institution) (pwm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________________
RICKY S. FARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 14-cv-1246-pp
RACINE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
AND SGT. LINCOLN,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
(DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
______________________________________________________________________________
The plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, alleging violations of his civil rights. This matter comes before the court
on the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for
screening of the plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
The Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this action because the
plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. That
law allows a court to give an incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with
his lawsuit without pre-paying the civil case-filing fee, as long as he meets
certain conditions. One of those conditions is a requirement that the plaintiff
pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the plaintiff pays the
initial partial filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of
the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id.
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On October 14, 2014, the court issued an order requiring the plaintiff to
pay an initial partial filing fee of $18.57. (Dkt. No. 5). The plaintiff paid that
amount on November 4, 2014. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for
leave to proceed without pre-paying the filing fee, and will allow the plaintiff to
pay the balance of the $350.00 filing fee over time from his prisoner account,
as described at the end of this order.
Review of the Plaintiff’s Complaint
The law requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint
or portion thereof if the plaintiff raises claims that are legally "frivolous or
malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is legally frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900
(7th Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it
is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. “Malicious,”
although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,” “is more usefully
construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 110910 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, the
plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
[he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not need to
plead specific facts, and his statement need only “give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). However, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions” or
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state
a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
“that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint
allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts follow the
principles set forth in Twombly. First, they must “identify[] pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A plaintiff must support legal conclusions
with factual allegations. Id. Second, if there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, courts must “assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
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To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendants: 1) deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States; and 2) acted under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v.
Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of
North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s pro
se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)).
In the case at bar, the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that on June 30,
2014, while incarcerated at the Racine Correctional Institution, he was serving
a tray of food to another inmate. As the plaintiff was walking the tray over,
defendant Sgt. Lincoln backed up. As Sgt. Lincoln backed up, her buttock
brushed against the plaintiff’s hand as he walked past her. The plaintiff alleges
that Sgt. Lincoln then stopped and said, “Excuse you Farris!” The plaintiff
stopped and said excuse me, said that he was sorry, and pointed out that she
was the one who backed up into him. Sgt. Lincoln told the plaintiff that if it
happened again, she was going to send the plaintiff to the hole. The plaintiff
alleges that he again said he was sorry, and that was the end of the incident.
(Dkt. No. 1 at 4).
The plaintiff alleges that after Sgt. Lincoln walked away, two other
inmates laughed, saying that the plaintiff had looked scared when Sgt. Lincoln
threatened to send him to the hole. The plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Lincoln saw
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the other inmates laughing, at which time, she did decide to send him to the
hole. Id.
The complaint indicates that Sgt. Lincoln filed a conduct report against
the plaintiff, in which he alleges that she lied about everything that happened.
Sgt. Lincoln then failed to appear for the plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, where
he was found guilty of being disruptive; he denies that he was disruptive. He
was sent to the hole for 60 days (he served 16). The plaintiff alleges that, as a
result of being falsely accused of something he did not do, the plaintiff is
emotionally depressed, is seeing a psychiatrist for depression, insomnia and
paranoia, and is taking anti-depressant medication. Id. at 3.
The plaintiff does not state in his complaint which of his constitutional
rights he believes the Racine Correctional Institution, or Sgt. Lincoln, violated.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has considered at least one case in which
an inmate alleged that a prison guard’s knowing use of false evidence
constituted a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. In Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141
(7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit held that before a prisoner may be
sanctioned, “the prison officials must provide [the] procedural requirements
outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell [,418 U.S. 539 (1974)]: advance written notice of
the violation, written statement of fact-finding, the right to present witnesses
and present evidence where it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safely.” It appears that the plaintiff in this case is alleging the same thing—that
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Sgt. Lincoln violated his due process rights by filing an allegedly false conduct
report against him.
To be entitled to the due process protections discussed above, a plaintiff
must first show that he has a protected liberty interest. Domka v. Portage
Cnty., 523 F.3d 776, 779-80 (7th Cir. 2008) citing Minch v. City of Chicago, 486
F.3d 294, 302 (7th Cir. 2007); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)
(“[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty
interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.”). A liberty interest
exists when prison officials restrain an inmate in a way that “imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s sentence of thirty
days in segregated confinement “did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at
486. The Seventh Circuit has gone farther, finding that confinement in
segregation for longer periods of time did not constitute “atypical and
significant” deprivation of the prisoner’s liberty and thus did not implicate the
liberty interest protected under the due process clause. Thomas v. Ramos, 130
F.3d 754, 760-62 (7th Cir. 1998) (70 days of segregation out of a twelve-year
prison sentence); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (56 days in
disciplinary segregation and 34 days in discretionary segregation).
In this case, the plaintiff was sentenced to 60 days in segregation, but
served only 16. Under the cases cited above, a term of 16 days in segregation
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does not create a liberty interest protected by due process. The court also notes
that, despite the fact that no due process was required, the plaintiff did receive
such process. He attached as an exhibit to his complaint the DOC Form 84 on
which he gave his written explanation of his version of the events with
Sgt. Lincoln. A witness also gave a statement on that form. (Dkt. No. 1-2).
There was a disciplinary hearing, and while it is not entirely clear from the
complaint, it appears that the plaintiff did attend and was able to present his
version of the events.
Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff’s segregation for 16 days
did not create a liberty interest requiring due process, and that despite that
fact, he did obtain process of the kind described in Wolff v. McDonnell. The
court concludes that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, and will dismiss the case.
The court ORDERS that the plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt.
No. 2).
The court DISMISSES this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. The court instructs the clerk of
court to enter judgment accordingly. The court also instructs the clerk of court
to document that this plaintiff has brought an action that was dismissed for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1), and
that this plaintiff has incurred a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. §1915(g).
The court further ORDERS the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections or his designee to collect from the plaintiff's prison trust account
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the $331.43 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the
plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding
month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding
payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds
$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). The Secretary or his designee
shall clearly identify the payments by the case name and number.
The court will send a copy of this order to the warden of the institution
where the inmate is confined.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that if the plaintiff appeals from this decision,
such an appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(a)(3), unless the plaintiff offers bona fide arguments supporting his
appeal.
Dated at Milwaukee this 22nd day of June, 2015.
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