Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation et al v. Chervon North America Inc

Filing 205

ORDER signed by Judge J.P. Stadtmueller on 6/6/2017 GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 177 Defendant's Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs to supplement their response to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 9 in accordance with this Order within 7 days. See Order for further details. (cc: all counsel) (jm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORPORATION, METCO BATTERY
TECHNOLOGIES LLC, AC (MACAO
COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED,
and TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO.
LTD.,

Case No. 14-CV-1289-JPS

Plaintiffs,
v.
CHERVON NORTH AMERICA INC.,

ORDER

Defendant.
Defendant Chervon North America Inc. (“Chervon”) filed a motion
to compel discovery responses on April 17, 2017. (Docket #177). In its
motion, Chervon accuses Plaintiffs of failing to adequately respond to
several of its interrogatories. Plaintiffs’ general response is that the
information Chervon seeks is either already in its possession or will be a
part of Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures, which are not yet due. Chervon’s
motion is fully briefed and, for the reasons stated herein, the Court will
largely deny the motion.
1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts have broad discretion in deciding matters relating to

discovery. Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 646–47 (7th Cir.
2001); Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1110 (7th Cir. 1993). Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), parties may obtain discovery “regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The

information sought need not itself be admissible to be discoverable. Id. In
considering matters of proportionality, the Rule directs courts to consider
“the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,
and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit.” Id. While these proportionality concerns have always
been a part of the Rule, they now enjoy pride of place after the 2015 Rule
amendments. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 2015
Amendment; Elliot v. Superior Pool Prods., LLC, No. 15-cv-1126, 2016 WL
29243, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016).
2.

DISCUSSION
The interrogatories at issue are Nos. 1, 3, 5–7, and 9. At the outset,

the Court notes that the issues Chervon raised herein were mostly
resolved by Plaintiffs’ supplemental responses served after the motion
was filed. Yet as made clear in its reply brief, Chervon has not relented in
any aspect of the motion. Nevertheless, in order to press onward to
resolution of these matters, in view of the fast-approaching dispositive
motion deadline, the Court is satisfied that the parties adequately met and
conferred with respect to the issues raised in this motion as required by
the federal and local rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); Civ. L. R. 37. Thus,
the Court will turn to substantive disputes over the interrogatories,
addressing each in turn below.

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2.1

Interrogatory No. 1

Interrogatory No. 1 is a contention interrogatory, seeking to learn
Plaintiffs’ legal theories and the factual bases for their infringement
claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) (allowing interrogatories to seek
“opinion[s] or contention[s] that relat[e] to fact or the application of law to
fact”); Tragozanos v. City of Algona, No. 09–C–1028, 2011 WL 2650852, at *1
(E.D. Wis. July 6, 2011) (“Contention interrogatories are used to elicit a
description of the opposing party’s theory and proof to be employed.”)
(citing Zenith Elecs. v. WH–TV Broad. Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir.
2005)). As relevant here, Interrogatory No. 1 requests that Plaintiff map
each limitation of each claim of the relevant patents onto each allegedly
infringing product. (Docket #179-2 at 6–7). In response to this portion of
the interrogatory, Plaintiffs provided charts which contain a side-by-side
comparison of the limitations of each claim in the relevant patent and each
accused product. Id.; (Docket #179-3 at 2–3).
Chervon rejoins that these charts are unhelpful because they
merely parrot the claim language twice, especially when it comes to the
critical “20 Amp Limitation.” (Docket #178 at 11–13). For instance, with
respect to Chervon’s Kobalt K18-LB30A battery pack, Plaintiffs say that
“[t]he plurality of Sanyo UR18650W2 battery cells of the Kobalt K18LB30A battery pack are capable of producing an average discharge
current greater than or equal to approximately 20 amps,” making it
equivalent to the limitation in claim 1 of the ‘290 patent requiring that “the
battery cells [be] capable of producing an average discharge current
greater than or equal to approximately 20 amps.” (Docket #179-3 at 4).

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Plaintiffs did not originally report any test results confirming that
this battery has in fact been determined to meet the 20 Amp Limitation.
Yet during this litigation and during inter parties review before the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Plaintiffs have relied on testing performed
by one of their experts, Dr. Mehrdad Ehsani (“Ehsani”). In connection
with the prior round of summary judgment briefing in 2015, Plaintiffs
submitted supplemental charts that more specifically connect the
infringing products to the facts learned in discovery. (Docket #91-1).
Further, Ehsani submitted a declaration which provides some detail about
Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the 20 Amp Limitation, the tests Ehsani
performed as they relate to that limitation, and the results of those tests.
See (Docket #91-3); (Docket #185 at 3–4). Nevertheless, Chervon is
unsatisfied, claiming that Plaintiffs never provided the raw data or
methodologies Ehsani employed in his testing. Attempts to subpoena
Ehsani’s work from Plaintiffs have failed, and ongoing meet-and-confer
efforts have yielded no supplemental responses. Without more specificity,
Chervon argues, it cannot prepare for expert discovery. (Docket #178 at
12–13). Chervon contends that it should not have to wait for most of fact
discovery to conclude before it learns the contentions underlying
Plaintiffs’ claims, especially when such information is routinely provided
at the beginning of discovery in patent cases. Id. at 14.
Plaintiffs respond by noting that they provided an additional
supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1 after Chervon filed the
instant motion. (Docket #185 at 5). The supplemental response
incorporates the supplementation previously included in Plaintiffs’ 2015

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summary judgment submissions, as well as citations to the evidence
Plaintiffs believe support a finding that each limitation is met with respect
to each accused product. Id. It also includes a narrative description of
Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the 20 Amp Limitation, Ehsani’s testing
methodology, and a promise to “identify the underlying test data. . .as
soon as production of that data is complete.” Id. at 5–6, 16–17; (Docket
#186-4 at 8–10). Plaintiffs also maintain that they should not be required to
prove their infringement claims via an interrogatory response, especially
not before the expert opinions underlying the contentions are due to be
disclosed. (Docket #185 at 13).
In its reply, Chervon insists that Plaintiffs’ recent supplementation
does not address its concerns about the methodologies and data Ehsani
employed to assess the infringing products against the 20 Amp
Limitation. (Docket #196 at 6–7). Specifically, Ehsani’s averments do not,
in Chervon’s view, sufficiently describe “who performed all of the tests,
what underlying testing protocols and methodologies Plaintiffs used,
including the number times each battery pack was tested or the voltage
and temperature thresholds (if any) that were used, or all of the raw data
from their testing.” Id. Chervon also reports that Plaintiffs have not made
good on their promise to start producing any of the underlying test data.
Id. at 7.
Whether Plaintiffs’ existing response to Interrogatory No. 1 is
adequate is influenced by the decisions of other district courts around the
country dealing with similar questions. Preliminarily, however, it should
be noted that some of these districts—the Eastern District of Texas and the

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Northern District of California in particular—have adopted local rules
pertinent to contention interrogatories in patent infringement actions. See
B-K Lighting, Inc. v Vision3 Lighting, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1134 (C.D. Cal.
2013). These rules often require very early disclosure of infringement
contentions and limit the plaintiff’s ability to amend them later. See id.
The policies animating those local rules—crystallizing legal
theories early and ensuring those theories stay consistent throughout the
case—are, to be sure, of significant value in ensuring expeditious trial
preparation. See id. But such rules do not exist in this District, and so the
Court can only apply the underlying principles to the extent they are
consistent with the parties’ obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which control here. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power
Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that the Federal
Rules “replaced a system in which the issues had to be conclusively
defined at the outset of litigation through the pleadings, with a system
that relied on discovery and pretrial hearings to gradually identify the
precise issues in dispute as more information became available”). Thus, at
the outset, the Court must set aside Chervon’s belief that it is entitled to
early disclosure of Plaintiffs’ infringement contentions simply because this
is a patent case. While that may be true in other Districts, it is not so here.1

Notable as well, the Court’s trial scheduling order has no provision
specifically directed at the issue of patent infringement contentions. See (Docket
#31, #137). This is consistent with the Court’s belief that discovery and subjectmatter-specific issues are best left to the good offices of counsel, working
cooperatively to ensure the speedy and inexpensive resolution of the parties’
disputes. See (Docket #28 at 2) (leaving parties to confer regarding all other
deadlines not specified in the scheduling order). This means that B-K Lighting,
1

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Turning to the substance of Plaintiffs’ existing response, the Court
finds it sufficient at this juncture, even were the Court to apply the more
stringent disclosure requirements of the local rules in other Districts. First,
Plaintiffs identified each allegedly infringing product and lined up each
limitation of each claim against each product. See Linex Techs., Inc. v. Belkin
Int’l, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707–08 (E.D. Tex. 2008). It is clear that
Plaintiffs’ original response would have been insufficient had it not been
later supplemented, since it “merely parroted the asserted claim language
and failed to explain how the accused products infringed the asserted
patents.” Id. at 711; Droplets, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C12–03733 HRL,
2013 WL 1563256, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2013). But now Chervon has the
benefit of Ehsani’s declaration, which explains in narrative form the basic
contours of the testing he performed and the results he obtained. See
Droplets, 2013 WL 1563256, at *3–4 (contentions were insufficient where
plaintiff parroted claim language and attached relevant evidence without
any explanation connecting the evidence to its infringement theory).
Although not each and every fact underlying his conclusions has yet been
disclosed, that disclosure will be made in expert discovery.
Thus, this case is unlike Shared Memory, where the court found that
the plaintiff had provided “vague contentions and conclusory statements”
that were not consistent with its obligations under the court’s local
infringement contention rule. Shared Memory Graphics LLC v. Apple, Inc.,

930 F. Supp. 2d at 1136, referenced by Chervon, is inapposite, as the court there
determined whether the plaintiff’s infringement contention amendments, which
were late under the court’s scheduling order, should be permitted. Here, there is
no such deadline.

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812 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The information Plaintiffs
have provided is adequate to give Chervon reasonable notice of the
grounds for Plaintiffs’ belief that infringement exists. Id. at 1025. Further,
they associate the evidence at hand with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the 20
Amp Limitation. Id. (requiring contentions to “map specific elements of
Defendants’ alleged infringing products onto the Plaintiff’s claim
construction”). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ response appears satisfactory under the
view of the court in Carver v. Velodyne Acoustics, Inc., 2092 F.R.D. 273, 274
(W.D. Wash. 2001), cited by Chervon, because Plaintiffs provided a chart
specifying how each limitation of each claim corresponds to each accused
product, as well as their own claim construction to help connect the
products to Plaintiffs’ theory of infringement.
Chervon’s contention interrogatories are directed at learning
Plaintiffs’ theory connecting facts to the applicable law; they are not a way
to end-run around expert disclosure deadlines. Nor are Plaintiffs required
to prove their infringement case in response to an interrogatory. Droplets,
2013 WL 1563256, at *2 (local patent infringement contention rules do not
“‘require the disclosure of specific evidence nor do they require a plaintiff
to prove its infringement case’”) (quoting DCG Sys. v. Checkpoint Tech.,
LLC, Case No. 11–cv–03729–PSG, 2012 WL 1309161, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
16, 2012)). Having received sufficient insight into Plaintiffs’ legal theories,
particularly as to the 20 Amp Limitation, Chervon can ask no more. Linex,
628 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (“Infringement contentions ‘are not meant to
provide a forum for litigation of the substantive issues; they are merely
designed

to

streamline

the

discovery

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process.’”)

(quoting

STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 754, 755 (E.D. Tex.
2004)). Chervon has the information it needs to craft a response to these
contentions and elicit expert testimony to support its response, whether or
not it agrees with the methodologies employed or Plaintiffs’ view of the 20
Amp Limitation. Id.; Shared Memory, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1025 (finding that
although the defendants thought the plaintiff’s contentions to be without
merit, “[t]his is precisely what [infringement contentions] are designed to
accomplish,” and they “could well set up an early motion for summary
judgment or partial summary adjudication on affected claims”). Thus,
Chervon’s motion to compel with respect to Interrogatory No. 1 must be
denied.
2.2

Interrogatories Nos. 3, 5–7

Interrogatories Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 7 are not closely related in subject
matter but all drew a very similar response from Plaintiffs—namely,
referring Chervon to the documents they produced in response to its
requests for production. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d) allows this
sort of response, but Chervon contends that it cannot easily locate the
documents because Plaintiffs referred to them by metadata tag rather than
Bates numbers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1) (noting that a party must
specify response records “in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating
party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party
could”). Chervon requests that Plaintiffs identify their documents by Bates
number and, moreover, provide fulsome responses to those contentionseeking portions of the interrogatories which cannot simply be answered
by reference to documents alone. (Docket #178 at 17–18); Shorter v. Baca,

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No. CV12-7337-JVS (AGR), 2013 WL 12133826, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1,
2013) (recognizing identification by Bates or production number as an
ordinary method to specify documents to be reviewed under Rule 33(d)).
Chervon’s request has largely been mooted by Plaintiffs’
supplemental responses made after its motion was filed. Those responses
now incorporate specific Bates references for all responsive documents.
(Docket #185 at 21–23). Without deciding whether a party must always
supply Bates numbers to comply with Rule 33(d), the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ compliance with Chervon’s request in this regard moots this
portion of Chervon’s motion.2
This leaves the second of Chervon’s complaints—that Plaintiffs
should provide additional narrative response to the parts of these
interrogatories that cannot be answered by producing documents.
According to Chervon, these include the portions of these requests that
seek “information regarding Plaintiffs’ first awareness of alleged
infringement, identification of most knowledgeable persons, and
contentions [that] cannot be determined by reference to documents
alone.” (Docket #196 at 12).
The Court finds Chervon’s position unconvincing. Chervon offers
no more than a perfunctory suggestion that further supplementation is

In their supplemental responses, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference their
earlier responses, apparently for the sake of completeness. See, e.g., (Docket #1864 at 14–18). Chervon continues to complain about this, asserting that because the
prior responses contain references to documents identified only by metadata tags
and not Bates numbers, Plaintiffs might rely on metadata tags in future citations.
(Docket #196 at 12). The Court does not share Chervon’s fear, particularly in light
of Plaintiffs’ willingness to provide the relevant Bates numbers.
2

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needed. It gives no insight into what more it expects to see in Plaintiffs’
response or why Plaintiffs’ existing narratives and objections are
inadequate. For instance, after the parties’ meet-and-confer in late March
but prior to Chervon’s motion, Plaintiffs supplemented their original
response to Interrogatory No. 3, which seeks their contentions about
Chervon’s willful infringement, with a narrative response. (Docket #186-4
at 16–17). Chervon does not set forth specific challenges to this
supplemental response.
Similarly, with respect to Interrogatory No. 7, which requests
information about the tests and methodologies employed to find that the
accused products meet the 20 Amp Limitation, Plaintiffs’ post-motion
supplemental response objects to parts of the interrogatory and references
their response to Interrogatory No. 1, which in turn explains the tests
Plaintiffs performed. Id. at 6–10, 26–28. Absent some explanation why this
supplemental response is itself inadequate, the Court finds no basis to
compel further responses. See Design Basics, Inc. v. Granite Ridge Builders,
Inc., No. 1:06-CV-72, 2007 WL 1830809, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 21, 2007)
(party seeking discovery has the burden to show that the response is
evasive or incomplete) (citing James Wm. Moore, 7 Moore’s Fed. Prac. §
37.05[5] (3d ed.)). This is especially appropriate where Chervon has not
shown why following Plaintiffs’ references to other interrogatory
responses, such as Interrogatory No. 3 pointing to Interrogatory No. 10,
fails to compensate for a lack of detail in the response at issue. Compare
(Docket #186-4 at 15–17), with (Docket #186-5 at 8–11).3
3

For Interrogatory No. 3 in particular, the Court notes that nowhere in

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Likewise, although Plaintiffs provided little narrative response to
Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 6, id. at 19–26, Chervon does not claim that
Plaintiffs’ extant responses, references to other responses, or objections to
providing additional narrative are without merit, id. at 19–22.
Interrogatory No. 5 seeks information about when Plaintiffs first learned
of the alleged infringement and what testing was initially done, while
Interrogatory No. 6 asks Plaintiffs to explain their contentions supporting
their request for pre-suit compensatory damages, including when
Plaintiffs provided notice to Chervon of the patents-in-suit and how
Plaintiffs and their licensees complied with the marking requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 287. Id. Faced with Chervon’s conclusory request, the Court
will not try to speculate as to what more it wants or whether any valid
objections stand in the way. Thus, the Court finds that Chervon’s motion
as to these aspects of these interrogatories is without merit.
2.3

Interrogatory No. 6

Chervon next raises a separate deficiency in Plaintiffs’ response to
Interrogatory No. 6. As noted above, that interrogatory seeks information
about Plaintiffs’ claim for pre-suit damages, including details regarding
Plaintiffs’ licensees marking their products with the patents-in-suit.
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 287, a plaintiff can recover pre-suit damages only

Plaintiffs’ response to that interrogatory, nor in the referenced response to
Interrogatory No. 10, do Plaintiffs actually identify the persons most
knowledgeable about the subject matter of Interrogatory No. 3, as it requests. But
again, Chervon does not take the time to demonstrate to the Court why this sort
of information is not subject to one of Plaintiffs’ objections or covered in an
existing response—including that this will be the subject of expert discovery. The
Court will not analyze these matters sua sponte.

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when a licensee selling the product consistently and continuously marks it
with the applicable patent. Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,
24 F.3d 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Chervon asserts that Plaintiffs have refused to provide marking
information about their licensees. (Docket #178 at 15). Plaintiffs say that in
between the meet-and-confer and the filing of the instant motion, they
supplemented this response to provide the necessary information. (Docket
#185 at 24–26). That supplemental response concedes that Plaintiffs and
their licensees did not mark products embodying the ‘173 and ‘510
patents, (Docket #186-4 at 24),4 and it references a September 2015
declaration by Elizabeth Egasti Miller (“Miller”), General Counsel to
Plaintiff Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, that explains that Plaintiffs’
licensees were required by contract to mark relevant products with the
‘290 patent, (Docket #91-36). Chervon believes that this supplemental
response is still inadequate as to the ‘290 patent, since the Miller
declaration only shows that Plaintiffs’ licensees were obligated under their
licensing agreements to mark the products, not whether, when, and how
the products were actually marked. (Docket #196 at 10–11).
The Court agrees with Chervon that Miller never describes how
and when products were marked, only that licensees were supposed to be
marking and that Plaintiffs monitored their licensees to ensure that this
was occurring. See (Docket #91-36 ¶¶ 12–17). However, the Court sees no

Plaintiffs maintain that they are nevertheless entitled to pre-suit damages
because Chervon had actual notice of its infringement of these patents, (Docket
#185 at 26 n.9), but the merit of this contention is irrelevant to resolving the
present discovery dispute.
4

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reason to compel a further response to the interrogatory at this time.
Plaintiffs are well aware of their burden to prove that marking occurred as
required by Section 287, see (Docket #185 at 25); if they believe the Miller
declaration is sufficient to meet their burden, that is their choice.
Moreover, Chervon did not explain whether the numerous documents
referenced in this response, (Docket #186-4 at 25–26), fill in this possible
gap left by Miller’s declaration. As a result, the Court will deny the motion
with respect to this aspect of Interrogatory No. 6.
2.4

Interrogatory No. 9

Finally, there is Interrogatory No. 9, which requests Plaintiffs to
provide their damages contentions, including the theory of damages and a
calculation thereof. The request further seeks analysis of the bases for
Plaintiffs’ damages, depending on what type of damages theory is used—
e.g., lost profits, reasonable royalty, or both. Finally, the interrogatory asks
Plaintiffs to state whether they seek pre-judgment interest and, if so, the
rate and how the rate was determined.
Plaintiffs originally objected and provided no substantive response,
claiming that they would “provide information in response to this
Interrogatory and expert disclosures in accordance with the form and
timing required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the applicable
Orders set by the Court.” (Docket #186-5 at 7). Chervon says that it needs
the factual bases for Plaintiffs’ damages claims so that it can engage in
expert discovery on those issues. (Docket #178 at 15). Plaintiffs assert that
Chervon’s interrogatory essentially seeks their damages expert report
before the expert disclosure deadline. (Docket #185 at 26). Nevertheless,

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they provided a supplemental response after Chervon’s motion was filed
which references specific Bates-numbered documents supporting their
claimed damages, including documents related to Plaintiffs’ licensing
agreements, its sales and financial data, and Chervon’s sales and financial
data. Id. at 27; (Docket #186-5 at 7–8). Plaintiffs maintain that any further
specificity about their method for calculating damages is reserved for
expert discovery. (Docket #185 at 27).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ supplemental response is mostly
sufficient. Plaintiffs have identified with specificity the documents
supplying the facts supporting their damages claim. Missing from their
response, however, is some basic identification of their damages theory.5
Although a precise assessment of how the facts connect to the applicable
legal standard or a calculation of the ultimate damages claims can await
expert analysis, the legal theory of damages is capable of identification
without the expert’s help. See Mobile Storage Tech., Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. C
09-03342 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 1292545, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010); see also
U.S. ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 538, 543–44 (N.D. Ill.
2005)

(observing

that

damages

contention

interrogatories

are

commonplace and appropriate under the liberal discovery Rules). This
was the reasoning of Robert Bosch, cited by Plaintiffs, which held that the
plaintiff need not provide a complex, multi-factor damages analysis
because
Plaintiffs note in the brief that they do not seek lost-profits damages.
(Docket #185 at 27). Although Plaintiffs do not say so expressly, this admission
leads the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs are proceeding under a reasonableroyalty theory, which requires analysis of the factors announced in Georgia Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5

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[d]isclosing damages amounts and the manner in which
those amounts were calculated requires too detailed of an
analysis and explanation for an interrogatory response.
Defendants have been placed on notice of the two damages
theories Bosch intends to pursue. The precise details of those
theories should be reserved for expert discovery[.]
Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On, Inc., No. 12-11503, 2013 WL 1703328, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2013); see also Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v.
Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893, 2004 WL 2108410, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
21, 2004) (in complex Securities Act case, defendants were entitled to learn
in a contention interrogatory the plaintiffs’ “general theory of damages”
and “documents demonstrating” those damages, but not “the exact
damages formula”). The same result should obtain here. Thus, the Court
will order Plaintiffs to further supplement their response to Interrogatory
No. 9 and identify their damages theory or theories.
3.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Chervon’s motion

to compel is in most respects without merit. However, the Court directs
Plaintiffs to supplement their response to Interrogatory 9 as explained
above within seven (7) days of this Order.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Chervon North America Inc.’s
motion to compel (Docket #177) be and the same is hereby GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part as stated herein; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall supplement their
response to Chervon’s Interrogatory 9, consistent with this Order, no later
than seven (7) days from the date of this Order.
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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 6th day of June, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

J.P. Stadtmueller
U.S. District Judge

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